POLITICS AS USUAL: FRANKLIN ROOSEVELT, THOMAS DEWEY, AND THE WARTIME PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN OF 1944
POLITICS AS USUAL: FRANKLIN ROOSEVELT, THOMAS DEWEY AND THE WARTIME PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN OF 1944

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By

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ABSTRACT

This dissertation examines the U.S. wartime presidential campaign of 1944. In 1944, the United States was at war with the Axis Powers of World War II, and Democrat Franklin D. Roosevelt, already serving an unprecedented third term as President of the United States, was seeking a fourth. Roosevelt was a very able politician and—combined with his successful performance as wartime commander-in-chief—waged an effective, and ultimately successful, reelection campaign. Republicans, meanwhile, rallied behind New York Governor Thomas E. Dewey. Dewey emerged as leader of the GOP at a critical time. Since the coming of the Great Depression—for which Republicans were blamed—the party had suffered a series of political setbacks. Republicans were demoralized, and by the early 1940s, divided into two general national factions: Robert Taft conservatives and Wendell Willkie “liberals.” Believing his party’s chances of victory over the skilled and wily commander-in-chief to be slim, Dewey nevertheless committed himself to wage a competent and centrist campaign, to hold the Republican Party together, and to transform it into a relevant alternative within the postwar New Deal political order. Often overlooked by historians, the low-key and “uninteresting” Dewey was an institutional preserver, opening the door to a Dwight Eisenhower presidency, and the “Modern Republicanism” of the 1950s. Unlike Taft (and Herbert Hoover before him), Dewey (and Eisenhower after him) tacitly condoned the basic New Deal reform structure. Though set against a backdrop of global war, the 1944 campaign was also an old-fashioned, free-swinging, partisan affair—including stump speeches, rallies and parades, radio and newspaper advertising, harsh rhetoric, and a near record voter turnout.
on Election Day. As an ordinary event in an extraordinary time, the 1944 campaign was a testimony to the strength of American democracy.
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Chapter One:  
Introduction

The United States was in the midst of a presidential election, and at war. The president was running for reelection, and his poll numbers were at an all time low. His challenger, an aloof, intelligent, and sophisticated Northeasterner, loathed the president, believing that the U.S. was “lied, not led into war,” and that the upcoming election was one between “competence and incompetent bungling.”1 The opposition party, selecting its nominee early in the election process, and without much fight, affirmed the need for partisanship and constructive, wartime criticism. The president, to the disbelief and anger of his critics, refused to acknowledge mistakes, and used his status as commander-in-chief to promote his candidacy—even addressing the nation from a battleship in the Pacific. He was, detractors charged, arrogant, deceitful, and reckless. He faltered before the media—fumbling his words, and appearing both agitated and distant. Investigations into the reasons for America’s entry into the war also abounded-- could the President have done something to prevent the attack on America just three years earlier? The President, meanwhile, hammered at his opponent’s vagueness and inconsistencies on policy issues—particularly as it related to foreign policy. “Let’s have an end to the shilly-shallying,” declared one of the President’s more vocal supporters. “Do you remember [the opposition] candidate as a courageous leader who took strong stands… Or do you remember him as an office seeker dealing in platitudes and sitting on the fence waiting to find out which way to jump? ... Can you afford to take a chance on a fence straddler with a record on foreign affairs like that… when your future and that of your children is at stake?”2 The United States was at a crossroads. Emotions were high, lines were drawn, the campaign was intense, and the year was 1944.
The election of 1944 was the first presidential election since 1864 to take place while the nation was at war. After a brief primary season, the Republican Party, in late June, settled upon New York Governor Thomas Edmund Dewey—the former District Attorney, and popular special prosecutor of Legs Diamond and Lucky Luciano—as its nominee for President of the United States. Dewey, aged forty-two, was the first presidential candidate to be born in the twentieth century. His running mate was the conservative Governor of Ohio, John W. Bricker. The Democratic nominee for President was the three-term incumbent, sixty-two year-old Franklin Delano Roosevelt. Though there was little doubt about Roosevelt seeking a fourth term, much speculation existed concerning his choice for a running mate. Vice President Henry Wallace was widely unpopular among party elites, especially those from the South, who objected to his liberal views on race, and who feared that Roosevelt—rumored to be deteriorating in health—might not survive a fourth term. In the end, Democratic professionals replaced Wallace with Senator Harry S. Truman of Missouri. Sensitive to the wartime setting of the election, both Roosevelt and Dewey—early in their campaigns—adopted dignified and low-key electoral strategies. By late September, however, “politics as usual” returned, as the campaign degenerated into a “free-swinging” partisan affair, characterized by political “body punches and head-rocking.” On Election Day, despite polls indicating a race too close to call, the Roosevelt-Truman ticket received fifty-three percent of the popular vote, and 432 electoral votes. Still, this was the closest presidential election since Woodrow Wilson’s upset over Charles Evans Hughes in 1916. A shift of only 500,000 votes in the right states would have given Dewey an Electoral College win, and the White House.
Though it took place in wartime and was extremely close, the 1944 election has interested few scholars. There are several reasons for this neglect. One is that it does not conform to what Harvard political scientist V.O. Key described in the 1950s as a “critical election.”

“According to Key, critical elections have occurred periodically in American history, generating high levels of voter interest, upsetting the previous balance of power among competing parties, and producing durable changes in the compositions of the voter coalitions supporting each party.” Examples of such elections include 1860, 1896, and 1936. By this standard, then, 1944 was a not a “critical election,” but a mere “maintaining election” that resulted in neither a transfer of power nor a major realignment in voter allegiance.

A second reason is that the relevance of the American presidential campaign in general has come under attack in recent decades from both historians and political scientists. With the rise of “new history”—characterized by an emphasis on the experience of ordinary Americans, quantification and cultural analysis, and the eclipse of conventional political and intellectual history—many historians, by the 1970s, began to dismiss presidential elections studies as narrow, elitist, and ill-equipped to examine those changes—such as family, environment, and social beliefs—that have most affected the human condition. “The old ‘presidential synthesis’—which understood the evolution of American society chiefly via presidential elections and administrations—is dead (and not lamented),” historian Eric Foner declared in the early 1990s. Similarly, many political scientists have, since the 1940s, argued against dwelling on “campaign effects”—those twists and turns of candidate strategies, endorsements, and appearances that “impact” elections. “Voters are not fools,” V.O. Key once observed, and neither are they
"straitjacketed by social determinants or moved by unconscious urges triggered by devilishly skillful propagandists." Instead, they are retrospective: “As voters mark their ballot they may have in their minds impressions of the last television spectacular of the campaign, but, more important, they have in their minds recollections of their experiences of the past four years.” Meanwhile, those voters who are not retrospective, are loyal partisans instead, and will not be swayed regardless. By the 1990s, retrospective issue voting had given birth to the “theory of the predictable campaign.” Presidential campaigns, this view holds, are not only limited, but also—through an examination of the state of the election year economy and incumbent approval ratings—predictable, and thus irrelevant. Though their approaches are different, the conclusions of many historians and political scientists are fundamentally the same—i.e. presidential campaigns matter very little. It is the purpose of this study, focusing on the 1944 presidential election, to refute these notions.

A “political campaign” is multi-dimensional in nature, and thus subject to a variety of definitions and interpretations. For example, it can mean the spring and summer primary election contests that result in the nomination of a candidate, or it can mean only the fall campaign—that period between the summer nominating conventions and the November election—or it can simultaneously refer to both. These spectacles include smiling candidates, camera flashes, balloon drops, parades, cross-country stump speeches, ill-tempered reporters, mass advertising, and, in more recent years, televised debates. In addition, “campaign” can refer to a “permanent” presence of electoral preparation and positioning. While presidential elections occur every four years, their campaigns in some form are perpetually in progress. “Even before an election is over, speculation begins
about who might make the run in the next election or even in the one after that. Every major policy decision, every triumph or misstep by a national politician is read in the context of its implications for the next presidential election, and every act of every prominent politician is interpreted as politically calculated to achieve the upper hand in the next campaign.”¹¹ Finally—in a more abstract sense-- a “campaign” is a conversation. As Roderick P. Hart, Professor of Government at the University of Texas in Austin, argues in *Campaign Talk: Why Elections Are Good for Us* (2000), campaigns are collections of words and that words-- all by themselves-- are important: “If we are patient enough to examine [words] carefully, if we are willing to look for connections among them, much can be learned. Much can be learned because people treat their words casually, as if they were no more substantial than gossamer, irrelevant to the relations they share with one another. But even a moment’s reflection finds this is a canard... By choosing one word a speaker decides not to use another, thereby creating a sociolinguistic map that can be read.”¹²

Thomas M. Carsey, in an excellent analysis of gubernatorial races entitled *Campaign Dynamics* (2001), adds that “Central to the unfolding of a campaign is the struggle between candidates to provide new information to voters. Candidates shape the information context within which voters make their decisions by battling to influence what is salient to voters when they cast their ballots. Through this process, the content of campaigns influences voting behavior.”¹³ *Campaigns, then, are rivaling stories about the past, present, and future.* While the information voters have prior to the beginning of a campaign will influence their voting behavior, voters do not possess complete information. “Incomplete information creates uncertainty in the electoral process, and
candidates try to reduce that uncertainty by providing additional information to voters over the course of a campaign."\textsuperscript{14} The result is what Carsey calls “heresthetic change”—i.e. changing the nature of the “issue space” for voters so they are encouraged to change which candidate they support. “The campaign becomes a struggle between candidates providing information to voters as they try to define for voters the important issues in that particular election.”\textsuperscript{15} The following study seeks to consider “campaign” in all its political dimensions.

The American presidential election campaign matters. From the perspective of history as a discipline, presidential campaigns—swirls of issues, events, people, and words—have the potential to constitute what historian Alan Brinkley has described as an “important frontier” between great public events and the less visible social phenomena that form their context.\textsuperscript{16} The actual history of presidential campaigns, meanwhile, has valuable light to shed on political scientists’ understanding of “campaign theory.” For example, most advocates of the predictable campaign theory, dismiss (predictably) Carsey’s above arguments on the grounds that heresthetic change (1) cannot compete with the retrospective voter’s own experiences with issues, and (2) is inherently limited by the existence of partisanship. This view, however, fails to consider non-voters. Non-voters are usually this way because they are uninspired, uninformed, and uninterested. If a campaign can connect to the culture in such a way-- as 19\textsuperscript{th} century presidential campaigns did—so as to relate to and involve citizens—generating passion about issues, candidates, and even parties—it can inspire “new voters” to go to the polls. Finally, campaigns matter substantively—i.e. they are, quite literally, “the pulse of our
They are, Lyndon Johnson once observed, “a blur, a whirlwind, an excitement—frustrating, exhilarating, exhausting, and necessary [italics added].”

Specifically, the presidential election of 1944 is worthy of serious examination for at least seven reasons. First, it was a wartime presidential campaign. The United States has experienced few such contests. In fact, 1944 was only the third in U.S. history up to that time—1812 and 1864 being the other two. Since 1944, there have been four: 1952 and Korea, 1968 and Vietnam, 1972 and Vietnam, and 2004 and Iraq. In 1944, the United States was at war against the Axis Powers of World War II: Germany, Italy, and Japan.

Second, it was an ordinary election during an extraordinary time. While the United States was fighting a global war, over forty-seven million Americans participated in free and fair elections at home. It was an incredible testimony of the power of American democracy.

Third, the 1944 election embodied the principle and practice that candidates actually campaign for the office. Throughout most of American history, stumping for the presidency was considered vulgar. In 1896, Democrat William Jennings Bryan broke with precedent, and campaigned openly for the job, traveling over 18,000 miles and averaging 80,000 words per day. He lost. Traditional sensibilities lingered into the early decades of the twentieth century, as candidates such as Theodore Roosevelt, Woodrow Wilson, and James Cox tried to find an uneasy balance between tradition and modern campaigning with modern democratic demands. During the 1930s, Franklin Roosevelt “helped propel the candidate toward the people. His three reelection bids capped the trend whereby Presidents campaigned. His four efforts, as well as those of his
opponents, helped settle the century-long debate between active and passive candidacies. Henceforth all nominees, challengers and incumbents, would campaign energetically.19

Fourth, it witnessed the beginning of a nonpartisan, or “at the water’s edge,” foreign policy that would last through the Cold War. Though specifics might be subject to debate, the basic contours—in this case (1944), the need to pursue the Axis nations to an “unconditional surrender,” and to create a postwar international organization to help keep the future peace—were never challenged.

Fifth, the 1944 election coincided with rising suspicions of the Soviet Union. As the campaign made clear, there existed within the United States a definite (and growing) anticommunism that—coupled with Stalin’s postwar rhetoric and aggression—contributed to the Cold War. Contrary to popular belief, there existed in wartime America great concern over communism. In fact, the roots of “McCarthyism” were not in the deterioration of U.S.-Soviet relations after World War II, but in conservative wartime fears of an emerging New Deal/military super-state.

Sixth, 1944 was the last time the “Solid South” voted solidly Democratic. There were deep and growing divisions among Democrats over race and the New Deal (especially in the South) in 1944, and Roosevelt, due to tremendous personal appeal, the war, and concessions to conservatives, was able to keep the party together one last time. He died in April 1945, and never again would Democrats be able to take the South for granted, and never again would they overwhelmingly carry the region.20

The reemerging Republican majority of the late 20th century was grounded largely in a divided postwar Democratic Party. The seeds of that division were sown in 1944 over reform, race and communism. Central to this Democratic divide—as it related to
communism--were two key players in the presidential election of 1944: Henry Wallace and Harry Truman. Though the lines between the two men were not that stark in 1944 (when Truman was still an unknown senator from Missouri), the dumping of Wallace as vice president and the selection of Truman as his replacement marked an important watershed in Democratic Party history. By 1948, Wallace had come to represent the small number of liberals willing to accept American Communist Party leader Earl Browder’s vision of party and international cooperation. Harry Truman, in contrast, had become the champion of not only anti-communist liberals, such as historian Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. and Protestant theologian Reinhold Niebuhr, but also mainstream “Roosevelt Democrats,” such as actor Ronald Reagan, who believed that the defeat of Nazism had cleared the way “for the rise of a new, more menacing threat to the principles of liberty and democracy—the Soviet Union.”

And seventh, 1944 was important in that it maintained “politics as usual” in the sense that the traditional American two-party system--on the verge of collapse--was preserved. Instrumental in saving the two-party system was “moderate” Republican Thomas E. Dewey of New York. By 1944, the Republican Party, despite modest rebounds in the 1938 and 1942 midterm elections, was in critical shape. Saddled with the blame for the Great Depression, and unable to articulate a clear and positive vision for economic recovery, Republicans witnessed their power--and majority status--diminish at all levels of government throughout the 1930s. Furthermore, the party lacked serious and popular direction, and by 1944, in the midst of World War II, was weak, fragmented, and in danger of extinction.
It was in that context the 1944 election campaign unfolded. Though few, including Dewey, expected the GOP to defeat an incumbent in wartime, the goal for many Republican leaders was to revitalize the party. This was especially true of Dewey, who did win the GOP nomination that year, and who passionately believed that the two party system was in danger of collapsing. He became the face of the Republican Party, and remained so throughout the 1940s and early 1950s and was the vehicle for party change, unity, and, ultimately, success. He was something that Roosevelt’s other Republican opponents, including Wendell Willkie, were not, and that was a party builder. Ever the pragmatist, he accepted the social welfare legislation of the New Deal, while simultaneously expressing devotion to basic party traditions and rhetoric. Ever the innovator, Dewey-- even before Pearl Harbor-- abandoned isolationism, and acknowledged America’s growing global responsibilities. Believing that without the existence of two or more internally diverse parties competing for support of the electorate and power in government, American liberties would be in danger, he chartered a cautious course and avoided extremes—particularly conservative ones. Not surprisingly this put him at odds with such GOP leaders as Senator Robert A. Taft of Ohio (and later Eugene McCarthy and Barry Goldwater). Dismissed by his critics as an opportunist, liberal, accommodator, Tory, and loser, Dewey nonetheless revitalized the Republican Party, and, in doing so, rescued the party from collapse, and laid the foundation for Republican presidential victories in the second half of the twentieth century. He was the youthful face of the party, and an essential transition or bridge between Hoover and Eisenhower.
Despite his own three unsuccessful campaigns for the presidency in the 1940s, Dewey rebuilt the party of Herbert Hoover to fit into, and to be a relevant alternative within, the post-World War II, New Deal political order. He sought not to roll back the New Deal, but to ensure (within a New Deal context) that America would continue it’s “pursuit of our bright ideal… our right to Freedom and the Pursuit of Happiness.” As Ford Bond, Dewey’s radio director in 1944 observed shortly after the election, when Dewey “advocated broadening and extending the benefits of social and economic legislation to more and more of our people [as he did in a speech in San Francisco that fall], he wasn’t saying ‘Elect a Republican administration and we will give you these [Democratic] things too.’ He was giving voice to the American ideal. He was saying, in effect, ‘You can have these things and Freedom too.’” The objective of Dewey, and all of those associated with him, Bond concluded, was to rebuild the Republican Party “to be worthy of national trust.” As such, Dewey was very much an institutional preserver, paving the way for Eisenhower and the “Modern Republicanism” of the 1950s. Indeed, Dewey was one of the more prominent GOP leaders to encourage an Eisenhower candidacy in 1952. Disturbed by McCarthyism, and dismayed by what he called Taft’s “stupid jackass idea” to, in 1951, oppose President Harry Truman’s plan to shift 70,000 American soldiers to Europe on the grounds that it might strain the national economy, Dewey repeatedly told journalists (beginning as early as October 1950) that he would recommend to his own New York delegation that “they support General Eisenhower for President.” Privately, he was in frequent conversation with Eisenhower, and was ultimately successful in appealing to the General’s sense of duty. As President from 1953 to 1961, Eisenhower
did not disappoint, accepting both the New Deal (while “holding the line” on spending) and an internationalist foreign policy. Though power struggles within the GOP did not end with the Eisenhower presidency, the party had nevertheless—through the efforts of moderates like Dewey—emerged from the very critical 1930s and 1940s, intact.
Chapter Two:  
The State of the Nation

War

It came literally from out of the blue. Shortly before 7:55 a.m., on 7 December 1941, a Japanese attack wave, consisting of 183 torpedo planes, dive bombers, level bombers, and fighters, appeared over an unsuspecting U.S. Pacific Fleet stationed at Pearl Harbor in Hawaii. There, on the island of Oahu, American sailors were sleeping, eating breakfast, and lounging on decks. It was a bright, clear and calm Sunday morning.

"Everything was perfect," Rear Admiral William Rea Furlong of the Oglala later recalled. The sun was shining, buglers were preparing to sound "To the Colors," and a church bell rang in the distance. Then the sounds of dive bombers, sirens, and explosions filled the air. As the first Japanese bombs fell, Fleet headquarters cabled the Navy Department in Washington: "Air Raid, Pearl Harbor—This is No Drill." In the nation’s capitol, where Secretary of Navy Frank Knox received the Fleet’s message, it was 1:20 p.m. Knox immediately telephoned President Franklin Roosevelt in the Oval Office and informed him of the attack. According to aide Harry Hopkins, who was in a meeting with the President at the time of Knox’s call, Roosevelt was calm, solemn, and even reflective. He discussed with Hopkins, in some detail, his administration’s efforts to keep the country out of the war, and then concluded that the matter was, due to Japan’s actions, out of his hands. Nearly thirty minutes later, the President informed Secretary of State Cordell Hull of the report, and called for a meeting of senior military and cabinet officials. Back at Pearl Harbor, the Japanese attack continued for nearly another two hours, until 9:45 a.m. The U.S. Pacific Fleet was shattered. Twenty-one ships, including
eight battleships, were either disabled or sunk. At Oahu’s airfields, 164 American planes were destroyed, and 128 damaged. Over 2,300 Americans were killed at Pearl Harbor, and over 1,100 more were wounded. The United States was at war.

World War II was the joining of two geographically separated armed conflicts. One originated in East Asia in 1937 from Japanese militarism, and the island nation’s hegemonic designs for Southeast Asia and the western Pacific. The other conflict began in 1939, with Nazi Germany’s invasion of Poland on 1 September, and the subsequent British and French declarations of war. Officially, the United States remained neutral during the first two years of the war, not entering the conflict until December 1941, when it was forced to do so in response to both the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and a German declaration of war. In reality, however, the United States had become an unofficial belligerent and ally of Great Britain in mid 1940, and by the fall of 1941, was engaged in an undeclared naval war with the Third Reich. “The fundamental reason for this shift in U.S. policy was the series of dramatic German military victories in the spring of 1940, culminating in the June conquest of France. The speed and totality of these victories... led many Americans to question their traditional belief that the Atlantic Ocean constituted a defensive moat that freed them from concern with the European balance of power and provided extensive time to prepare for any threat. German power now appeared to pose such a threat, one capable of crossing the Atlantic at will and easily defeating the meager U.S. military forces then in existence.”

Following Roosevelt’s election to an unprecedented third term in November 1940, the United States had moved slowly toward war with what it perceived to be the greatest threat to America: Germany. On 17 December 1940, the President, during a press
conference with reporters in the Oval Office, announced that there would be no slackening of America’s determination to assist the Allies. “Suppose my neighbor’s house catches fire,” he said, “and I have a length of garden hose four or five hundred feet away. If he can take my garden hose and connect it up with his hydrant, I may help him to put out the fire. Now what do I do? I don’t say to him before that operation, ‘Neighbor, my garden hose cost me $15; you have to pay me $15 for it.’ What is the transaction that goes on? I don’t want $15—I want my garden hose back after the fire is over…”4 With that story, Roosevelt introduced his concept of Lend-Lease assistance to the Allies. Explaining that Great Britain did not have the money to purchase essential materials, he asked Congress to rescind the cash provision of cash-and-carry, and permit the President to lend or lease supplies to any country whose defense was vital to the security of the United States. “In the face of great perils never before encountered,” Roosevelt declared during his Third Inaugural Address, “our strong purpose is to protect and to perpetuate the integrity of democracy.”5

The Lend-Lease bill generated much controversy. As the weeks passed, it became apparent that the country was divided on the issue without regard to party, profession, background, or creed. For example, James B. Conant, president of Harvard, insisted that “our only hope as a free people lies in a defeat of the Axis Powers.” Robert M. Hutchins of the University of Chicago, meanwhile, feared that ‘the American people are about to commit suicide.”6 Labor and business were also divided, as were the nation’s politicians. Among the country’s former presidential candidates, Democrats James Cox, John W. Davis, and Alfred Smith, and Republican Wendell Willkie, supported the bill, while Republican Alf Landon and Socialist Norman Thomas were firmly opposed.
Herbert Hoover, the only living ex-president, was also against the measure. Thomas E. Dewey of New York, a candidate for governor in 1942, and the frontrunner among Republican presidential contenders for 1944, called in January 1941, for “every possible aid to Great Britain short of war,” but clumsily added that the Lend-Lease Bill itself “would bring an end to free Government in the United States and would abolish Congress for all practical purposes.” Less than a month later, at a Lincoln Day dinner in Washington, Dewey—perhaps with eyes on a Gallup poll that showed 68% of Americans approved of the President’s plan—clarified his position, announcing: “I believe our party stands out almost unanimously for all-out aid to the heroic people of Britain. With some necessary reservations of power to the people through Congress, I am satisfied the House [Lend-Lease] Bill will be adopted. Speaking for myself alone, I hope it will be.” After much debate, Congress approved the measure, and Roosevelt signed it into law on 11 March 1941. “Through this legislation,” the President observed, “our country has determined to do its full part in creating an adequate arsenal of democracy.”

On 6 January 1941—as Lend-Lease began making its way through the legislative process—Roosevelt addressed a joint session of Congress, and enunciated what he called the “Four Freedoms” essential to any lasting postwar peace. These freedoms—freedom of speech and expression, freedom of worship, freedom from want, and freedom from fear (or war)—must be realized “everywhere in the world.” “Nazi forces,” the President said later at the annual White House Correspondents’ Association Dinner, “are not seeking mere modifications in colonial maps or in minor European boundaries. They openly seek the destruction of all elective systems of government on every continent.”
Liberty, as epitomized by the Four Freedoms, must be defended. Human rights must reign supreme. “The light of democracy must be kept burning.”

That spring, U.S. forces occupied Greenland and Iceland to keep them out of the hands of the Nazis. Simultaneously, the United States began to assist the British in tracking German submarines in the Atlantic. Then, on 10 August 1941, Roosevelt met with British Prime Minister Winston Churchill aboard a warship off the coast of Newfoundland to discuss joint military strategy, and to express their mutual vision of a postwar world. In their public statement following their conference, the two leaders announced the Atlantic Charter. Overall, they condemned aggression, affirmed the right of national self-determination, advocated freedom of the seas and liberal trading practices, and endorsed the principles of collective security and disarmament. The following month, a German submarine fired at an American destroyer (the Greer), and on 11 September, Roosevelt addressed the nation, and—in reviewing German attacks against American shipping on the high seas—denounced the Nazis as the “rattlesnakes of the Atlantic.” In addition, the President—explaining that “when you see a rattlesnake poised to strike, you do not wait until he has struck before you crush him”—announced a policy of “preemption,” authorizing naval patrols to shoot on sight all Axis vessels operating between the United States and Iceland:

Do not let us split hairs. Let us not say: ‘We will only defend ourselves if the torpedo succeeds in getting home, or if the crew and the passengers are drowned.’

This is the time for prevention of attack.

In the naval waters which we deem necessary for our defense, American naval vessels and American planes will no longer wait until Axis submarines lurking under the water, or Axis raiders on the surface of the sea, strike their deadly blow—first.
My obligation as President is historic; it is clear. It is inescapable. It is no act of war on our part when we decide to protect the seas that are vital to American defense. The aggression is not ours. Ours is solely defense.

But let this warning be clear. From now on, if German or Italian vessels of war enter the waters, the protection of which is necessary for American defense, they do so at their own peril.¹³

Then, in late October, the *Reuben James* was sunk by a German submarine, and 115 American sailors were lost. The U.S. was bracing itself for war with Germany. Then came Pearl Harbor.

At 2:28 p.m., Eastern Standard Time, on 7 December, Admiral Harold Stark telephoned Roosevelt and confirmed the attack at Pearl Harbor. The report was very preliminary, but he did convey to the President that the attack had been very severe, and that American lives had been lost. A few moments later, Roosevelt called Steve Early, the White House Press Secretary, and dictated a news release which Early was to immediately release to the press. At 3:00, the President met with Secretary Hull, Secretary Knox, Admiral Stark, and Army Chief of Staff, General George Marshall.

“*The conference,*” Harry Hopkins observed in his diary, “*met in not too tense an atmosphere because I think that all of us believed that in the last analysis the enemy was Hitler and that he could never be defeated without force of arms; that sooner or later we were bound to be in the war and that Japan had given us an opportunity. Everybody, however, agreed on the seriousness of the war and that it would be a long, hard struggle.*”¹⁴ One hundred miles away, at Pawling, New York, Thomas E. Dewey—serving his last month as New York’s District Attorney—was leaving a golf course when he received news of Pearl Harbor. “Well,” Dewey sighed, “it is a different world now.”¹⁵
Roosevelt woke at dawn on the morning of 8 December, and completed his draft of the message to Congress requesting a declaration of war against Japan. Outside the White House, a large crowd gathered in show of support. Occasionally, the people broke out in tune, singing “God Bless America,” “America the Beautiful,” “My Country ‘Tis of Thee,” and other patriotic songs. At 12:30 that afternoon, Roosevelt was driven in an open car down Pennsylvania Avenue to the Capitol Building. As he entered the House chamber, he was greeted by unanimous and thunderous applause. “Even his bitterest opponents now saw him as commander in chief of a wronged, righteous, and vengeful nation.” From the well of the House, he began: “Yesterday, December 7, 1941—a date which will live in infamy—the United States of America was suddenly and deliberately attacked by naval and air forces of the Empire of Japan.” The President spoke for only six minutes. His speech was solemn, “eloquent and powerfully delivered, capturing exactly the mood of his countrymen and their legislators.” After cataloguing Japan’s actions over the past several hours—including its attacks on Hong Kong, Guam, the Philippines, Wake Island, and Midway Island—Roosevelt braced the nation for war:

As Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy, I have directed that all measures be taken for our defense. Always will we remember the character of the onslaught against us. No matter how long it may take us to overcome this premeditated invasion, the American people in their righteous might will win through to absolute victory. I believe I interpret the will of the Congress and of the people when I assert that we will not only defend ourselves to the uttermost but will make very certain that this form of treachery shall never endanger us again. Hostilities exist. There is no blinking at the fact that our people, our territory and our interests are in grave danger.
With confidence in our armed forces—with the unbounding
determination of our people—we will gain the inevitable
triumph—so help us God.

I ask that the Congress declare that since the unprovoked and
dastardly attack by Japan on Sunday, December 7th, a state of war
has existed between the United States and the Japanese Empire.19

The assembly broke out in applause. There was no debate in Congress, and exactly two
and one-half hours later, the President signed the official declaration of war. Three days
later, on 11 December, Germany and Italy declared war on the United States.

On 1 January 1942, the Allied nations, including the United States, Great Britain, the
Soviet Union, and China, signed the Declaration of the United Nations, “pledging
themselves to military victory and the creation of a postwar world based on the principles
of the Atlantic Charter.”20 In an address to the nation a few weeks later, Roosevelt
reminded his countrymen that “This war is a new kind of war,” and then presented in
very clear terms the challenges the United States now faced:

The broad oceans which have been heralded in the past as our
protection from attack have become endless battlefields on which
we are constantly being challenged by our enemies.

We must all understand and face the hard fact that our job now
is to fight at distances which extend all the way around the globe.

We fight at these vast distances because that is where our
enemies are. Until our flow of supplies gives us clear superiority
we must keep on striking our enemies wherever and whenever we
can meet them, even if, for a while, we have yielded ground.
Actually we are taking a heavy toll of the enemy every day that
goes by.

We must fight at these vast distances to protect our supply lines
and our lines of communication with our allies—protect these lines
from the enemies who are bending every ounce of their strength,
striving against time, to cut them. The object of the Nazis and the
Japanese is to separate the United States, Britain, China, and
Russia, and to isolate them one from another, so that each will be
surrounded and cut off from sources of supplies and
reinforcements. It is the old familiar Axis policy of ‘divide and conquer.’

Victory would not be easy, the President insisted; it required “hard work and sorrow and blood.” Indeed, the entry of the United States into the war was followed by a series of stunning defeats in the Pacific. The Dutch East Indies, Singapore, Malaya, the Philippines, and Burma were all overrun by the Japanese war machine, and it appeared that India, New Zealand, and Australia might be next. The situation in North Africa and Europe, meanwhile, was just as bleak. By summer, the Nazis were advancing to positions within miles of the Suez Canal in Egypt, and were clamoring at the gates of Leningrad, Moscow and Stalingrad in the Soviet Union. Meanwhile, Americans at home were experiencing the “pinch of war” in shortages, rationing, higher prices, and long hours of work. Still, America’s first year of war was not without important successes. For example, at the Battle of Midway in June, the entire Japanese Air Fleet was devastated, and Japanese expansion was stopped. From this point on, Japan would be on the defensive. In the European Theater of Operations that November, the Allies launched Operation Torch against Nazi and Vichy forces in North Africa, resulting in a French surrender in Casablanca, Oran, and Algiers.

The year 1943 began with the Allies, at Casablanca, committing themselves to the elimination of German and Japanese war power, and to the “unconditional surrender” of Germany, Italy, and Japan. Slowly, the tide of war turned in favor of the Allies. In February, the Soviets broke the German siege at Stalingrad, and began to drive the Germans out of Russia. In May, Nazi forces were crushed in Tunisia, clearing the Mediterranean for Allied shipping and opening the door for Operation Husky, the
invasion of Italy, in July. Then, on 3 September, Italy surrendered unconditionally. In an address to the nation that summer on the situation in Italy, Roosevelt declared: “The massed, angered forces of common humanity are on the march... The first crack in the Axis has come.”24 In the course of the year, Samuel Rosenman, a speech writer for the President, later observed, “the ultimate outcome of the war became certain. The question at the end of 1943 was no longer whether the United Nations would win the war. The questions were when would they win, and could they, after they had won, win the peace?”25

Then on 6 June 1944 came the much anticipated Allied, D-Day invasion of “Fortress Europe”—the storming of the beaches at Normandy, and the opening of the so-called “Second Front.” It was the last major military event to take place before the party conventions convened in Chicago that summer. Though an Allied success—Germany began a slow retreat across northern France-- over 4,000 young Americans had been killed in a single day.26 In a powerful address broadcast over radio, Roosevelt, in a message he composed himself, led the nation in prayer. He prayed:

Almighty God: Our sons, pride of our Nation, this day have set upon a mighty endeavor, a struggle to preserve our Republic, our religion and our civilization, and to set free a suffering humanity.... They will need Thy blessings. Their road will be long and hard. The enemy is strong. He may hurl back our forces. Success may not come with rushing speed, but we shall return again and again; and we know that by Thy grace, and by the righteousness of our cause, our sons will triumph...

For these are men are men lately drawn from the ways of peace. They fight not for the lust of conquest. They fight to end conquest. They fight to liberate. They fight to let justice arise, and tolerance and good will among all Thy people. They yearn but for the end of battle, for their return to the haven of home...

With Thy blessing, we shall prevail over the unholy forces of our enemy. Help us to conquer the apostles of greed and racial arrogancies.
Lead us to the saving of our country, and with or sister nations into a
world unity that will spell a sure peace—a peace invulnerable to the
scheming of unworthy men. And a peace that will let all men live in
freedom, reaping the just rewards of their honest toil.

Thy will be done, Almighty God.

Amen.27

Though Roosevelt’s prayer was well received—it was published in pamphlet form later
that year—not all sentiment coming into the White House was positive, as a letter, dated
7 June, from a resident of Braintree, Massachusetts, made perfectly clear:

My dear President:

… What insanity this war is, to drag our country in to save the British
Empire.
The American people will never forgive you for the deaths, maimed
and insane boys you are directly responsible for.

What are our war aims and what are we fighting for? Our finish will
come when we go bankrupt, total Chaos and Revolution all because a
willful President planned it that way.

God help you on Nov. 7th [Election Day]. Hope you can take the
humiliation without committing suicide.28

The end of the war was now clearly in sight.

The Home Front

The Second World War was a watershed event in American history. “Socially,
politically, economically, militarily, culturally, racially, sexually, demographically, even
mythologically, World War II,” journalist Haynes Johnson wrote in 1995, “was the
crucible that forged modern America. It was the transforming event that reshaped all
who lived through it, and continues to affect those born after it.”29 During the war, the
nation was changed from one of want and Depression to one of opportunity and
prosperity. It was a time of government growth, economic planning, population movement, and social reordering. It was also, contrary to popular belief, a time not of universal harmony but of healthy national debate and partisan division. Change often required political response, which, in turn, frequently sparked controversies and partisan debates. The United States, for example, was unprepared for war in 1941. Yet plants would have to be built to manufacture war goods, supplies would have to be acquired to maintain those facilities, and workers would have to be found to operate those plants—all the while maintaining domestic levels of consumption. In addition, wages and prices had to be brought under control in order to avoid ruinous inflation, and money had to be found to finance the entire war mobilization and production process. These necessities were neither cheap nor easy, and thus triggered much partisan discussion.

Not surprisingly, some in politics and academia expressed reservations about democratic processes in time of war. For example, Albert Guerard, writing in *The New Republic* in early 1943, argued that “If we choose to retain partisan labels, the Democrats, still nominally in power, are bound to suffer heavily... For the Republicans will vote for all the essential war measures, and claim credit for their patriotism; but the Democrats alone will be blamed for the discomforts inevitably arising out of these measures.”\(^{30}\) The result, he predicted, would be a reaction at the ballot box in 1944 that would “engulf the Democratic Party, the New Deal, and with them much our recent social progress.”\(^{31}\) Others feared that partisanship, with its “party squabbles and politics in high places,” might undermine the war effort both at home and abroad. Harold W. Dodds, president of Princeton University, disagreed. Political parties, he argued in an article for *The Yale Review* in the summer of 1942, were essential to both political liberty and national unity.
“It is their struggles for power that activate government,” Dodds noted. “Freedom of speech or opinion would be in vain without them to implement our liberties. There appears to be no alternative to elections except tyranny.” Under the two-party system, he added, political parties tended to “dull the keen edges of issues on which people divide rather than to sharpen them by introducing new causes of disunity. It is in their interest to do so… Each side wants to gain the support also of the independent middle-of-the-road voters not affiliated with it. As the two parties bid for votes their programs naturally move to the centre.”32 Writing in his Marxist magazine, Politics, in early 1944, journalist Dwight Macdonald, meanwhile, argued that calls for national unity had dangerous implications, noting that “In the totalitarian nations politics has vanished completely, at least in the sense of open, institutionalized contests between various interest groups.” As long class societies exist, he concluded, the only hope of the submerged majority to change things for their good “will rest on political action, breaking through the fiction of organic unity between the lion and the lamb and setting class groups off openly against each other.”33

The war, of course, did not interrupt American politics. In fact, the war not only failed to bring about an end of partisan conflict, it also caused many new issues to emerge and altered existing political alignments.34 One issue of high political importance was regulation of the wartime economy. Though the Roosevelt administration had made preliminary efforts at war mobilization before Pearl Harbor, it was not until early 1942 that mobilization agencies were galvanized. That January the President created the War Production Board (WPB), which was designed to exercise general responsibility over the economy in order to effect conversion to war production, restrict nonessential economic
activity, and coordinate material and production priorities. The WPB proved to be a
disappointment to the administration. Headed by the mild-mannered and indecisive
Donald Nelson of Sears-Roebuck, the power of the WPB was very limited. It lacked,
among other things, authority over rubber and petroleum (which were placed instead
under independent “czars”), and labor (having to rely solely on incentives). In addition,
the army and navy continued to award contracts with little regard for available facilities
and the supply of labor and materials. The result was mass confusion and inefficiency.
After disastrous midterm elections for his party, Roosevelt, in early 1943, struck back,
establishing a number of “alphabet agencies”—including the Office of War Mobilization
(OWM)—and implementing the Controlled Materials Plan, which allowed the army and
navy to continue to award contracts but gave the WPB control of material allocations and
production schedules.

The Office of War Mobilization, headed by South Carolina Democrat (and former
Supreme Court justice) James F. Byrnes, culminated a four-year effort to organize
economic mobilization. Superimposed on existing organizations, the OWM had
policymaking authority, and, according to historian Allan Winkler, became a court of
final appeal when industrial arguments occurred. Byrnes, a skilled and restless
politician, assumed neither operating functions nor administrative chores. He was used
instead to employ his political savvy to provide needed coordination. Byrnes’s
appointment as Director of OWM conferred upon him greater authority than a President
had ever previously delegated. It gave him, as he later recalled, “power to originate
policies and lay out programs that would coordinate the work of all the war agencies and
federal departments in any way connected with the production, procurement,
transportation and distribution of both civilian and military supplies;” moreover, it gave him the power to ensure that decisions were carried out.\(^\text{37}\) He was so successful that he soon had an office in the White House and began being referred to as “assistant president.” In 1944, the OWM was succeeded by the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion (OWMR), also under Byrnes, which aimed to prepare for the end of the war and demobilization.

The Roosevelt administration also faced serious challenges with labor. “Soon after Pearl Harbor FDR negotiated a no-strike/ no-lockout agreement with unions and management and then established the National War Labor Board (NWLB) to head off labor strife that might impair the war effort.”\(^\text{38}\) The board was successful, imposing settlements in some 20,000 wage disputes affecting 20 million workers, and approving 415,000 wage agreements by war’s end in 1945. It also helped expand union membership and assisted workers in winning better working conditions and higher wages. Due to these things—not to mention old-fashioned patriotism following Pearl Harbor—strikes and stoppages fell off sharply in 1942. However, many workers and unions still had real grievances. Wages, for example, continued to lag behind prices and profits. Also, manpower controls prevented some workers in specified jobs from seeking better positions and higher salaries elsewhere.\(^\text{39}\) Since union leaders enjoyed their “team” status with the administration—as well as fear of appearing unpatriotic—they rarely sanctioned strikes, thus opening the door to a number of “wildcat” strikes after 1942.

The New Deal and America’s entry into the Second World War also constituted a major turning point in American race relations. During the course of the 1930s and 1940s, black expectations (and power) rose, while white hostility in some quarters
outside the South slowly diminished. In 1932, Franklin Roosevelt became the first Democrat since Franklin Pierce in 1852 to win the presidency with a majority of the popular vote. That majority, however, did not include blacks, most of whom still voted—if at all—Republican. Though FDR did not push for civil rights legislation, he did, during his first term, ensure black representation in such New Deal programs as the WPA. During the 1936 campaign, Roosevelt provided token representation for blacks at the DNC, and even allowed some blacks leaders to be photographed with him. On election night 1936, Roosevelt won anywhere from 60 to 250% more votes in black neighborhoods in major cities than in 1932. For the first time, then, blacks voted overwhelmingly for the Democratic Party, and became a part of the Roosevelt coalition.40

Though blacks had supported Roosevelt in record numbers in his landslide 1936 victory, very little concerning race changed in the administration, and the Democratic Party—as revealed by its failure to adopt a civil rights plank in its party platform in 1940—seemed slow, if not unwilling, to move on civil rights. Furthermore, in the spring of 1940, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People began pushing for an end of discrimination in the armed services. Though the President did respond—directing the War Department that September to release a statement that “colored men will have equal opportunity with white men in all departments of the Army,” and that blacks, formerly limited to labor battalions, be given “proportionate shares in all branches of the Army, in the proper ratio to their population”—he did not address the issue of desegregation in the armed forces.41 In fact, Roosevelt, relenting to pressure from conservatives in the War Department, reneged on a promise made to NAACP leaders, and backed away from the controversy, releasing instead a statement in October 1940
announcing that the armed services’ policy on blacks would remain the same—i.e. they were “not to intermingle colored and white personnel in the same regimental organizations.”

Meanwhile, Republican presidential nominee, Wendell Willkie actively sought black support. In the party platform, drafted in Philadelphia that summer, Willkie presided over the drafting of the strongest civil rights plank in American history up to that time. Republicans supported federal anti-lynching legislation and protection of blacks’ right to vote. Furthermore, Republicans promised to end discrimination in civil service, army, navy, and all other branches of the government. Fearful of losing black support (yet mindful of divisions within his own party), the President announced the creation of the U.S. Office of Education to oversee a nondiscriminatory policy for its defense training program, and in October, he released to the press plans for a new Air Corps unit for blacks at Tuskegee. Still, he had backed away from complete desegregation of the armed forces. Hurrying to save face, Roosevelt, just two weeks before the 1940 presidential election, agreed to make a series of appointments that would demonstrate his desire to end discrimination in the military. He announced the promotion of Colonel Benjamin O. Davis, the only African-American of that rank in the regular Army, to Brigadier General. In addition, the President appointed the NAACP’s William Hastie as Civilian Aide to the Secretary of War, and he created a special post of Negro Advisor to the Director of Selective Service, to be filled by Campbell Johnson.

Although the President carefully avoided publicly condemning Jim Crow in the defense program, his concessions to the black leadership accelerated the train of events propelling civil rights to the fore as a national issue. Never before had the movement
been able to force the President to respond so directly to it demands. Roosevelt won that November, and with many middle-class whites and farmers returning to the Republican fold, blacks were optimistic since their support would be all the more important. Indeed, Roosevelt owed his narrow victories in Illinois, Kentucky, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Tennessee, to black support. To keep the pressure on the Administration, the NAACP—well aware now of its importance to the administration and electoral victories—organized a March-on-Washington Movement for 1941, to stop discrimination in the armed services. In late June, the President issued Executive Order 8802, stipulating that all employers, unions, and government agencies concerned with vocational training must provide for the full and equitable participation of all workers in defense agencies, without discrimination. To administer the ruling, Roosevelt established a Committee on Fair Employment Practices (FEPC) to investigate complaints. Hailing this as a second Emancipation Proclamation, black leaders called off the march.

According to historian Harvard Sitkoff, Executive Order 8802—though failing to live up to black demands for total desegregation of the armed forces—represented “an uncompromised victory for black protest” and unleashed a “greater militancy that would accelerate the fight to bring civil rights to the fore as a major national concern.” “Now is the time for action,” demanded the black Pittsburgh Courier, while the Norfolk Journal and Guide insisted that “This is no time to be conservative...There never was a time in the history of the United States when Negroes were more united concerning the impact of segregation on their lives.” “We are not exaggerating,” the Defender warned white America on the eve of Pearl Harbor, “when we say that the American Negro is damned tired of spilling his blood for empty promises of better days.” Then, in early 1944, a
group of prominent black intellectuals led by Rayford Logan (and including the aged W.E.B. DuBois) published a collection of essays under the title, *What the Negro Wants*. Though the authors came from a variety of ideological backgrounds—conservative, liberal, and radical—they all agreed that segregation must end, and that democracy, equality, freedom, and human rights be provided for all in America. In a 2001 reprint edition of Logan’s book, Kenneth Robert Janken, a history professor at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, added that the importance of the collection was in the fact that “liberal” white Southerners had previously (and successfully) argued that they knew best how to handle race relations and that the only alternative to their “mild” form of segregation was that of race haters like the Ku Klux Klan. The appearance of a broad-based black intellectual and political movement organized against segregation, seriously undermined the Southern race liberals’ moral authority, and ultimately opened the door for the *Brown* decision of 1954.

That same year, the publication of the Swedish economist Gunnar Myrdal’s *An American Dilemma* also generated controversy. In 1938, the Carnegie Corporation commissioned Myrdal to direct a two-year study on the segregation regime in the American Deep South. The result was *An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and Modern Democracy*, published in two volumes in 1944. According to Myrdal, all Americans, even poor, uneducated, white Southerners, possessed within them a commitment to “the American Creed”—those values that include liberty, equality, justice, and opportunity for everyone. Unfortunately, unreasoning prejudice corrupted the white mind and undermined that creed. The American dilemma in race, then, was the conflict between high democratic values on the one hand and discriminatory behavior on
the other. Myrdal was optimistic, however. “People,” he wrote, “want to be rational, and they want to feel that they are good and righteous. They want to have the society they live in, and their behavior in this society, explained and justified to their conscience.” Due to education and the experiences of World War II, their attitudes and behavior were being torn to pieces, and recognized as marks of ignorance. The war was changing America. It could not fight and defeat oppression abroad, only to allow discrimination to continue at home. World War II was about the “American Creed”—democracy and freedom—being spread around the world. The world was changing because of America, he concluded, and because of the war, America too was changing. Though naïve and overly optimistic—he believed that “Negro advancement” would break down discrimination more or less automatically without violent reaction—Myrdal’s work was nevertheless influential in shaping opinion around the country concerning the issue of “inferiority.” Blacks, Myrdal argued, were not inferior to whites, but only appeared to be, and that their condition was wholly and completely a product of race prejudice and the consequent disabilities inflicted on them by whites. The articulation of that argument played an important role in undermining segregation in the United States—to the point that when the U.S. Supreme Court overturned “Separate But Equal” in Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka (1954), the Court made reference to Myrdal and An American Dilemma.

Wartime America was also a time of migration—by war’s end, one in every five Americans had relocated. Eight million moved permanently to different states, half of those to different regions. One migratory stream traveled from south to north, while another flowed from east to west. The populations of Washington, Oregon, and
California exploded. By 1950, the population of California was 72% greater than it was in 1940. Thousands of workers poured into the great metropolitan centers of defense production—Detroit, Pittsburgh, Chicago, San Diego, Los Angeles, Oakland, Portland, and Seattle. “In a harbinger of postwar social geography they settled disproportionately not in the central cities but in the newly burgeoning suburbs, which grew at nearly three times the rate of traditional urban cores.”

This mass movement of people significantly influenced and altered the American wartime experience. The nation was in a state of incredible change and uncertainty—a state that one contemporary described as a “journey through chaos.”

In the port city of Mobile, Alabama, for example, novelist John Dos Passos noted in 1943 that the city was outgrowing itself and undergoing tremendous change. According to Dos Passos, every other man in Mobile seemed to be in work clothes, while the women wore slacks and overalls. Furthermore, the sidewalks were crowded and the gutters stacked with litter. Garbage cans overflowed, and the grass in peoples’ yards was trampled. The town was spilling into the country, as farmlands were converted into residential areas. Meanwhile, the country was pouring into the town, as white families moved from farm to factory in search of better economic opportunities. Mobile was a wonder land to these country folk, many of whom had never experienced electricity and running water. There were street cars and busses, and electric street lights. The city also, Dos Passos concluded, offered boundless opportunity for sin. “Girls,” he observed, “can go to beauty parlors, get their nails manicured, buy readymade dresses. In the backwoods a girl who’s reached puberty feels she’s a woman. She’s never worried much about
restraining her feelings when she had any. Is it any wonder that they can’t stay home at dusk when the streets fill up with hungry boys in uniform?”

In Buffalo, New York, in 1943, journalist Agnes Meyer observed that the general atmosphere was similar to that of a Western mining town that had just struck gold. Due to the brand new war industries being opened in the area—including Bell Aircraft Corp—the demand for manpower was great. All sorts flocked to plants, and while many loved their work and felt patriotic pride, others, “thrown into the hurly-burly of a large-scale production, crowds, a strange environment, easy money, and temptations of every kind, are morally and mentally confused. Their lives have been turned upside down by night work. Housing conditions for the workers who have flocked to the city 30,000 strong are bad. They sleep in shifts as they work in shifts.” Furthermore, the family was altered. “Children, especially those in the teen age, run the streets at all hours because both parents work”—the result: rising delinquency. Married couples were often employed in different plants (or at least different parts of the same plant), and thus rode to work with another member of the opposite sex and worked with another member of the opposite sex. This—coupled with the emergence of women as financially independent—had led to what Meyer described as numerous “marital tangles.”

In Uniontown, Pennsylvania, in May 1943, coal miners were on strike because consumer costs were on the rise and because food rations were woefully insufficient, especially for workers involved in such hard manual labor. Meanwhile, Detroit, Michigan—where numerous white and black Southerners had migrated in search of jobs (including those in the police force)—became the scene of one of the worst race riots in
American history, resulting in $2 million worth of property damage, the deaths of twenty-five blacks and nine whites, and the injuring of over 800.

The Rise of Conservatism and Anti-Communism

These wartime changes to the home front—along with the Roosevelt administration’s responses—led to a conservative renaissance. By the early 1940s, with the election of Franklin Roosevelt to the presidency in 1932, and again in 1936 and 1940, conservatism—widely associated with individualism, isolationism, a reluctance to fight fascism, big business, and the past—was viewed by many Americans as “obsolete, impotent, [and] even quaint.” Scattered and few in number, American conservatives felt lonely, despised, and lost in “a boundless wilderness of collectivism.” Overall, they believed that the New Deal, along with the war, had brought a “domestic superstate, a partially controlled economy, millions of conscripts under arms, and widespread fears of reversion to depression once demobilization set in.” The future seemed bleak. As it turned out, the war years witnessed the emergence—or what Godfrey Hodgson called the “Headwaters”—of modern American conservatism.

In 1943, seventy-one-year-old Albert Jay Nock—elitist, pessimist, and libertarian—published Memoirs of a Superfluous Man, a critical, if indirect, assessment of the New Deal. Nock, a journalist and former Episcopalian minister, lamented the abandonment of the classics from public education, and concluded:

If [the current education system] had done nothing to raise the general level of intelligence, it had succeeded in making our citizenry more easily gullible. It
tended powerfully to focus the credulousness of *Homo sapiens* upon the printed word, and to conform him in the crude authoritarian or fetishistic spirit which one sees most highly developed, perhaps, in the habitual readers of newspapers. By being inured to taking as true whatever he read in his schoolbooks and whatever his teachers told him, he is bred to a habit of unthinking acquiescence, rather than to an exercise of such intelligence as he may have. In later life he puts this habit at the unreasoning service of his prejudices. Having not the slightest sense of what constitutes a competent authority, he tends to take as authoritative whatever best falls in with his own disorderly imaginings.

Thus a system of State-controlled compulsory popular instruction is a great aid in making *Homo sapiens* an easy mark for whatever deleterious nonsense may be presented to him under the appearance of authority. 54

Nock the classicist, the man of culture, became convinced that the masses could never be saved. A “Remnant,” however, could be. For in every age there existed a small Remnant of truly intelligent people; it was the task of each would-be Isaiah, alarmed at decay and impending doom, simply to preach. 55 Though Nock died two years later, a Remnant of sorts did find him. In fact, the years 1943 and 1944 witnessed the publication of six “remnant” books that were especially important in the development of postwar conservatism: Isabel Paterson’s *The God of the Machine* (1943), Ayn Rand’s *The Fountainhead* (1943), Garet Garrett’s *The Revolution Was* (1944), Friedrich A. Hayek’s *The Road to Serfdom* (1944), and Ludwig von Mises’s *Omnipotent Government* (1944) and *Bureaucracy* (1944). In one way or another, each of these writings represented a feeling in the United States that “mass society, bureaucracy, [and] mediocrity, were robbing the individual, as citizen, as employee, as consumer and human being, of individuality,” and freedom. 56

One of the most important “remnant” writings of World War II was Friedrich Hayek’s 1944 *The Road to Serfdom*. Hayek, an Austrian-born professor of economics at the London School of Economics, argued that economic planning—that is, “planning against
competition”—leads to dictatorship. “Economic control,” he wrote, “is not merely control of a sector of human life which can be separated from the rest; it is the control of the means for all our ends.” Whoever controlled the means also determined which ends were to be served, and which values were to be rated higher and lower—“in short, what men should believe and strive for.” Instead of collectivism, Hayek favored making “as much use as possible of the spontaneous forces of society, and resort as little as possible to coercion…” Thus individualism became the supreme value, and could not be “reconciled with the supremacy of one single person to which the whole of society must be entirely and permanently subordinated.”

Another important conservative critique of big government was Ludwig von Mises’s Omnipotent Government: The Rise of the Total State and Total War, also published in 1944. Von Mises, an Austrian economist living in the United States, argued that the roots of Nazi totalitarianism (and thus World War II) were grounded in the post-World War I German ideology of etatism (or “trend toward government control of business”). Nazism, he insisted, was a not a product of capitalism, but of government control. This control characterized Nazi Germany, and it was the quest to enhance that government control that led to war in 1939. “A nation’s policy, von Mises wrote, “forms an integral whole. Foreign policy and domestic policy are closely linked together; they are but one system; they condition each other.” Since the further a nation “goes on the road toward public regulation and regimentation, the more it is pushed toward economic isolation,” it should be no surprise that Nazi Germany sought Lebensraum and, ultimately, world hegemony. Its national sovereignty hindered by international division of labor and free
trade, Nazi Germany went on the attack, seeking to control all economies so as to be in control, and to not be challenged by free trade and democracy.58

Closely linked to conservative fears of rising bureaucracy and “omnipotent government” were American interpretations of “totalitarianism.” A state “based on a self-conscious ideology with both the desire and the ability to maintain absolute power and control over its politically fragmented population,” “totalitarianism” was an imported word from Europe that was first applied to Mussolini’s Italy, and then to Hitler’s Germany, in the mid-1930s. By the start of the Second World War in 1939, some anti-Communist observers (including liberals) in the United States began using the term “totalitarianism” to describe the Soviet Union, which, by that time, had signed a non-aggression pact with Hitler, and had participated in the invasion and division of Poland. According to historians Les Adler and Thomas Paterson, in an excellent 1970 essay on “The Merger of Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia in the American Image of Totalitarianism,” “Soviet secretiveness, censorship, unconcern for public opinion, purges, ideological purification, and frenzied denunciation of enemies in the 1930s seemed to echo characteristics of the Nazi regime.” Many Americans, then, blurred the ideological differences between Communism and fascism and tended to believe that totalitarian methods overrode the role of ideology in shaping political forms.” Thus, even after Hitler turned against Stalin in the summer of 1941, many Americans still viewed the two ideologies “as denials of human freedom and tolerance, saw Germany and Russia as international aggressors, and pictured Hitler and Stalin as evil comrades.” “The American people,” The Wall Street Journal observed that June, “know that the principal difference between Mr. Hitler and Mr. Stalin is the size of their respective mustaches.”
In a *Fortune* magazine poll conducted in October 1941, 35% of those surveyed thought Germany and the Soviet Union equally bad, while 32% believed that while there was not much choice between the two, the Soviet Union was slightly better. Roosevelt’s decision to extend lend-lease aid to the Soviet Union that fall (1941) was met with fierce opposition, especially from conservatives.⁵⁹

After the United States joined the war effort with Great Britain and the Soviet Union in December 1941, an effort was made by the administration, as well as those in academia and media, to stress “common cause” among the Grand Alliance. For example, James E. Davies, a friend of FDR and former U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union (1937-1938), argued in his 1941 *Mission to Moscow* that “the Russia of Lenin and Trotsky—the Russia of the Bolshevik Revolution—no longer exists.” Communism there had proven to be inefficient, and after a long and sometimes cruel process, the Soviet Union transformed into “a system of state socialism operating on capitalistic principles [which is] steadily and irresistibly swinging to the right.” Even if Communism did survive inside the Soviet Union, Davies concluded, it was not a threat to the United States. Stalin was neither a revolutionary nor a bloody tyrant—“A child would like to sit in his lap and a dog would sidle up to him”—but a leader attempting to create an egalitarian society in which all men would be governed according to ethical principles—“the same principle of the ‘brotherhood of man’ which Jesus preached.”⁶⁰ Similarly, Foster Rhea Dulles’s *The Road to Teheran: The Story of Russia and America, 1781-1943* (1944) attempted to demonstrate the absence of conflict between the two nations, as well as their common revolutionary pasts and anti-imperialism stands. Even Wendell Willkie, the Republican presidential nominee in 1940, wrote of a “new Russia” in his 1943
bestseller One World that would neither “eat us [nor] seduce us.” It was somewhat of an intellectual stretch, however, and many Americans—both liberal and conservative—continued to be skeptical of Communist Russia.

Not all Americans were so easily convinced “that the fires of war had purified the Stalinist dictatorship,” and demanded a more realistic view of the Soviet Union. This group was diverse (and relatively small) and included: William Henry Chamberlain, Eugene Lyons, and John Dewey. Meanwhile, a foreign book to have tremendous impact in the United States was Arthur Koestler’s novel Darkness at Noon, published in 1941. Koestler was a Hungarian and former Marxist, who became disillusioned by Stalin and the purges of the late 1930s. The book eventually went through several editions, and by the mid-1940s was an anticommunist classic. However, as historian John Lewis Gaddis observed in The United States and the Origins of the Cold War (1972), while “antipathy for communism remained strong within the United States throughout the war… Americans directed this hostility against their own communists, not Russian ones.”

Indeed, with the expansion of government power during the New Deal and World War II, some Americans became convinced that some form of collectivism, including communism, might develop indigenously in the United States. By 1944, with Earl Browder’s “nonpartisan” Communist Political Association’s endorsement of Roosevelt for President, and the rise of Sidney Hillman’s CIO-PAC (also for FDR), tensions were high. “Today,” declared one candidate for President in 1944, “that pagan philosophy [of communism] is sweeping through much of the world. As we look abroad we see that in country after country its advocates are making a bid for power. We would be fools not to look for that same danger here. And we haven’t far to look.”
The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941 dealt a devastating blow to isolationism in the United States. In a Gallup poll the previous summer, only 38% of Americans questioned wanted the U.S. to join a league of nations after the war, while 39% objected. By the summer of 1942, those numbers had dramatically changed, with 73% in favor, and 27% opposed. The lessons of war, coupled with the ceaseless activity of internationalist pressure groups, such as the Committee to Study the Organization of Peace, had finally crippled isolationism and convinced many Americans that the United States had to play an active role in the postwar world. But what kind of role would that be? "Internationalism" was subject to various meanings, and its advocates, regardless of political party, were often in disagreement as to the purpose of American involvement in the war and the nature of the peace that would follow. One group, including Clarence Streit, Henry Wallace, and Sumner Welles, subscribed to the Wilsonian tenets of "progressive internationalism," with the hope that the war would usher in a period of worldwide social reform and the belief that peace should be founded on the equality of all nations. Other internationalists, meanwhile, contended that such views were overly idealistic. According to this more "conservative" and "realistic" group, including Walter Lippmann, H.J. Taylor, and John Foster Dulles, Americans "should understand the limitations upon world order imposed by nationalism, and recognize that peace could be attained only by agreement among the big powers." Sensing a growing curiosity among the American people, publishers and magazine editors produced an outpouring of books and articles dealing with the postwar world.
As a result, by the end of 1944, a voluminous literature of postwar international relations had emerged, and Americans now had a chance to read and discuss every possible approach to the future peace.⁶⁹

One of the first monographs to articulate a postwar peace plan was Clarence Streit’s “progressive” or “idealistic” Union Now, published in late 1939. According to Streit, a journalist for the New York Times, the perfect model for postwar planning could be found in America’s experience with federalism. Following the American Revolution in the late 18th century, the United States joined together in a loose national plan of union styled the Articles of Confederation. Over time, Streit observed, this confederation failed to govern adequately and subsequently gave birth to a federal union under the Constitution of 1787. Similarly, he argued, the League of Nations had been the world’s attempt at a confederation in the 20th century. It too failed, and must now give way to a federal union of democratic nations called “the Great Republic.” This utopian organization would consist only of those nations that believed in self-government and the freedom of the individual. Members of this body would enjoy the benefits of “a union defense force, a union customs-free economy, union money and a union postal and communications system. But, like the American states, the member nations would retain complete home rule and separate powers of government to handle local matters.” Structurally, the union would resemble the United States with a bicameral congress, with representation to the lower house based on population and representation in the upper house being equal. Instead of a president, Streit proposed a five-member executive board. Streit’s book was an immediate success and (by 1944) had undergone fourteen printings. He also had the
support of such high profile personalities as Clare Boothe Luce, W. Somerset Maugham, Robert Sherwood, Thomas Mann, and Raymond Massey.

In *The Century of the Common Man* (1943), Henry A. Wallace, the incumbent Vice President of the United States, presented another “progressive” vision of a postwar world order. Wallace and other social liberals “came to enthusiastically define the war as a revolutionary struggle and to look to America to redeem her own revolutionary heritage by uniting with the forces that sought the destruction of colonialism and by working to construct international organizations to eliminate the social and economic inequalities that produce war.”

Wallace devoted much of his book to that on which, he believed, peace ultimately depends: strong domestic programs. “We now know,” he wrote, “that the modern world must be recognized for what it is—an economic unit—and that wise arrangements must be made so that trade will be encouraged. The foundations of democracy can be rendered safe only when people everywhere have an opportunity to work and buy and sell with a reasonable assurance that they will be able to enjoy the fruits of their works.” The defeat of Germany and Japan, then, was only half the battle; the United States must build a world in which its human and material resources were used to the utmost if it is to win a complete victory. Indeed, the potential abundance of the world must be translated into real wealth and a higher standard of living. “Certain minimum standards of food, clothing, and shelter ought to be established, and arrangements ought to be made to guarantee that no one shall fall below those standards.” Between bill-of-rights democracy (the U.S. political model) and economic democracy (the Soviet communistic model), Wallace continued, there was an emerging democracy of the common man. According to the Vice President, this new democracy
was dependent upon the construction of a lasting international structure of peace, and was characterized by a promotion of equality of economic opportunity, free education, and minority and women's rights. In this democratic world community, "there will be a place for everyone—the worker, the farmer, the business man, the housewife, the doctor, the salesman, the teacher, the student, the store clerk, the taxi driver, the preacher, the engineer—all the millions who make up our world." The future of America, Wallace concluded, was a "middle class" existence, where the average American enjoys the conveniences of modern science: electric lights, modern plumbing, washing machines, refrigeration, radios, central heating, and comfortable furniture and rugs. "They include a car neither old nor ramshackle, decent clothes and books. They include his share of recreation—movies or theatre, trips, vacations, high school and college for his children, horse-racing, football, baseball, golf, or tennis, as his taste is inclined." This is America's future if it can translate its "present great productivity for war to an equally great productivity for peace."

Echoing Wallace were such idealists as Michael Straight, Freda Kirchwey, and Mortimer Adler. In his Make This the Last War (1943), the twenty-six-year-old Straight, an economist for the European Division in the U.S. State Department (and son of New Republic founder, Willard Straight), argued that the Second World War was "the crucial phase of a large struggle to achieve world unity" and that the war could not be won until the underlying conditions of world unity had been attained"—namely, full employment, national economic development, social harmony, and the creation of a world organization. Wars, then, would cease when the world became a single economic and political community under a federal government: "The flood tide is upon us that leads to
fortune... We must now declare that the joint boards of the United Nations are the beginnings of the permanent structure of world government, that the combined Chiefs of Staff are the leaders of a world army that will be the only armed force in the future peace. We need to declare now that the Supreme Council of the United Nations which we form is the central executive of a provisional world government: that the full Council of all the United Nations will become the provisional assembly of a world legislature; that the twenty-eight states of the United Nations, like our own original thirteen, will grow until the United Nations becomes the United Nations of the World. The time is now.” Writing in *The Nation* in March 1944, the liberal journalist Freda Kirchwey stated it even more bluntly than Wallace and Straight: “News from the underground in every country indicates an overwhelming conviction on the part of the people that the old system must be replaced with some form or degree of collectivist control, under democratic sanctions... Only a New Deal for the world, more far-reaching and consistent than our own faltering New Deal, can prevent the coming of World War III.” In *How to Think About War and Peace* (1944), Mortimer J. Adler, Professor of Philosophy of Law at the University of Chicago, added that war is caused by anarchy while peace is caused by government. While world wars are the result of world anarchy, world peace can be achieved through world government.

The most popular of the “progressive” writings, however, was Wendell Willkie’s *One World* (1943), which sold 197,130 copies in its first week in print, and over a half-million after three weeks. Willkie, the unsuccessful Republican nominee for President in 1940, spent most of his 206 pages reflecting upon his recent forty-nine-day (and 31,000-mile) trip around the world, detailing (through anecdote) his visits to the Soviet
Union, China, and the Middle East, as well as his meetings with leaders such as Joseph Stalin and Chiang Kai-shek. “In the last third of One World, Willkie drew on his experiences to deliver a sermon on internationalism.”80 He argued that “There are no distant points in the world any longer. I learned by this trip that the myriad of millions of human beings of the Far East are as close to us as Los Angeles is to New York by the fastest trains. I cannot escape the conviction that in the future what concerns them must concern us, almost as much as the problems of the people of California concern the people of New York. Our thinking in the future must be world-wide.”81 Alarmed by a lack of articulated Allied war aims, he warned that a war without purpose is a war without victory, and that there must be open discussions among the nations and within nations. He laid out three specific proposals concerning the postwar world. First, new order required a common council of the “United Nations” in which all planned together and devise grand military strategies, war production strategies, future economic cooperation strategies, administrative strategies for the defeated Axis nations, and organizational strategies to deal with the multiple problems accompanying the victorious, Allied nations in the war’s aftermath. Failure to create such a council and to achieve those strategies would result in our “moving from one expediency to another, sowing the seeds of future discontents—racial, religious, political—not alone among the peoples we seek to free, but even among the United Nations themselves.”82 Second, the Allies, Willkie insisted, must agree that the war is one of liberation—i.e. “giving to all peoples freedom to govern themselves as soon as they are able, and the economic freedom on which all lasting self-government inevitably rests.”83 Both aspects of freedom must be stressed and agreed upon, the victors will have won neither the peace nor the war. And
third, the United States must play an active and constructive role in the postwar and increasingly interdependent world.

On the realist side of the postwar debate there were also several popular works, including, “Toward World Order” (1942), by John Foster Dulles, *The Problems of Lasting Peace* (1942), by Herbert Hoover and Hugh Gibson, *U.S. War Aims* (1944), by Walter Lippmann, *How New Will the Better World Be?* (1944), by Carl Becker, and *The Children of Light and the Children of Darkness* (1944), by Reinhold Niebuhr. Overall, realists emphasized power politics, and the need for an Allied-led postwar international order. To liberal internationalists such as Mortimer Adler, realists were “pessimists,” who were “against aiming now at the kind of peace which could be perpetuated by world government alone and nothing less.”

Near the close of 1942, former President Herbert Hoover and career diplomat Hugh Gibson offered their analysis of war and peace in *The Problems of Lasting Peace*. The book – largely due to Hoover’s promotional efforts—became an immediate bestseller, and a selection in the Book-of-the-Month Club. According to Hoover and Gibson, there were six dynamic forces that contributed to war: ideologies, economic factors, nationalism, militarism, imperialism, and the forces of fear, hate, and revenge. “The history of war,” they argued, “is largely a recitation of the operation of these [above] forces and the failure of men to comprehend and control them.” Man, then, is ideological, and his ideas— involving human belief and faith— contain a militant, crusading spirit, and an inherent aggressiveness. Human beings, they continued, were also motivated by desires of economic benefit, as well as a love of family and country, and pride in racial accomplishments. Furthermore, Man was combative, egoistic,
arrogant, and a seeker of adventure and glory. Finally, he was a fearful, hateful, and vengeful being. All beings feared invasion, starvation, and economic disadvantage. He smoldered with hate from wrong, from rivalries, and from oppression, and yearns for revenge for past wrongs and defeats. All of these things, Hoover and Gibson argued, "will haunt the halls of the next peacemaking. It will not be a new world after this war. It will be a different world." So, what was the basis for a lasting peace? Two things: a foundation of settlements and a superstructure to preserve peace. The foundation for peace was achieved through the promotion of representative government, the provision of economic aid to both friends and foes, and the reduction of trade barriers. On top of this foundation should be built a superstructure of peace consisting of three elements: (1) a "conditional" period of armistice and settlement of certain urgent problems, (2) an intermediate period for economic recovery and the rebuilding of political life, and (3) a period of "cooling off" and discussion of long view problems. Specifically, this "superstructure"—spanning all three stages—should include the instant surrender of arms and demobilization of all enemy military forces, the repatriation of military prisoners, the removal of all blockades, the temporary restoration of prewar commercial treaties, the designation of provisional boundaries, the immediate call of freely chosen elective bodies, and the building of an international machinery to preserve peace. The problems of lasting peace were great, Hoover and Gibson concluded, but in the peacemaking to come, the leaders of mankind would have a fleeting chance "to bind the wounds, to restore faith, and to bring new hope to the world."s6

In a major speech in Chicago on 16 December of that year (1942), Hoover expanded on his collaboration with Gibson, especially as it related to a "cooling off" or transitional
period after the war. “The essence of my proposal,” Hoover declared, “is that we have no armistice, no general peace conference, such as Versailles. But that we set the peace making in two stages.” The first stage was what Hoover called an instant “conditional peace.” This involved—as he and Gibson had articulated in The Problems of Lasting Peace—total disarmament of the enemy, the designation of provisional boundaries of nations, the removal of economic blockades, famine and pestilence relief, and the immediate call of freely chosen elective constitutional assemblies in the liberated and enemy countries. “With these minimums,” Hoover asserted, “the world could move forward.” The second and final stage in Hoover’s “new approach to peace making” was “that the world should take time to cool off and work one by one” to find solutions for those problems that require time for deliberation, such as disarmament, reparations, intergovernmental debts, and the punishment of war crimes. These problems, Hoover concluded, “must have time for the cooling of war revenge and hatred. Many of them must have time for the development of world opinion and adherence. They should be separated from each other for solution and each saved on its merits.”

Hoover’s “cooling off” concept was quietly embraced by the Roosevelt administration. On 30 May 1942, Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles—ten days after receiving an advance copy of The Problems of Lasting Peace—distinguished, in a widely acclaimed Memorial Day speech at the Arlington National Amphitheatre, between (1) immediate, postwar peace concerns and (2) final peace terms to be determined and entered into after the passing of a “period of social and economic chaos which will come inevitably upon the termination of the present war, and after the completion of the initial and gigantic task of relief, of reconstruction and of rehabilitation which will confront the
At a press conference the following year, Roosevelt himself—without ever acknowledging Hoover—told reporters:

People are awfully... immature when they talk about ‘after the war.’ They have the idea, because of certain precedents, that when the last shot is fired in one area... there will be an immediate peace conference, or if all the areas stop shooting that there will be immediately a peace conference; there will be a great treaty signed between all the Nations of the world.

I think that it is a pretty fair guess to say that there will be a transition period [italics added]. You have to remember that most of the world is pretty well shell-shocked now... And I think that for the good of humanity perhaps it might be good before we start writing the fair copy of what is going to happen later on, that we should catch our breaths...

And so I rather look forward to a period of transition between the firing of the last shot and the signing of a formal agreement or treaty. Obviously, there are certain things that will happen during that transition period. One of them is the maintenance of peace... by... the victors.91

Writing to a friend a few days after Roosevelt’s remarks, Hoover noted that the President had adopted his line, and added with satisfaction that “The newspapers here comment on the fact that it is my proposal.”92

In U.S. War Aims (1944), famed journalist Walter Lippmann argued that the issue of American involvement in world affairs had been settled by U.S. entry into World War II. The “period of our unique, effortless security is ended,” he wrote. The popular notion that the Atlantic Ocean is too wide for an enemy to cross has been exposed as a myth, and “the United States has now to be defended, like all the other great states of history, by diplomacy, by policy, and by arms.”93 “Instead of debating the need of any positive policy,” Lippmann insisted, “we now have to deliberate upon what kind of positive policy we need.”94 A follow-up to his 1943 U.S. Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic-- in which Lippmann called for a resurrected Congress of Vienna (including the U.S.,
Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and China) to preserve international order and to serve as a nucleus for a more general postwar association of nations--*U.S. War Aims* proposed six lines of American policy to establish a long and ordered peace. Overall, the United States should (1) consolidate the already existing strategic and diplomatic connections of the so-called Atlantic Community, (2) recognize a Russian orbit over Eastern Europe, (3) understand that while China will be the center of a third strategic system destined to include all of Eastern Asia, it—i.e. the interior of Asia—is far beyond the reach (and direct involvement) of the United States, (4) anticipate the creation of Islamic and Hindu regional systems in the Middle East and Southeast Asia, (5) commit itself to the extinguishing of the war parties in the Axis nations, and (6) insure that neither Japan nor Germany are allowed to hold the balance of power in their respective regions of the world. In addition, Lippmann presented a scathing indictment of Wilsonian collective security. According to Lippmann, a former Wilson associate, the principles of the late Democratic president—outlined in his Fourteen Points speech of 1918—were a series of prohibitions grounded on the assumptions that national sovereignty was on the eve of yielding to world government. Thus, Wilsonian principles “forbid nation states to do the things which they have always done to defend their interests and to preserve their integrity.”

Though not an opponent of international organizations, Lippmann argued that the United States must not repeat the error of counting upon a world organization to establish peace. That is the responsibility of the victors. “They cannot delegate this responsibility to a world society which does not yet exist or has just barely been organized. We must establish peace specifically and directly in the world as we shall find it—by maintaining the combined defenses of the Atlantic nations, by continuing the great
coalition with the Soviet Union and with China, by making it impossible for Germany
and Japan to undo the settlement of this war and to separate the victors.96 Any universal
body that should exist must function primarily as a facilitator of intercourse among the
nations already at peace. “Let us not be so naïve as to think that the great issues of war
and peace, upon which hands the life of nations, will or can be settled by public debates
and public voting in an international assembly.”97 The responsibility for preventing war,
Lippmann concluded, was with the great military states themselves. There was, he wrote,
no escape from that reality.

In How New Will the Better World Be? (1944), Carl L. Becker, Professor Emeritus of
History at Cornell University, presented another “realistic” and pessimistic view of
postwar planning. According to Becker, the nation-state is the principal force in the
modern world. As such, all politics is power politics, and every display of power restores
the overall balance of power in the world to somebody’s favor or to somebody’s loss.
The Second World War, then, was simply the manifestation of power politics being
played out on a grand scale, and the primary purpose of the Allies in this “game” was to
restore the balance of power in their favor. Thus, Becker argued, the Allies—in contrast
to the Axis Powers (who were attempting to establish a new world order)—were fighting
to preserve the status quo in its fundamentals. Everyone, he wrote, “agrees that the
United States is fighting to preserve the American way of life, but what are the
fundamentals of that way of life? They are what they have always been since 1789—the
sovereign political independence of the United States; the system of representative
government as defined in the Constitution: free economic enterprise, and the
constitutional guarantees of the rights of freedom from arbitrary arrest and imprisonment,
freedom of religion, and freedom of speech and the press.\textsuperscript{98} Though these freedoms are imperfectly realized, and our system of government certainly capable of improvement, it is, nevertheless, the system we have. They are the fundamentals of the status quo, and they are what the United States (and presumably the Allies as a whole) is fighting to preserve. In the end, as to the postwar political order, Becker had little faith in “leagues” or “federations.” They were neither practical nor relevant. Indeed, Becker insisted that the League of Nations failed “not for a want of police force to back its decisions, but because, in all crucial situations, there were no decisions to be enforced. It failed because, being nothing but an agent of the member states, it could do only what the chief member states were willing to use it for doing; and in the crucial situations the member states were not willing to do what by signing the covenant they had promised to do.”\textsuperscript{99} Furthermore, the League failed because it was based on a false assumption—i.e. that the prevention of war is always a major national interest. Every state, though, engaged in World War II was engaged in it because it regarded some things, such as national independence in the case of the Allies, as far more important than the prevention of war. Finally, the international organization failed because it attempted to transfer political power from states that have it to a league of several theoretically equal, but in fact very unequal states by covenants and treaties. Such a transfer is impossible. Political power, Becker concluded, would remain where it was, lodged chiefly in a few great states; and the issue of peace or war would depend, League or no League, upon the conflict of real or supposed national interests of these states and the inevitable power politics played by them.\textsuperscript{100} The balance of power, then, remains the world order, and to prevent future
disruptions of it, the Allies in the postwar era must achieve economic unity with each other and the world.

In *The Children of Light and the Children of Darkness: A Vindication of Democracy and A Critique of Its Traditional Defense* (1944), Reinhold Niebuhr attempted to establish an ideological balance between the postwar visions of political realists, such as Carl Becker, and of Wilsonian idealists, such as Wendell Willkie. Like Becker, Niebuhr had little faith in leagues, police forces, or other international structures. He labeled the liberal internationalists, who held an optimistic, if naïve, view of the world and of human nature, as “children of light.” This group, he argued, mistakenly believes that the old simple universalism (with its moral imperative) and the new technological universalism (with its global interdependence) are poised to bring the political institutions of man into conformity with it. Thus, the children of light “think in terms of a possible world constitutional convention which would set up the authority and would then call upon the nations to subordinate their interests to this new sovereignty.” Naively, they underestimate the perennial power of particular and parochial loyalties that act as restraints on universality. Political realists, meanwhile, are “children of darkness.” This group, perceiving international relations as a struggle among nations for dominance and control, believes that world politics cannot rise higher than the balance of power principle. Unlike Becker, Niebuhr did not praise (or accept) power politics as the status quo. A balance of power, he observed, is a kind of “managed anarchy,” and under it, no participant is ever quite satisfied with its own position. “Every center of power will seek to improve its position: and every such effort will be regarded by the others as an attempt to disturb the equilibrium. There is sufficient mistrust between the great
nations… to make it quite certain that a mere equilibrium between them will not suffice to preserve the peace.” Niebuhr’s alternative vision of the postwar world was a compromise and a paradox. The compromise was the development of a genuine, democratic, world community resulting in a true world order. The foundations of this community (and peace) are mixed. It is a community grounded in a sophisticated, children of light idealism (i.e. one that seeks complete universalism) and a healthy, children of darkness realism (i.e. the recognition that power is required in the organization of all human communities). The paradox is that, according to Niebuhr, this world community can never be achieved. Between the two extremes of the children of light and the children of darkness there is only chaos and conflict, and the hope of world community. “The world community,” Niebuhr concluded, “standing thus as the final possibility and impossibility of human life, will be in actuality the perpetual problem as well as the constant fulfillment of human hopes.”104

Despite their differences in specific fields of postwar order, internationalists shared a common faith in international cooperation. “Discussion, arbitration, and conciliation were the techniques they believed would banish war from the world. Above all else, they worshipped Woodrow Wilson, finding his ideals their deepest convictions and vowing that one day they would make his vision of peace and brotherhood a reality.”105 Overall, they were old-stock, white Protestant Americans. They were Anglophiles who believed that the U.S. had inherited England’s role as arbiter of world affairs. They were bankers, lawyers, editors, professors, and ministers. A revival of Woodrow Wilson studies coincided with the surge of public support for U.S. entry into some form of world association after the war. “The Woodrow Wilson Foundation, almost totally inactive in
the 1930s came to life again during the war. At their twentieth annual board meeting in 1942, the directors took note of "a nation-wide return to the broad ideals of international cooperation and organization presented to the world by Woodrow Wilson." That same year, the American Council of Public Affairs published a collection of Wilson’s speeches entitled *Wilson’s Ideals*. In his introduction, editor Saul Padover portrayed Wilson as a prophet rejected in his lifetime but vindicated by the present crisis:

If he had not been defeated in his struggle to secure permanent peace and the rights of nations, there would be no Armageddon today. If Wilson had not been defeated [by Republicans in the Senate], France would still be a nation, and Norway, and Holland, and Czechoslovakia, and Italy would be free; Greece would not be a charnel house; Poland would not be depopulated; Yugoslavia would not be a shambles. Because Wilson lost the battle for peace, millions of men have already died, and millions more will yet die.

Yet, Padover concluded, his work was not in vain: "There can be no doubt as to the [military] outcome [of this war], but this time the peace, too, will be won and won essentially on the basis of Wilson’s ideals. There can be no other durable peace but a democratic and cooperative peace, as Wilson had envisioned it."

The year 1944—with the coming of the presidential election and the rise of interest in a postwar organization—witnessed the publication of a number of other Woodrow Wilson and League of Nations studies. "Nearly all the authors were sympathetic to Wilson, treating him as a man whose tragedy was live before his time." A very popular work, published at the beginning of the year, was Gerald Johnson’s *Woodrow Wilson: The Unforgettable Figure Who Has Returned to Haunt Us*, a pictorial biography that stressed the people’s failure to understand the prophetic vision of their president. According to Johnson, an editorial writer for *The Baltimore Sun*, Wilson had many faults. He was
“arrogant, bullheaded, puritanical, icy, or blistering on occasion, sometimes appearing to
be self-righteous, frightfully candid, learned, and impatient of ignorance, with a faculty of
being right in a most irritating way.”

But that was not all, Johnson concluded:

If that were all, then Wilson being down would stay down. But he
doesn’t. For the past two years, especially, he has haunted our minds like
a bad conscience. Americans are thinking and talking of Wilson more
than they are of some political leaders who consider themselves very
much alive. Men have begun to examine him again and they find an
interesting thin. His faults stuck out; they did not drive in. His bitterest
enemy never called him weak. If he was right, then the rest of us were
wrong, terribly wrong. Why should Wilson’s memory return to trouble us
in the hour of our agony? We repudiated, dismissed and buried him long
ago; why will he not stay dead? He will not be dismissed, he will not be
ignored, he haunts us by night and by day. Is he, in a sense, the
conscience of America?

Then there was J. Eugene Harley’s eulogistic Woodrow Wilson Still Lives, which told
the familiar story of how isolationists frustrated Wilson’s postwar vision of international
cooperation. Harley, a professor of political science at the University of Southern
California, described Wilson’s ideals as “forming ‘a veritable Rock of Gibraltar’ and ‘a
strong rallying point for all who think of the days of peace and reconstruction ahead.’”

Similarly, Karl Schriftgiesser’s hard-hitting and popular biography of Senator Henry
Cabot Lodge—Wilson’s Republican nemesis—entitled The Gentleman from
Massachusetts, depicted Wilson as a man of vision and principle. Lodge, in contrast,
was portrayed as “a man filled with a venomous hatred of Wilson,” while the defeat of
the League of Nations in the Senate was treated as “a conspiracy hatched at Theodore
Roosevelt’s sickbed and carried out against the national interest for partisan and personal
motives.” Early in World War I, Schriftgiesser observed, “Lodge had wanted a
League of Nations. When it came, it was the gift of a Democratic President, the gift of a man who his closest friend [former President Theodore Roosevelt] deeply hated and for whom he himself had built up a hatred equally intense. For that reason, and because he wanted to bring back his party into power, he fought to the bitter end.114

Finally, one Wilson book of especial scholarly note was Thomas Bailey’s objective *Woodrow Wilson and the Lost Peace*, published in 1944. Bailey, a professor of history at Stanford University, criticized Wilson for losing “sight of the distinction between the fundamental causes of the war and the possible objectives of peace.”115 At the start of the war in Europe in 1914, Bailey observed, Wilson was the leading American isolationist, believing, like most Americans, that the war was not the affair of the United States. “When events later forced him to change his mind and become the leading internationalist, he expected that his isolationist following would change their minds too, and march right along behind him.”116 He was wrong. While he took the lofty step to declare that the U.S. was—after April 1917—fighting to make the world safe for democracy, most of his countrymen believed they were fighting simply to defeat Germany. Wilson, Bailey reasoned, should either have reckoned with that body of public sentiment or have educated it. Nothing was to be gained by ignoring it. With Wilson and the League of Nations debate as a backdrop, Bailey concluded with seven principles that the American people should keep in mind in connection with a general peace at the end of World War II: (1) that war aims should be unambiguous, practicable, and acceptable to American public opinion; (2) that American public opinion should be educated in advance to its responsibilities in world affairs, and more particularly to its responsibilities in executing any peace treaty; (3) that the principle of “unconditional surrender” should
be imperative; (4) that the American peace commission should be bipartisan; (5) that the defeated powers should be privileged to discuss the terms of peace; (6) that no treaty can last unless it provides workable machinery for peaceful change in an ever-changing world; and (7) that “the victor can have vengeance, or he may have peace, but he cannot have both.”

The deceased President made it into not only thousands of pages of print, but also a Hollywood film. Darryl F. Zanuck’s Oscar-winning screenplay, *Wilson* (1944), a Twentieth Century Fox production, became an immediate and critical success, starring Alexander Knox (nominated for an Oscar as “Best Actor”) in the lead role. In the film’s final scene, Wilson stood in the ornate President’s Room in the U.S. Capitol Building, and bade his cabinet farewell. The date was supposed to be 4 March 1921, Wilson’s last day in office. A grandfather clock, reading three minutes until noon, ticked loudly in the background. Then, John Barton Payne, Secretary of the Interior, approached Wilson, and asked: “Mr. President, now that the United States has rejected the League, can we ever hope for peace—a real understanding among nations?” Knox’s Wilson thoughtfully replied:

Yes. I am not one of those who has the slightest anxiety about the eventual triumph of the things I’ve stood for. The fight has just begun. You and I may not live to see it finished, but that doesn’t matter. The ideals of the League are not dead just because a few obstructive men now in the saddle say they are. The dream of a world united against the awful wastes of war is too deeply imbedded in the hearts of men everywhere... I’ll even make this concession to Providence—it may come about in a better way than we proposed.
With one minute of the Wilson presidency remaining, Senator Lodge and his Republican cohorts then marched into the room, and reported that the sixty-eighth Congress was ready to adjourn. Wilson glared at his arch rival, and replied coldly: “The President has nothing further to communicate.” The clock then struck noon, Wilson slowly exited the room, and with “My Country “Tis of Thee” playing in the background, the film credits began to roll. Watching a private showing of *Wilson* at the White House in early September 1944, President Roosevelt was inspired. Impressed by some of the quotations, he asked aide William Hassett to look them up for future reference in the presidential campaign.¹¹⁹

One of the most substantive postwar plans presented that year was John Foster’s Dulles’s “Six Pillars of Peace”—a plan that even President Roosevelt privately endorsed as “splendid.” Dulles’s work was especially important considering his role as foreign policy advisor for Thomas Dewey, a leading contender for the Republican presidential nomination in 1944. The two men had been neighbors in the Woolworth Building in New York, for some time, when in May 1937, over lunch, they began a mutually beneficial friendship that would last until Dulles’s death in the late 1950s. Dulles, aged forty-nine in 1937, was the grandson of John Watson Foster, who had served as President Benjamin Harrison’s Secretary of State from 1892 to 1893, and the nephew of Robert Lansing, who had served as President Woodrow Wilson’s Secretary of State from 1915 to 1920. In 1937, Dulles was a law partner at Sullivan and Cromwell, and he informed the young prosecutor that the firm’s senior litigation man was in poor health and likely to leave. Dulles wanted to see him replaced by someone “both youthful and poised, [and] capable of top-notch research and courtroom hypnosis”—someone like Dewey. Though
Dewey did not take Dulles’s job offer—he ran unsuccessfully for governor in 1938 instead, the two became close associates, and as Dewey contemplated higher national office, he sought advice from Dulles on foreign affairs. Though an admirer of Democrat Woodrow Wilson, Dulles embraced the young New York Republican, and, in turn, Dewey, who was a novice at international politics, “drank deeply from the Dulles cup.”

Dulles’s first book was published in 1939, on the eve of World War II in Europe (and Dewey’s first presidential bid), and was entitled *War, Peace, and Change*. Dulles’s goal was to analyze and understand the origins and nature of war, so as to avoid it. “The war system,” he wrote, “has long been tolerated. Force was sanctioned as a legitimate and indeed primary method of settling international differences and determining changes in the domains of the sovereign states. The war system was thus legitimized because force is the primitive, natural way of settling differences, and any alternative is hard to find.”

Though the development of modern science, and the experience of World War I, had led to a “worldwide” conviction that war was intolerable—as expressed in the founding of the League of Nations (1919), and the adoption of the Kellogg-Briand Pact (1927)—the war system still prevailed and all people lived under its menace. Overall, Dulles argued that war, at the most basic level, was the result of man’s selfishness, which created conflicts of desire that force—unless other means were provided—could solve. The avoidance of war, he insisted, depended on a proper understanding of peace, which had traditionally been misidentified with perpetuating the status quo. That was why the League of Nations, for example, had failed. The victors of the Great War, Dulles wrote, “conceived of peace as the avoidance of all change, the creation of a situation such that they would be left in tranquility to enjoy their existing status… No thought was given to
setting up machinery to effect changes from time to time in those treaties and in those international conditions ‘whose continuance might endanger the peace of the world.’”

True peace, then, was “the avoidance of one particularly obnoxious method of change [i.e. force] by facilitating a less obnoxious method—that security [i.e. freedom from violent attack upon person or property] can be attained only at the price of insecurity [i.e. state measures short of force, such as sanctions and open trade, the would deter aggression and/or diminish cultural and national barriers].”

Dulles concluded by offering four general principles to be pursued if the elimination of force as the solvent of conflicting desires was to be achieved: (1) the restoration of individual reason to its proper position of control over human action, (2) the preservation of intellectual freedom, (3) the discouragement of exaggerated subservience to one’s own state as the sole source of economic opportunity, and (4) the securing of elasticity in the treaty structure of the world. In summary, Dulles’s vision of peace was “based on the concept that life is fluid and, if civilization is to survive, there must be means of change without war.”

Then, in early 1941, Dulles was named chair of the Federal Council of Churches’ 100-member Commission to Study the Basis of a Just and Durable Peace, and in 1943, he formulated an ethical “Statement of Political Propositions” upon “which world order must be based.”

Reflecting Dulles’s personal ideology and conviction that “Christians should, as citizens, seek to translate their beliefs into realities,” the statement’s “underlying premise was that ‘disregard for moral law brings affliction,’ and ‘we must find a way to bring into ordered harmony the interdependent life of the nations.’” Its underlying purpose was to outline ‘six areas within which national interdependence is demonstrated, and where, accordingly, international collaboration needs to be
organized." Specifically, these “Six Pillars of Peace” were the culmination of his arguments in *War, Peace, and Change*, and included: (1) organized political collaboration (including regional pacts) between the Allies and subsequent regional others, (2) multilateral economic agreements based upon liberal trade principles, (3) a standing international body to adapt a global peace treaty to changing conditions, (4) the promotion of the ultimate autonomy of subject peoples, (5) international control of armaments, and (6) the international recognition of spiritual and intellectual liberty. That spring, Dulles presented the “Six Pillars” to President Roosevelt, who professed interest in making “some public reference” to it “at some near future date.” Having hoped for an immediate endorsement, Dulles was disappointed, and privately railed against the Roosevelt administration’s lack of “competence to deal with the problem of bringing this war to an acceptable end and making quick and orderly transition to some better post-war order.”

The newly elected Governor of New York also endorsed the principles of the Six Pillars, and believed Dulles’s plan to be the best model for postwar international cooperation and the maintenance of the future peace. Writing to Alf Landon that June, Dewey worried (from a practical perspective) that Republicans were, on foreign policy, at least, emitting signals in all directions, and thus bewildering the American public. “From the people I see of all kinds all over the country,” the Governor wrote, “I think there is a very unfortunate and yet genuine confusion about the position of the Republican Party in international affairs.” It was time, he believed—if the GOP was to be competitive in the next year’s presidential election-- for Republicans to unite and articulate a single, internationalist vision of postwar American foreign policy.
Democratic Politics

The early 1940s marked a low point in the Roosevelt administration. The war was going badly, and on the home front the President seemed unable to effectively and efficiently handle domestic affairs. In a January 1943 Gallup survey, 60% responded that they were dissatisfied with the way the government had conducted the war effort at home the previous year. Complaints included: “Should have shown more foresight and acted sooner on rationing of scarce goods,” “Should have tightened up government efficiency,” “should have dealt more firmly with labor unions and strikes,” and “should have given the public more information about war problems—less ‘sugar coating’ of bad news.” Indeed, Roosevelt’s efforts at mobilizing the economy for war—through the creation of new (and bickering) “alphabet agencies,” and the implementation of wage restrictions and price controls—only alienated voters (especially farmers and industrial workers), and resulted in dramatic losses for his party in the 1942 midterm elections. “Everywhere we have gone,” one reporter later observed, “the one complaint of the kindred souls that we find is that the Democratic organization is shot to hell, and that the caliber of the local candidates who are running as Democrats is slightly less than zero-zero. The day where they can ride in on Roosevelt’s shirt-tails has gone… I want to vote for Roosevelt [in 1944], but if he is elected my recommendation is this: he ought to fire everybody below the rank of vice president and start again… [T]here is too much dead wood around Washington after 12 years… [I]f he is going to secure his place in the history books at the page where he is in my book, he had damned well better clean house and get some new blood.”

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Though Democrats maintained their majorities in both houses of Congress, Republicans gained forty-seven seats in the House of Representatives (reducing the Democratic majority to only nine seats), and added seven seats in the Senate (leaving Democrats with a working majority of twenty-one). As the Seventy-Ninth Congress convened in January 1943, Roosevelt faced serious challenges to his leadership. The narrowness of Democratic majorities in the new Congress allowed Republicans and conservative southern Democrats (who filled more than half of the Democratic seats in Congress) to join forces and dominate the legislative agenda. Throughout 1943, Congress frustrated and defeated much of the administration’s domestic agenda. As 1944 approached, the Democratic Party was becoming increasingly fragmented over both domestic and foreign policy concerns. The main lines of contention were drawn between Southern conservatives and Northern liberals over civil rights, war mobilization, the New Deal, postwar international order, and the power of organized labor and its role in the party.

While Executive Order 8802 and the publication of *What the Negro Wants* and *An American Dilemma* buoyed African-American hopes (and encouraged them toward further activism), many white Democratic leaders in the South were angry and alarmed. Then, in the summer of 1944, the United States Supreme Court ruled in *Smith v. Allwright*, that the Democratic white primary in the South was unconstitutional. Although the Constitution prohibited states from denying the vote on account of race, white southerners, since the end of Reconstruction in the 1870s, had advanced the theory that the Democratic Party was a private association, and as such, could discriminate in any way it chose. Since there was no substantive Republican presence in the South,
the Democratic primary functioned as the election, and as a result, the Court ruled, was in violation of the Fifteenth Amendment. The Supreme Court’s ruling in *Smith v. Allwright*, V.O. Key observed in 1949, “precipitated a crisis in southern politics.” “It is obvious,” former Alabama Governor Frank Dixon anxiously wrote his state party chairman, “that the only thing that has held the Democratic Party together in the South for many years past has been the thing which caused its strength in the first place, namely, white supremacy... [Now], through forced registration of negroes in this state, the Democratic Party will become anathema to white people in the South.” In Arkansas, Governor Homer Adkins, reaffirmed that the Democratic Party was a white man’s party, and called upon the state party to change its rules in order to circumvent the Court’s decision. Mississippi Congressman John Rankin, meanwhile, “warned legislators in his state to take action against the ‘communistic drive... to destroy white supremacy in the South.” Not surprisingly, one immediate impact of the Court’s decision was an interjection of race into the political campaigns of 1944—especially among the Democrats who had been “progressive” in the past. Another impact was a short-lived challenge to FDR’s nomination to a fourth term, as represented by the “Texas Regulars,” who in the summer of 1944 temporarily took control of the state’s Democratic organization. The Regulars not only resented *Smith*, but also (and more importantly) the administration’s efforts at war mobilization, which, critics claimed, encouraged big government, higher taxes, and bureaucratic inefficiency and waste. Roosevelt, however, was too popular—with an 80% Gallup approval rating in the region in 1943—to lose the South. As a young navy pilot named George Bush observed in letter home to his family the following September, “The southern boys will support Roosevelt. The ones I’ve
talked with seem to think he’s some sort of a god—I don’t believe they look too closely
at what the New Deal administration has done or has not done.”

Another area where Democrats were divided was in war mobilization. In the fall of
1943, Senator Harry F. Byrd of Virginia published a small article in *American Magazine*
entitled “Are We Losing Our Freedom?” In it, Byrd introduced three families
representative of America at large: the Joneses, the Johnsons, and the Smiths. These
families are patriotic, hawkish, and law-abiding, Byrd wrote, but “now they’re becoming
alarmed... They expected to find the war effort a well-oiled machine driven by
competent operators, with a minimum of waste and bungling... But almost every time
they come in contact with it—and that means almost every hour in the day—they
discover that, as far as it applies to civilians, at least, the machine *isn’t* well oiled, the
cogwheels don’t mesh, and it is being driven by a horde of experimenters all wanting to
go in different directions.” Journalist David Hinshaw echoed the Virginia Senator in a
book entitled *The Home Front*. Hinshaw argued that the President and his administration
were to blame for the Democrats’ losses in the 1942 midterms. Though Roosevelt was a
great champion for democracy, and a gallant leader who gave of himself unsparingly,
official indecision, incompetence, and poor organization combined to convince the
people the neither he nor the officials closest to him knew a great deal about how to
organize the nation for the war or how effectively to direct its war program, especially in
the area of agriculture. According to Hinshaw, American farmers were hit hard by the
war and by incompetent government bureaucrats, who suffered from a “surplus
psychology,” and who thus tied farmers’ hands with limitations on labor and
machinery—resulting, ultimately, in a limitation of farmers’ capacity to produce. The
decline of farm labor was linked to a mass exodus from the farm to the factory, as a result of the administration’s bargains with labor over higher salaries. The drafting of young farm boys into the service at incredibly high rates also dealt a significant blow to farm labor needs. Meanwhile, farmers felt undermined by a lack of farm equipment parts, which the administration failed to provide in a timely manner, and a lack of gasoline, which the government continued to ration, to run that equipment.  

Democrats (and the American Left, in general) were also divided in the area of foreign policy. Though, as discussed earlier, liberals were in general agreement on the war and internationalism—that is, they believed in the war effort and in an active role for America in the postwar era—they were becoming increasingly divided over what the world should like after the defeat of the Axis Powers. For example, to those on the left such as Henry Wallace and the editors of *The Nation* and *The New Republic*, the war offered America a chance to establish a New Deal for the world—an opportunity, as the Vice President described it in the spring of 1941, to organize the postwar world around “the eradication of human suffering and poverty.” To others, such as Earl Browder, leader of the American Communist Party, the war—and especially FDR’s “good will” statements at the Tehran Conference in November 1943—offered legitimacy for communists in the American political process. “Emerging from these friendly conferences [with the Soviet Union, China, and Great Britain],” Roosevelt declared at Tehran, “we look with confidence to the day when all the peoples of the world may live free lives untouched by tyranny and according to their varying desires and their own consciences. We came here with hope and determination. We leave here friends in fact, in spirit and in purpose.”  

Browder, as he wrote in *Teheran and America* (1944), believed this communiqué meant
that the capitalist democracies had finally agreed “to accept the Soviet Union ‘as a permanent member of the family of nations,’ abandoning once and for all their hopes for its destruction.” Furthermore, Browder saw it as an opportunity for the Marxist minority in the United States to be accepted, and to be allowed to collaborate actively with the democratic majorities in the country. “Our post-war plan,” Browder wrote, “is national unity for the realization of the perspectives laid down in Teheran.” The 1944 presidential election provided the American Communists, they believed, with their first opportunity to partner with “progressives” as legitimate players in American politics. They were wrong. In fact, such misreading of the American mind led to a reaction of others also on the Left who viewed communists in general and the Soviet Union in particular, as the major threats to postwar peace and security. Once again, as the 1944 elections approached, Republicans sensed an opportunity for gain.

Then, during a press conference in December 1943, the President announced that the New Deal slogan was no longer relevant, and that what was needed was a “Dr. Win-the-War.” When pressed later by reporters to explain the comment, Roosevelt added that Dr. New Deal had treated an internally sick nation during the Depression. After Pearl Harbor, Dr. Win-the-War had to be consulted to fight a new crisis, a external infection that threatened the nation’s very survival. Liberals, though not entirely shocked, were outraged. Public reaction, meanwhile, was also less than enthusiastic. In a confidential report to Roosevelt in early 1944, Samuel Rosenman informed the President that most Americans supported a federal commitment of full employment and to expand social security programs. Furthermore, many in the administration believed that Democratic losses in the 1942 midterms were the result of lack of interest among Democratic voters,
and that an abandonment of the New Deal, even as a slogan, could generate greater electoral apathy in 1944.

Roosevelt, however, was a very pragmatic politician, and not a starry-eyed theorist. He was, as he himself noted in his 1932 *Looking Forward*, interested in applying what worked to solve a particular problem at hand. In 1933, during the dark days of the Great Depression, the New Deal was his tool. By the early 1940s, however, the United States was not in an economic depression, but a global war, and “Dr. New Deal” was not equipped to handle that crisis. The Second World War required an all-out Allied victory, and thus the emergence of what Roosevelt called “Dr. Win-the-War,” characterized by military construction, troop deployments, and wartime domestic controls. Though he never articulated it as such, Roosevelt implied—even in his December 1943 news conference—that once the war had been won, there would need to be a new Dr. to handle the postwar period—a “Dr. Keep-the-Peace,” perhaps, to practice preventive health care within the international system. The New Deal was not dead during the war, just dormant, and by all indications, Roosevelt planned to incorporate it into a postwar atmosphere of peace. Indeed, in early 1944, during his State of the Union Address, he unveiled what one historian has called the “Second Bill of Rights.”

On 11 January 1944, President Roosevelt delivered his Eleventh Annual Message to Congress in absentia. For the first time since 1913, when Woodrow Wilson restored the practice of the President appearing before a joint session of Congress in person, the President did not deliver the State of the Union address in person. Roosevelt, struggling with the flu and under doctor’s orders to stay in the White House, sent a paper copy to Capitol Hill instead. Then, at 9:00 p.m., the President—fearing that the newspapers
would not give the undelivered speech full attention – read his message to the nation over the radio. He was, the President explained to his listeners, under doctor’s orders to rest and remain indoors. In what was perhaps the most radical speech his presidency, he argued that “true individual freedom cannot exist without economic security and independence. ‘Necessitous men are not free men,’” he said. “People who are hungry and out of a job are the stuff of which dictatorships are made.” The President then articulated a “second Bill of Rights under which a new basis of security and prosperity can be established for all—regardless of station, race, or creed.” It included the right to a useful and vital job; the right to earn enough to provide adequate food and clothing and recreation; the right of farmers to raise and sell their products for a decent return; the right of businessmen to trade in an atmosphere of freedom from unfair competition and domination by monopolies at home or abroad; the right of every family to a comfortable home; the right of all to adequate medical care; the right to adequate protection from the economic fears of old age, sickness, accident, and unemployment; and the right to a good education. These rights, he insisted, spelled security, and after the war must be implemented. “America’s own rightful place in the world depends in large part upon how fully these and similar rights have been carried into practice for our citizens. For unless there is security here at home there cannot be lasting peace in the world.”141 With this bold and high-minded speech, Roosevelt, subtly but surely, kicked off his bid for a fourth term. Dr. New Deal and Dr. Win-the-War had become one.
The Republican Party

The Republican Party of the early 1940s was a party divided and in disarray. One problem facing the party as 1944 approached, was that it had not elected a national ticket for sixteen years—not since 1928 and Herbert Hoover’s victory over Al Smith. Saddled with the blame for the Great Depression, and unable to articulate a clear and positive vision for economic recovery, Republicans witnessed their power and majority status diminish at all levels of government throughout the 1930s. The election of Democrat Franklin Roosevelt to the presidency in 1932 marked the end of decades of Republican electoral dominance, and the beginning of a Democratic majority that would last twenty years. Republicans were repudiated, disheartened, and divided. Writing in the New York Herald Tribune shortly before Roosevelt’s landslide victory in the 1936 presidential election, Walter Lippmann observed: “There are as yet no signs that the Republican party has found an issue on which it can unite. In fact, there are many signs which indicate that the schism which rent it in 1912, was healed in 1920, and broke out again in 1932, is deeper than ever.”

When the Seventy-fifth Congress convened in early 1937, only seventeen Republicans sat in the Senate, and eighty-nine in the House of Representatives. Unfamiliar with minority status, frustrated Republican leaders often stumbling into political errors, further undermining both party morale and public support. Though the party had improved by the end of the decade, it was due less to its own political ingenuity than to Democratic blunders and infighting. After all, the late 1930s were marked by Roosevelt’s “court-packing” plan (1937), the “Roosevelt recession” (1937-1938), and the beginning of World War II in Europe (1939). Nevertheless, in
those years of Democratic victories, many Republican voters had died and little effort had been made to acquaint new voters with the basic ideals of the party. In fact, as political scientist Samuel Lubell noted in the 1950s, Republicans had long been laboring on the wrong side of the national birthrate. During the 1930s, twenty-one million people reached voting age, the majority of whom were children of the immigrant poor. Their parents had come to the United States some twenty-eight million strong between 1890 and 1914, and had settled in Atlantic seaboard cities and habitually voted Democratic. These urban minorities had received little support from Republicans in the 1920s, and when their children came of age—coupled with the Great Depression—assured the GOP a decade of political aridity.  

Another problem facing the GOP by the early 1940s was a lack of serious and popular direction. Out of power at all levels Republicans did not have a single leader or voice the way Democrats did in the person of the President of the United States, and thus they descended into factionalism with congressional leaders and presidential contenders all espousing rival agendas, both foreign and domestic. The only leader closely associated with the party was the nation’s only living ex-president, the unpopular Herbert Hoover. Then there was the problem of Franklin Roosevelt himself. Roosevelt was one of the most talented politicians in American history. Republicans could not match his political wits, and they did not know how to deal with “That Man.” He was elected with 57% of the vote in 1932; a record-breaking 60.8% in 1936; and 55% in his successful bid for an unprecedented third term in office in 1940. And it seemed as if he would never go away. Indeed, Roosevelt was seeking a fourth term in 1944.
Also, the United States was at war, and the American people—previously divided over whether or not the U.S. should support the Allies in the Second World War—rallied together with a total commitment to a “no end save victory” over Japan and its Axis partners. Republicans, then, faced the dilemma of being the opposition party in a time of war. That status required a delicate balance between the expression of patriotism and support of the war on the one hand, and the display of constructive criticism and political relevance on the other. After Pearl Harbor, many Republicans saw the war as a possible threat to their existence, and believed that the Democrats would try to use the patriotic and unified spirit across the country to their political advantage. A nationwide speech by the chairman of the Democratic National Committee, Edward J. Flynn, in February 1942, seemed to confirm this suspicion.

Flynn charged that Republicans were “not as much interested in the war as … [in] controlling the House of Representatives.”¹⁴⁶ “[M]y feeling,” he continued, “is that this crisis having occurred during a Democratic administration… is ours to direct… to an ultimate and complete victory.” Looking ahead to the November midterm elections, Flynn added: “I naturally feel that no misfortune except a major military defeat could befall this country to the extent involved in the election of a Congress hostile to the President… We have not forgotten the obstacles thrown in the path of President Wilson after the first World War and the ultimate victims were people.”¹⁴⁷ Republicans were outraged by Flynn’s comments. Joe Martin, Chairman of the Republican National Committee, accused the DNC chairman of “seeking a one-party system, and of wanting to ‘liquidate’ the Republican opposition.”¹⁴⁸ “Republicans,” he said, “will continue to give President Roosevelt one hundred per cent support to win the war. We will continue
to put national safety above partisanship. Despite abuse or vilification... we will stand by the American right to offer any constructive appraisal or suggestion.149 Four days after Flynn’s speech, Roosevelt reprimanded the committee chairman, telling reporters: “When a country is at war we want Congressman, regardless of party—get that—to back up the Government of the United States.”

Still, what should Republicans do? How far should their members of Congress accept blindly the measures presented and the powers and funds requested by the administration? How far should they surrender their own views to hasten any war program approved by the President? Speaking on the floor of the Senate a few days after Pearl Harbor, Republican Senator Robert A. Taft of Ohio, argued: “I believe there can be no doubt that criticism in time of war is essential to the maintenance of any kind of democratic government... Of course, that criticism should not give any information to the enemy. But too many people desire to suppress criticism simply because they think that it will give some comfort to the enemy to know that there is such criticism...

Congress does have the job of reasonable criticism. I think it has the job of criticizing the conduct of the war when it is properly subject to criticism. [For example], the surprise at Hawaii should, in my opinion, be investigated by committees of Congress, and not left entirely to the executive department.”150 A few months later, former President Herbert Hoover echoed Taft’s sentiment in a speech before the Annual Assembly of the National Industrial Conference Board, Inc., in New York City. According to Hoover, “Criticism of the conduct of the war may rightly lead to criticism of public officials. In a democracy even the President is not immune from rightful criticism... Patriotism is not devotion to public servant. It is devotion to our country and its right aims. No public servant can be
free of criticism if democracy is to continue to live.”151 Hoover’s speech was well-received from many quarters, and was, at Senator Taft’s initiative, printed in the

_Congressional Record._152

Finally, Republicans suffered from an identity crisis—particularly as it related to foreign policy. Though isolationism—defined variously as “antipathy toward Europe and things European (particularly military alliances, power politics, and wars), belief in the invulnerability and suzerainty of the United States in the Western Hemisphere, [and] a fervidly nationalistic desire to preserve American freedom of action”—cut across party lines, it was most widely associated with the Republican Party.153 It had been Republicans who led the fight against Woodrow Wilson’s beloved League of Nations after World War I, and it had been Republicans in the years immediately prior to Pearl Harbor, who were the most vocal “noninterventionists” and members of such “isolationist” organizations as America First. That did not mean, of course, that all, or even most, within the GOP were isolationists—they were not. Still, as with most other issues, Republicans were divided along several, fine lines when it came to foreign policy. First, there were the staunch isolationists—those like New York Congressman Hamilton Fish and New Mexico Congresswoman Ruth McCormick Simms—who opposed American involvement in world affairs on the grounds that national interconnections, if unordered by political authority, lead inevitably to war. Many isolationists, even after Pearl Harbor, never fully reconciled themselves to American military involvement in the Second World War. Furthermore, they were all opposed to any kind of revived or rejuvenated postwar “league of nations.”
Second, there were those Republicans like former President Hoover, who favored American participation in world affairs—and who even before Pearl Harbor had begun considering “the kind of world organization toward which we should all work after the war”—but who had opposed American intervention into World War II before Pearl Harbor. This group of “noninterventionists” genuinely believed that the U.S. would be able to achieve greater influence on future peace if it remained out of the war. They were not isolationists in the strictest sense, and after Pearl Harbor, this group immediately expressed support for both the President and the war effort. As Michigan Senator Arthur Vandenberg, a symbol of “isolationism” in the U.S. Senate, later observed, “My convictions regarding international cooperation and collective security for peace took firm form on the afternoon of the Pearl Harbor attack. That day ended isolationism for any realist.”

Finally, there were those within the party who, in early 1941, had endorsed Roosevelt’s Lend-Lease plan for assisting the Allies, and accepted the growing likelihood that the United States would be required to enter the war. Furthermore, these Republican “internationalists” sought to “convince Americans to join a world peace organization and thereby promote equality among all peoples, regardless of race, color, or nationality.” Specifically, most in this group advocated (1) the immediate creation of an Allied organization to address war problems, and (2) the transformation of that Allied organization into a world state to settle postwar problems, and to keep future peace. Led by Wendell Willkie, the party’s unsuccessful nominee for President in 1940, they were described by their more conservative critics as “Republican Pollyannas who want to compete with Henry Wallace.” Principled, ambitious, tactless, and a former Democrat,
Willkie alienated many Republicans in the spring of 1942, with his refusal to forgive past noninterventionist stands, and to categorize all Republicans who had disagreed with the Roosevelt foreign policy as “isolationists.” Delivering the commencement address at Union College in May 1942, the Hoosier—with an eye toward the approaching midterm elections—called upon the graduates to “choose leaders who have principles and the courage to state them plainly. Not men who examine each shift of sentiment and watch the polls of public opinion to learn where they stand. I beg of you, vote for straight-out men—not wobblers.”

Willkie was especially critical of New York gubernatorial candidate, Thomas E. Dewey, whom the above Union College remarks were no doubt directed toward. Willkie’s dislike of Dewey was grounded in two things. First, he distrusted Dewey’s recent conversion to internationalism, and believed the former District Attorney would become a rallying point for isolationists after the war. And second, Willkie wanted to become the Republican nominee for President in 1944, and he viewed Dewey as his chief rival. Like any other contender, he sought to discredit and eliminate possible threats to his candidacy. As a matter of fact, Willkie’s foreign policy views were not that different from Dewey, Hoover, and Landon. Certainly, he was more of an idealist, but he was no more of an internationalist. Willkie genuinely wanted to reform the Republican Party, and he desperately wanted to become President. His passion, mixed with his ambition and his poor political skills, combined to distance him from those who were actually quite close to him on most issues.

Thomas Dewey was a very cautious politician, whose views on foreign policy had in fact developed significantly since 1940. Yet, as one historian observed, “he was too
proud and too much a partisan to do public penance for past [isolationist] misjudgments. As well, he accurately assessed that discussion of foreign policy was still a perilous balancing act for any Republican with national ambitions. Because the GOP was a minority party, a politician could ill-afford alienating factions of the Party by speaking out on each facet of diplomacy as it emerged. Thus, he was annoyed by Willkie’s constant sniping in the spring of 1942, and believed the Hoosier was attempting to corner him on the issues, and sabotage his gubernatorial campaign—if not blatantly challenge him for the office. In fact, on 30 June 1942, Dewey composed an anonymous, and ultimately unsent, letter to Willkie, in which he “criticized the 1940 nominee for his ‘dog in the manger’ attitude toward Dewey. The letter warned that now Willkie was a candidate again, he would have to defend certain ‘isolationist statements’ made in 1940. ‘I think that most people would like to forget about the past,’ the letter continued, ‘but you have set the standard for looking backward.’ The letter ended by urging Willkie to stay out of the New York race. ‘Most of your real friends would deplore a contest between you and Mr. Dewey. You are working for the same ends… unity in the war and the building of a better world after the victory.’” As it turned out, Willkie did not challenge Dewey for governor. Instead, the former party standard bearer in the fall of 1942, departed the country on a fifty-day journey around the world.

Most Republicans were noninterventionists, and after Pearl Harbor, they resented criticism from officials within the Roosevelt administration, as well as among Willkie Republicans, that they had been “isolationists.” On 20 May 1942, Hoover, in his first major speech after U.S. entry into the war, warned against intolerance:
There are a number of varieties of intolerance. One cult undoubtedly believes that outside the obvious alien enemy agents and crackpots... there is a group of Americans somewhere in some dark corner who want defeat. I have not heard a single sane American who wants defeat. They want victory.

But the national gunning for this phantasmagoria has taken too much ground. The high priests of this cult have concluded that all those who were opposed to war before Pearl Harbor cannot possibly be patriotic Americans ever. Or at least they are under suspicion as being appeasers, compromisers, various obnoxious bipeds, reptiles, and Cliveden sets, Nazis sympathizers and Sixth Columnists. Yet 75 per cent of the American people were opposed to the war before the attack on Pearl Harbor. Nevertheless this 75 per cent who are now in outer darkness are willingly sacrificing their sons, their brothers, their husbands, and they are working and paying without murmur.\textsuperscript{161}

After the speech, Hoover privately observed that it had raised the hair of those who had organized for the midterm elections to defeat all Republican Representatives and Senators who had been pre-Pearl Harbor noninterventionists. “This group,” Hoover complained, “is an unnatural combination of the reactionaries and the left-wingers who, for entirely different points of view, worked to get the country into war—and want a monopoly of patriotism now.”\textsuperscript{162}

Communicating closely with Hoover on party affairs, especially as it related to foreign policy, was Alf Landon of Kansas, the unsuccessful Republican nominee for President in 1936. Like Hoover, the former Kansas Governor expressed concern over the “ridiculous charge that the Republican party is isolationist.” In a nationally-broadcast Flag Day address in 1943, Landon sought to lay that accusation to rest. He called “for open discussion of the non-military aspects of United States foreign policy and congressional minority representation in the formulation of that policy.”\textsuperscript{163} More importantly, he outlined, in a very similar fashion to Hoover and Gibson, a “realistic” postwar plan for
peace. According to Landon, representatives of the Allies “should, for several years after the war, sit as ‘an interim world council’ to supervise punishment of war criminals, disarmament and political reconstruction of enemy countries, restoration of world-trade relations, and famine relief. Such a council should also set up commissions to consider plans for better international economic relations, for the government of undeveloped lands, for machinery to ensure a lasting peace, for world disarmament, and ‘for international recognition of the principle of religious liberty and for the autonomy of nations.’” He also urged that the United States soon recognize the desirability of some form of ‘permanent international organization’ … for achieving… the prevention of conflicts between nations.”

Willkie, Hoover, and Landon, of course, were not the only Republicans speaking and writing about foreign policy in the early war years. Harold Stassen, Governor of Minnesota and presidential contender, unveiled, in March 1943, a plan that also embraced the creation of an association of sovereign nations. This body, Stassen proposed, should be organized as a single-house Parliament, and devoted to, among other things, establishing a world code of justice, and building a “United Nations Legion,” consisting of air, naval, and land forces capable of enforcing the code of justice, supporting the administration of international areas, and insuring the continued disarmament of probationary areas. Meanwhile, Clarence Budington Kelland, Republican National Committeeman from Arizona, outlined his own plan for postwar American security—a blueprint The Nation blasted as a “post-war America First.” Kelland’s so-called “Zones of Safety Plan” called for postwar regional pacts, a “concord among the victor nations” to maintain the peace, and the building of a five-ocean navy.
Though he spoke frequently of “international collaboration,” Kelland nowhere mentioned
or embraced the concept of world organization.

With the GOP “emitting signals in all directions” on foreign policy issues, Harrison
Spangler, the newly elected Republican National Committee Chairman, announced in
May 1943, that a foreign policy conference was to be held that fall on Mackinac Island in
Lake Michigan. The origins of the Mackinac Conference were grounded in the
formation, in May 1943, of a pro-Willkie, anti-isolationist, extra-party organization called
the Republican Post-war Policy Association. Not wanting to be upstaged, and fearing
disunity on foreign policy as the 1944 presidential election approached, Spangler—a
friendly acquaintance of Dewey, who had been a compromise choice as chairman--
invited forty-nine Republican congressmen, governors (including Thomas Dewey), and
RNC members. Wendell Willkie, who did not hold public office, was not invited, and
neither were Senators Joseph Ball of Minnesota and Harold Burton of Ohio, both of
whom had been advocating the creation of a United Nations Organization for months.

The task of drafting a foreign policy model to be presented at Mackinac fell to Senator
Vandenberg. “I am hunting for the middle ground,” Vandenberg wrote a friend,
“between those extremists at one end of the line who would cheerfully give America
away and those extremists at the other end of the line who would attempt a total isolation
which has come to be an impossibility.” Vandenberg’s advance resolution was
submitted to Dewey, and a few others, for review before the conference began in early
September. Dewey carefully scrutinized the proposals, urging Vandenberg to “use more
specific language when discussing Republican obligations toward future world peace.”
Overall, Vandenberg’s plan, approved by the Mackinac Conference on 8 September,
followed closely the Senator’s own resolution then before the Senate. Overall, the Mackinac Declaration called for “responsible participation by the United States in a post-war cooperative organization among sovereign nations to prevent military aggression and to offer permanent peace with organized justice in a free world [italics added].”

Writing to Vandenberg after the conference, Dewey congratulated the Senator “on a great job of conciliating the divergent views not only of your committee but of the whole Council… The Party should be grateful to you indeed for a major contribution to its welfare as well as that of the country.” Even Willkie called it “a very distinct step in the right direction.” The Republican Party was now on record, with the war still in progress, as supporting the principle of international organization. As historian Robert Divine noted in the early 1970s, “It was the most important step yet taken toward American involvement in a future international organization.”

The United Nations, the Holocaust, and Postwar Germany

While Republicans articulated a postwar foreign policy at Mackinac in 1943, the Roosevelt administration continued to struggle with developing its own detailed and long-range plan for the postwar world. One obstacle to creating an early plan was the administration’s fear of antagonizing the Soviet Union to the point that it made a separate peace with Germany. Another problem for the White House was public opinion, and the concern that any attempt to define a consistent and feasible pattern of war objectives might undermine domestic unity and the prosecution of the war. Shortly after Pearl Harbor, the State Department, led by Cordell Hull of Tennessee, was assigned the task of
developing concrete war aims—including considerations not only of world organization, but also treatment of the defeated Axis Powers. In regards to world organization, Hull, a neo-Wilsonian internationalist and sure-footed devotee to collective security who wanted to avoid the mistakes of 1919 and 1920, established in early 1942 the Advisory Committee on Postwar Foreign Policy to formulate a blueprint for peace and to help generate a public opinion favorable to the idea of world organization. It included representatives from the State, War, Navy, Treasury, and Agriculture Departments, the White House, the Board of Economic Warfare, the general public, and both Democrats and Republicans in Congress. Hull, however, continued to move cautiously, focusing not on specific plans, but on educating the American people on the merits of any such international body.

Meanwhile, on 14 March 1943, Republican Senator Joseph Ball of Minnesota, introduced in the U.S. Senate the bipartisan Ball-Burton-Hatch-Hill Resolution ("B2H2"), which called for “an organization of the United Nations” with authority “to provide for the assembly and maintenance of a United Nations military force and to suppress by immediate use of such force any future attempt at military aggression by any nation.” Without input and leadership from the White House—Roosevelt was not as enthusiastic about collective security as Hull—and with both Democrats and Republicans divided along several ideological lines, the resolution soon stalled. Then, on 21 September 1943, shortly after Republicans met at Mackinac, the U.S. House of Representatives overwhelmingly passed the Fulbright Resolution, named after freshman Arkansas Democrat, J. William Fulbright, expressing support for the creation of “appropriate international machinery with power adequate to establish and to maintain a
just and lasting peace among the nations of the world, and as favoring the participation of
the United States therein.\textsuperscript{176} In early November the Senate finally followed suit and
passed a similar United Nations resolution, the Connally Resolution-- named after its
sponsor, Democrat Tom Connally of Texas—that recognized “the necessity of there
being established at the earliest practicable date a general international organization,
based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all peace-loving states, and open to
membership by all such states, large and small, for the maintenance of international peace
and security.”\textsuperscript{177} In both the House and Senate resolutions—as well as in the subsequent
joint resolution—the supporters of B2H2 failed to secure explicit reference to military
force. For his part, Ball was determined to make it a central issue in the upcoming
presidential campaign.

Franklin Roosevelt, though an “internationalist” and public supporter of collective
security rhetoric, never had any intention of limiting U.S. freedom of action within the
context of a postwar collective security organization.\textsuperscript{178} According to political scientist
Willard Range, Roosevelt held few deep convictions regarding the details or structure of
the machinery of collective security.\textsuperscript{179} His chief interest and goal was cooperative action
by states for the maintenance of peace, and not the search for proper vehicles and method
to apply that principle. He was, nevertheless, willing to accept almost anything in the
way of machinery so long as it produced the desired end of cooperative action. Thus, he
allowed Hull and Democrats in Congress to proceed with a United Nations plan in 1943
and 1944. Roosevelt’s own cooperative preference, however, remained traditional
balance of power, spheres-of-interest, realpolitik. As he revealed publicly at Tehran in
December 1943, the President wanted Big Power guardianship over not only the policing
of the defeated Axis Powers but also all important postwar decisions. Specifically, he envisioned the world divided into four spheres of influence each dominated and policed by its most powerful resident—Great Britain, China, the United States, and the Soviet Union.

Another foreign policy problem facing the Roosevelt administration by 1944 was the question of postwar Germany. Would it, as Gerald Swope, president of General Electric and a friend of FDR, suggested in a New York Times article in September 1943, be broken up, slapped with economic controls, and purged of it “Prussian military clique”? Or, would it, as Secretary of State Cordell Hull envisioned, be unified and have a strong, self-supporting economy that would help “restore sanity to its society and empower the rebuilding of Europe”? Franklin Roosevelt believed himself to have a special understanding of German politics and psychology. As historian Michael Beschloss noted in a recent study on this subject, no other American President had had more early experience on German soil than FDR. As a youth, his family traveled to Germany frequently, even enrolling him in a local school to learn the language. In 1901, he and his mother had tea with Wilhelm II aboard the Kaiser’s yacht. Then, in 1919, shortly after World War I, Roosevelt, as Assistant Secretary of the Navy once again returned to Germany, this time with his wife, Eleanor, to visit the ancient fortress at Ehrenbreitstein on the Rhine and Mosel Rivers. This “education” had deeply influenced the President. According to Beschloss, he believed that “the Germans were a ‘misguided’ people ‘subjected to the rule of a [Prussian] military caste’ and ‘led along a path they could not understand.’” Like the author of Is Germany Incurable?, a popular book published in 1943 by New York psychiatrist Richard Brickner, Roosevelt believed German society to
be “paranoid” and “megalomaniac.” In late 1943, the President told Hull that Germany should be divided into three or more states with Prussia—which he incorrectly perceived to be great haven for Nazism—totally disarmed and completely isolated. Of those closest to President, Secretary of the Treasury, Henry Morgenthau, a secular Jew and longtime friend and Hyde Park neighbor of FDR, had perhaps the most influence with the President—at least on this issue.  

In January 1944, after early indications of a Jewish Holocaust, Morgenthau had gone to the President requesting the creation of a War Refugee Board, “to forestall the plan of the Nazis to exterminate all Jews and other minorities.” Roosevelt—not wanting congressional hearings on government inaction, and fearful of the loss of the Jewish votes to an acceptable Republican such as Thomas Dewey of New York—agreed. Now, a few months later, Morgenthau proposed another plan to the President, one for postwar Germany. Overall, the Morgenthau Plan called for all heavy German industry to be destroyed. Germany’s plants and equipment, labor, and other assets would be given to the Soviet Union, and other Nazi victims. There would be no reparations, but the Allies would draw up a list of “arch-criminals of the war,” and once apprehended, be “put to death forthwith by firing squads.” Finally, reflecting the President’s own views of Prussian militarism, all German aircraft, military uniforms, bands, and parades would be outlawed. The War Department was hostile to Morgenthau’s proposal, considering it dangerous and naïve. The big question, however, was what FDR thought of the plan.
In 1944, the Socialist Party of America rallied behind fifty-nine year-old Norman Thomas, a New York lecturer and writer, and party standard-bearer since 1928. Born in Ohio in 1884, Thomas graduated from Princeton University in 1905, where he studied history and political science under Woodrow Wilson. By 1911, Thomas, a Presbyterian pastor in East Harlem, had become a committed socialist and pacifist. In 1918, during the First World War, he founded and edited the socialist paper *The World Tomorrow*. Two years later, Thomas joined with Jane Addams, Upton Sinclair, and Elizabeth Gurley Flynn to establish the American Civil Liberties Union. In the early 1920s, he served as an associate editor of *The Nation*, and in 1924, he became the Socialist candidate for Governor of New York. Following the death Eugene Debs in the late 1920s, he became the Socialists’ quadrennial candidate for president through 1948.182

During the early days of World War II, Thomas was a vocal critic of American intervention. In September 1940, he, along with Charles Lindberg and Burton Wheeler, formed the America First Committee, which quickly became the most powerful isolationist group in the United States. It advocated four principles: (1) that the United States must build an impregnable defense, (2) that no foreign power could successfully attack a prepared America, (3) that American democracy would be preserved only by staying out of the Second World War, and (4) that any “aid short of war” would weaken national defense at home, and threaten to involve the United States in the war abroad. After Pearl Harbor, Thomas, of course, changed his position on the war, and expressed his support of the U.S. war effort. However, he continued to be a very vocal critic of the
Roosevelt administration—especially as it related to the policy of “unconditional surrender.”

On 4 June, Thomas accepted his party’s presidential for the fifth time. Addressing supporters in Reading, Pennsylvania, he attacked the similarities between the Republican and Democratic Party platforms. “It is a sobering and even alarming prospect that confronts us,” Thomas declared. “The campaign will be bitter. Emotions will be roused more or less along class lines. Democrats and Republicans will vie with each other in calling the name fascist. But actually and by design there will be a minimum of difference in the vague generalities the politicians will offer us—the choice between Tweedledum and Tweedlededee will scarcely be worth the cost.” Thomas’s own platform called for “an immediate political peace offensive based on the offer of an armistice to the peoples of the Axis nations.” This “peace offensive” would consist of the Allied settlement of boundary disputes, the formation of regional federations of small nations, the offer of self-government to colonial lands, and worldwide disarmament. On the domestic front, meanwhile, Thomas he promised to rule the economic “heights.” These heights of the modern economic order—natural resources, money, banking and credit, monopolies and semi-monopolies, and public utilities—must be, he declared, socially owned and controlled. In addition, a Socialist administration would “fight the handing over of the new ‘public domain,’ the war plants, to big business,” and support public works projects (when necessary) and shorter hours to fight unemployment. Thomas’s running-mate was forty-seven year-old Darlington Hoopes, a Reading attorney and former state legislator. 183
Chapter Three:
The Republican Nomination

There were a number of Republican contenders for the presidency in 1944. One name often mentioned by Washington insiders was “Mr. Republican,” the son of former President William Howard Taft, Senator Robert A. Taft of Ohio. Taft, aged fifty-five, was a freshman senator, elected in 1938, and the chief conservative spokesman within the Republican Party. Like Thomas Dewey, he had made a serious, and ultimately unsuccessful, run for the Republican nomination in 1940. A brilliant political analyst, Taft, as early as 1941, was contemplating another run for the presidency. By the end of 1942, however, he was not optimistic about Republican chances in 1944, and decided against a presidential bid—making it official in December of that year. There were a number of reasons for Taft’s decision not to run. First, President Roosevelt, whom most, including Taft, believed would seek a fourth term, was enjoying enormous popularity as “Dr. Win-the-War,” and would be difficult to defeat in wartime. Second, Taft was up for reelection to the U.S. Senate in 1944, and by all accounts, would face stiff Democratic resistance. If he tried for the presidency and failed, he might, he feared, lose his Senate seat. And third, Ohio’s other outspoken conservative Republican, Governor John W. Bricker, won reelection to a third term in 1942, and was already building a campaign organization. With Taft out of the race, conservatives, united in their opposition to Wendell Willkie, rallied behind the popular Ohio governor.

John William Bricker wanted to be President of the United States, and in November 1943, he announced his candidacy for the 1944 Republican nomination. Overall, Bricker was a contender with several political advantages. First, he was an attractive governor
from the Midwest. Ohio had produced seven Republican Presidents since the end of the Civil War, and Bricker--the only Republican in Ohio’s history to be elected to three terms as governor—had proven himself a natural vote-getter. Born in a cabin in 1893, the fifty-year-old Bricker had a reputation in Ohio as a “plain, homespun, common-sense fellow,” who, as a youth, had attended a little red schoolhouse near Columbus, and helped his German-Scot-Irish father husk corn. As Governor, he was “ruggedly honest, intensely sincere,” and hardworking. “There is a saying,” The American Mercury observed in May 1943, “that any man who can carry Ohio, Michigan, and Indiana can be elected President of the United States. If this is true, then John William Bricker could be elected today; for there seems little doubt that he could carry these states against Roosevelt.”

A second advantage for Bricker was his solid anti-New Deal, conservative credentials. On his first day as Governor in 1939, he had fired four thousand office holders in the state, and by the early 1940s could boast that in spite of greatly increased public services, Ohio had fewer state employees—22,000 in all—than it did just a few short years ago. In contrast, he complained, “we’ve got 90,000 Federal employees in Ohio. What do they do? I ask you, what do they do? We haven’t asked deferment for a single State employee, yet thousands of these Federal jobholders are being kept out of the Army!” A top priority in a Bricker presidency, he told a reporter, would be a drastic decrease in the number of federal employees. He wanted to be President, he said, not to save the world, but to “defeat that bunch of rascals” and “fumigate Washington.”

Third, Bricker did not have a prewar “isolationist” record. In fact, he had been so busy “running Ohio” that he had not gotten involved in any of the postwar planning
debates. He did not have time for that fight, he once explained, but insisted that his first concern would be simply “to make America strong.”

Fourth, he had strong support in the South. In October 1943, former President Hoover advised Bricker—in an early instance of the “Southern strategy”—“that gaining the support of conservative states’ rights southerners was a key to victory. He wrote to the governor: ‘It seems to me our job is to secure the support of the Jeffersonian wing of the Democratic Party, not try for the New Dealers—whom we can never get.’” Bricker agreed, and in late 1943 traveled to the South and met with community leaders in several states, including the Virginia Chamber of Commerce.

And fifth, Bricker was—aside from Willkie—the only Republican who had officially announced his candidacy. Other possibilities, including New York Governor Thomas Dewey, General Douglas MacArthur, and Minnesota Governor Harold Stassen (in service in the Pacific), all insisted that they neither wanted the nomination nor were seeking it. If Bricker was in fact the only conservative in the race, and the liberal Willkie, who had strong opposition within the party, could be outmaneuvered, the Ohio Governor had every reason to believe that his chances of becoming the party’s nominee were very strong.

If Bricker was a contender with many advantages—and he was—then he was also a candidate with many flaws—flaws that ultimately proved his undoing. One problem with Bricker was that he was a virtual unknown outside of the Midwest. Furthermore, he was perceived to be an intellectual lightweight, who was vague on most issues, especially those relating to foreign policy. That image was not helped the Governor, when in a response to a reporter’s question, in the spring of 1943, on postwar planning, admitted: “I
don’t know anything about how the postwar world should be organized. I have never been to Europe. How can I know where the boundary between Russia and Poland should be? How can I know what kind of government France should have? If I should be elected President, I’ll get the best advice I can from people who know something about the rest of the world, and I’ll do the best I can.” While such statements were a part of the Governor’s overall “down-home” appeal in Ohio, he was seeking to move from the Governor’s Mansion to the White House, and as such, his remarks were shallow, naïve, and insufficient. Then, in March 1943, Bricker’s “pre-candidacy” was dealt a serious blow, when the great Kansas journalist William Allen White dismissed the Governor as “an honest Harding,” who, like the late president, “hopes to get by without saying anything, without getting on either side of the momentous questions of the hour—domestic or foreign.” He was, White continued, the candidate of “the same forces in the Republican Party that gathered around Taft in 1912 and that nominated Harding in a ‘smoke filled room’ in 1920.” Those forces must be resisted in 1944. The nation, he concluded, required a man with the leadership to “say who he is, what he is and why.”

The harm inflicted by White’s article was compounded by Bricker’s failure to respond adequately. In early April 1943, just a few weeks after White’s scathing piece, Bricker delivered what was supposed to be a major foreign policy address before the Political Science Academy in New York City. It was a dismal failure. According to Bricker biographer Richard O. Davies, “His speech amounted to nothing more than another set of familiar, if nonspecific, generalizations about the dangers to American freedom posed by an incursive federal bureaucracy. Not only was his speech lacking in specific policy statements and laden with trite generalizations, but he uncharacteristically suffered from a
first-class case of stage fright. His delivery was uncertain and tentative.” His remarks “only reinforced the growing perception that he lacked a grasp of the major issues.” Bricker did not help his case when, on 1 January 1944—in opening his official drive for the nomination—he delivered a nationally-broadcast radio address that, amazingly, failed to address any foreign policy issues. The Governor promised instead to focus upon “whether the place of the individual in society shall be strengthened or whether he shall become more and more dependent upon organized government.”

Bricker was further disabled by his failure to build a strong organization capable of coordinating the multiple demands of a campaign. In late 1943, Bricker’s campaign manager resigned after a dispute with his boss. Though a new manager was selected, the Bricker campaign continued to be perceived as loose, inefficient, and uncertain, and thus frightened away many potential financial supporters. In addition, complaints began to surface about mail going unanswered. John B. Hollister, a former Willkie supporter and advisor to Bricker, complained to the campaign in January 1944, that people—especially donors and National Committeemen—needed to be flattered, and that such “loose ends should be picked up.” “[T]here is,” he argued, “nothing more unflattering than failure to answer a letter.” In the end, Bricker’s star never rose. His campaign lacked depth, organization, momentum, and ultimately, popular support. He won only .3% of the total primary vote that spring.

The problems with Bricker led many conservatives to rally behind General Douglas MacArthur, the sixty-four-year-old commander of the Southwest Pacific Area theater. MacArthur was an attractive presidential possibility for several reasons. First, he had an impressive military background and reputation. A 1903 graduate of West Point, he
subsequently served as a member of the Army’s General Staff (1913-1917), Brigadier General of the 84th Infantry Brigade (1917-1918), Superintendent of West Point (1919-1922), Army Chief of Staff (1930-1935), military advisor to the Philippines (1935-1941), and commander of all U.S. forces in East Asia (1941-1942). Since early 1942, MacArthur had been waging an offensive against Japanese forces in the southwest Pacific, using “highly successful ‘leapfrog’ flanking envelopments with combined air, land, and sea forces.” From Australia, his base of operations, MacArthur had “leapfrogged” along the New Guinea coastline, and by the summer of 1944—following Admiral Chester Nimitz’s victories in Saipan, Tinian, and Guam—was poised to retake the Philippines.

In addition, the Arkansas native was very popular—a Roper poll conducted for Fortune magazine in 1942, revealed that the General had an approval rating of 57.3%. MacArthur’s popularity was grounded not only in his military successes, but also in his public utterances and ability to control the news. For example, “in 1943, he said of Corregidor, the doomed Philippine fortress from which he had escaped by PT boat the year before: ‘Until we lift our flag from its dust, we stand unredeemed before mankind. Until we claim again the ghastly remains of its last garrison, we can but stand humble supplicants before Almighty God. There lies our Holy Grail.’” In addition, he granted interviews to only those reporters who agreed to depict his speech and actions in very favorable and extravagant terms. Altogether, this led many Republicans, including Senator Arthur Vandenberg of Michigan, to believe that he was the only Republican capable of defeating Roosevelt in a wartime presidential campaign.
At the same time, MacArthur had conservative credentials. Though never an isolationist, MacArthur’s rout of the Bonus Army in Washington D.C., in 1932, as well as and his frequent clashes with President Roosevelt over Army appropriations in the mid 1930s, endeared him to many conservatives. Equally important was the fact that he seemed to be willing to accept a draft for the Republican nomination. In the spring of 1943, Senator Vandenberg met with two of MacArthur’s aides in Washington, and expressed vigorous support for the general. To the Senator’s surprise, he shortly thereafter received a confidential letter from MacArthur, dated 13 April 1943, which read: “I am most grateful to you for your complete attitude of friendship. I only hope that I can some day reciprocate. There is much that I would like to say to you which circumstances prevent. In the meanwhile I want you to know the absolute confidence I would feel in your experienced and wise mentorship. MacArthur.”13 In his diary, Vandenberg expressed amazement at the message, and its potential historical worth, and concluded, ‘Mac’ certainly is not ‘running away’ from anything. It is typical of his forthright courage.”14

Vandenberg, independently from the General, then proceeded to quietly organize a draft movement for MacArthur—“quietly,” he believed, being essential to success. Writing in his diary in September 1943, Vandenberg noted:

I think it is desperately important that there should be no signs whatever of any centrally organized activity. It seems to me that the American people are rapidly coming to understand what the General is up against in the Far East [a reference to the Roosevelt-Churchill decision to fight the war in Europe first and the subsequent shortage of men and materials in the Southwest Pacific]. These people can easily martyrize him into a completely irresistible figure. So it seems to me more important than ever that we should give our own ‘commander-in-chief’ no possible excuse...
upon which to hang his own political reprisals. It is obvious on every hand that the movement [for MacArthur] is making solid headway in all directions... I cling to the basic thought that if MacArthur can be nominated it will be as the result of a ground swell and not as the result of any ordinary preconvention political activities [italics added].

As it turned out, prudence and subtlety were not characteristics of either MacArthur or many of his Congressional supporters. Against Vandenberg’s protests, the General, who had made no public statement expressing interest in the presidency, was entered into both the Wisconsin and New Hampshire primaries, where he performed poorly—even coming in last in New Hampshire. In Illinois, MacArthur supporters won their only primary victory, with their candidate, running unopposed, receiving 76% of the vote. The result of all this visible draft activity was—just as Vandenberg had feared—increased scrutiny of the old soldier. Indeed, in January 1944, The American Mercury published a scathing article entitled, “General MacArthur: Fact and Legend” and which was subsequently printed in the Army Library Bulletin that February. The article identified the General with “Old Guard Republican” isolationists, and attempted to tear down—by separating “fact from fancy”—hero worship of MacArthur. Then, in mid-April 1944, came the death nail of MacArthur’s unofficial candidacy.

On 14 April, Republican Congressman A. L. Miller of Nebraska, a MacArthur supporter, disclosed that he had written to the general about the presidential race and had received a reply. He then released to the press his correspondence (two letters) with the Pacific commander. “I was shocked,” Vandenberg later recalled, “that he should have ever written the letters which Miller made public.” In Miller’s first letter, the Congressman railed against the Roosevelt administration and asserted “that unless this
New Deal can be stopped this time, our American way of life is forever doomed.”

MacArthur replied, expressing his agreement “unreservedly,” and Miller’s arguments as “complete wisdom and statesmanship.” In the second letter, which MacArthur called “scholarly,” Miller warned that “a ‘monarchy’ was being established in the United States by ‘left-wingers and New Dealism.’”

A few days later, on 29 April, MacArthur released a statement from his headquarters in New Guinea, requesting that “no action be taken that would link my name in any way to the nomination. I do not covet it nor would I accept it.”

“The MacArthur adventure,” as Vandenberg described the draft movement, was over.

Liberals in the Republican Party, meanwhile, placed their faith in Wendell Willkie, the party’s unsuccessful nominee four years earlier. Willkie returned to the United States in late October 1942, and began working on One World, to be published early the next year. He then opened his drive the Republican nomination in the summer of 1943, while touring the country and promoting his book. That fall, he made appearances throughout the West and South, but with little impact. A poll taken among the party rank and file for The Republican magazine in early 1944, revealed that the “average Republican leader” was willing to have the United States join a worldwide organization dedicated to keeping the peace and promoting economic cooperation. This average Republican, however, was against extensive disarmament after the war, the surrender of island outposts, and the ‘idea of Uncle Sam masquerading as an international Santa Claus.’

A Gallup poll in February showed Willkie a distant second to Dewey (45% to 21%) among Republican voters. Then, in March, Dewey’s lead in Gallup increased to 50%, while Willkie
remained in second place with a steady 21%. The decline of Willkie’s political fortunes in early 1944, was related to two things.

For one, he lacked political finesse, and as a result, was often perceived to be lecturing, rather than leading, the party. A former Democrat, he even on one occasion addressed his audience as “You Republicans.” In November 1943, the Omaha World-Herald observed that Republicans “mistrust [Willkie] as another ‘big cock of the roost,’ stubbornly bent on having his own way, with contempt for all others whether of high degree or low, if you are not as smart as he is.”23 Time magazine, meanwhile, referred to him as a “Moose on the Loose,” and described his manner at a fall dinner for freshmen GOP Congressmen in Washington as “aggressive” and “truculent.” According to the report, “Willkie told Congressmen he could have the Presidential nomination if he wanted it; he was ready to go over their heads to the people.”24 In late February 1944, he entered the Wisconsin primary—not the most friendly place for Willkie to make his stand considering the state’s isolationist background—and embarked on a grueling twelve-day, 1,500-mile trek across the state. He made a number of mistakes in Wisconsin. As Willkie scholar, Donald Bruce Johnson observed: “He was not always cordial to party workers upon whom he was dependent; he was uncompromising in his charges that his opponents represented reaction in contrast to his brand of liberalism; and most important, he bitterly criticized his own party members. No matter how valid his comments may have been, they smacked to party regulars of disloyalty to the party as a whole.”25 “Of course he was talking at the party from the outside,” Dewey later remarked. “Gosh, you like to have a fellow who identifies himself with the party if he expects to be its spokesman, its leader... He’d been a Democrat until 1940, and had never got over it.”26
And second, many Republicans, as polling data indicated, simply disagreed with the Hoosier on most issues. This was true not only in the area of foreign affairs, but also domestic issues. For example, on 3 February 1944, Willkie delivered a speech on “Our Domestic Economic, and Fiscal Policy in Relation to Our Well-Being at Home and Abroad,” in which he advocated dramatic tax increases to help pay for the war while it was still being waged.\(^\text{27}\) The speech was originally written by a Willkie advisor named John W. Hanes, who, in the first draft, called for lower taxes. Willkie read the speech, and believing the “lower the taxes” theme was unrealistic, changed it to include a sixteen billion-dollar tax increase. Hanes protested that such a proposal would kill Willkie off politically—to which the Hoosier replied: “Johnny, you said this was the time for a speech on taxation, and I am making it.”\(^\text{28}\) The speech was a disaster, and Willkie found himself roundly criticized by business Republicans who had supported him in 1940.

The end of Willkie’s drive for the presidency came on 4 April, the day of the Wisconsin primary. Though he was the only candidate to personally campaign in the state, he came in last. Thomas Dewey, who insisted that he did not even want the nomination, smashed Willkie, receiving 17 delegates to Willkie’s 0. Speaking in Omaha, Nebraska, the following day, Willkie withdrew from the 1944 presidential race. “The result of the primary,” he told a startled audience, “is naturally disappointing... It is obvious now that I cannot be nominated. Therefore, I am asking my friends to desist from any activity toward that end and not to present my name at the convention. I earnestly hope,” he concluded, “that the Republicans will nominate a candidate and write a platform which really represents the views which I have advocated and which I believe
are shared by millions of Americans.”29 Willkie then shook the hands of well-wishers, boarded a train, and returned to New York. Six months later he was dead.

The big winner of the 1942 midterm elections was Thomas Edmund Dewey, the newly elected Governor of New York. Today, Dewey’s name does not generate much excitement, or for that matter, recognition. In the 1930s and 1940s, however, he was a major political force, and a young man on the rise. Born in Owosso, Michigan, on 24 March 1902, Dewey came from a comfortable Midwestern home. His father, George, was a local newspaper editor and Republican leader, who instilled in his only child the value of hard work, and an interest in politics and writing. Dewey’s mother, Annie, meanwhile, was an efficient manager of the family home, and a very powerful influence over her son. It was from his mother that Dewey learned thrift, tidiness, and perfectionism. Indeed, Dewey was a model boy. He had perfect attendance at school, went to church regularly, and was usually the first in the neighborhood to be called in at night. He was also very active, and always in motion, even naming his pet dog, “Pronto.”30

In 1923, Dewey graduated from the University of Michigan, where he studied music, and in 1925, from the Columbia University School of Law. In June 1928, he married Frances Eileen Hutt, a young and pretty opera singer from Sapulpa, Oklahoma. After Columbia, Dewey decided to pursue a career in law in New York City. It was there in the 1930’s that he built a national reputation for himself as a tough, racket-busting District Attorney—successfully prosecuting Lucky Luciano, Legs Diamond, and Jimmy Hines In 1937, he was even portrayed by Humphrey Bogart in the MGM film, The Marked Woman, which was loosely based upon the Luciano case. In 1938, he ran for
New York Governor, and narrowly lost to popular incumbent Herbert Lehman. Then, in 1940, Dewey, aged thirty-eight, made his first of three attempts for the presidency, but his youth and inexperience—combined with the outbreak of World War II in Europe—wrecked his candidacy, and the Republican nomination went instead to Wendell Willkie. Finally, in 1942 Dewey achieved his first statewide electoral success, winning the New York gubernatorial race, and securing that office for Republicans for the first time in thirty years. As he addressed supporters in the lobby of the Roosevelt Hotel on Election Night, one enthusiastic partisan cheered: “This makes you the next President of the United States!”

Throughout 1943 and early 1944, the New York Governor insisted that “I am not and shall not become a candidate for the Republican nomination. I have important work to do here in New York and I want to do it.” Still, Dewey stood out from other possible contenders for a number of reasons. First, he was young—only forty-two in 1944—and energetic, and had a pleasing baritone voice that came across very effectively on radio. Second, he was the Governor New York, an office that seemed to breed presidential nominees. Indeed, over the course of the past one hundred years, eight governors of New York had won their party’s nomination, and four had actually won the ultimate prize. Dewey’s mere occupancy of that office, then, made him a perpetual object of presidential consideration. Third, he was a proven vote-getter. Not only had he won the governorship in 1942, but also his choice for lieutenant governor was overwhelmingly elected in a highly charged special election in November 1943. Fourth, Dewey had a reputation for intelligence and efficiency, and getting things done. Herbert Brownell, Dewey’s campaign manager, later recalled: “He assembled a first-rate staff about him
and always had a practical goal: getting someone convicted or a bill passed through the legislature. Although I would not describe him as a political visionary, he knew what needed to be done. He was a true reformer and not a self-interested politician, and he had the zeal and ability to surmount opposition to his reform efforts. This didn’t make him popular with those people he had to deal with, but it did make him effective. Finally, he had an excellent “draft” organization led by three talented and trusted advisors: Herbert Brownell (liaison between Dewey and the national Republican organization and the party organizations of other states), Edwin F. Jaeckle (strategist), and J. Russell Sprague (party operator). This team, without any “official” support from Dewey—Jaeckle later recalled, “He never gave a nod and he never gave me a no”—worked steadily behind the scenes, beginning in October 1943, to promote the Governor, and to engineer a draft. Their work paid off. A Gallup poll, taken in early 1944, indicated that Dewey led the Republican presidential field with 45% of support. Willkie, who had been openly campaigning for weeks, came in a distant second with 21%. Writing to Dewey that winter, historian James Truslow Adams spoke for many Republicans when he admitted a change of heart from 1940:

I did not want a President with a DA’s mind but the governorship of New York is a different matter and as I look over the possible candidates... I am beginning to feel that you might do the most to save the situation. I voted for Willkie last time.

As Adams’s letter implied, a crucial part of Dewey’s successful march to 1944 presidential nomination was his public image as a moderate and experienced governor who could save the GOP from foreign policy extremists on both sides of the ideological
spectrum. The most candid foreign policy statement made by Dewey came in September 1943, as he arrived at Mackinac. When asked by reporters during a press conference if he would favor a postwar alliance with Great Britain, Dewey responded in the affirmative, and added:

We have had a *de facto* alliance with Great Britain ever since the War of 1812. In the two principal cases since when war was made on Great Britain, we went to her defense. The American people never before had such a shock as they had when they realized that Germany might capture the British fleet. You remember as well as I how everyone was chilled. 39

Furthermore, Dewey—echoing Roosevelt’s Four Policemen concept—“hoped” that the Soviet Union and China would join in this postwar partnership—which, he insisted, would never interfere with American sovereignty. Citing John Foster Dulles’s “Six Pillars of Peace” as his inspiration, Dewey concluded that the “time had come... for America to abandon selfish nationalism and assume new international obligations.” 40

The twenty-third Republican National Convention convened in Chicago on Monday morning, 26 June 1944, and lasted for three days, until Wednesday, 28 June. Chicago was designated as the convention city for both political parties that summer, and Republicans, numbering some 20,000 strong, met first in Chicago Stadium. It turned out to be a rather lackluster event with delegates and onlookers bored, unenthused, and unresponsive. For weeks prior to the start of the convention, party leaders talked of “tone”—the event, they said, must strike a solemn note in keeping with the gravity of the times. After all, the convention was meeting just three weeks after D-Day, and as Representative Joseph Martin of Massachusetts observed, “The battle of Normandy...
subdued our conflicts at home. We took our cracks at New Deal ‘collectivism’ and Roosevelt’s ‘court-packing,’ but they did not crackle the way they used to before the real guns were firing.” Deliberately, then, partisan celebrations were held to a minimum; “speakers trimmed rabblerousing phrases in advance to make place for themes of war.”

From beginning to end “solemnity was the keynote over a ground bass of moderation in attack.” Another reason for the lackluster mood in Chicago was the virtual pre-convention collapse of all candidacies except that of Governor Dewey. The outcome of the convention, then, seemed predictable and thus generated little excitement. In addition, there was a general spirit of defeatism among the party faithful concerning GOP chances in November. Party leaders and party organization had, due to Roosevelt’s role as popular wartime leader, lost confidence in an Election Day victory and the pep necessary to win it. Finally and most importantly, the weather played a crucial role in the squelching Republican enthusiasm at Chicago. A blistering heat wave engulfed the Windy City, with the temperature inside the convention hall registering a sweltering 105 degrees. James M. Bailey, a friend of Governor Dewey, filmed much of the convention with his silent, but colorized home movie camera. The film captured weary and hot convention goers fanning themselves, gulping soft drinks, and refusing to participate or react to the brass band music led by Chicago’s famous song leader, Carl Craven. Of course, there were still rallies and floor demonstrations, but in the main, the crowd was largely lethargic.

The Republican Party Platform of 1944 was a detailed and progressive statement of party goals for the future. On foreign policy, the GOP followed the Mackinac Declaration of 1943. In regard to civil rights, however, the platform was very bold.
condemned racial and religious prejudice, and pledged the establishment of a permanent Fair Employment Practice Commission. Unlike the Democrats later that summer, Republicans proposed a Constitutional amendment abolishing the poll tax, and went on record favoring immediate legislation against lynching. Addressing the convention moments before the platform’s adoption, D. H. Sims, Bishop of the African Methodist Episcopal Church in Philadelphia, observed that “Because we took the Negro for granted and neglected his voice crying in the American wilderness, the Democratic Party, being an opportunist party, took advantage of the situation. The New Deal captured the imagination of the Negro in 1932 and he took a sabbatical leave from the Republican Party.” The present moment, he insisted, provided the party of Lincoln with an opportunity to restore lost confidence and lost votes:

If the Party will castigate the poll tax, mob violence, discriminations in job opportunity, unfair employment practices in labor and industry, this will be a demonstration to the world in general and to the Negro in particular that we [Republicans] are placing the welfare of the whole American community above that of any special section of it...

A Changing world has produced a changed Negro. He believes the Republican Party is a ship but that it has been badly battered by the social and political storms. We are here in dry dock. For God’s sake and our own perpetuity, let us prepare for the dangerous, heavy sea which lies inevitably before us. If she is to carry the Negroes of America as passengers, they wish to be carried as first-class passengers with no outmoded life boats or life savers.45

The GOP platform also called for lower taxes, a Constitutional amendment “providing equal rights for men and women” in the workplace, and the creation of a Department of Agriculture. Another interesting component of the Republican platform was its statement
on presidential tenure. Foreshadowing the ratification of the Twenty-Second Amendment in 1951, Republicans favored a Constitutional amendment “providing that no person shall be President of the United States for more than two terms of four years each.” The platform attacked the New Deal in only general terms, focusing mainly on the “selfish and partisan control over the functions of Government agencies where labor relationships are concerned,” and a “bungled and inexcusable machinery program and confused, unreliable, impractical price and production administration.”

The most critical assessment of the New Deal, of course, fell under the platform’s discussion of labor. Specifically, Republicans charged the Democratic administration with “the perversion” of the Wagner Act, which, “menaces the purposes of the law and threatens to destroy collective bargaining completely and permanently,” and the emasculation of the Department of Labor. In addition, the GOP condemned (1) “the conversion of administrative boards, ostensibly set up to settle industrial disputes, into instruments for putting into effect the financial and economic theories of the New Deal,” (2) “the freezing of wage rates at arbitrary levels and the binding of men to their jobs as destructive to the advancement of a free people,” and (3) “the repeal by Executive order of the laws secured by the Republican Party to abolish ‘contract labor’ and peonage.”

Another four years of New Deal polices, the platform concluded, “would centralize all power in the President, and would daily subject every act of every citizen to regulation by his henchmen; and this country could remain a Republic only in name.”

Speakers at the convention included the popular Governor of California, Earl Warren, former President Herbert Hoover, and Congresswoman Clare Boothe Luce of Connecticut. Warren delivered the keynote address on night one, and articulated the
party’s position: “This is our job: To get out boys back home again—victorious and with all speed. To open the door for all Americans; to open it, not just to jobs, but to opportunity! To make and guard the peace so wisely and so well that this time will be the last time that American homes are called to give their sons and daughters to the agony and tragedy of war.” He then talked about the election campaign within the context of the war. “To get that job done is why we are here. This Convention and this election are not time out from the job of winning the war and the peace. This Convention and this election are part of that job. We are here to speed the cause; to help America to speed the cause for which our fighting men are giving their lives. We are here to make the road on which America can march toward victory toward opportunity, toward peace… For so great a venture together, we must be together. Here and now, we can begin to get together. That is our purpose. It is the purpose of this Convention to put the public welfare above private self-interest; to put the nation above the party; to put the progress of the whole American community above special privilege for any part of it; to put indispensable principles, once and for all, above indispensable men.” Warren offered few specifics, but that was his intent. He wanted to identify Republicans as supportive of the war effort, and as a party that was inclusive: “In those States where the people have returned to the Republican Party, government is not only for the people, but of and by the people. That means not some of the people, but all of the people. Their kind of representative government reaches from ocean to ocean and from border to border. It extends to both sides of the tracks. It includes every citizen. That is why the platform of this Convention will be one on which all of us can stand together—not divided by race or creed, not as minorities or majorities, but as fellow Americans.” This war, he concluded,
“cannot be fought and won as Republicans or Democrats. This is an All-American War. There is a place for every American in it.”\textsuperscript{48}

The second night of the convention began with the nation’s only living ex-president, Herbert Hoover, speaking on “Freedom, the Job of the Youth.” Alluding to Dewey, he said, “In every generation youth presses forward toward achievement. Each generation has the right to built its own world out of the materials of the past, cemented by the hopes of the future… This Convention is handing the leadership of the Republican Party to a new generation. And soon to support these younger men there will be an oncoming generation who will differ from all others.”\textsuperscript{49}

The night closed with the fiery reporter, correspondent, playwright, and Member of Congress from Connecticut, Clare Booth Luce. Luce, the attractive wife of \textit{Time} editor Henry Luce, was the Anne Coulter of her day. It was her job to throw red meat to the delegates. After distinguishing G.I. Joe (the American serviceman) from G.I. Jim (the pal, buddy, or brother of Joe who has already fallen in combat), Luce took a direct, and unfair, shot at Roosevelt. Conveniently ignoring Republican opposition to the President in Congress before Pearl Harbor, Luce asked: “Do we here in this Convention dare ask if Jim’s heroic death in battle was historically inevitable? If this war might not have been averted? We know that this war was in the making everywhere in the world after 1918… Might not skillful and determined American statesmanship have helped to unmake it all through the ’30s? Or, when it was clear to our Government that it was too late to avert war, might not truthful and fearless leadership have prepared us better for it in material and in morale, in arms and in aims?” Luce then unveiled her main criticism: “The last twelve years have not been Republican years,” she said. “Maybe Republican Presidents
during the ‘20s were overconfident that sanity would prevail abroad. But it was not a Republican President who dealt with the visibly rising menaces of Hitler and Mussolini and Hirohito. Ours was not the Administration that promised young Jim’s mother and father and neighbors and friends economic security and peace. Yes, peace. No Republican President gave these promises which were kept to their ears, but broken to their hearts. For this terrible truth cannot be denied: these promises, which were given by a Government that was elected again and again and again because it made them, lie quite as dead as young Jim lies now. Jim was the heroic heir of the unheroic Roosevelt decade: a decade of confusion and conflict that ended in war.\(^{50}\)

On the third and final day of the convention, Dewey’s name was officially placed into nomination by Nebraska Governor Dwight Griswold, who described the New York Governor as “the spokesman of the future.” A Dewey demonstration immediately broke out. “Delegates marched through the aisles holding aloft pictures of Dewey and placards bearing such inscriptions as ‘Dewey Will Win!’ ‘America Wants Dewey!’ ‘Dewey, the People’s Choice!’ ‘Win With Dewey!’\(^{51}\) Less than an hour later, Ohio’s Governor Bricker announced the withdrawal of his own candidacy, and called upon his supporters to vote for Dewey, whom Bricker described as “a great, a grand, a vigorous, a fighting young American—the noble, the dramatic and appealing Governor of the great State of New York…\(^{52}\) Following Bricker, Minnesota Senator Joseph H. Ball, Lieutenant Commander (and former Governor) Harold Stassen’s representative at the convention, withdrew Stassen’s name from consideration, and pledged support for Dewey. Congressman Everett Dirksen soon followed suit. The roll was then read. It was a Dewey sweep, with only one dissenting vote. Grant Ritter, a fifty-four-year-old diary
farmer from Wisconsin, protested, “I am a man, not a jellyfish,” and then cast his one vote for General MacArthur. By 2:30 p.m. that Wednesday, it was all over, and Dewey was the nominee. Listening to the radio in Albany, Governor and Mrs. Dewey prepared to leave the Governor’s Mansion and fly to Chicago. By 9:00 p.m. they were in the Windy City.

While Dewey made his way to Chicago by plane, the convention, under the able leadership of his political team, selected Ohio Governor John Bricker for the second spot on the ticket. Dewey had wanted Governor Earl Warren of California to be his running mate, but the Governor had refused, citing his pledge in 1942 not to seek national office. Dewey, who later referred to Warren as a “big, dumb Swede,” then agreed on Bricker to balance out the ticket ideologically, and also to help bring the South into play in November. Under the advice of former President Hoover, who frequently counseled the Buckeye Governor, Bricker had begun in 1943 (during his unsuccessful drive for the presidential nomination) visiting with Southern business, party, and civic leaders. He had been generally well-received, and actually had some appeal in the South. Indeed, later in the campaign, Bricker traveled through Tennessee and Kentucky, writing to Dewey, “The crowd [in Kentucky] was responsive and everywhere Democrats came to me and said they are voting on our side this year.” In Tennessee, meanwhile, Bricker did not express much hope in carrying the state in November, but added, “the benefit of going into Tennessee is the confidence it will give to some of the other [Southern] states and the hope that we might build up a two party system in other states to the benefit of the party.” While Bricker was not Dewey’s first choice—and thus often looked down upon by Team Dewey—he did enjoy Dewey’s respect and friendship. Indeed, in a
conversation with journalist Raymond Moley in 1943, Dewey inquired about Bricker. Moley, who admired Bricker, praised the Ohio governor in generalities only to be interrupted by Dewey with the crack, “You haven’t said a word that makes him any better than Harding.” “This nettled me,” Moley later recalled, “but... I set out to work and for twenty minutes I expounded with ample detail about Bricker the administrator, the politician and the man. Dewey seemed better satisfied, and when I saw him next, he said, ‘I have grown to think Bricker is pretty good.’ Then, possibly without knowing that he was giving my speech back to me, he elaborated on Bricker the administrator, the politician and the man.”

At Chicago Stadium, over 20,000 Republicans jammed into the hall to greet the presidential nominee. At approximately 9:10, with the closing strains of “America,” the Governor and Mrs. Dewey walked into the hall, and stepped out on the tongue extending from the platform to the podium, loud-speakers, and microphones. The room was adorned in American flags and ribbons of red, white, and blue. Positioned in front of the podium (at the end of the platform) was a giant golden eagle statue—with wings spread. Dressed in a grey pin-stripped suit with red tie, the Governor appeared dapper, calm, and confident. His wife, young, pretty and smiling, was wearing a black dress and an orchid corsage. “They were received with enthusiastic and prolonged applause, both bowing acknowledgement, first to those in front, then to right, left, and all round the great hall. A chair was provided for Mrs. Dewey on the platform’s tongue, and she took the seat while the Governor stood at her side and continued bowing appreciation of the great acclaim.” Finally, at 9:20 p.m.—as Dewey removed a handkerchief from his pants pocket and wiped the sweat from his face-- the Permanent Chairman of the Convention,
Congressman Martin of Massachusetts, struck the gavel, and declared: “I now have the honor to present to you the next President of the United States, Thomas E. Dewey.” Speaking over the cheering crowd, Dewey began his acceptance speech: “Mr. Chairman and fellow Americans: I am profoundly moved by the trust you have placed in me. I deeply feel the responsibility which goes with your nomination for President of the United States at this grave hour of our nation’s history... [and] I accept the nomination.”

Dewey’s convention speech was relatively short and crisp, and aimed at expressing three main foreign policy themes: unity, continuity, and credibility. “To our Allies,” he declared, “let us send from this Convention one message from our hearts: The American people are united with you to the limit of our resources and our manpower, devoted to the single task of victory and the establishment of a firm and lasting peace. To every member of the Axis powers let us send this message: By this political campaign, which you are unable to understand, our will to victory will be strengthened, and with every day you further delay surrender the consequences to you will be more severe.” In addition, he insisted that “The military conduct of the war is outside this campaign. It is and must remain completely out of politics... Let me make it crystal-clear that a change of administration next January cannot and will not involve any change in the military conduct of the war.” Dewey also sought to identify the GOP as a credible and constructive participant in postwar planning. “There are,” he said, “only a few, a very few, who really believe that American should try to remain aloof from the world. There are only a relative few who believe it would be practical for America or her Allies to renounce all sovereignty and join a superstate. I certainly would not deny those two
extremes the right to their opinions; but I stand firmly with the overwhelming majority of my fellow citizens in that great wide area of agreement. That agreement was clearly expressed by the Republican Mackinac Declaration and was adopted in the foreign policy plank of this convention.\textsuperscript{59}

Only a small part of the speech dealt with domestic policy. Overall, it included the usual criticisms of the New Deal—namely, that it had not solved the Depression, that it lacked faith in America, and that it was old and worn-out. Unveiling what would become a recurrent theme, Dewey pledged “that on January 20\textsuperscript{th} next year our government will again have a cabinet of the ablest men and women to be found in America. Its members will expect and will receive full delegation of the powers of their offices. They will be capable of administering those powers. They will each be experienced in the task to be done and young enough to do it. This election will bring an end to one-man government in America.” As the speech ended, the convention hall erupted into “thunderous applause.” Dewey was then joined by Governor Bricker on the platform, the two shook hands, and “the great stadium resounded to the cheers of the multitude.” “Dewey Snaps GOP From Coma,” declared \textit{Newsweek}. The presidential campaign of 1944 had officially begun.\textsuperscript{60}

Enthusiasm over Thomas Dewey’s nomination was not universal, of course, particularly among members of the liberal press. Dewey had a very poor relationship with the news media dating back to his early days as a racketbuster. He had a reputation for secrecy and strict control of information, and as a result, he was often treated with disfavor by the media, which mocked him as short, inexperienced, humorless, and ambitious. One of the earliest critics of candidate Dewey was Benjamin Stolberg.
Writing in the *American Mercury* in the summer of 1940, Stolberg criticized the then District Attorney as ambitious, opportunistic, ignorant, immature, and arrogant. Dewey, he argued, suffered from an inferiority complex. He was a “little boy,” Stolberg wrote, who acted the way he did because of his short stature and youth. From that generalization, Stolberg concluded that Dewey thus hated his father, who was slightly taller than Dewey, and sought the presidency only to make up for his inadequacies, particularly his height. “Nothing less than the presidency will make him feel as big and mature as papa.” There were two main problems with this ridiculous and rather bizarre analysis. First, Stolberg, for all his psycho-babble, was neither a psychiatrist nor a Dewey intimate. And second, Dewey—though of a small physical frame—was not *that* short. He was 5’8”—roughly the same height as the average American male at that time.

Another critical, if less fanciful, piece came in early 1944 with Richard H. Rovere’s article in *Harper’s Magazine* entitled “Dewey: The Man in the Blue Serge Suit.” According to Rovere Dewey—though alert and possessed of a highly disciplined mind—lacked boldness. He was a cautious man, who stood “four-square and flat-footed in the middle” and refused to ever “say anything that has not been double-checked for safety and propriety.” Indeed, the Governor—through the employing of professional pollsters—had streamlined the old political practices of “sniffing the breeze, playing it safe, tapping the grass roots, or keeping the ear to the ground” into an exact science. He lacked conviction and vision, and had, Rovere insisted, refused—like a third-rate Congressman—to “face up to the real issues of our time.” Furthermore, he was, Rovere argued, a “platitude king,” piling up familiar phrases “so neatly and with such roundness of phrase that the listener or reader is sometimes deluded into thinking that he is
following a weighty argument.” With his trained baritone voice and courtroom manner
of presentation, Dewey made even such bromides as “We shall have our freedom so long
as we are all free!” sound good. Finally, Rovere dismissed Dewey’s reputation as an
economic miracle-worker in New York as “poppycock.” The real credit for the state’s
booming economy and sound fiscal situation belonged to (1) the war and (2) Dewey’s
Democratic predecessor, Herbert Lehman, who left the state in 1943 with a $40,000,000
surplus.

Washington correspondent I. F. Stone, writing in The Nation that summer and fall,
was no more kind to the Republican hopeful. According to Stone, Dewey—while
competent, courageous, and hardworking—was “extraordinary only in his drive, his
singleness of purpose, the intensity of his ambition.” The Governor was, he continued,
“wholly self-seeking”—choosing “the law as a profession because he thought it offered
the prospect of greater and more secure financial rewards than singing.” Furthermore, his
sensational stint as prosecutor in New York was opportunistic, a quick stepping-stone to
the governorship (and the presidency), and “not the beginning of a job that he felt had to
be completed in the interest of civic duty or clean government.” In addition, Stone
argued that Dewey— rather than being wicked, sinister, dishonest, or fascist— was simply
“uninteresting,” presenting no complexities, and deviating no way from type. “I can see
nothing but the commonplace in his mind,” he wrote. “I sense no lift of idealism in his
spirit; his motivations seem to me wholly self-seeking.” Finally, Stone complained that
the Republican nominee reeked of self-assurance, and was completely void of human
warmth. “He is not what we call a regular guy. There is nothing in him of Willkie’s rich
curiosity, human interest, or careless vitality. Dewey is small stuff and cold fish,
handsomer and physically robust but really a good deal like Coolidge, frugal spiritually, a man who does not give himself freely." 61

Finally, there was The New Republic's "Dewey: The Man and His Record," printed in late September 1944. According to this twenty-page "Special Section," Dewey was neither a despondent, indecisive Hoover nor an easy-going, humorous FDR. Instead, he was a Calvin Coolidge "made vocal, equipped with overweening ambition, and not caring very much on whom he tramples, or how hard, in fulfilling that ambition." 62 The piece went on to discredit Dewey's record as prosecutor and governor, and concluded with a consideration of "Dewey as President." The real guide to determining what to expect from a Dewey administration, the editors argued, was a careful appraisal of those upon whom the Governor relied heavily for advice. His "cronies," including Jaeckle (described as having "storm-trooper tactics"), Bell, and Brownell, were, in the main, "publicity men, political strategists, or ghost-writers rather than experts on economics, finance, or political science... Their function seems to have been to aid Mr. Dewey in his climbing the ladder of public office rather than to lay out policies which they would like to see the nation follow." A President Dewey, the authors surmised with hyperbole, would never stand out against these, and other men (including isolationists and anti-New Dealers), and would thus "be a prisoner in the White House of the worst elements in the Republican Party, so far as concerns the two great objectives of our time: prosperity and peace." 63

The New Republic also included in its special section several disparaging jokes and quotes at the Governor's expense. For example, one reporter on seeing Dewey's Great Dane, "Canute," exclaimed—in an obvious reference to the Governor's height—"Does he...
ride it to work!” Another journalist, appropriating an old vaudeville joke, added that Dewey, “having drunk too much coffee, had spent the night pacing up and down under his bed.” With great glee, the liberal weekly also quoted several Dewey associates, such as one woman who stated that “You have to know Mr. Dewey very well in order to dislike him,” and another who asked, “How can you vote for a man who looks like a bridegroom on a wedding cake?” Overall, these and other reports undermined Dewey’s image, and build an inaccurate perception—which still lingers among many academics today—of Dewey as a small, inexperienced young man, quite vain and pompous, self-seeking and ambitious, and oblivious and/or contemptuous of the feelings and desires of others.

Still, Dewey did get some favorable coverage, especially in the news magazines, including Time, Newsweek, Look, and The Saturday Evening Post. In addition, he enjoyed the publication of two campaign biographies. One, Rupert Hughes’s authorized Attorney for the People: The Story of Thomas E. Dewey, had been written in 1939, and was updated and re-released for the 1944 campaign. Hughes was very close to his subject, later declaring: “I believe with all my heart that if he is elected he will not only do more to carry us through the oncoming crisis of the peace than any other man could do, or would do; but that he will go down in history as one of the purest patriots and most noble statesmen our country has ever known.” The book—though important today for historians due to its detail and input by Dewey—was not taken seriously at the time. Commenting on the work in The Nation, I.F. Stone tersely observed that Hughes “seems to have confused him with George Washington and Lucky Luciano with a cherry tree.” The other, Stanley Walker’s Dewey: An American of this Century, which the liberal
Nation described as “local-yokel,” was typical campaign puffery. The book was folksy in nature, and in an attempt to humanize the Governor, detailed not only his career, but also his personal life, including his love of golf, cigarettes, and family. Amazingly, Walker, without intending to be humorous, spent an entire paragraph tracing the development of Dewey’s mustache, which evidently began as a “tentative, unpromising wisp,” while Dewey was on a bicycling trip in France in 1925, but was “soon full-blown and bristly.” On the positive side, about a quarter of Walker’s 350 pages consisted of the text of several Dewey speeches, dating back to 1937, and ending with the 1944 speech of acceptance. Though it had become common by 1944 for candidates to write manifestos or autobiographies, Dewey, who had written a critique of the Roosevelt administration in 1940 entitled The Against the New Deal, did not publish any writings for 1944. Copies of his 1940 work, however, were still in circulation, and Dewey continued to stand by its sentiments.

As the title suggested, The Case Against the New Deal dealt primarily with domestic concerns. In it, Dewey hammered home the theme—repeated in 1944—that Roosevelt encouraged defeatism at home. “At the root of the New Deal’s failure to solve our economic problems,” Dewey wrote, “has been its assumption that the United States had achieved a mature economy. This defeatist philosophy led inevitably to the conclusion that the system of free private enterprise had lost the power to sustain itself. It must, therefore, be supported, on the one hand, by government efforts to ‘create purchasing power,’ while, on the other, being restrained from unwise expansion through government regulation.” The United States was in a crisis, Dewey warned, but it was a crisis of
faith—in ourselves, in our system, and in our own traditions. On the solution of that crisis, he insisted, was all around, in every state, in every city, and on every farm:

Here in our own America we have the manpower, the wealth, the natural resources, and the genius to invent and create. We have the industrial skill to release that ever-flowing stream of new inventions and greater productivity wherein lies the future of our own America. I don’t say to you, close your eyes and have faith—I say to you, open your eyes, look around you and be convinced.  

Dewey also criticized Roosevelt for incompetence in government (namely, budget deficits), national disunity (i.e. government versus business, labor versus capital, labor versus labor, collectivism versus individualism, and defeatism versus optimism), dishonesty (specifically, party intimidation and coercion, illegal campaign finance, and agency corruption), and economic failure (including declines in national and farm income). Overall, Dewey’s work was really a “case against” and not really a blueprint for anything in particular. It did, however, represent Dewey at his best, and that was as “Prosecutor.” The closest he came to articulating a vision was in his brief discussion of foreign policy, which he linked to domestic policy. According to Dewey, “Any successful foreign policy must be broadly founded on a successful domestic policy.” In the end, Dewey’s chief focus was, as it would be in 1944, on change—i.e. change in national leadership.

Dewey’s only other publication up to that time was a 1939 essay in Religious Digest on the subject “Can Religion Save the U.S.A.?” Like many other conservatives, he insisted that religion—in this case Christianity—was essential to the maintenance of a free republic. Alluding to liberalism and the New Deal, he warned that “[N]o nation was
ever made good or strong by laws alone. The pretended strength of government is never a substitute for the real strength of the individual.” Excessive reliance upon government, he continued, weakened the individual, reminding his readers that “The tower of a high building is no firmer than the weakest part of its foundations,” and that likewise, society could not endure if government was “built on a mass of weakened individuals.” America must not abandon religion. “For where material values are set above spiritual values, religion ceases to be vital. And where religion is no longer vital, pagan philosophies move in [italics added].” This “pagan philosophy” was a typical conservative reference to the liberal viewpoint that man is not self-controlling, and not responsible for his own acts. Conservatives believed that from this pagan view emerged a number of the Old World ideologies, including socialism and communism. Both rested on the same ideas: that the individual was nothing and that the strength of the party was the only thing that mattered. “We shall reject false gods of material philosophies,” Dewey concluded. “When we have cleaned our own house, we shall keep it clean.”

Thomas Dewey was a formidable opponent. As historian Robert Ferrell observed, “His youth bespoke activity that the tired Roosevelt could not imitate, even in appearance; in reality, to be sure, the president was tired indeed. Dewey could claim to be a new broom after eleven years of the Democracy, wherein the party of Roosevelt had worn itself out in meeting the challenges of the Great Depression and now, World War II. Against those claims, in which there was more than a grain of truth, only ‘the champ,’ the Democrats’ greatest vote-getter since President Andrew Jackson a century and more before, could have assured victory. No other Democrat could have stood against Dewey and won.” That is not to suggest that Dewey was flawless. He was not. In fact, he
possessed many serious flaws as a candidate—flaws that undermined both his 1944 and 1948 presidential bids.

He was young and relatively inexperienced, especially in foreign affairs, at a time in which the nation was involved in global crisis. Dewey was also secretive and combative with the media, which often resulted in unfavorable news stories. In addition, he was very cool in personality (which probably stemmed from a genuine shyness and discomfort with popular politics). It was in 1944, for example, that a photographer shouted to Dewey, “Smile Governor,” to which Dewey coolly replied, “I thought I was.” Years later, Dewey’s apprentice and admirer, Richard M. Nixon of California, recalled a Republican fundraiser in 1952 during which:

[A] paying guest who had obviously had too much to drink came up... [and] slapped Dewey on the back, told him he was the greatest governor in New York’s history, and said he hoped he would run for reelection. As the man walked away, Dewey very deliberately knocked the ashes off his cigarette, which like FDR he smoked through a holder, turned to me, and said, ‘Who was that fatuous ass?’ In fact, the man happened to be the publisher of a string of weekly newspapers in New York State. Like many brilliant people, Dewey found it very difficult to tolerate fools. In politics, that is a fatal mistake for three reasons. First, the man might not be a fool. Second, even fools vote. And third, a fool might still have something worthwhile to say to you.”

Dewey was also an artist (in this case a trained vocalist) and a perfectionist, and was thus very intense, focused, and ambitious. In his campaigns, the Governor had a very keen sense of production, was very performance-driven, and was fanatical about detail. For example, in early October 1944, Dewey wrote his national radio director, Henry Turnbull, complaining that “at the last two speeches it was almost impossible to read my manuscript. This is the most serious possible handicap in delivery of a speech and I hope
whatever radical steps may be necessary will be taken forthwith to see that in the future I can at least read my speeches.” Revealing his sensitivity to applause, Dewey added: “I have an exceedingly bad impression of the way the applause has been handled in all of the speeches except Louisville and Oklahoma City, on the radio. I am sure this can be done very much better.”

In a memo to Brownell a few months earlier, one of Dewey’s media consultants commented on the candidate’s propensity for perfection:

> There is one thing I would say to the Governor about this question of pictures and that would be to quit worrying about it and just be himself. When there is something to smile about—smile, and when the occasion call for being serious—be serious. He is much too good to spoil the splendid effects he is getting by being too concerned about it.

Ultimately, Dewey as presidential candidate was handicapped by fear—fear of his own good instincts and fear of making spectacular blunders. As journalist Raymond Moley observed in 1949, “In any analysis of the art of politics the significance of Thomas E. Dewey must be in the amazing fact that he went so far with so little natural political endowment.” He was, Moley claimed, like Samuel Johnson’s dog that walked on two legs: “‘He doesn’t do it very well but the amazing thing is that he can do it at all.’”
Chapter Four: 
The Democratic Nomination

Franklin Delano Roosevelt was sixty-two years old in 1944, and in poor health. He had served as President of the United States for twelve years, and would be asking for another four. He was, without a doubt, one of the greatest politicians in American history. Born in 1882, Roosevelt enjoyed great privilege, traveling the world and being educated in schools like Groton and Harvard. When the Democrats came to power in 1913, under Woodrow Wilson, Roosevelt was appointed Assistant Secretary of the Navy, a position his Republican cousin, Theodore, had once held. In 1920, he was selected to be the vice presidential candidate for Governor James Cox of Ohio. Of course, the Democratic ticket went down to defeat that year to Republicans Warren Harding and Calvin Coolidge, but Roosevelt was tabbed as a rising star. Then, in 1921, tragedy struck. In July, while vacationing in Campobello, Roosevelt was stricken with polio. He never walked again. Over the course of the 1920s, he worked to regain his health, and in 1928, was elected Governor of New York. Four years later, in the midst of the Great Depression, he was elected President of the United States. He was reelected in 1936, and again in 1940 to an unprecedented third term. By the end of 1943, Roosevelt believed he would need a fourth term to win the war and to succeed where Woodrow Wilson had failed. “He hoped to be the architect of the postwar world and to do this it was necessary to win one more election.”¹ “God knows I don’t want to [run],” he told one advisor early in 1944, “but I may find it necessary.” That spring he told Admiral Leahy, “I just hate to run again for election,” and expressed the hope that progress in the
war would make it unnecessary for him to be a candidate. Still, there was never any serious doubt that Roosevelt would not seek a fourth term in 1944.

Several books were published about the President, as well as the New Deal, in 1944. The first was *What Manner of Man?*, a small biography written by *Fortune* writer Noel Busch. The book was part reportorial gossip, part history, and part psychoanalysis. Overall, Busch effectively detailed the White House life of the President, and gave behind the scenes glimpses of the Cairo and Teheran conferences—Roosevelt, for example, took with him fifty detective novels picked by the Library of Congress. He also criticized Roosevelt’s “casual, illogical ways, his petulances, his taste for crises (which sometimes leads him to arrange a few when they do not occur naturally), and his occasional indulgence in grandiose administrative mismanagement.”² The weakest section of the book was Busch’s attempt at what *The Nation* called “parlor psychoanalysis.” For example, according to Busch, Roosevelt’s 1937 battle to reorganize the U.S. Supreme Court “was really just a ‘spoiled brat’ who feels thwarted by legal authority.”³ On the whole, however, Busch—whom historian Allan Nevins described as an excellent reporter, a mediocre historian, and a wretchedly unconvincing psychoanalyst—inclined the balance in favor of Roosevelt, concluding that the President “still seems to be on his game, if not quite at the top of it.” Another Roosevelt study from 1944 was Compton Mackenzie’s overly sympathetic campaign biography, *Mr. Roosevelt*. The President also made an appearance in Upton Sinclair’s novel, *Presidential Agent*, which was the fifth installment in Sinclair’s Pulitzer Prize-winning Lanny Budd Series. Though Roosevelt did not write any books himself in 1944—as he did for the 1932 and 1936 campaigns—two collections of the President’s speeches were
Though Roosevelt enjoyed great popularity—a Gallup poll from the summer of 1943 revealed the President’s approval at 80% in the South—many southern Democratic politicians were displeased with the administration, especially over civil rights. Many Southerners, however, hoped there would be no need to bolt the party. They believed, especially after setbacks for Democrats in the elections of 1942 and 1943, Roosevelt could be forced to retire from politics in 1944. This faith was not confined to disaffected southerners. James Farley, an experienced and well-qualified observer, felt that Roosevelt would not run again, because public opinion had turned against him. Democrats, he believed, should form a “nucleus” to “organize a third party movement so strong that it will give these galloping wastrels so much food for thought that Mr. Roosevelt will voluntarily get out. Then we could nominate Harry Byrd and carry the Southern states.”

In late 1943, John U. Barr, a wealthy New Orleans manufacturer and vice president of the Southern States Industrial Council, formed the “Byrd for President Committee” which aimed to coordinate southern efforts to cast off the yoke of the New Deal and to place Virginia Senator in the White House. A serious Southern revolt, however, never materialized.4

Henry A. Wallace was a problem for the President. Though he enjoyed widespread popularity among rank-and-file Democrats, the liberal Vice President was extremely unpopular with the senior leadership in the party. One strike against Wallace was his association with radical liberalism. As historian Robert Ferrell observed in a 1994 study on the Truman selection, “The idea of liberalism still carried immense appeal, and if one
asked the man or woman in the street if he or she were a New Dealer the answer would have been yes. But liberalism as an ideology was losing its attraction, and by 1944 the good economic times of the war era made it seem almost unnecessary. Too, Wallace’s supporters, labor unions and the small fringe of American radicals—socialists and a few communists—affronted the more moderate liberals, if one might so describe them; they did not like the militancy of wartime union leaders, nor the socialists-communists.”

Furthermore, many party leaders feared Roosevelt would not live through a fourth term. Edwin Pauley, treasurer of the DNC, told party leaders in the spring of 1944, “You are not nominating a Vice-President of the United States, but a President.” Indeed, Pauley, DNC Chairman Robert Hannegan, Bronx leader Edward Flynn, Chicago Mayor Ed Kelly, and Postmaster General Frank Walker—all non-Southerners—were determined that Wallace would never be President of the United States. They decided to meet with FDR on 11 July, and convince him that Wallace must be dumped from the ticket.

Roosevelt, who needed these men, ultimately agreed. Incidentally, his acquiescence to removing Wallace was also grounded in the fact that the Vice President was not very popular in the Senate in his role as President of that body. Wallace kept to himself, and had not built any strong friendships on Capitol Hill. According to historian Robert L. Messer, this was the death nail of Wallace’s doomed candidacy. “To avoid the problems of Woodrow Wilson after the first World War, Roosevelt wanted to do everything he could to assure Senate cooperation in the coming peacemaking.”

Wallace, then, had to go—and in fact had been approached about not running as early as May of that year.

In the secret White House meeting with Hannegan, Walker, Pauley, Kelly, and Flynn on 11 July, the President discussed a number of vice presidential possibilities. The
consensus was that Wallace was out, and should be replaced by someone like Sam Rayburn of Texas, Alben Barkley of Kentucky, James Byrnes of South Carolina, or Harry Truman of Missouri. Rayburn, Speaker of the House of Representatives, was an attractive possibility, but the certification of an anti-Roosevelt slate of delegates from Texas to the DNC that summer demonstrated he could not control his own state. Rayburn’s star quickly faded. Meanwhile, Barkley in the U.S. Senate was, at age sixty-seven, deemed too old. Roosevelt’s “deputy President” and close friend, James Byrnes, was stricken from the short list due to his southern origins, racial attitudes, and poor relations with labor. It did not help matters for the South Carolinian that he had been born a Roman Catholic, but left the church upon his marriage to an Episcopalian. Roosevelt feared a backlash from millions of Irish Catholics in key Eastern cities. The President himself advocated Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas. The associate justice was in his mid-forties, loved the Western outdoors, and delighted, as did FDR, in gossip and off-color stories. Roosevelt believed him to be a “wonderful fellow” who “looked and acted on occasions like a Boy Scout, and would have... appeal at the polls—and besides, played an interesting game of poker.” Hannegan, however, insisted that Douglas was not a strong enough party man to have a following and would thus be unacceptable to state and local party leaders and their followers. Hannegan’s own recommendation to the President was his old mentor, U.S. Senator Harry S. Truman.

Truman, aged sixty, offered a number of positive qualities to the Democratic ticket. He was from Missouri, a border state—and thus had appeal in the South—and was considered a moderate on most issues, including race. In addition, he had served in the Senate for nearly ten years, and was well-known and well-liked. Whereas the ever-aloof
Wallace spent much of his time on trips abroad, “representing” FDR and ignoring Senators, Truman was a regular in Speaker Rayburn’s private Capitol Hill hideaway, “the Board of Education.” It was there (Room 9) that legislators—after all of the official business of the day had been completed—would meet for a “libation.” According to Truman biographer David McCullough, to be invited to join Rayburn, even once or twice in a term, was considered a sign that one had arrived. More importantly, Truman was chairman of the Senate Special Committee to Investigate the National Defense Program (or the Truman Committee) charged with investigating wartime plants. He became very visible around the country, and earned a reputation for hard work, honesty, efficiency, and common sense.

As the secret White House conference of 11 July drew to a close, Roosevelt declared: “Bob, I think you and everyone else want Truman! If that’s the case, it’s Truman.” As the group dispersed, Hannegan, fearing the President might change his mind, asked FDR to put his commitment to Truman in writing. Roosevelt agreed, writing on a scratch piece of paper:

Dear Bob,

You have written me about Harry Truman and Bill Douglas. I should of course, be glad to run with either of them and believe that either one of them would bring real strength to the ticket.

Always sincerely,
Franklin D. Roosevelt

“I know this makes you boys happy,” Roosevelt said as he handed the letter to the chairman, “and you are the ones I am counting on to win this election. But I still think Douglas would have the greater public appeal.” As Hannegan left the White House, he
looked at Walker, who had been waiting downstairs, and said “I’ve got it.” Clearly, the DNC chief did not read the note. It was—with the noncommittal language and inclusion of Supreme Court Justice William Douglas—not the clear statement he had requested. Furthermore, Roosevelt postdated it 19 July. Roosevelt, who could be cold, calculating, and shrewd, was also—as this episode demonstrated—in control. While older and in poor health, FDR was nevertheless—as he himself understood—“indispensable” to a Democratic victory in November, and he intended to keep his options for vice president open.¹⁰

Though Roosevelt remained noncommittal on Truman, it was clear that Wallace and Byrnes were out of the running. In fact, before the 11 July conference adjourned, the President, who disliked unpleasant tasks, instructed Walker and Hannegan to inform them as such. It would not be that easy. Both men were fighters, both understood themselves to be important to the President, and both were committed to securing the nomination for themselves. It did not help matters that FDR refused to confront people with information he knew to be disagreeable. “He always hopes to get things settled pleasantly,” the First Lady once remarked, “and he won’t realize that there are times when you have to do an unpleasant thing directly and perhaps unpleasantly.”¹¹ This was certainly the case with Wallace and Byrnes in 1944. Knowing that the “game was over,” he nevertheless gave assurances to both men on the same day, 12 July, and only hours apart, that they had his support, and that they were sure to win the second spot on the ticket. In fact, on 10 July, when the Vice President—having been approached now a second time by Roosevelt intimates to withdraw from the vice presidency—asked about the nomination, Roosevelt said that he was his choice, and agreed to write a letter to the
convention chairman indicating that “If I were a delegate to the convention I would vote for Henry Wallace.” He cryptically added, however, that he could not bear to see Wallace rejected at the convention, and told the Vice President to think of his family and of “the catcalls and jeers and the definiteness of rejection.” Again, on 13 July the Vice President indicated that he would “withdraw at once” if Roosevelt felt him to be harmful to the ticket. Incredibly, Roosevelt, who had been trying to remove Wallace from the ticket for at least three months, replied that it was a “mighty sweet offer,” but that he “could not think of accepting it.” As Wallace later recalled, the President then drew him close, “turned on his full smile,” and with a “very hearty handclasp” said, “While I cannot put it just that way in public, I hope it will be the same old team.” Once again the President ended on a cryptic note: “Even though they do beat you out at Chicago, we will have a job for you in world economic affairs.” It was now clear to Wallace that the President, despite an ambiguous presidential letter of “endorsement” to the DNC, “wanted to ditch me as noiselessly as possible.” However, as long as the President refused to tell him to drop out of the race, Wallace, with a 65% approval rating in the latest Gallup poll, planned to go to Chicago and fight for the nomination.

James F. Byrnes, meanwhile, was an entirely different problem for Roosevelt. Byrnes, a former South Carolina Senator, was a close personal friend and longtime political ally. Ever ambitious, he had been a vice presidential hopeful four years earlier. After the selection of Wallace in 1940, Roosevelt nominated the disappointed Senator to the U.S. Supreme Court. To the surprise of many Washington insiders, Byrnes accepted the post, and took to the bench in June 1941. Shortly thereafter, of course, the United States entered World War II, and the once influential Senator began publicly complaining...
that the cloistered atmosphere of the court gave him, as he described it, “ants in my pants.” In early 1942, he resigned from the court and took up residence in a small office in the East Wing of the White House as director of the five-man Office of Economic Stabilization. As head of OES, Byrnes was FDR’s, “professional ‘no’ man” to all groups seeking higher wages, prices, or profits. In that position, it did not take him long to make enemies, especially within the leadership ranks of organized labor, and in 1943, he asked to be relieved. Roosevelt then named him director of the Office of War Mobilization, in which he was responsible for presiding over “all manner of procurement, production, and allocation of goods and services related to the war effort.” He was, one historian recently observed, czar over all the other wartime economic czars, and he soon became known in the media as “Assistant President for the home front” In his role as “assistant” or “deputy” President, Byrnes enjoyed a free hand when it came to domestic concerns. “He could ‘lay down the law’ to cabinet officers and make independent decisions on priorities, personnel, and jurisdictional disputes, knowing in advance that the president would back him. Byrnes wanted the vice presidency, and announced through Hopkins that he planned to run if the president had no objections.

On 13 July—two days after the secret leadership conference where FDR committed himself to either Truman or Douglas—Byrnes, unaware of that commitment, met with the President, who told him not to worry: “Everyone assures me that you will be nominated without any trouble.” Byrnes, who knew the President well, was not convinced, and pushed the issue, turning a fifteen-minute appointment into an hour-long meeting, during which Roosevelt finally expressed reservations about a Byrnes candidacy. Party leaders, he said, “were afraid you would cost the ticket two or three hundred thousand Negro
votes.” “Mr. President,” the South Carolinian responded, “all I have heard around this White House for the last week is ‘Negro.’ I wonder if anybody ever thinks about the white people. Did you ever stop to think who could do the most for the Negro? This is a serious problem, but it will have to be solved by the white people of the South. If Mr. Wallace or Mr. Douglas says he is against the poll tax that is not news and they cannot change the views of southerners. But if I say I am against the poll tax that means something.” Roosevelt agreed, but then proceeded to list a number of other disqualifying factors, including Byrnes’s age (he was sixty-five, three years older than FDR). Waiting outside the Oval Office as Byrnes left was another presidential visitor, the vice president of the Congress of Industrial Organizations, Sidney Hillman.

The next day over lunch with Postmaster General Frank Walker, Byrnes was informed about the secret leadership meeting of 11 July, and FDR’s preference for either Truman or Douglas. “He was out,” Crowley said. Byrnes, however, refused to accept defeat, and telephoned the President at Hyde Park. Once again, Roosevelt shamefully resorted to deception. “When we all went over the list,” he said referring to the leadership meeting, “I did not say that I preferred anybody or that anybody would cost me votes, but they all agreed that Truman would cost fewer votes than anybody and probably Douglas second. This was the agreement they reached and I had nothing to do with it. I was asking questions. I did not express myself.” Byrnes then read the President’s statements to Hannegan, who was now confused. Still in the race (and now aware of a potential rival) an underhanded Byrnes called an unknowing Truman in Independence, Missouri, that same day, 14 July. “Harry,” Byrnes said, “the President has given me the go sign for the Vice Presidency and I am calling up to ask if you will nominate me.” Truman readily
agreed. Shortly thereafter, Byrnes left for Chicago prepared to force himself upon the convention. He, of course, did not.\footnote{18}

The fall of Byrnes’s candidacy has been the subject of much speculation. In his excellent *The End of an Alliance: James F. Byrnes, Roosevelt, Truman, and the Origins of the Cold War* (1982), historian Robert Messer made an interesting case that Byrnes was nothing more than Roosevelt’s unacceptable anti-Wallace candidate—a pawn to make Truman, Roosevelt’s real choice, seem more acceptable to horrified pro-Wallace liberals. Though Messer gave Roosevelt too much credit as a master strategist—glossing over the disarray in the White House that July-- the President clearly did not want Byrnes as a running-mate. As in the case with Wallace, he was unwilling to be honest and injure feelings. The problem with Byrnes, however, was that he threatened to divide the anti-Wallace vote with Truman, and thus allow Wallace, who in fact had strong delegate support, to walk away with the nomination. Truman, meanwhile, could not be discarded because he was acceptable to labor, while Byrnes was not. In 1943, the “assistant president” had clashed with labor over the latter’s demands for increased pay due to higher costs of living caused by the raising of prices by manufacturers and of higher rents due to wartime housing shortages. Byrnes, however, insisted upon (and boldly declared) a policy of “hold the line.” The President desperately needed the support of labor in this election. Dewey was a tough opponent, and besides, many Roosevelt voters were in the military serving overseas, while others were workers laboring in new localities, where voter registration could often be difficult, if not impossible. The CIO’s Sidney Hillman, who had met with FDR in the Oval Office a few days before the DNC convened in Chicago, was “violently” opposed to Byrnes, but supportive of Truman. Byrnes was then
out of the running, and he was informed as much on Monday, 17 July, the opening day of
the convention. The reason—a convenient excuse that may have been planned by FDR
all along—given to Byrnes was that the President had stipulated that any vice presidential
pick must be first cleared by CIO leaders, including Sidney Hillman, and that he (Byrnes)
had failed to secure clearance. Though deeply bitter, Byrnes did not resign his White
House position, nor did he bolt the party. Instead, he graciously released Truman from
his pledge to nominate him, and then quietly left Chicago. He gave only one speech in
support of the Democratic ticket that fall, however.

On 19 July, Democrats arrived in Chicago to hold their twenty-ninth national
convention. Unlike Republicans, who had met in the same place a few weeks earlier,
Democrats were in a festive mood. The war was being won, the economy was booming,
and Franklin Roosevelt had consented, once again, to be a candidate for reelection.
Though sometimes fragmented along many different policy and ideological lines,
Democrats rallied one last time behind their leader—a man they understood to be
“indispensable” to both party unity and electoral victory. Delegates—equipped with red,
white, and blue fluorescent victory “V’s”—were confident and enthusiastic, and very
partisan. Chicago Stadium was decorated in a “grand manner,” with thirty-eight life-size,
highly colored cardboard cut-outs of service men and women in battle poses, and
positioned toward the delegates’ seats from every corner of the hall. In addition, large
black and white portraits of the fourteen Democratic presidents from Thomas Jefferson to
Franklin Roosevelt were placed over the balcony. An eight-foot colored image of FDR’s
face, meanwhile, looked down on the convention floor from the highest point of the
northwest girders. Often overshadowed by the vice presidential selection struggle, the
1944 Democratic National Convention was itself remarkable by its old-fashioned, peacetime, hardball, “politics as usual” tone. Two speeches, in particular, stood out as especially noteworthy—and harsh.

The first was the Keynote Address delivered by Oklahoma Governor Robert S. Kerr, whom *The Washington Post* described as a “strapping and eloquent orator of the old school.” Republicans, Kerr declared, were hateful, blind, and obstructionist, and their young presidential nominee a vague, inexperienced, and reactionary disciple of Herbert Hoover. “Who,” he asked, “will represent the United States of America? An untried leader who has not even told his own people what his views are? Or the man who has from the start declared his position in clear and certain words, and who has the respect and esteem of all the United Nations as no other living American?” In addition, the Oklahoman took Dewey to task for characterizing, in his speech before the RNC, the Roosevelt administration as a group of “tired old men.” “Let us examine the record,” Kerr exclaimed.

Shall we discard as a ‘tired old man,’ the fifty-nine year-old Admiral Nimitz?

Shall we discard as a ‘tired old man,’ the Lion of the Pacific, sixty-two year-old Admiral Halsey?

Shall we stop his onward sweep to redeem the Philippine Islands and discard as a ‘tired old man,’ sixty-four year-old General Douglas MacArthur?

Shall we discard as a ‘tired old man’ the Chief of all our Naval Forces, sixty-six year-old Admiral King?

Shall we discard as a ‘tired old man,’ the greatest military leader of our nation, sixty-four year-old General George C. Marshall?
No, Mr. Dewey, we know we are winning this war with these ‘tired old men,’ including the sixty-two year-old Franklin D. Roosevelt as their Commander-in-Chief. Convention delegates then broke out into a thirty-nine-minute demonstration. The Governor was not finished, however. Dewey, he charged, was an isolationist in disguise—another Harding—who sought to crucify FDR just as the Old Guard had done to the “great-hearted Woodrow Wilson” some twenty-five years previous. Then, in an obvious attempt to neutralize one of Dewey’s more promising positions—i.e. that the next administration would be a peacetime one—Kerr argued that Republicans could not be trusted at home once the war was over. Reminding Americans of Hoover’s “stupid and brutal” crushing of the Bonus Army in 1932, he declared that “When this war is won, a grateful nation will not forget, nor go back on its returning service men and women; nor will this nation go back to a Republican Administration that did go back on the returning servicemen of World War I.”

The most heated and controversial point of Kerr’s speech, however, was a question he raised about midway through his text. Criticizing Republican isolationists in Congress prior to Pearl Harbor, he asked, “Shall we restore to power the party whose national leadership, under the domination of isolationists, *scrapped and sank more of our fleet than was destroyed by the Japanese at Pearl Harbor*? [italics added] Or can we fail to support the Democratic Administration under which America has become the greatest naval power on earth?” Dewey, meeting with his cabinet in Albany, made no comment. Surprisingly, Kerr’s speech motivated little public response. Among the nation’s major newspapers, only the Republican-friendly *Chicago Daily Tribune* chimed in, observing,
"One thing we know: When we suffered the disgraceful defeat at Pearl Harbor the commander-in-chief was not a Republican."\(^{23}\)

The following day, Indiana Senator (and Permanent Chairman of the convention) Samuel Jackson described 1944 as a "fateful" election, and warned that "in the fiercest, most devastating war mankind has ever known" a Democratic defeat would mean battleships for Hirohito and legions for Hitler. "Frankly," Jackson continued, "could Goebbels do better himself to bolster Axis morale than the word that the American people had upset this administration...? We must not allow the American ballot box to be made Hitler's secret weapon!"\(^{24}\) Jackson's speech was but one example of an aspect of the 1944 campaign often overlooked—Nazi-baiting by Democrats and other Roosevelt supporters. Throughout the fall, there were numerous references to Dewey's "Hitler mustache" in speeches and campaign literature. For example, one pro-Roosevelt leaflet, paid for by the Socialist Party of Oregon, read:

Behind the mask of 'Tom Thumb' 'Double-Talk' Dewey and his 'Hitler Mustache' stands Hog-Joweled, Heartless Hoover, every Labor Union Wrecker, Ku Kluxer, Jew-Baiter, Poll-Taxer, Negro-Hater, Press Prostitute, Radio Rat, Putrid Pulpiteer and ghoulish War Profiteer! IF YOU'RE SCREWY... VOTE FOR DEWEY!\(^{25}\)

Supporters of Dewey, including John Foster Dulles and Senator Gerald Nye, were also charged with being pro-Hitler. "U.S. Fascists Want... [Dewey] in the White House," declared a publication of the New York County American Labor Party.

They Like Dewey—and Our Enemies Too

December 6, 1941... Pro-Axis
November 7, 1944... Pro-Dewey

They Have Not Changed!\(^{26}\)
The Democratic Party itself, as suggested by Jackson’s speech, focused more on Hitler and morale. Late in the campaign, for example, the office of Roosevelt aide Harry Hopkins considered circulating a report that the German Chief of Staff had urged Hitler to seek an armistice. Hitler, however—the report claimed—“rejected the proposal on the ground that an election was coming up in the United States and if Roosevelt was defeated and Dewey elected the unity of the United Nations might be shattered, especially in view of Dewey’s statements with reference to Russia.” Following Jackson’s speech before the DNC, Dewey, once again—fearful of igniting political passions, mobilizing the Democratic base, and splintering the Republican Party—said nothing.

The first night of the convention was also decision time for Truman. That day FDR’s letter “endorsing” Wallace—written three days earlier—was released. “I have been associated with Henry Wallace during his past four years as Vice President, for eight years earlier while he was Secretary of Agriculture, and well before that,” Roosevelt informed Chairman Jackson. “I like him and I respect him and he is my personal friend. For these reasons I personally would vote for his nomination if I were a delegate to the convention. At the same time, I do not wish to appear in any way as dictating to the Convention. Obviously the Convention must to the deciding.” While it appeared to some to be “the coolest and cruelest brushoff in all the long Roosevelt career,” Wallace and his supporters were hopeful. At least—or so they thought—there candidate was the only one mentioned by the President in writing.

Unlike Wallace, Byrnes, and others, the Missouri senator did not want the nomination. On 13 July, just six days before the convention was to convene, Truman wrote to his wife
Bess from Kansas City about an exchange with a Kansas City Star reporter named Roy Roberts. “Just gave Mr. Roberts a tough interview saying I didn’t want the Vice Presidency. Mr. Roberts says I have it in the bag if I don’t say no—and I’ve said it as tough as I can.” Indeed, Truman had pledged his support to Byrnes. In another exchange with reporters in Chicago on 19 July—the opening day of the convention—the Senator, responding to a reporter’s remark that as Vice President he might “succeed to the throne,” insisted, “Hell, I don’t want to be president.” “I’m satisfied with where I am,” he told another. That night from Truman’s room in Chicago’s Stevens Hotel, Hannegan placed a call to Roosevelt on the West Coast. Roosevelt asked Hannegan, “Have you got that fellow lined up yet?” to which the Chairman replied he had not. “Well, tell the Senator,” Roosevelt shouted, “that if he wants to break up the Democratic party by staying out, he can; but he knows as well as I what that might mean at this dangerous time in the world. If he wants to do it, anyway, let him go ahead.” The President then slammed down the phone. The Senator was stunned. “Well, if that’s the situation,” he told Hannegan, “I’ll have to say yes. But why the hell didn’t he tell me in the first place?”

The second day of the convention also witnessed the nominations for President. There was never any real doubt that Roosevelt would be granted a fourth campaign. On the evening of 20 July, the roll call began, and Roosevelt’s name was placed in official nomination by Senator Alben Barkley of Kentucky, a feisty Democrat who had, on occasion, broken with the President on domestic issues. Roosevelt, Barkley declared, was “endowed with the intellectual boldness of Thomas Jefferson, the indomitable courage of Andrew Jackson, the faith and patience of Abraham Lincoln, the rugged
integrity of Grover Cleveland, and the scholarly vision of Woodrow Wilson. A thirty-minute floor demonstration followed Barkley’s speech, and then Roosevelt’s name was seconded by four others, including Vice President Wallace, who described the President as “the greatest liberal in the history of the U.S.” and as “the most experienced military strategist” to ever occupy the presidency.

Wallace’s speech was preceded by one from Mrs. Fred T. Nooney, a delegate from Florida, who—without his knowledge or consent—placed the name of Virginia Senator Harry Byrd into nomination. He was, Nooney said, a man of integrity and courage who fully believed “in the principles of democracy as laid down by our forefathers, those great lawmakers of our nation, who firmly and unswervingly believed that a President of these United States should serve no more than two terms in office.” “I think it is time,” she concluded, “to go back to Virginia, the cradle of Democracy, for a true Democratic President to lead us out of the maze of red tape and centralized bureaucratic governmental control.”

Byrd’s nomination was shortly thereafter seconded by the Mississippi, Texas, and Virginia delegations. Byrd posed no serious challenge to the President, and Roosevelt, of course, easily won renomination on the first ballot. He received 1,086 votes to Byrd’s 89.

That night, 20 July, Roosevelt delivered his acceptance speech to the Democratic National Convention. Unlike previously, he did not accept from the convention hall. Instead, he addressed enthusiastic Democrats live and over the radio from an undisclosed location. Six days earlier, he had departed Hyde Park, making his way by rail to Marine Base, San Diego, where, in a small, specially-equipped train car, he planned to officially accept his party’s nomination before traveling, covertly, by cruiser to Pearl Harbor. Accompanying Roosevelt were Admiral McIntire (White House physician), Samuel
Rosenman (speechwriter), Elmer Davis (head of the Office of War Information), Dr. Howard Bruenn (heart specialist), and Grace Tully (the President’s secretary), among a few others. As the President prepared to deliver his speech, moving-picture and still cameras and radio broadcasting equipment were brought into the tiny rail car to document the event. Meanwhile, on the convention floor in Chicago, delegates listened to writer Quentin Reynolds introduce the President. Reynolds, who had just returned from visiting with troops, spoke of soldiers’ hopes for the future. “Your sons know this,” he said. “[T]hey know that all of America has contributed to making the victory possible. But they also know one other thing. They know that this mighty achievement… was accomplished under the leadership of their Commander-in-Chief and ours—Franklin D. Roosevelt.” Then, amidst thunderous applause, Chairman Jackson announced: “Ladies and gentlemen of the Convention: the President of the United States!”

“Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen of the Convention, My Friends,” the President began. “I have already indicated to you why I accept the nomination that you offered me—in spite of my desire to retire to the quiet of private life. You in this Convention are aware of what we have sought to gain for the Nation, and you have asked me to continue.” Roosevelt then announced that he would not campaign “in the usual sense.” “In these days of tragic sorrow, I do not consider it fitting. And besides, in these days of global warfare, I shall not be able to find the time.” He did, however, qualify the statement, adding that he would “feel free to report to the people the facts about matters of concern to them and especially to correct any misrepresentations.”

Overall, Roosevelt’s speech was nonpartisan in nature, and aimed at highlighting his role as commander-in-chief. Elegant and above the foray, the President told his listeners
that he was presently at a naval base performing his duty under the Constitution. “The war waits for no elections,” he declared. “Decisions must be made—plans must be laid—strategy must be carried out. They do not concern merely a party or a group. They will affect the daily lives of Americans for generations to come.” He then pledged himself to three goals: to win the war, to form an international organization with armed forces to prevent another war, and to provide returning veterans and all Americans with employment and decent standards of living.40 In a long series of “They will decide” sentences, he then cited his administration’s record in both foreign and domestic policy. “They will decide on the record—the record written on the seas, on the land, in the skies. They will decide on the record of our domestic accomplishments in recovery and reform since March 4, 1933, and they will decide on the record of our war production and food production—unparalleled in all history, in spite of the doubts and sneers of those in high places who said ‘It can’t be done.’”

Roosevelt then ended his speech by doing two things that were very uncharacteristic for him—he admitted mistakes and he read a quote. In an attempt to preempt Republican attacks that he was unprepared for war in December 1941, Roosevelt admitted, “We have made mistakes. Who has not? Things have not always been perfect. Are they ever perfect in human affairs?” No, but the objective, he insisted, remained clear, and that was to win the war and secure a lasting peace for generations to come. The quote he read was from Abraham Lincoln’s Second Inaugural Address, delivered after the nation’s last wartime election. Assuring voters that like Lincoln, he too looked forward to the coming peace, closed by reading:
‘... with firmness in the right, as God gives us to see the right, let us strive on to finish the work we are in; to bind up the Nation’s wounds; to care for him who shall have borne the battle, and for his widow, and his orphan—to do all which may achieve and cherish a just and lasting peace among ourselves, and with all nations.”

The convention hall erupted in prolonged applause. Meanwhile, inside Roosevelt’s special rail car, a photographer snapped what turned out to be a very unfortunate and unflattering picture of the President. With his mouth open—probably in mid-speech—Roosevelt looked old, haggard, and ill. Not surprisingly, it soon made itself into circulation, and as one White House intimate observed, “started tongues wagging... all through the United States.”

After the President’s speech, party leaders in Chicago prepared for the vice presidential vote the following day, Friday, 21 July. Their plan to put Truman over the top was two-fold. One was to release Hannegan’s note from FDR (postdated 19 July) that stated he would “be very glad to run with either” Truman or Douglas. The letter was printed in the Friday morning (21 July) newspapers, and, of course, generated much excitement. The other was to spread the word, delegation to delegation, that Roosevelt was convinced Truman would cost him fewer votes than any other candidate. That evening—after the formal nominations of Wallace, Truman, and Barkley—roll call began. On the first ballot, Wallace received 429 ½ votes, just 160 votes short of the necessary 589. Truman came in second with a strong 319 ½ votes. On the second ballot, which occurred immediately after the first, Truman picked up support and secured the nomination, receiving 1,031 votes to Wallace’s 105. Chairman Jackson then announced, “Will the next Vice President of the United States come to the rostrum? Will Senator Truman
Truman made his way to the stage, and reading from a sheet of paper, said: “Honor. I’ve never had a job I didn’t do with all I have. I shall continue in the new capacity as I have in the U.S. Senate, to help the commander-in-chief to win the war and save the peace. I have always been a supporter of Franklin D. Roosevelt in domestic and foreign policy and I shall continue to do just that with everything I have as V.P.”

Truman proved to be a good choice, but he too was not without some flaws. He was, for example, associated with the corrupt Kansas City boss, Tom Pendergast, and as such, was viewed by some as small, petty, and not especially bright. The Republican nominee had made his career on fighting corruption, and some Democrats feared that Truman would play into Dewey’s “campaign story.” Also, the Senator was a very dull formal speaker. He was at his best unscripted, but an unscripted Truman was an invitation to disaster. Listening to the Democratic convention from Albany, Thomas Dewey told a visitor that he was pleased with Roosevelt’s selection of Truman. “Why, Herb [Brownell] ought to send him a check for that,” Dewey joked. “Truman will help us more than he’ll help Roosevelt.”
Chapter Five:
The Making of a Wartime Campaign

The 1942 elections gave the Republicans reason for cautious optimism for the White House in 1944. The GOP could begin with a bedrock of support of about twenty million votes to offset Roosevelt’s high wartime approval rating. If the GOP could add approximately ten million independent votes to its column in 1944, a Republican victory, party leaders believed, was very possible. Democrats, not surprisingly, interpreted the midterm results very differently. Their studies of the party’s 1942 decline revealed that Democratic setbacks were the result not of Republican popularity, but of a fall-off in voter participation. Only twenty-eight million people voted in the 1942 elections, eight million fewer than in 1938, and nearly twenty-two million fewer than in 1940.\(^1\) This drop in participation, Democrats believed, reflected wartime social upheaval: “young men in the armed forces lacked the opportunity or incentive to cast absentee ballots, and war workers who had recently taken jobs in different states could not meet [one and sometimes two-year] residency requirements.”\(^2\) Inconvenience and time away from work without pay were additional factors in the low participation levels of 1942. This decline in turnout hit Democrats, who relied heavily upon draft-age voters and the working classes, especially hard. “In district after district the Republican vote fell slightly or remained stable, but the Democratic vote dropped precipitously.”\(^3\) Victory in the 1944 presidential contest, Democrats concluded, depended primarily upon a high turnout of voters.

Thomas Dewey waged a competent, efficient, centrist, and serious (if unsuccessful) campaign against “the Champ” in 1944. In fact, Dewey’s campaign was unique to
presidential elections in at least four important ways. First, it began early—several weeks, in fact, before Labor Day, and the traditional start of the fall campaign. In July, immediately after the Republican convention in Chicago, Herbert Brownell, Dewey’s campaign manager launched a media blitz that included the printing of one thousand posters bearing Dewey’s image, the publication of campaign literature and songs, news reels, and the production of five million “Dewey for President” buttons and banners. Furthermore, Dewey’s campaign was built around radio—a medium he as an attorney felt comfortable with. In this last campaign of the pre-television age, he delivered twenty-four nationally broadcast addresses. Also, the Dewey campaign was oriented toward only two dozen northern, central, and western states, which controlled a majority in the Electoral College, and which, in 1944, had Republican governors. Realizing that elections were won in the precincts, and not in the newspaper headlines, Dewey carefully cultivated local leaders who were responsible for delivering votes in their areas. Thus, when he began personally campaigning by rail in September, he spent most of his time not at rallies and other public appearances, but behind closed doors with local Republican leaders. After his meetings with local leaders at various stops around the country, he held press conferences, repeating local complaints about the administration, but carefully refraining from endorsing it. This technique, one journalist following Dewey observed, “made him the sounding board for every complaint of disgruntled people.” Lastly, Dewey’s campaign was the first to rely heavily upon opinion polls in determining candidate messages, appearance schedules, and national strategies. He did not bother campaigning in the solidly Democratic South.
In a confidential memorandum to Stanley High, dated 5 September, Dewey articulated a number of basic themes to be emphasized in the campaign. “Each of these themes,” Dewey wrote, “really ought to be in every speech. That is impossible, but that is the objective toward which I should like to attempt to go.” One was that the next administration would be largely a peacetime administration. “This should be said over and over again,” Dewey wrote. Another theme was that you could “change horses in mid-stream” and still be compatible with obtaining victory. Alluding to Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain’s fall (and Winston Churchill’s rise) in the spring of 1940, Dewey observed “The difference between us and the British is that the British did it [i.e. changed administrations] earlier [in the war]. We have changed governments [from Democratic to Republican] in most of the states [since 1941] and greatly strengthened the war effort and thereby speeded victory.” Evoking the memory of Woodrow Wilson toward a far different conclusion than Democrats, Dewey insisted that Roosevelt and his administration were “tired, old men.” As he had charged in a speech before the American Newspapers Publishers’ Association that spring, the United States “must not repeat the tragic error of twenty-five years ago. The central error of our course in 1919 was the false assumption that words could create peace… Men everywhere wanted to feel that a treaty which proclaimed peace would suffice to assure it and that from there on they could relax… Within a few years the reality of Germany bore no relation whatever to the word picture of Versailles. This was because those who drafted the treaty were tired war leaders. They could not find within themselves the physical and mental strength to make the peace a living reality [italics added].”

5
In addition, Dewey stressed that the New Deal was determined to keep young men in the Army after the war. "They have been saying for six months," he wrote, "that they intend to keep the young men in the Army because there will be no jobs. We propose to bring them home to the earliest practical moment and leave occupation of our defeated enemies to volunteers." Then there was the theme of "jobs—jobs—jobs." According to the Republican nominee, he offered "competence in reconversion" over the New Deal's incompetent economic bungling—which, he stressed, had failed for eight years before the war to cure the Depression. Dewey also stressed that taxes under Roosevelt were "unendurable," and that small business, which had been choked by the New Deal, was the root of every big business, and the way the nation prospered. Finally, Dewey instructed his surrogates that the following be emphasized about himself: that he had administrative ability; was inclusive to "all races, creeds, color and shades of political opinion," and that he was optimistic about the future of America and had faith in a free society as against a regimented, totalitarian one. The catch-phrase for all of these themes was the message—which Dewey stressed should be "repeated and repeated"-- that "It is time for a change."6

That same month, September, the RNC published a small pamphlet entitled What to Talk About to assist Republican leaders taking an active part in the Dewey-Bricker campaign. "Every speech should be an attack speech," the RNC declared. "We have to have hardhitting, down-to-earth, chapter-and-verse material showing how flagrantly the New Deal has failed." In addition, "Every speech ought to have some material deliberately designed to interest and appeal to women." The women's vote, the party recognized, would be decisive, with up to 60% of all votes cast by women. Speakers
should also, “somewhere, state the fact that the Dewey administration will be in office from January 20, 1945 to January 20, 1949,” and that it would be not a war, but a peacetime administration. The chief problem for a President Dewey would not be what America requires to win the war, “but what America will require after the war is won.” Another talking point emphasized by the RNC was optimism. “It cannot be said too often that what Thomas E. Dewey offers is a Get-up and Get-Going American Future… [and] that this year we can end our wanderings in the New Deal’s Defeatist Wilderness.” Foreshadowing a theme made popular in the 1984 Ronald Reagan reelection campaign, the Republican committee added: “America is at the morning of her destiny!” Finally, the RNC emphasized the need for “a return to character and integrity in government and in the men who govern… This year the American people want a return to a leadership that has deep moral convictions and the faith of our forebears. These should be a great emphasis on those things which, on the deeper levels of life, really matter.” The pamphlet also articulated for speakers “Our Three Basic Issues,” including: “It’s Time To Change,” “Winning The War And The Peace,” and “Jobs After Victory.”

The Roosevelt strategy for the fall, meanwhile, was to distance the President from partisan politics, and stress instead his role as wartime commander-in-chief. During the Democratic National Convention in July, Roosevelt was conspicuously absent, inspecting naval and maritime bases in California—“too busy,” it appeared, with his presidential duties to worry with politics and accept his party’s nomination in person. In August, Roosevelt traveled to Hawaii to meet with General Douglas MacArthur, and in early September, he attended the Second Quebec Conference with British Prime Minister Winston Churchill. The President’s goal was to look “presidential,” and emphasize his
role as commander-in-chief. Meanwhile, Senator Truman would bear the burden of
stumping the country. This “Rose Garden” strategy, however, was riddled with risks,
including conforming to the Republican charge that Democrats were tired and
disinterested in domestic affairs, and that the President himself was old, in poor health,
and unable to wage a vigorous campaign, much less serve out a fourth term. With Dewey
pulling ahead of Roosevelt in the polls in early September, Democratic leaders began
pressuring Roosevelt to abandon his “Rose Garden” strategy and actually campaign. In
late September, he agreed.

Specifically, FDR—through surrogates, pamphlets, and radio advertising—
endeavored to win the election by presenting the to the American people a platform of
experience and accomplishment, and the necessity of continuity in the war effort. First,
Roosevelt stressed the legislative accomplishments of his administration versus the
promises of Dewey. Typical of this line of argument was “For What the Hell Should We
Apologize?,” a speech delivered by Mark Etheridge, publisher of the Courier-Journal
and the Louisville Times, before the Oklahoma Democratic State Convention in May
1944 (and published and distributed by the DNC that fall). Citing various pieces of
alphabet legislation, Etheridge chided those Democrats, who occasionally spoke of the
administration with a note of apology in their voices. “Is any Democrat ashamed that we
took a banking structure which had had 5,770 failures in the four years of Hoover… and
restored confidence, virtually eliminated failures and insured losses?,” he asked. “Are we
not proud that through housing projects all over this country, we have taken people out of
the squalor and filth of rat-infested slums and given them a chance to breathe good air
and their children a chance to be something better than gutter rats? … Are we ashamed of
TVA and its twenty-one dams? Are we ashamed that we fed the poor and the unemployed? Are we ashamed that because of us, old people are drawing pensions all over the country? Do we dare apologize for the fact that we have enlightened child labor laws, or minimum wage and maximum hours laws?  

Another talking point pushed by the administration was the argument that the political and economic preparation for international peace and postwar security should be left to those who had been waging the war and had been in constant association with the Allies. In addition, the President and his team implied that any fundamental change in the civilian government would imperil postwar security and give an opportunity, which the incumbents would not, to isolationists and economic “Tories” to turn back the clock of progress and invite World War III. The safe—as well as deserved—course was to give a “vote of confidence” to the Commander-in-Chief who had directed a successful war. The Roosevelt campaign also kept a record of all of Dewey’s public statements, searching them for misstatements and contradictions, in an effort to portray the New York Governor as inexperienced, uncertain, and opportunistic. Though Roosevelt enjoyed—as his campaign platform indicated—enormous advantages, they were not sufficient by themselves to win the election. Victory required not only the right issues, but also organization and enthusiasm to inspire voters to the polls.  

There were several obstacles confronting Democrats in the area of voter turnout—obstacles they had been unable to overcome in the midterm elections two years earlier. One problem was that many young voters were serving overseas in the armed forces. In the midst of a global war, these young citizen-soldiers often lacked the opportunity or incentive to request and then cast absentee ballots. Another problem was that many
wartime workers, as discussed earlier, were on the move in the search of work in various war industries. If workers crossed state lines—and many did—they were confronted with residency requirements which hindered voting. For example, in 1944, five states demanded two years of residency to vote, while thirty-two others insisted on at least one year. Furthermore, workers who did meet residency requirements were often reluctant to forfeit wages by taking time off, and those working night shifts or overtime found voting an inconvenience. It did not help matters that many war plants were on the outskirts of towns, often requiring a timely and potentially costly commute. As the 1944 campaign season approached, Democrats, who relied heavily upon younger and working class voters, were desperate to energize and activate eligible voters. DNC chairman Robert E. Hannegan, addressing the party’s national convention that July, expressed this strategy publicly. “Our job,” he said, “is to go to the people of America and lay the facts before them. It is to cite the record. It is to tell the simple truth. Our job is to see to it that our people are registered. It is to see to it that they vote. It is to work for as big a soldier vote as we can get. It is to go the American people, person-to-person.”

Essential to a Democratic victory in 1944 was a heavy turn-out among soldiers. In 1944, over nine million young men were in the U.S. armed services, five million of whom were stationed overseas. Since both Democrats and Republicans believed the presidential election would be close, the issue of soldier voting became very controversial, and raised several important questions. Could ballots reach soldiers fighting overseas in time? Who should be responsible for administering ballots, the states or the federal government? Would state and local elections be included on those ballots, or just the presidential contest? The Roosevelt administration-- perceiving that most
servicemen supported their commander-in-chief--sought to make it as easy as possible for soldiers to cast a ballot. Thus, in June 1943, the administration’s plan for soldier voting, the Green-Lucas Bill, was introduced in Congress. Overall, it aimed to simplify absentee voting by giving ballots to all servicemen in advance of federal elections, and allowing them to mark it at the appropriate time—instead of requiring each soldier to apply for a ballot, wait to receive it, and execute it weeks later. A special bipartisan War Ballot Commission (WBC) was also proposed to oversee the entire process. Republicans and southern Democrats immediately cried foul. Republicans expressed concern that the bill lacked proper safeguards against voter intimidation, and the appointment by the President of Republicans with “pink,” New Deal tendencies to the WBC. Southern Democrats, meanwhile, “feared any proposal that might undermine state control of voting and enfranchise Negro servicemen.”14 A common concern, however, was the bill’s challenge to states’ rights. Critics, such as Democrat John Rankin of Mississippi, complained that the bill would “create ‘a super-bureaucracy’ and ‘wipe out State laws and State qualifications for the electors in violation of the Constitution.’ The sponsors, he added, had a ‘wild desire to concentrate into the hands of the Federal Government all power over elections.’”15

In an effort to rectify some of those problems, Democratic Senators John McClellan of Arkansas, James Eastland of Mississippi, and Kenneth McKellar of Tennessee, proposed a “state control” bill. The bill, which passed Congress in March 1944 and became law without a presidential signature, provided for a federal ballot only when a state expressly approved its use, and when a soldier had applied for and failed to receive an absentee ballot.16 In Albany, meanwhile, Thomas Dewey led the nation in reforming absentee
voting procedures, pushing through the legislature in July 1944, the New York Soldier Vote Law. Under this law, every member of the armed forces from New York would be given a postcard. The soldier would then have to sign his name and his home and service address on that card and mail it to the War Ballot Commission at Albany. Should a soldier fail to receive a postcard, a simple letter or card to friends or family would serve the purpose if sent to the state capitol. The information would then be processed, and the soldier shortly thereafter would receive a full ballot with the name of every state, local, and federal candidate for office printed on it.¹⁷ Not all soldiers, of course, were for Roosevelt. One of those in the minority favoring Dewey was a young combat pilot from South Dakota named George S. McGovern. “I’m going to be more than disgusted if Dewey doesn’t win,” the future Democratic nominee for President (1972) wrote a friend back home. “I really think we need a man like Dewey in there now! I like the vigor and efficiency that he has shown in the past and even in the way he is conducting his campaign. I think he’ll do a lot toward clearing up all the dozen and one messes that the government is in now. For one thing he has a fairly definite attitude toward everything really vital and that’s something the New Deal certainly hasn’t had.”¹⁸

To get their messages out, the Dewey and Roosevelt campaigns relied upon a number of organizations and donors. The 1944 presidential election was one of the first to fall under the limits of campaign finance reform. In 1939, Congress passed (and the President signed) the Hatch Act, which, among other things, limited the national committees to raising and spending no more than $3,000,000 per calendar year. Also, the act limited individual contributions to a national campaign to only $5,000 per year. With this act, the role of the national committees, which traditionally provided the leadership
and coordination of a national campaign (including getting voters to the polls, raising money, scheduling speakers, and getting the party message out via pamphlets, newspapers, and radio), forever changed; no longer would they play the dominant organizational role in a presidential campaign. Since the Hatch Act did not “apply to contributions made to or by a State or local committee or other State and local organization,” money continued to pour into presidential campaigns—just not through the national committees. Individual donations over $5,000 could still be given, but not in one place (such as the national committee). Instead, individuals (and for that matter, corporations) would have to distribute their donations through various independent and auxiliary groups, which, of course, did not have raising or spending caps. For example, an individual wanting to financially support Dewey for President in 1944, could donate $5,000 to the Republican National Committee, as well as to numerous other state, local, and independent organizations, such as: Democrats for Dewey, the All-American Committee for Dewey and Bricker, the Aviation Committee for Dewey, the People’s Committee to Defend Life Insurance and Savings, the Southern Anti-New Deal Association, the Girls Who Save Their Nickels to Elect a Republican President Club, the United Republican Finance Committee of Metropolitan New York, and the American Democratic National Committee—to name only a few. In all, Republican state and finance committees spent more than nine million dollars in support of the Dewey-Bricker ticket.

The American Democratic National Committee (ADNC) was one of the largest and more interesting independent groups to support Republicans in 1944. Like most independent groups, its name was meant to attract certain voters—in this case,
Democrats. The ADNC was founded in early 1944 by a group of conservative Democrats, including Roosevelt’s former Secretary of War Harry H. Woodring, and former Missouri Senator James A. Reed. The purpose of this group was to oppose Roosevelt’s fourth term bid, and in June, shortly before the Republican and Democratic national conventions, the ADNC held a convention in Chicago—attended by several of the “Texas Regulars”—and decided against the formation of a third party. They dedicated themselves instead to work to “defeat the Democratic candidate and to elect the candidate of the Republican Party.” By November the ADNC had established state organizations in thirty-six states—all, of course, independent of the RNC. Like the “Democrats for Dewey”—a Republican-planned group that often affiliated with the ADNC—the ADNC believed Roosevelt had led their party from its traditional values. They were especially offended by the influence of Sidney Hillman’s CIO and other “leftist” elements in the Democratic Party.19

Among pro-Roosevelt organizations, Sidney Hillman’s CIO-PAC was the most important. Hillman, aged fifty-seven, was a Lithuanian-born Jew, who in 1944, was former head of the powerful labor federation, the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO). As a young man he had been a member of the Socialist Party, had met and been captivated by Leon Trotsky, and had published a small book, entitled Reconstruction of Russia and the Task of Labor (1922), that was sympathetic toward the goals of the newly formed Soviet Union.20 In response to the Smith-Connelly Act of 1943, which prohibited campaign contributions from labor organizations, Hillman formed the Political Action Committee (PAC) in July of that same year. The PAC was not a political party, but an organization “to educate the people on their political rights and how to use them to
improve their own conditions and to help banish poverty and the fear of poverty from our land.”

It stood against every reactionary force, while standing for (1) a complete Allied victory over the Axis and the destruction of fascism, (2) all-out aid to returning servicemen, (3) full employment at fair wages, (4) good housing, medical care, and education for all, (5) equality of opportunity regardless of race or religion, (6) a just and adequate Social Security system, and (7) planning for a lasting peace.

The CIO-PAC was one of the first attempts in the United States to organize labor for political purposes on a national scale. It was an obvious attempt to circumvent the Smith-Connolly Act, which, incidentally, had numerous loopholes. For example, money spent prior to the conventions was not restricted. Also, as Hillman soon discovered, the PAC did not have to draw on union treasuries or donate money directly to candidates (which the law forbade), but could instead solicit ‘voluntary’ contributions and put out its own material. In addition, Hillman “undertook the huge task of reclassifying union membership lists, which were arranged by shop rather than by ward or precinct, so that registration drives could be conducted and tabs kept on voter turnout.” Toward this end, the former labor leader joined efforts with Earl Browder’s American Communist Party—which had dissolved as a political party, and reformed itself as the Communist Political Association—to find the necessary skilled and committed organizers to staff national and regional PAC offices. This connection with Browder and the Communists—along with the $1,000,000 raised and spent in support of the Roosevelt-Truman ticket-- became a major issue in the 1944 presidential election. Furthermore, labor’s vital role in providing money and manpower for Roosevelt anticipated labor’s importance for Democrats in later elections.
Both parties also invested heavily in radio advertising, with Republicans the more innovative. The Republican National Committee, for example, not only prepared a number of national broadcasts, including speeches by Dewey and Bricker, but also suggested to state and local organizations various radio activities, such as “Registration Recordings.” The recordings were written from a non-partisan stance, and thus could be used by radio stations as a public service. Another type of recording was “Get Out the Vote,” which were also non-partisan in nature, and thus free, encouraged people to actually go to the polls and vote. The next type was the “Special Recordings between Governor Dewey and other Republican Governors.” The concept behind these recordings was quite interesting. The recordings were to be about fifteen minutes in length, and involved each governor welcoming Dewey to his state. Dewey would reply by endorsing the state ticket, “mentioning the names of the individual candidates for statewide office” and then replying “to the individual governors in a short talk of seven or eight minutes, discussing the issues of special interest to the individual states.” As a “Strictly Confidential” Radio bulletin from the RNC to the state committees, dated 15 August, explained, “We believe a discussion of local issues by the candidate for the presidency will let the people of your state know that he is familiar with them and how he thinks on them.” Finally, there were the “One Minute Spot Recordings.” According to the RNC, the spots were aimed at the Roosevelt voter, “who has his mind set” and “is not likely to tune in our major speeches by our candidates. He is a closed book, unless we can catch him unawares.”23 The spot campaign included four themes—the “Clear Everything with Sidney” series, the “4th Term” issue, the Vice Presidency (or Presidential health), and “Peacetime Years,” which focused on a statement made by General Lewis
Hersey’s statement from earlier that year indicating that the administration’s postwar plan for employment was to keep American soldiers in the armed services. One Dewey spot read:

If you are think ‘you might as well’ vote for Franklin D. Roosevelt again—stop and think!

Has he ever relinquished willingly any power he has gained over you? Will he give up the greatest power of all—the presidency? Not while he can use an emergency as an excuse to continue in office. Do your American duty while there is still time. The only way you can save yourself from the continuing reign of Franklin D. Roosevelt is to vote for Thomas E. Dewey.  

Another one introduced for the first time a phrase that would repeatedly be used by Republicans against Democrats in subsequent campaigns:

If you are thinking you ‘might as well’ vote for Franklin D. Roosevelt again—stop and think!

His henchmen said, ‘We will tax and tax and tax—and spend and spend and spend—and elect and elect and elect!’ And they meant this, too! Any emergency—any excuse they will use to drag your vote into their net. The only way you can stop them is with your vote. Change while there is still time. Vote for Thomas E. Dewey for President! 

Democrats, of course, responded in kind, with most spots (read by celebrities such as Orson Welles, Frank Sinatra, and Humphrey Bogart) emphasizing the “Hoover Depression”:

[Opens with traffic noise that slowly fades away and into a dialogue]

Buy an apple, Mister?

Yeah, give me a couple of ‘em.
Okay, here you are... Thanks very much [laughter]

Just like 1930, isn’t it?

Buddy, this makes 1930 look like the good old days. This is really a depression. But what’ya expect? We never should have elected Dewey. But we don’t seem to learn, do we?

[Traffic noise, fade away, and then Announcer]

This doesn’t have to happen again, folks. It’s just a case of keeping men with 1929 ideas out of office in 1944.26

Both sides also used electronic media, including both news reels and radio. News reel coverage of the campaign during the late summer provided the two parties with more than enough material to release campaign films. That fall, the Republican National Committee released *Dewey: Spokesman of the Future*, a short film biography of the New York Governor that included footage of his wife and two young sons, his home at Pawling, New York, his years as New York’s District Attorney, and his speeches as Governor and presidential candidate. The intent of the film was unmistakable—to create a public image of Dewey as “family man and competent, no-nonsense administrator.”27 Democrats, meanwhile, released *Lest We Forget*, a chronicle in film of Roosevelt’s twelve years as President. Not surprisingly, the film’s goal was to portray FDR as a successful incumbent and victorious commander-in-chief. Throughout it, the President was in motion— in action—from giving speeches, to signing legislation and meeting with foreign leaders.28

Radio was another important campaign tool. Roosevelt, ever the extrovert, enjoyed speaking. He was informal, direct, and conversational. He was also a slow speaker, averaging 110 words per minute, which allowed the average listener to grasp (and be
impressed by) what had been said. Roosevelt’s delivery rate was slightly lower than what the British Broadcasting Corporation recommended for its newscasters, 125 words a minute. In 1933, he had initiated the fireside chat as a new form of presidential communication, and in doing so, created an ideal vehicle to project his radio personality. According to James F. Bender, a consultant for the National Institute for Human Relations in 1944, Roosevelt’s “gift of good speech and his lively sense of communication are inextricably bound up with his dominant personality trait, extroversion.”29 Dewey’s personality, meanwhile, was what Bender described as “ambiversion”—i.e. he was neither dominantly extroverted nor introverted, but, like most people, a mixture of both. More inhibited as an ambivert, Dewey’s speeches were thus more formal, and delivered in the tradition of Henry Clay, John C. Calhoun, and Daniel Webster—fast (between 120 and 149 words per minute), projected, and clear. Of the two, Bender believed Dewey to have the more powerful voice. However, when it came to popular appeal, especially among women (a key constituency in 1944), Bender gave Roosevelt an edge. The reason: dialect. Dewey, originally from Michigan, pronounced his words in general American, the dialect that spread westward from Philadelphia, and was spoken by over 90,000,000 Americans and Canadians. Roosevelt, in contrast, spoke with a more British cast, New England dialect. While Dewey said “part” and “mother,” Roosevelt pronounced them “pah-t” and “moth-uh.”30 Roosevelt’s speech, Bender concluded, was different from most Americans, and thus came across as charming and attractive.

There were a number of similarities between the two leading candidates for President in 1944. Both, for example, were only children, and greatly attached to and influenced
by their adoring and strong-willed mothers. Though the Roosevelt family was more affluent, both men enjoyed very secure and serene childhoods. Both were Episcopalians in name, but neither were greatly shaped by their faith. Both Roosevelt and Dewey had served as Governor of New York. Both lived in Dutchess County, New York, and were practically neighbors. Incidentally, this was the only time in American history that two candidates for the presidency came from the same county. Both also liked farming, though neither were genuine farmers. Neither were they heavy readers. In fact, both enjoyed reading mystery novels. Both were manipulative, delighted in keeping people unsure of their intentions, and enjoyed pushing people around. Robert Taft once described Dewey as “very arrogant and bossy”—a man who moved with the political winds and kept his own council. Harry Truman once remarked that FDR was an “enormous egotist,” while Roosevelt’s daughter, Anna, wrote a friend that her father was “cold, calculating and shrewd and you can’t tell what he will do.”

While there were similarities, there were also important differences. Roosevelt could make fun of himself; Dewey could not. FDR was very outgoing and “people friendly,” and Dewey, again, was not. Indeed, while Roosevelt “always greeted verbal information with smiles of appreciation and unnecessary ‘yessing,’” Dewey, one contemporary observed, came back with questions. “He ‘frisks’ the mind of a visitor with penetrating inquiry. He makes him prove things, which is generally embarrassing to people who never bother to verify what they say. This habit of Dewey’s disturbs people who do not know him well. It makes them feel foolish or unwanted or intrusive.”
Chapter Six:
The Fall Campaign

In late summer, Dewey—instead of vacationing—worked quietly behind the scenes laying the organization and foundation for the fall campaign, as well as fulfilling his official duties as Governor. On July 1, upon his return from the Republican National Convention, he stressed unity in the war effort, telling a welcoming reception in Albany that America had the greatest political system in the world, and that all nations would soon recognize it to be—despite campaign differences and debates—the most united country in the world. While Dewey genuinely had a very high regard for public office, especially the presidency, he nevertheless wanted to give his candidacy legitimacy by emphasizing it within the context of America's democratic strength. "We can risk an election," he continued, "because to us that means we are free men and women. We are going to keep the things we are fighting for and strengthen them by having an election in these times... As a result of this campaign we will prove that in the process of fighting a total war this country can preserve its sacred free processes and become stronger as a result of an election." 1 A few days later, in speech before the Empire Girls' State, Dewey added another component of his campaign—platform. The government, he insisted, had become disconnected from the people. One reason was that the Federal Government considered itself apart from and superior to the other branches of the government, and above the people. The other was the growing aggressiveness of pressure groups and special interests who pushed their various claims so vigorously that they acted as a wedge between the government and the broad interests of the American people. "One of the big
tasks of the next few years,” he concluded, “will be to bring government closer to the people and to bring the people closer to the practice of self-government.”

One of Dewey’s first major acts of the post-convention season, however, came in late July and early August. On 26 July, running-mate John Bricker met with Dewey at the Governor’s Mansion in Albany, and afterwards took questions from reporters. While Dewey was relaxed and affable, Bricker—well aware that Team Dewey held him in low regard and had preferred Earl Warren—seemed uncomfortable. He snapped irritably at the press, and in a response to a reporter’s question, he stumbled, allowing that he would welcome the support of anyone interested in defeating Roosevelt. “That’s how elections are won,” he casually explained. Asked if that view extended to the extreme racist Gerald L. K. Smith of Shreveport, who was in the process of organizing his own presidential campaign, Bricker responded affirmatively, adding that Smith’s vote would “count like all the rest.” A few days later, Smith announced that Bricker would be his vice presidential running mate. “I had paid little attention to Gerald L. K. Smith or his movement until last night, when he associated my name with him and his movement,” Bricker told reporters in St. Louis. “I shall not have my name used in any such connection. I hate demagoguery, religious intolerance and racial prejudice. They can destroy our free government as they have around the world. I shall fight them as long as I am in public office and as long as I live.” Similarly, Dewey issued a statement characterizing Smith as “one of those rabble rousers who, like Adolf Hitler, makes racial prejudice his stock-in-trade. His contemptible attempt to associate himself with Governor Bricker is a sinister effort to smear the Republican candidate for Vice
President.” Following the Smith debacle Bricker began stumping throughout most of the forty-eight states.

Two days after the Bricker incident, Dewey issued a bold statement concerning Republican Representative Hamilton Fish of New York. Fish was a staunch isolationist and fierce critic of FDR, who, before Pearl Harbor, was very sympathetic toward Hitler’s Germany. In 1933, for example, he had signed his name as a sponsor to a Nazi propaganda book entitled *Communism in Germany*, which argued Hitler had saved Germany from a communist takeover. Five years later, he was a main speaker at a German Day Rally in Madison Square Garden, where the swastika was displayed, the Nazi “Horst Wessel” sang, and the Hitler salute given. The following year, on the eve of World War II, Fish was rumored to have flown around Europe, at Germany’s request and expense, urging its leaders to further appease Hitler. Then, in the summer of 1944, Fish remarked to reporters that Jews were “unfortunately” for Roosevelt and the New Deal, and that Dewey would not carry a single predominately Jewish district in New York City. That was, he said, not an attack against Jews, but “the plain truth.” In response, on 28 July, Dewey reminded the public that he had publicly opposed Fish’s reelection two years earlier, and that he was doing so again in 1944. “Anyone who injects a racial or religious issue into a political campaign is guilty of a disgraceful, un-American act,” Dewey said. “I have fought that kind of thing all my life and always will regardless of partisan considerations. I have never accepted the support of any such individual and I never shall.” Despite the Governor’s best efforts, Roosevelt supporters continued to identify Dewey with Fish. The Congressman, for his part, did not help matters. A few days after
Dewey’s denunciation, Fish told reporters he would still support the Governor for President.

Another important post-convention campaign move made by Dewey was his convening of a two-day GOP Governors Conference in St. Louis beginning on 2 August. Dewey, accompanied by his wife, staff, and forty reporters and photographers, left Albany by train on 30 July. His first stop was in Pittsburgh, where about 2,500 people gathered at the rail station to get a glimpse of the candidate. With an eight-piece band playing “Anchors Aweigh” and “Hail to the Chief,” Dewey—in adherence to his wartime strategy of working the party organization and not the public—avoided speech-making, and instead met with local party, business, labor, and agriculture leaders in a downtown hotel. There was pomp, however. Escorted by motorcycle and mounted police, he traveled through town in an open car in parade-like fashion. Along the motorcade route people gathered and held up signs reading “Welcome Governor Dewey.” The Governor acknowledged their cheers by removing his hat and waving.

The stop in Pittsburgh was strategic. Roosevelt had carried Pennsylvania in 1940 by only 281,000 votes, 104,000 of which came from Allegheny County, which included Pittsburgh. In a morning press conference—the only media event of the day—Dewey unveiled a campaign message that would quickly become a constant: that the next president would take office in January 1945, and would be concerned mainly with postwar, domestic affairs, including reconversion. “Pittsburgh,” Dewey declared, “produces one-quarter of the steel of the whole United States. The State produces one-quarter of the coal. While the reconversion of facilities will perhaps not be as great here as in war factories, where they must have new equipment to change back to making
automobiles and refrigerators, the employment problem will be perhaps even more acutely affected, with the tapering-off of production as we come closer to the end of the war.” Though the nation was making great progress in fighting the war, the administration, he charged, was “making no progress in preparation for what will follow.” The United States could not stand another “Roosevelt depression which lasted for eight years, with more than 10,000,000 unemployed continuously from 1933 to 1940, inclusive.” He offered no specifics of his own. Dewey also used the occasion to take aim at the President and his argument that the country should not “trade horses in midstream.” “That argument,” he told reporters, alluding to the dropping of Wallace a few days before, “was demolished in Chicago when they changed one-half of the horse.”

The Republican Governors Conference, made up of twenty-six state executives, was a brilliant move by Dewey. It helped him organize the other governors into an effective political unit for the campaign. After all, Republican governors represented three-fourths of the American people, and 314 electoral votes—more than enough to win the presidency. As Herbert Brownell later remembered, “Each [governor]... was really the active head of the Republican campaign effort, and sometimes the state people disregard the national campaign and spend most of their time trying to elect the state ticket... We also wanted them to see Governor Dewey in action. Many of them didn’t know him very well personally. We thought if they could see him at close range, see his dynamic qualities, see how he was organizing the campaign, that they’d have more of a personal interest in seeing him succeed.” In addition, the conference helped to inject the conflict between state and federal governments into the campaign on the theory that most people believed their state governments had done better jobs in recent years than the federal
government. As Dewey noted at the close of the conference, “During the past twelve years the Governors of the states have never once been permitted to exchange views with the President of the United States, and entire regions of our country have been without representation in the National Government.” Furthermore, the conference enabled him to distance himself from congressional Republicans and other “Washington insiders,” and identify more with popular and “progressive” state and local governments.

The specific purpose of the Governors Conference, however, was to articulate a Republican vision for postwar domestic concerns. The result was a detailed statement of policy on reconversion and postwar jobs, veterans, affairs, highways, public works, public lands, the National Guard, agriculture, unemployment compensation, and insurance. In the area of jobs, the governors argued that the Roosevelt administration was listless, negligent, and void of leadership. Comprehensive and immediate action by the national government was imperative, Republicans agreed, to provide for a smooth transition from war to peacetime production. Not only should industry be enabled to make that conversion, but also employers should be informed of the federal government’s policies so to be prepared for reconversion. Central to any federal policy on jobs, they added, was the promotion of private (especially small) business under an enterprise system, and the recognition that the states shared responsibility in encouraging “commerce, industry, and agriculture in order to stimulate full employment at good wages and the profitable use of all our production facilities.” In addition, the governors announced support for (a) the G.I. Bill of Rights, which was described as “sound legislation, (b) a federal highway program, (c) public works projects in times of national economic crisis, (d) the retention of the National Guard as a state force and as a reserve
component of the United States Army, (e) a “free agriculture” supported by a federal
government devoted to disposition of surpluses and fair market prices, (f) state regulation
and control over insurance businesses, and (g) a state-led improvement and extension of
unemployment compensation. Republicans also called for—consistent with military
needs—the prompt return to private ownership of Western lands acquired for war
purposes. Furthermore, the acquisition of Western lands for the establishment of national
parks, monuments, and wildlife refugees, should be filtered through regard for local
problems and congressional controls. “If, under the guise of conservation,” GOP leaders
warned, “this acquisition and encroachment program [of the Roosevelt administration]
continues, we shall soon find ownership of our lands lodged in the Federal Government
sufficient to threaten seriously the very existence of many of our States and the loss of
local self-government to millions of free American citizens.”

Though it was not
published in book form—like the Clinton-Gore Putting People First (1992) or Dole-
Kemp Trusting the People (1996) campaign treatises of recent years—the GOP
governors program did represent the Dewey-Bricker plan for America in 1944.

The chief domestic strategy of the Dewey campaign was to attack bureaucratic
inefficiency and wrangling in Washington, while stressing that government wartime
controls in farming and industry could lead to an administrative dictatorship in the United
States. In addition to attracting the general protest voter, Dewey sought to win
independents and Democrats by delivering a series of sober policy speeches that
embraced (and even expanded upon) the more positive features of the New Deal. His
chief strategy in the realm of foreign affairs was to emphasize that the next four years
would likely be peace years, and that the new era needed to be shaped by a new team.
The Roosevelt administration, he repeatedly asserted, was tired, worn-out, and old. “It’s time for change” was his constant message. To assist in making that message resonate with the American public, Republicans released a *Dewey-Bricker Songsheet*, which included “The Republican Battle Hymn” (set to the tune of “The Battle Hymn of the Republic”):

> They say to change your horse while in the middle of the stream,  
> Is not the smartest thing to do, but this can plain be seen,  
> A horse that’s run twelve years should be retired to pastures green,  
> So vote Republican.

> Vote for Dewey and for Bricker,  
> Win the war and do it quicker,  
> Vote for Dewey and for Bricker,  
> And keep our Country free.

> They both are honest, capable, and men of proven worth,  
> Their heads are clear, their minds are strong, their feet are on the earth,  
> They’re trained to guide our destiny, they’ll put our country first,  
> So vote Republican.  

To the delight of Republicans, the Democratic National Convention provided Dewey with material to reinforce his themes. A few days after the Democrats met in Chicago, Dewey campaign manager (and RNC chairman) Herbert Brownell, told reporters in Washington that “As Mr. Roosevelt sets out to seek a fourth term as President, his candidacy must be considered against the backdrop” of his party’s convention. “In twelve years,” Brownell argued, “his party has failed to produce a single leader to succeed him. It has labeled itself a one-man party.” Furthermore, Democrats, in repudiating FDR’s choice for vice president (i.e. Wallace), “has proved one of the chief contentions of the Republican Party: it’s time to change horses.” Finally, Brownell
observed, the convention revealed Democrats to be controlled by two elements—“the bosses of the corrupt big-city machines and the radical left wingers who are closer to communism than to any other political philosophy.” Speaking at RNC headquarters at the Roosevelt Hotel in New York on 10 August, Brownell added “We can’t speak of them as a party any more because they have been so split by factionalism.” Specifically, the chairman spoke of those more ardent supporters of FDR who were now convinced they had been used as pawns by “the Browder-Hillman group, the Wallace faction, and the so-called ‘Boss’ clique dominated by the Hague, Kelly and Pendergast machines.”

The “Browder-Hillman group” mentioned by Brownell was the subject of much controversy, and one of the major issues of the 1944 presidential campaign. On 25 July 1944, just four days after the Democrats ended their meeting in Chicago, Arthur Krock of the New York Times wrote an article entitled “The Inflammatory Use of a National Chairman.” In the piece, he quoted FDR at a private meeting with party leaders discussing the vice presidential nomination. According to Krock, Roosevelt, convinced he would live forever, casually instructed Hannegan and the others to “clear everything with Sidney [Hillman].” The DNC immediately (and falsely) issued a denial: “No such thing was ever said by the President... [I]t was never uttered.” Though he had some of the facts wrong—apparently Roosevelt said “Clear it with Sidney”-- and did not know the maneuvering that accompanied the preliminaries to and course of the convention, Krock was right about the role labor (in the person of Hillman) played in the vice presidential pick, and what it did to Byrnes’s candidacy. Ford Bond, director of the Republican Radio Campaign, seized on the story at once, and quickly released a one-minute “spot” announcement denouncing the CIO-PAC’s “stranglehold on the New Deal
party.” Cartoons and jingles were also prepared for publication. One cartoon, for example, was entitled “In His Side Pocket,” and depicted a smiling Hillman-- dressed in a suit decorated with dollar signs-- placing a donkey in his front left coat pocket. A Republican jingle set to the tune of “Good Night, Ladies,” meanwhile, declared:

Good night, Perkins,
Good night, Ickes,
Good night, Browder
You’re leaving us at last.

Pack you grip and roll along,
Roll along, roll along,
Pack you grip and roll along,
And clearing with Sidney is past!16

Opening his vice president campaign in French Lick, Indiana, in early September, John W. Bricker charged that the CIO-PAC, “including its communistic adherents,” was seeking to “buy” a fourth term for Roosevelt “with money extracted from the honest and patriotic workers of this country.” Once again, he declared, the New Deal had “the sinister support of notoriously corrupt political machines.”17

The “Clear Everything with Sidney” controversy erupted while Roosevelt was attending the secret “Hawaii Conference” (26-28 July) with his top Pacific commanders, including General MacArthur and Admiral Chester Nimitz, commander-in-chief of the Pacific Fleet and of the Central Pacific Area. Shortly after midnight on the morning of 21 July, the President left San Diego, where a few hours earlier he had accepted his party’s nomination for president, and embarked for Pearl Harbor aboard the cruiser Baltimore. The cruiser was preceded by six destroyers, and had complete air cover. Since the President was “nearly all the time… within easy reach of enemy action,” the
news media agreed to observe a twenty-one day “blackout” on his actions and whereabouts. After an uneventful voyage, Roosevelt arrived at Pearl Harbor on 26 July, and immediately set out with his commanders to discuss Pacific strategy.

Specifically, the meeting was convened to settle a dispute between Nimitz and MacArthur, and to determine where to go next in the Pacific theatre. Nimitz, representing the interests of the navy, argued for a move on Formosa (at the expense of the Philippines) en route to Japan, while MacArthur, representing the army’s wishes, insisted upon the liberation of the Philippines. The navy’s argument for Formosa was that the island was closer to Japan and would thus enable direct aerial intervention against the Japanese in China, strengthening Chiang Kai-shek, and adding to the American potential for inflicting damage on the Japanese. The army disagreed, arguing that a Formosa campaign would involve an extensive land war (and would thus have to be delayed until after the war in Europe), and that it would be extremely hazardous with the Japanese still in control of the Philippines. In contrast, MacArthur added, the Philippines was a less risky target and “the re possession of American territory, the fulfillment of a promise to the Filipinos, and the liberation of many thousands of American prisoners.” Furthermore, in any move against the Philippines, the United States could expect the help from those within the island chain who had been loyal friends, while in Formosa, which had been under Japanese control for fifty years, no such support could be expected. In his Reminiscences, MacArthur claimed that he then privately warned FDR: “If your decision be to bypass the Philippines and leave its millions of wards of the United States and thousands of internees to languish in agony and despair—I dare to say that the American people would be so aroused that they would register most complete resentment
against you at the polls this fall.” Roosevelt, of course, decided in favor of the Philippines, but he did so not out of electoral concern, but because MacArthur had the better strategic arguments, and because it was the intelligent analysis of detached commanders.

The following day, 27 July, Roosevelt, MacArthur, Nimitz, and Admiral William D. Leahy toured the island of Oahu. According to speechwriter Samuel Rosenman, who accompanied Roosevelt, “the streets of the cities and villages were lined with residents of the island. I thought that this was taking unnecessary risks. Many of the inhabitants were pure Japanese or descended from mixed marriage of Japanese. The President, however, insisted on riding through the crowds—and in an open car… Following behind the procession I could not help thinking how dreadful a toll one well-placed bomb would take. The Secret Service men were worried to distraction.” After the island tour, Roosevelt on 28 July visited a military hospital, where he asked to be wheeled slowly through all the wards where someone had lost an arm or leg. Near tears, he smiled and spoke to several of the injured soldiers. It “affected us all very deeply,” Rosenman later recalled. Later that same day, Roosevelt and his staff boarded the Baltimore and began their journey home with a scheduled stop in Alaska.

On 12 August, Roosevelt arrived at Bremerton Naval Yard in Washington State. There, he decided to give a report to the nation on his trip to Pearl Harbor and Alaska. FDR wrote the speech himself. His speechwriter, Samuel Rosenman, had already returned to the states before the decision was made for the President to address—while standing on the deck of a destroyer and with Puget Sound as a backdrop—10,000 naval yard workers live and over nationwide radio. He had been neither seen nor heard from
by the people of the United States since 20 July, Rosenman later wrote, and they deserved more. “But the speech had nothing to say, and said it poorly.” It was long, scattered, and “chatty.”

Roosevelt encountered several problems at Bremerton. One was discomfort, and involved his decision to deliver the speech standing, which required, of course, the use of leg braces. In the years before the war, the President had always insisted on wearing braces when appearing before an audience. As the stress of events increased, however—and as his health deteriorated—he neglected to wear them. Thus, as he stood to deliver his speech at Bremerton, it had been over a year since he had last worn braces. Furthermore, having lost weight due to sickness, the braces did not fit well and were uncomfortable. Another problem for Roosevelt was insecurity. He was standing on the curved deck of a destroyer, which made him feel unstable. Also, a strong wind was blowing, adding to his discomfort and fear of falling down. Then there was the problem of the audience. It was positioned far away from the President—too far to permit the necessary feeling of contact which he thrived upon, and which was so helpful to his delivery. More importantly, he had a heart problem. According to one the President’s physicians, he may have sustained an attack of angina pectoris (chest pain) at the time of the speech. Although there were no changes on his EKG, Roosevelt reported experiencing pain underneath the sternum, and which extended to both shoulders and lasted for fifteen minutes. Together these things made him “hesitant, halting and indecisive.”

“The speech at best was a rambling account of his journeys and experiences during the past month,” Rosenman later recalled, “and he ad-libbed a great deal in a very ineffective
manner. It was a dismal failure.” Listening to the speech over the radio, Rosenman “had a sinking sensation of concern that something must have happened to the President since I had left him in Hawaii. His voice and delivery seemed so different.”22 That address, along with the unflattering photograph of Roosevelt in San Diego in late July, led many, Rosenman continued, to conclude “that ‘the old man is through, finished.’ His friends and supporters of many years shook their heads sorrowfully and said, ‘It looks like the old master has lost his touch. His campaigning days must be over. It’s going to look mighty sad when he begins to trade punches with young Dewey.’”23

The speech was bad, but not as bad as Rosenman, who, writing in 1952, sought to use the speech as a foil for the famous Fala speech, indicated. Considering the President wrote the speech himself, and that he delivered it under the circumstances described above, it was quite good. In fact, the speech was even included in a 1946 collection of Roosevelt speeches entitled Nothing to Fear, and edited by B.D. Zevin. Zevin’s introduction to the speech, published at the dawn of the Cold War, focused on Roosevelt’s statements about Asia. Near the end of the address, Roosevelt warned that from a defense perspective, the United States must always control the Great Circle route from Puget Sound to Siberia and China. “The destinies of the peoples of the whole Pacific,” he declared, “will for many years ahead be entwined with our own destiny.” Furthermore, media reaction was not unkind. In fact, there were few damaging allusions to the speech in any of the nation’s leading newspapers and magazines. Only the ardently pro-Dewey Time described the speech as a “rambling, folksy account,” but added that the President looked “tan, gay, and relaxed.” Writing from Algiers on 14 August, even
Charles de Gaulle informed the President that he had “listened with great interest to the fine speech you have just made.”

Though Republicans tried to raise health as an issue in the fall campaign, it never really caught the public’s interest. A poll conducted in early September indicated that only 1.6% of those surveyed would switch to Dewey because of the President’s health. In October, that number fell to .5%. The real controversy to emerge from Bremerton was not health but radio time. Socialist Norman Thomas attacked the Bremerton speech as “political,” and demanded equal broadcast time for the other presidential candidates to address troops overseas. A few days later, on 25 August, the War Department announced that it was granting Thomas’s request. Eight hours later, however, Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy retracted the statement, and declared that in fact FDR’s speech was “not political” and that Thomas’s request was now denied. Republicans immediately cried foul, insisting that the speech was political, and that the Army’s reversal was “due, without doubt, to White House pressure.” The issue soon faded a few weeks later when the five contending parties (Democratic, Republican, Socialist, Prohibition, and Social Labor) reached an agreement with the army concerning overseas broadcasts. The agreement allowed for the rebroadcasting of political speeches to soldiers overseas, beginning 18 September and ending 2 November.

The Bremerton speech—though an opportunity for the President to highlight his role as commander-in-chief—was not political. He made no reference to the campaign, or to Republicans and Democrats. It was literally a report on his activities of the previous twenty-one days. The charge that the speech was “political” was grounded in the assumption that the entire Pacific trip itself was an elaborate part of Roosevelt’s
reelection campaign. After all, the President could have settled the MacArthur-Nimitz dispute in Washington, and saved the country the expense of his dangerous journey into hostile waters. Perhaps—but he was still commander-in-chief, and as such had prerogative to make such a call. Although a Roosevelt apologist, Samuel Rosenman probably came the closest to understanding Roosevelt’s desire to travel to the Pacific in July and August 1944-- and it did not involve the presidential politics. According to Rosenman, “the President found it useful to make these trips… Preparations, laying out the routes on the map, figuring distances and fixing times of arrival and departure at various places—these were all given his personal, loving attention, no matter how busy he was. His visits to the training camps gave him a closer feel of the conduct of the war, and getting out of Washington, he said, always gave him a better perspective.” Furthermore, he believed that visits to military installations in different parts of the world not only helped the morale of troops, but also gave assurances to family members back home that everything possible was being done for their loved one’s safety at the front.

Did making such a dangerous trip, and ending it with a national address on the deck of a destroyer in the Pacific help the image that his campaign team wanted to emphasize? Of course, but it was not overtly political; it was an inherent advantage of incumbency—he was the President of the United States, and the event was a natural reminder that the “other guy” was not.

The war and postwar planning issues, as the President’s Pacific trip demonstrated, were obvious disadvantages to the Governor of New York, who was not the commander-in-chief, and who, furthermore, had no military experience. To offset this problem and even counter Roosevelt’s expected strategy of concentrating on the war, Edwin Jaeckle, a
brilliant and candid senior member of Dewey’s campaign staff, proposed in July (just shortly after the Republican convention) that the Governor travel abroad, visiting European battlefronts and conferring with other leaders of the Grand Alliance. Reluctant to do much that might focus attention to his non-military record (and alienate isolationists within his own party who might see any such tour as reminiscent of Willkie), Dewey dismissed this advice, and moved instead—with the help of his chief foreign policy advisor, John Foster Dulles—toward moving postwar foreign policy (namely debate on a postwar world organization) completely out of the campaign.

The backdrop for the implementation of this strategy was the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, which was to meet in Washington that fall and make preliminary plans for a permanent postwar international organization (the future United Nations). On 16 August, Dewey issued a statement from Albany, expressing deep disturbance over recent reports indicating that conference members—the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and China—planned to “dominate the world by force and through individual agreements as to spheres of influence.” That the Allies had developed overwhelming power over their enemies did not, he argued, “give us the right to organize the world so that we four will always be free to do what we please while the rest of the world is made subject to our coercion. That would be the rankest form of imperialism. Such a proposal would be rejected by the American people.” A departure from his controversial comment to reporters at Mackinac the previous year—in which he spoke of a permanent postwar alliance with Great Britain—Dewey hoped to bridge the gap between himself and the defeated Wendell Willkie, whose One World concept was grounded in the idea of self-determination, and who had yet to endorse the Governor. He also hoped to garner
support among American voters with ethnic ties to “smaller” Eastern European nations like Poland. “The problem of future peace has two aspects,” Dewey continued. One related to the defeat of Germany and Japan, and the other to the promotion of postwar peace. As to Germany and Japan, Dewey insisted that they must be “wholly and conclusively defeated. More than that, they must be rendered permanently powerless to renew tyranny and attack.” The achievement of those goals, he acknowledged, rested in the unity and power of the four Allies. However, as to the promotion of postwar peace, the Allies must not sink into the abyss of power politics, but “rise to new high level of cooperation and joint effort among respected and sovereign nations to work for and to preserve the peace of the world through all the years to come, based on freedom, equality, and justice.”

Secretary of State Cordell Hull was alarmed by Dewey’s statement, and the following morning issued a statement of his own insisting that the Governor had misconstrued what was planned for Dumbarton Oaks. “Governor Dewey can rest assured that the fears which he expressed in his statement are utterly and completely unfounded.” The purpose of the conference, the secretary said, was to discuss the most feasible and desirable methods of establishing the kind of organization envisaged in the Moscow Declaration and U.S. Senate resolution (the Connally Resolution). Furthermore, the conference was merely “preliminary to similar discussion and early conference among all the United Nations and other peace-loving nations, large and small.” Responding to reporters’ questions, Hull added that he would welcome a conference with the Republican nominee to “straighten out any points connected with the postwar organization and a nonpartisan approach to it.”
The following day, 18 August, Dewey sent a telegram to Hull, informing the secretary that he was accepting the offer, and that he had designated John Foster Dulles as his representative. In addition, Dewey stated that he was “convinced that every effort to organize both temporarily and permanently for the establishment of lasting peace should be accelerated,” and that he was happy to extend his fullest cooperation to the end that the result should be wholly bi-partisan and should have the united support of the American people. Hull received Dewey’s message while in a cabinet meeting at the White House. Roosevelt, the secretary later recalled, agreed that he should send a reply agreeing to meet with Dulles, but expressed skepticism regarding any nonpartisan agreement with leading Republicans.

After receiving Hull’s reply on 19 August, Dewey and Dulles met with reporters in Albany, and elaborated on their views of world organization and postwar security. The looming question of the day, they said, was determining whether the problem of controlling Germany and Japan would be a world organization task, or a regional one. If it was a world organization task, Dulles explained, then “you almost necessarily have to have a Four Power control of that world organization, because the four great powers who win this victory are not going to take any chances with the fruits of victory, of losing them through turning the control of Germany and Japan over to a world organization which is so diffuse and general in its organization that there cannot be assurance that the terms of the peace would be carried out.” That scenario, they argued, was unacceptable because it would lead to the Four Powers controlling the world body for all of its purposes so as to keep all of the world under control. The positive alternative, they insisted, was for control of the defeated nations to be the task of the four big powers and
certain regional and liberated nations. For example, in the case of Germany, liberated countries like France, Belgium, Poland, and the Netherlands, partnering with the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union, would assume certain specific tasks in controlling the defeated Reich. Japan, meanwhile, would be controlled by China, the United States, and Great Britain. The Soviet Union might play a role there too should it join the war in the Pacific.  

The meeting between Dulles and Hull took place in Washington the following Wednesday, 23 August. Dulles, suffering from a nerve ailment in his foot, was in excruciating pain, and on crutches. He was in such discomfort that he could not travel by train or plane. Accordingly, Dewey arranged for him to travel to Washington in a state vehicle—an act that was roundly criticized in the press. Washington columnist Drew Pearson, for example, chastised the Governor during a Sunday night broadcast for allowing Dulles, who literally had to be driven door to door wherever he went in Washington, to waste rationed gasoline. Pearson insisted that he had seen Dulles himself on the street and that he had looked quite fit. "The truth was," Dewey later recalled, "that Foster was in such bad shape that he was going on two crutches to every meeting, and when he got to the home of the friend he was staying with, he got into the house on his crutches and went upstairs on his knees... He belonged in a hospital—where he was, before long."  

The Hull-Dulles discussions lasted for three days. In their first meeting Hull presented Dulles with the administration's latest draft of the proposed United Nations Charter, and a four-page memorandum summarizing the charter's provisions. Overall, the organization was open to membership of all peace-loving countries, large and small,
on the basis of their sovereign equality. All members were equally represented and voted as equals except in budgetary matters, where the vote would be proportioned to each nation’s financial contributions. All members were likewise eligible to serve on the Four Powers-led Executive Council (a precursor to the Security Council), and participate in elections to the body. In fact, as to the make-up of the Executive Council, there were more small states than large ones. Although the “Big Four” had veto power in the use of force, they could not undertake any coercive action by themselves. Finally, all member nations were to contribute armed forces and facilities in accordance with their respective capacities to undertake any kind of joint action. Dulles read the draft and declared it to be “excellent and satisfactory as to the issue of the small nations. The secretary then reminded Dulles that all nations were interconnected, and that “we could not consider large nations in one compartment and small nation in another.”

In addition, both men were in agreement on the basic proposition that it was important to create a world organization that was supported by all Americans regardless of party. Also, they both agreed that such an effort would be unsuccessful if it had a partisan—in this case, Democratic—label attached to it. They disagreed, however, on what foreign policy matters—aside from the world organization—should be removed from partisan debate. Hull wanted an agreement broad enough to cover not only the creation of “the United Nations,” but also all subjects relating to the future peace, including the controversial arrangements that might be made with the Soviet Union for the future of Poland. Dulles, of course, was adamantly opposed to any such broad agreement. For him and Dewey, the important issue was to forge a “bipartisan” approach solely to the creation of the United Nations. In the end, Hull and Dulles agreed to disagree (or at least
be vague) on this point. Their public statement released on their last day of meetings, 25 August, read:

The Secretary maintained the position that the American people consider the subject of future peace as a nonpartisan subject which must be kept entirely out of politics. Mr. Dulles, on behalf of Governor Dewey, stated that the Governor shared this view on the understanding, however, that it did not preclude full public nonpartisan discussion of the means of attaining a lasting peace.31

The word “nonpartisan” in the above statement was also the subject of great debate between the two leaders. Dulles preferred the use of the word “bipartisan,” implying that both parties would be involved on a political basis in policy making toward the UN organization. Hull, believing this to be an attempt at gaining political advantage, insisted instead upon the more general “nonpartisan,” meaning that neither party would be involved in that policy making on a political basis. In addition, Hull maintained that “under our constitutional structure, we could not have both parties sharing the responsibility. The party in power had the responsibility for the execution of foreign policy. This responsibility could not be delegated. The opposition party… had the moral responsibility not to base its opposition, if any, to our proposals for the United Nations organization on partisan grounds.”32 After several hours of discussion, Dulles finally agreed to the word “nonpartisan.”

The result of these discussions, Dewey wrote the Secretary of State on 25 August, “constituted a new attitude toward the problem of peace.”33 Hull replied in agreement on 4 September, adding that the discussions and his letter “constituted a heartening manifestation of national unity on the problem of establishing an international peace and
security organization.” He then suggested to Dewey that they might make their exchange of letters public “so that there might be fuller public understanding of our common ground on this important subject.”34 Two days later, Dewey telephoned Hull, and agreed to give the letters to the press. He also suggested a few changes in the proposed UN charter. One was that the right to bring a question to the attention of the General Assembly or the Security Council be extended to any state, and not limited to member states. Another was that treaty conditions should be included in the subject matter that might be brought to the attention of the Assembly or the Council. Hull agreed to send them immediately to Under Secretary of State Edward Stettinius at Dumbarton Oaks with the request that they be incorporated into the final document then being formulated. None of the parties at the conference objected, and Dewey’s suggestions were written into the final draft. Throughout the rest of the campaign Hull continued—through former German Ambassador Hugh Wilson—to maintain contact with Dewey and Dulles. Though he had to remind Dewey on a few occasions that he too had played a role in initiating the nonpartisan agreement, Hull later acknowledged that the Governor “uniformly rendered excellent service to the nonpartisan approach toward the United Nations.”35

Norman Thomas, the Socialist Party candidate for President, was not impressed by the Hull-Dulles agreement. Writing in *Human Events* a couple weeks before Hull and Dulles met in the nation’s capitol, Thomas argued that the campaign “unity” on world organization was nothing more than “an evasion of differences of opinion calculated to prevent discussion of the great issues upon which the prevention of a Third World War depends…” This “verbal unity,” he continued, was blocking the road to a democratic
mandate on peace, and clearing the way for FDR’s “great design”—i.e. a revived League of Nations completely dominated by a cartel of imperial powers: the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union. China, meanwhile, was perceived as too weak and divided—subject, even, to civil war—to play a dominant role in the immediate postwar era. Like Dulles and Dewey, he believed such an arrangement to be potentially disastrous, opening the door to a revolt of the “colored nations” and races of the Far East. Unlike the two Republicans, however, Thomas anticipated an interconnected Soviet threat. “Sooner or later,” he wrote, “the USSR… is bound to forget its present alliance and to aid native revolt against white—predominately British—supremacy. If we fight again with and for Britain… it will be a terrible and unsuccessful [third world] war. That war, or long sustained preparation for it, will doom our democracy.” The sure way to secure a lasting peace, he concluded, was through inclusive international cooperation, self-government for all, and the end of imperial exploitation. Yet, neither Republicans nor Democrats offered anything new—just the same old “triple-alliance imperialism, masked by a phony and vindictive ‘internationalism.’”

Thomas’s complaint aside, the Hull-Dulles agreement to keep partisan politics out of the discussions on the creation of the United Nations was remarkable in several ways. It prevented the topic of the United Nations from being engulfed—as it had at the end of the First World War—in furious Senate controversy and partisan attack. Hull did not want the Roosevelt administration to make the same mistakes as Woodrow Wilson twenty-five years earlier. Wilson had been very partisan—especially during the wartime midterm elections of 1918—and had, as the war drew to a close, ignored Republicans, and, to a most unfortunate end, excluded them from the peacemaking process. For his part, Dewey
did not want his party to once again play the roles of vengeful antagonist, isolationist, and obstructionist. He genuinely believed—as his comments since 1941 had indicated—that the United States must have an internationalist foreign policy, and that post-World War II isolationism would spell the doom of the Republican Party.

From a campaign standpoint, the Hull-Dulles talks were remarkable in the political benefits they provided for the Dewey campaign. In one masterful stroke Dewey was able to (1) remove a divisive subject to his party from the political discourse, (2) center the campaign around his perceived strength, domestic policy, and (3), as Senator Vandenberg shrewdly observed, rob Roosevelt of his campaign argument that it would “break the continuity” of the peace negotiations if the President was defeated. As August gave way to September, Dewey was on the offensive, and enjoying a small lead in the Labor Day polls. “I shall not weep bitter tears if Dewey wins through a small vote coming out,” a discouraged Roosevelt wrote to a friend in mid-August. “Neither you nor I have any real right to take on any more responsibilities.” The President had not disliked his other challengers, Landon and Willkie—and, in fact, had a genuine respect for Willkie— but “he really hates that Tom Dewey,” one administration intimate observed. Inside the White House, meanwhile, aides worried if the President still had “that old campaign magic.” He often seemed tired and depressed, and when Dewey’s name entered a conversation, he often grew disinterested. At the end of August, Roosevelt told Margaret Suckley, his archivist at Hyde Park, that he would not be surprised if Dewey won in November. Democrats, he said, seemed too confident of success, and were thus “just not bothering to register for victory.”37
While Dewey was working with Hull to forge a nonpartisan foreign policy, Roosevelt made one of his first campaign acts since the nomination. On 18 August, just a few days after his Bremerton speech, the President met with Senator Truman at the White House. “The encounter consisted of little more than genial pleasantries, the new nominee tendering his thanks and Roosevelt, as Truman recalled it, giving him ‘a lot of hooey about what I could do to help the campaign.’ They lunched in the open behind the White House under an enormous oak planted by Andrew Jackson more than a hundred years earlier. Not having seen FDR face-to-face from more than a year, he was shocked by Roosevelt’s haggard appearance and the way his hands trembled as he attempted with little success to pour cream into his coffee.”38 “The President looked fine and ate a bigger lunch than I did,’ Truman told reporters afterward. ‘He’s still the leader he’s always been and don’t let anybody kid you about it. He’s keen as a briar.’ Privately, however, he was shocked: “His hands were shaking and he talks with considerable difficulty… It doesn’t seem to be any mental lapse of any kind, but physically he’s just going to pieces.”39 On the night of 31 August, Truman delivered his first official speech of the campaign. Speaking in front of the old red-brick courthouse in his birthplace of Lamar, Missouri, the Senator declared—in an obvious reference to Dewey—that “Tomorrow’s challenge is today’s problem. The proven leadership of our successes must continue. The fortunes of the future for which our boys have fought, bled and died must not be endangered by entrusting them to inexperienced hands. There is no substitute for experience, which can be gained only through the years of application and service.”40 This issue of experience and trusted leadership was a recurring theme, and its irony was
evidently lost on Truman—a man who was being groomed for the presidency and who had as about as little foreign policy experience as the Governor of New York.

Following his official “Acceptance Speech” at Lamar, “party leaders soon developed a grueling campaign schedule in which Truman would be the workhorse, criss-crossing the country to rouse the troops.” He traveled by rail in an old combination sleeper and dining car called the *Henry Stanley*, and was accompanied by a small staff, including Hugh Fulton as campaign manager and speechwriter, young Matt Connelly, an investigator for the Truman Committee, who was recruited to be “an all-around arrangements man,” and Paul A. Porter, a bright, young liberal from Kentucky, who was the DNC’s publicity director, was taped to help with press relations. Beginning in early October and continuing through Election Day, Truman spoke in more than fifteen states, and over twenty large cities, including New Orleans, Los Angeles, Portland, Minneapolis, Milwaukee, Akron, Boston, New York, and Pittsburgh. Though an unexciting speaker, Truman hit at Dewey and the Republicans with great energy and zeal. “It was a very enthusiastic tour,” he later remembered. “I stopped at every little stop where the train stopped. It was the first whistle stop tour, but it wasn’t referred to as a whistle stop tour in those days.”

With the start of the traditional fall campaign following Labor Day, Wendell Willkie—and the quest for his endorsement-- became a major campaign issue. Though the 1940 Republican nominee was not allowed to speak at the convention, he was vocal nonetheless that fall, publishing a small tract in September entitled *An American Program*. Willkie’s work was a brief analysis and commentary on the convention platforms adopted by Republicans and Democrats that summer. According to Willkie,
the platforms were timid and evasive, and represented what he called the “Cowardice at Chicago.” He was especially critical of the GOP, which he insisted missed an opportunity to take a clear stand on postwar foreign policy, and thus attract independent voters. The party platforms, he argued, “are read by the independent voter, who does not decide how he will vote before hearing the issues discussed. It is precisely this independent voter—the man who does not vote automatically for any candidate his party may nominate—who has determined most Presidential elections in the past generations.”

In addition, Willkie scolded both parties for failure to make serious and substantive statements on civil rights and social security. For Willkie, the equitable treatment of the black minority in America was essential to a just and lasting peace. Prejudice and discrimination, he wrote, must end—fighting the Nazis made that clear—and the government must ensure it. Finally, he promoted insurance eligibility and coverage for all Americans, and the assurances of good food, education, adequate clothing, medical care, and a decent home for every child.

Then, in early October 1944, Willkie suddenly died of a heart attack, without having endorsed either Dewey or Roosevelt. Years later, FDR aide, Samuel Rosenman wrote of a meeting with Willkie in June 1944, in which, he proposed joining with Roosevelt to forge a liberal and internationalist party in America. However, in his 1994 memoir, *Advising Ike*, Herbert Brownell insisted that Rosenman was wrong. According to Brownell, he and Henry Luce, editor of *Time* and a Willkie supporter in 1940, met with the Hoosier in a suite at New York’s Waldorf Astoria Hotel in late summer 1944. “Over cocktails and at dinner,” Brownell recalled, “Willkie criticized Dewey and his policies; the attack was vehement. Suddenly he said, ‘And I want you to know, Brownell, that
your man is going to be defeated and I am going to run for president in 1948 and will be elected.’ After a pause he added, ‘But I like you, Brownell, and want you to be my campaign manager in ’48.’” Recognizing an opening, Brownell replied that Willkie could not win the Republican nomination in 1948 if he did not endorse Dewey in 1944. Around midnight, he “got up and lumbered off,” with Brownell and Luce agreeing “that maybe the important job had been done.” Shortly thereafter Brownell learned that Willkie had telephoned Eugene Pulliam, an influential Indiana newspaper publisher (and grandfather of future Vice President Dan Quayle), asking him to set up time on a leading radio network so he could announce his support for Dewey. “Unfortunately,” Brownell wrote, “a few days later, instead of listening to the planned speech, I was attending Willkie’s funeral services.” Still, Dewey felt slighted by his “fat little friend”—as he privately called Willkie. Reflecting upon that relationship, Dewey, years later, recalled: “[He] didn’t [support me] when I was nominated for President in 1944, after he had been so badly beaten in Wisconsin by delegates I didn’t recognize and had asked to withdraw. I was finally nominated. He never supported me, and he never did anything but snipe, and finally he went to a hospital and died of bitterness.”

Another major issue in the presidential campaign of 1944 was the status of the President’s health. From late 1943 to early 1944, Roosevelt was plagued with colds and bronchial infections, which ultimately led the President’s physician, Ross T. McIntire, to schedule a thorough physical examination. On 28 March 1944, Howard G. Bruenn, a lieutenant commander in the Medical Corps and cardiology consultant to the Naval Hospital in Bethesda, Maryland, examined Roosevelt—the first cardiologist to ever do so. Bruenn diagnosed the President as having hypertensive heart disease—FDR’s blood
pressure at the time of exam was 188/105 mm.Hg.—cardiac failure (left ventricular), and acute bronchitis. Breunn then advised McIntire that the President be placed on a regimen of bed rest, sedation, digitalization (treatment with digitalis to improve cardiac function), codeine for cough control, salt restriction, and weight loss. McIntire was shocked. “You can’t do that,” he said. “This is the President of the United States!”

Eventually, McIntire relented, and Bruenn’s recommendations (with some modifications) were implemented. Roosevelt’s blood pressure, however, continued to rise. On 3 April it was 210/108. The next day it was 226/118, and on 5 April, 218/120. “He looked so tired and worn that I was shocked,” declared one Roosevelt intimate after dining with the President in late March. Throughout the spring speculation mounted that FDR, poor in health, might not seek a fourth term. Benjamin V. Cohen, a Roosevelt advisor, suggested he should instead accept an invitation to preside over the emerging United Nations organization. Roosevelt, unaware of the seriousness of his condition, intended, however, to seek a fourth term, and made his decision public on 10 July. No physician ever advised him to not seek reelection. In fact, McIntire reportedly even told the President that “With proper care and strict adherence to rules… [your] chances of winning through to 1948… [are] good.” According to medical doctor Hugh Evans, in a recent and very thorough study on Roosevelt’s health, “the medical culture of the time generally promoted a lack of candor in discussing serious diseases. Illness or its progress was not customarily discussed with patients, unless they failed to comply with doctor’s orders. Presidential health matters were assumed to be private, rarely reported frankly or with clinical detail.” Roosevelt never inquired, and neither Bruenn nor McIntire ever informed.
The President was not the only one unaware of the true status of his health. Neither were the American people. The White House-- wanting to portray the commander-in-chief as alert and fit—consciously conducted a misinformation campaign. Staffer Joseph Daniels, for example, “selected and carefully edited the photographs of the president for distribution” while the ever-optimistic McIntire continued to insist that Roosevelt “was in better health than at any time since he entered the White House.” Even the President participated (unknowing or not) in the cover-up. Meeting with reporters after his first examination by Bruenn, Roosevelt said that he “had bronchitis, but was otherwise fine.” He was not fine, of course. “Franklin seemed to feel miserable,” the First Lady later wrote in her Autobiography, and in early April, “made up his mind that he would go down and stay with Bernard Baruch at his plantation, Hobcaw, in Georgetown, South Carolina.” Though the month-long trip was relaxing, and he returned to the White House-- as the New York Times reported—“tanned, rested... with an improved color and which some of the tired seams smoothed from his face,” Roosevelt’s blood pressure remained dangerously high (240/130 mm Hg. on 28 April). Furthermore, the President could not keep his appointments. Then, in early August 1944, came the speech at Bremerton Naval Base discussed earlier. Roosevelt, who probably experienced a mild heart attack during the speech, seemed distracted, unsure of himself, and uncharacteristically soft-spoken. He also looked especially worn and fragile. This incident, along with the photograph of Roosevelt reading his Acceptance Speech, led many of the President’s critics to declare before the campaign’s end: “A Vote for FDR May be a Vote for Truman.”
In his 1993 memoir, *Advising Ike*, Herbert Brownell recalled that “Although we did not fully know about the president’s condition at the time… we did know that the pictures of the president portrayed an ill and tired man.” In light of FDR’s appearance and the rampant rumors about his health, Brownell’s publicity director, Steve Hanigan, then “prepared an elaborate document for Governor Dewey’s consideration, which made the president’s failing health a major campaign issue and demanded full disclosure.” Dewey considered it, but his advisors were divided on the issue. Congress was heavily Democratic, and so there would certainly be no congressional inquiry into the state of the president’s health. Furthermore, the press seemed disinterested, and did not do any investigative reporting on the subject. In the end, Dewey decided not to tackle the health issue directly, fearing a backlash in the wartime atmosphere. Steve Hanigan resigned in protest. 59

In early September, Roosevelt continued with his “Rose Garden” strategy, and on 11 September traveled to Canada aboard the presidential train, *Ferdinand Magellan*, to meet with British Prime Minister Winston Churchill at the Second Quebec (or Octagon) Conference. Though the official purpose of the meeting was to discuss military strategy, the real reasons were more political. Churchill came to the conference, for example, seeking to secure postwar Lend Lease aid for Great Britain, while Roosevelt came hoping to “settle all… questions” about Germany. The President was also well aware that such a meeting highlighted his role as commander-in-chief at a critically important political time. The German question was of vital importance, however. By the fall of 1944, Allied forces were fast approaching Germany’s borders, and-- as Secretary of War Henry Stimson reminded the President in August-- General Dwight Eisenhower was still
without instructions on "vital points" of policy concerning German occupation and
reconstruction. Roosevelt then convened a special Cabinet Committee on Germany that
included Stimson, Hull, presidential aide Harry Hopkins, and Secretary of the Treasury
Henry Morgenthau. The committee, like the administration at large, was riddled with
internal rivalries, and, as the President departed for Quebec in September, had still not
settled upon a policy to recommend.

Considering himself to be an expert on Germany—and having recently been
confronted by Morgenthau with the issue of Nazi death camps—Roosevelt favored a hard
line against a defeated Reich. In addition, as Michael Beschloss has recently noted, "with
various German anti-Hitler plotters having pressed both Stalin and the West to make a
separate peace, the President wished to ensure that the Soviets stayed in the war to
unconditional surrender." Conversely, he hoped to demonstrate to Stalin that the
United States and Great Britain had no intention of making a separate deal with Hitler.
Thus, FDR invited to Quebec not his Secretary of War or his Secretary of State, but his
Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau, a man who was "convinced of the inbred
evil and compulsive bellicosity of the German people." On 13 September, Morgenthau
presented his radical plan of "de-Nazification and deindustrialization of Germany" to
Churchill. "I have never had such a verbal lashing in my life," the Treasury Secretary
later wrote. He would not be "chained to a dead German," the British prime minister
exclaimed. "I'm all for disarming Germany. But we ought not prevent her living
decently... You cannot indict a whole nation... [Such measures] are unnatural, un-
Christian and unnecessary." Besides, he did "not want to be left alone in Europe with
the Bear." Churchill also feared that the Morgenthau Plan, which the United States
pitched as a way for Britain (by replacing Germany as a supplier of sophisticated industrial products) to prosper economically, might be a substitute for American lend-lease aid. FDR gave assurances otherwise, and explained that it was a tactical chip opposite Stalin. Churchill then announced that he had been “converted,” and on 15 September the two leaders solemnly endorsed the conversion of postwar Germany “into a country primarily agricultural and pastoral in its character.”

In Washington, Secretary of War Henry Stimson was shocked. In the margins of his own copy of the Morgenthau Plan, Stimson wrote: “Childish folly!... A beautiful Nazi program!... This is to laugh!.” He also privately described it as “Carthaginian.” A few days later, on 23 September—the morning after FDR’s famous Fala speech, in fact—the Wall Street Journal, in a page one article entitled “Treasury Plan Calls for Dismemberment, Ban on Most Heavy Industry,” revealed the contents of the Morgenthau Plan, describing it as “Carthaginian” (which, probably meant the leak came from War Department). In Berlin, Hitler’s propaganda chief, Joseph Goebbels announced in the Volkscher Beobachter that “Roosevelt and Churchill Agree to Jewish Murder Plan!” As U.S. forces were fighting to take their first major German city, Aachen, along the Belgian-Dutch border, German radio warned residents to avoid the fate of the Morgenthau Plan—a plan drafted by “spokesman of world Judaism” and FDR “bosom” friend, that pledged to “dismember Germany, destroy its industry, and ‘exterminate forty-three million Germans.’”

Roosevelt, meanwhile, refused to accept responsibility, insisting that he had no intention of turning Germany into an agrarian state. In a press conference on 29 September, the President denied reports that his cabinet was “split” on the issue of
postwar Germany. “Every such story, he said, was “essentially untrue,” and “I might emphasize the word essentially.” Performing a complete “about-face” on the Morgenthau Plan, Roosevelt announced that he was now asking Leo Crowley, head of the Foreign Economic Administration, to advise him German postwar exports and trade. Privately, he told Hull that “No one wants to make Germany a wholly agricultural nation again, and yet somebody down the line has handed this out to the press. I wish we could catch and chastise him.” Then, on 3 October, Roosevelt explained to Stimson that he had merely wished to save some of the Ruhr’s proceeds for Great Britain, which was “broke.” “About this pastoral, agricultural Germany, that is just nonsense,” the President said. “I have not approved of anything like that. I am sure I have not.” Knowing otherwise, Stimson refused to let the issue drop, replying that the President should not say that publicly until “you have refreshed your memory with this paper, which I have in my pocket.” The secretary then presented FDR with a copy of the signed Quebec memorandum with Churchill, initialed “O.K. FDR.” “Flustered” and “perfectly staggered,” Roosevelt looked at Stimson and said, “Henry, I have not the faintest recollection of this at all!”

While Roosevelt laid low and appeared “presidential,” Dewey launched a campaign swing around the country. He would not whistle stop. That, he said, would be inappropriate under the wartime conditions. Instead, he planned to bypass many of the larger towns, as well as the large crowds, and focus instead on planning with state and local machine Republicans. He dubbed it “the Listening Campaign.” On 6 September, the Governor left Albany on a special train equipped with the latest technology in sound equipment. He was accompanied by the press (about seventy journalists in all) and his
staff. A Fortune poll released the day of his departure from New York showed the race very close, with Roosevelt enjoying a small lead of 52.6%. A Gallup poll, released the following day, however, reported Dewey with 51% of support from those surveyed. On 7 September, Dewey delivered his first formal speech of the fall campaign. Addressing a crowd of about 13,500 at the Convention Hall in Philadelphia, Dewey—against a backdrop of hanging American flags—stressed that in all likelihood the next administration would be a peacetime one:

Yes, we are proving that we can wage war. But what are the prospects of success as a nation at peace? The answer depends entirely on the outcome of this election.

At the very outset I want to make one thing clear. This is not merely a campaign against an individual or a political party. It is not merely a campaign to displace a tired, exhausted, quarreling and bickering administration with a fresh and vigorous administration. It is a campaign against an administration which was conceived in defeatism, which failed for eight straight years to restore our domestic economy, which has been the most wasteful, extravagant and incompetent administration in the history of the Nation and worst of all, one which has lost faith in itself and in the American people.

The audience was made up mainly of women and young girls in bobby socks, and, on the whole, not responsive to Dewey’s hard-hitting indictment of the Roosevelt administration. According to Tom Reynolds, a liberal journalist from the Chicago Sun, who was traveling with the campaign (and secretly reporting back to the White House), the word for this stop was “apathy”: “The crowds on our arrival were hardly normal shopping crowds. Their chief salute was ‘where’d you get the gas?’ The crowds that did gather were notable for being about 70 per cent women. The men are away at war or working on war jobs. The city GOP machine didn’t fill the Convention hall—I counted
15 empty tiers of seats in the back. Dewey, himself, didn’t think he did so well—his voice was so complicated acoustically by the bounce off those empty tiers."67 At a press conference with reporters at the White House the next day, Roosevelt laughed at Dewey’s charge that his administration was “old, tired, and defeated.” When asked if he was going to respond to the Governor, the President smiled, and lazily replied, that he had not heard the speech, and thus felt uninformed.

The following day, Dewey turned out a “whooping, cheering crowd” in Louisville, Kentucky. He used the occasion to answer a letter printed in The Atlantic Monthly by famed writer and historian Gerald W. Johnson, who publicly asked the Governor, “What do you, as a Presidential candidate, offer me, as a voter, that Harding did not offer in 1920?” Dewey’s response was both clear and detailed. He endorsed Roosevelt’s plans for world organization—declaring it to be essential to “make secure the peace of the world”—but emphasized that any such body “must be the work of many minds. No one man or two or three or four men can shape it. Some sixty nations all over the globe, great and small, must help to shape it, must believe in it, join it and make it work over all these years to come.”68 On the whole, Dewey’s remarks were met with approval in the media. “The Democrats, the Elmira Star Gazette concluded, “have found out that their perpetual candidate, Mr. Roosevelt, is not running against Hoover this time. Governor Dewey in his speeches in Philadelphia and Louisville made plain, blunt charges and accusations against the New Deal Party that will have to be answered; or the voters will be wondering why.”

A few days later, however, in Valentine, Nebraska, the usually cool and calculating Dewey blundered, charging—based upon an unsubstantiated INX dispatch from Quebec-
- that the administration had shortchanged General Douglas MacArthur in the Pacific because he posed a political threat to the President. The charge, of course, was ridiculous and false, and Dewey, when pressed by reporters for evidence, later admitted he had been misinformed. He also—literally in the shadow of Roosevelt dams--criticized the New Deal for neglecting the American West. On this leg of the tour, however, he did begin to relax. As biographer Richard Norton Smith observed, “The ban on rear platform talks was forgotten now. At places like Livingston, Montana, and Coeur d’Alene, Idaho, Dewey looked forward to developing the western half of America’s continent. He accepted a ten-gallon hat at Sheridan, Wyoming, rode in a torchlight parade at Billings, Montana, and laughed at the memory of himself speaking to a full house in a blizzard four year previously, when a sudden gust blew open a door and he shouted in exasperation, ‘Where the hell is that wind coming from?”69 During his stop in Valentine, he reportedly even shouted “Ride ‘em, cowboy” at a rodeo, and shared box of popcorn with a four-year-old admirer.70 Problems were looming, however. His radio audience dropped from a Hooper rating of 20.3 at the beginning of his swing, to a 14.5 by Seattle on 18 September. Then there was the issue with money. His campaign was nearly broke, and Dewey began privately wondering if he had enough money to even complete his campaign swing and return to Albany.

On 18 September Dewey was in Seattle, where he made a strong appeal to blue collar workers. The Civic Auditorium, seating 6,500, was full, and another 1000 people sat outside in ball park bleachers. The crowd, however, was largely non-labor. “We are adrift” in the field of labor, he declared. “There is no course, no chart, not even a compass. We move, when we move at all, to the shifting winds of the caprice of one
man.” Furthermore, labor relations were “smothered under a welter of agencies, boards, commissions, and bureaus.” Dewey reminded his audience that it had been a Republican President, William Howard Taft, who created the Department of Labor, and then outlined his program for change. As president, he would appoint, from the ranks of labor, an active and able Labor Secretary. In addition, he promised to abolish unnecessary bureaus and agencies, and put the functions of labor back into the Department of Labor. Alluding to the CIO-PAC, he also vowed to put an end to special interest, and ensure that every worker stood equally in the department that was created to serve them, not rule them.

“There is no question where we want to go during these peacetime years for which we are electing a new president,” Dewey concluded. “We must establish equality between business, labor, and agriculture, we must have full employment. It must be at a high wage level. We must have protection of the individual from loss of his earning power through no fault of his own. We must have protection of the individual against the hazards of old age. We must have those things within the framework of free— and I mean free—collective bargaining.”

The next day, 19 September, the Dewey campaign crashed-- literally. At 11:50 a.m. (PWT), Dewey’s train—en route to Portland-- ploughed into the rear of a Great Northern passenger express near the small town of Castle Rock, Washington. Several passengers on both trains suffered minor injuries. The Governor and Mrs. Dewey were badly shaken, but otherwise fine. “The wreck was damned unpleasant,” Tom Reynolds wrote Steve Early a few days later. “I’ve traveled a quarter of a million miles with your boss [FDR] and the worst I ever got was a hangover.” Dewey, meanwhile, pressed on to Portland, where that night he spoke to a crowd of 7,000 in the city’s Ice Arena. Oregon,
like Washington and the other states Dewey had visited during his “Listening Campaign,” was “in a state of flux,” and thus very much “on the fence.” In the speech, which was both well-delivered and well-received, Dewey—countering Democratic arguments that the team fighting the war should also end it—hit hard on “the indispensable man” theme, declaring: “Let’s have no more of this pretense about indispensable men. There are no indispensable men. If our Republic after 150 years of self-government is dependent upon the endless continuance of one man in office, then the hopes which animated the men who fought for the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution have indeed come to nothing. The peace and prosperity of America and of the world can never depend on one man.”

From Portland the Dewey special traveled to San Francisco, where on 21 September, at Municipal Hall, Dewey, as one critic described it, “climbed into bed with the President” and endorsed the New Deal. The specific question addressed in this speech was could America have both political freedom and economic security. Dewey, of course, believed it could—if there was a change in administration. Overall, he promised to continue the best parts of the New Deal while incorporating old-fashioned Republican values, such as economic opportunity, and honest and efficient government. “Whether we like it or not, and regardless of the party in power, government,” he declared, “is committed to some degree of economic direction. Certain government measures to influence broad economic conditions are both desirable and inevitable.” For example, the postwar years would require the federal government to stabilize interest rates, ensure widespread job opportunities in private enterprise, and support farm prices against the menace of collapse. The old, pre-New Deal days were gone, he said, and would “never
come back again.” Thus, he concluded, America needed “a new point of view toward the relationship between government and the people. The role of government cannot be the purely negative one of correcting abuse, of telling people what they may or may not do. Government must be the means by which our people, working together, seek to meet the problems that are too big for any one of us or any group of us to solve individually.”

The crowd, caught totally unprepared for such a declaration, offered only minimal applause. In his report to the White House, journalist Tom Reynolds noted that “Hal Faust of the Chicago Tribune, Dick Lee of the New York News, Warren Francis of the Los Angeles Times, and a dozen others gagged when we got the text of the speech. I got a service message from my office the next night that said that the Tribune had played the Dewey speech on page 10—‘apparently under the impression it was Roosevelt talking.’”

The next day Dewey addressed a partisan crowd of 93,000 in Los Angeles, where, standing under a fifty-two-foot American flag and accompanied by Hollywood celebrities such as Ginger Rogers, he bored his audience with a complex and high-minded speech on social security and unemployment insurance. ‘My God, what was the matter with him?’ Rupert Hughes overheard in the crowd. Indeed, supporters of Dewey began to complain that his speeches were dull and over the head of most Americans. He had done the same thing a few days earlier in Seattle, where instead of tearing away at the Roosevelt administration, he spoke on labor policy. Though a great speaker, his topics had a way of actually bringing an otherwise enthusiastic audience down. One journalist even thought Dewey might be intentionally trying to bore the nation into not voting.
As Dewey made his swing around the nation, the White House announced that the President would deliver an address to the Teamsters Union on 23 September. Those close to Roosevelt believed him to be too preoccupied by the war to fully appreciate Dewey’s challenge. Several factors were at play for Democrats on the eve of the Teamsters Speech. First, there was the issue of the President’s health. He needed to appear robust. The fact that he would be seated worried some. Second, there was the need to defend the administration’s record, and to respond to Dewey’s charges. And third, many Democrats believed Dewey was purposefully trying to bore the nation and thus drive turnout on Election Day to record lows. The President, it was believed in the White House, needed to shake things up, energize his base, and electrify the nation. He did not disappoint. Though he remained seated during the speech, he was energetic, conversational, witty, and extremely partisan. It was arguably the best political speech of his entire career.

Roosevelt joked about his age (and by implication, his health), noting that he was actually four years older since the last election—a fact, he said, that seemed to annoy some people. He then masterfully incorporated mention of the Great Depression, adding that “in the mathematical field there are millions of Americans who are more than eleven years older than when we started to clear up the mess that was dumped in our laps in 1933.” Still, FDR wryly noted, Republicans seemed intend on criticizing him for prewar economic turmoil. “Now, there is an old and somewhat lugubrious adage which says: ‘Never speak of a rope in the house of a man who has been hanged.’ In the same way, if I were a Republican leader speaking to a mixed audience, the last word in the whole dictionary that I think I would use is that word ‘depression.’” He also denied several
"fantastic" charges made by Republicans, including one that the administration was planning to keep men in the armed services after the war was over for fear that their might be no jobs available for them at home. It was, he declared, a "callous and brazen falsehood" aimed at stimulating fear among American mothers, wives, and sweethearts. Furthermore, "it was hardly calculated to bolster the morale of our soldiers and sailors and airmen fighting our battles all over the world." Republicans, the President insisted, were attempting to distort his record and deceive the American voter. In fact, they had, he charged, already imported into the campaign the propaganda techniques of dictators. One technique "was all set out in Hitler's book—and it was copied by the aggressors of Italy and Japan. According to that technique, you should never use a small falsehood; always a big one, for its very fantastic nature will make it more credible—if only you keep repeating it over and over again."

The highlight of the speech, however, was the President's mention of his dog, Fala. Republican leaders, he said, had not been content with attacks on him, or his wife, or on his sons. "No, not content with that, they now include my little dog Fala. Well, of course, I don't resent attacks, and my family doesn't resent attacks, but Fala does resent them." Earlier, Republicans in Congress had charged that while Roosevelt was in the Pacific in August, Fala had been left behind on an Aleutian Island, and that FDR had sent a destroyer back to find him, at a cost to the taxpayers of "two or three, or eight or twenty million dollars."

You know—Fala’s Scotch, and being a Scottie, as soon as he learned that the Republican fiction writers in Congress had out and concocted a story that I left him behind on an Aleutian Island and had sent a destroyer back to find him—at a cost to the taxpayers of two or three, or eight or twenty million dollars—his Scotch soul was furious. He has not been the same dog since. I am
accustomed to hearing malicious falsehoods about myself—such as that old, worm-eaten chestnut that I have represented myself as indispensable. But I think I have a right to resent, to object to libelous statements about my dog... 78

The audience reaction was enthusiastic at a minimum. One member of the audience beat a silver bread tray with a soup ladle, while another smashed glasses with wine bottles every time the President ridiculed Dewey. 79 When he had finished speaking, Roosevelt reportedly turned to labor leader William Green and said, “They liked that, didn’t they?” 80 Speechwriter Samuel Rosenman later recalled, “The applause and cheers when he finished were startling to those of us who had seen him out campaigning in 1932, 1936, and 1940. Never had there been a demonstration equal to this in sincerity, admiration and affection. In the mind of every friend and supporter who stood and cheered and applauded in that large dining hall was the same thought: ‘The old maestro is back again—the champ is now out on the road. The old boy has the same old fighting stuff and he just can’t be licked.'” 81

Dewey, who listened to the speech over the state-of-the-art RCA radio system in his private rail car, was stunned and furious. Determined to respond in kind, he began planning for a major public response, and even signed bank notes to help raise the necessary $27,496.46 to expand network coverage from 164 to 288 radio stations nationwide. 82 Covering Dewey on this swing, Chicago Sun reporter Tom Reynolds, in a “confidential” report to White House press secretary Steve Early, noted that following Roosevelt’s speech, Republicans were disorganized and frantic. In Belen, New Mexico, Brownell, who for hours had been desperately trying to communicate with Dewey by phone, finally made contact. According to an unsympathetic Reynolds, “the little
governor” had to take Brownell’s call “in a public booth before the eyes of all around.”

Even more humiliating, Henry Turnbull, Dewey’s radio director, was also cramped in the telephone booth. The effect of Roosevelt’s speech among the correspondents, Reynolds wrote, was “almost incredible. The Chicago Tribune and New York News crowd already were sour on Dewey, and when the President lifted him out of the water, they went even more sour. There wasn’t a dissenting vote among the correspondents—Dewey was left in a position behind that he occupied when he left Pawling on Sept. 6. He must have felt it, too.” For the first time in the campaign, he began receiving “boos” from the audiences. Meanwhile, as the Dewey Special pulled out New Mexico en route to Oklahoma City, where Dewey would respond publicly to Roosevelt’s speech, somebody placed several red, white, and blue “Roosevelt” stickers on the windows of his train.

In Oklahoma City on 25 September, Dewey rebutted Roosevelt’s Fala speech before a crowd of over 15,000. His address was broadcast live over national radio, and was interrupted thirty-eight times by applause. “For two and a half weeks,” Dewey began, “I have been laying before our people the program I believe we must adopt if we are to win here at home the things for which our American men are fighting abroad.” In doing this, he explained, he had carefully considered the wartime circumstances of the campaign, and had consciously avoided inserting politics into the war effort. The President, despite a pledge to the contrary, was now engaging in mud-slinging, ridicule and wisecracks. He had, Dewey continued, plumbed to the depths of demagogy by dragging into the campaign the names of Hitler and Goebbels. “Let me make one thing perfectly clear. I shall not join my opponent in his descent to mud-slinging. If he continues... he will be alone.” Dewey then proceeded to indict the administration on the prewar economy,
noting that ten million Americans were still unemployed in 1940 after seven years of the New Deal. "By waging relentless warfare against our job-making machinery, my opponent succeeded in keeping a depression going eleven long years—twice as long as any previous depression in our history, and the somber, tragic thing is that today he still has no better programs to offer. That is why the New Deal is afraid of peace, that’s why it resorts to wisecracks and vilification—when our people want victory followed by lasting peace in the world—and jobs and opportunity at hope. That’s why it’s time for a change."

Dewey concluded by employing another one of his campaign themes—i.e. Roosevelt was not the candidate of the average Democratic voter, but of special interests. "My opponent," he charged, "now announces his desire to be President for sixteen years. Yet in his speech… he called it a ‘malicious falsehood’ that he had ever represented himself to be ‘indispensable.’ … Let’s get this straight. The man who wants to be President for sixteen years is, indeed, indispensable. He is indispensable to Harry Hopkins, to Mme. Perkins, to Harold Ickes… to America’s leading enemy of civil liberties—the mayor of Jersey City. He’s indispensable to those infamous machines in Chicago, in the Bronx, and all the others. He’s indispensable to Sidney Hillman and the Political Action Committee, he’s indispensable to Earl Browder, the ex-convict and pardoned Communist leader. Shall we, the American people, perpetuate one man in office for sixteen years? Shall we do that to accommodate this motley crew?"

"FDR Asked for It" ran the headline of the New York Telegram the next morning. Traveling through Minnesota a few days later, Governor Bricker wrote that “Everywhere I have heard nothing but words of praise for your Oklahoma speech. It has given greater
impetus to Republicans than anything that has happened. They are ready to go to town—raise money and get out the votes.” From California, Dewey’s campaign biographer, Rupert Hughes, wired that the speech was more than oratory—“it was an earthquake.” U.S. News added that the country “was going to have an old-fashioned, free-swinging campaign after all.”

In 1995, historian Gil Troy argued that contrary to popular opinion, the Fala speech was a rare political miscalculation by Roosevelt. Examining White House mail and editorials and “Letters to the Editor” from newspapers around the country, Troy noted that “regular” or “mainstream” Democrats—the very type Dewey wanted to either attract or bore into staying at home on Election Day—were three to one against the speech. Most complained about either (1) the distasteful attempt to compare Dewey’s tactics with Hitler’s, or (2) the frivolous injection of a dog into the political discourse. “One citizen,” for example, “reported to the Detroit News that ‘Candidate Roosevelt’s political speech filled me with a feeling of deep disgust and loathing.’ When mothers are mourning and sons are dying, how can ‘this man’ think it ‘fit to regale their ears with such insulting trash and triviality as the qualities and feelings of his dog!’” Many Americans still expected their president to remain above politics, and Roosevelt had disappointed. With his Oklahoma City speech, Dewey also disappointed and thus missed an important opportunity. Instead of rebutting and attacking Roosevelt, he should have, in hindsight, remained quiet, and let FDR get all the blame for being too partisan. Disgusted Democrats and independents would have either voted for Dewey or opted not to vote. By playing on FDR’s terms, he nullified any possible benefits from Roosevelt’s blunder. Dewey quickly realized his mistake. It was, he later recalled, “the worst damned speech I
In fact, the outrage over the Fala and Oklahoma City speeches had such an impact on Dewey that it shaped his lackluster 1948 campaign against Harry Truman.

While campaigning in Tulsa, on 26 September, just one day after his Oklahoma City speech, Dewey was approached by Colonel Carter Clarke of the Army Special Branch, who handed the Governor a top-secret letter from the Army Chief of Staff himself, General George C. Marshall. The letter read:

My Dear Governor:

I am writing to you without the knowledge of any other person except Admiral King (who concurs) because we are approaching a grave dilemma in the political reactions of Congress regarding Pearl Harbor. What I have to tell you below is of such a highly secret nature that I feel compelled to ask you either to accept it on the basis of your not communicating its contents to any other person and returning this letter or not reading any further and returning the letter to the bearer.

Dewey stopped reading the letter. "Marshall does not do things like that," he told Clarke. "I am confident that Franklin Roosevelt is behind this whole thing. Now if this letter merely tells me that we were reading Japanese codes before Pearl Harbor and that at least two of them are still in current use, there is no point in my reading the letter because I already know that... and Franklin Roosevelt knows about it too. He knew what was happening before Pearl Harbor, and instead of being reelected he ought to be impeached." Dewey then returned the letter and consented to meet secretly with Clarke once he returned to Albany.

When later asked by a congressional panel why he decided to write Dewey, Marshall replied that he was worried about Pearl Harbor references from Republicans that were
“growing more pointed as the campaign became more violent.” In addition, it had been suggested he go to FDR “for help,” and that, the Army Chief of Staff believed, would not do. “I felt it absolutely necessary,” Marshall recalled, “that Mr. Dewey feel sure that the President had no knowledge whatever of my action and that he feel sure that it was entirely non-political. That is the way, I understand, Governor Dewey accepted it.”

Marshall was right to be worried. According to Dewey advisor Herbert Brownell, the campaign had decided early on to disclose “the truth about Pearl Harbor.”

The Pearl Harbor attack, and the administration’s handling of military preparation in the weeks before, had been the subject of furious controversy in Washington for two years. Though the administration’s official explanation for the attack was “slugged without warning,” many critics of the President were less sure. According to Dewey biographer Richard Norton Smith, Washington cocktail parties were enlivened with talk that—as two service boards of inquiry were privately beginning to reveal in the summer of 1944—U.S. code breakers had broken Japanese war codes in the spring of 1941, and that the State, War, and Navy Departments, as early as that November, “had a reasonably complete knowledge of the Japanese plans and intentions and were in a position to know their potential moves against the United States.” Sensing an opportunity, Republicans went on the attack. “The primary responsibility for the Pearl Harbor catastrophe,” Congressman Ralph Church of Illinois declared in early September, “was in Washington and not in the Pacific.”

A few days later, on 18 September, Indiana Republican Forest Harness introduced a resolution in the House of Representatives calling for a committee to conduct a special study of the attack and report back within thirty days. Clare Booth Luce, meanwhile, charged that Roosevelt was “the only American President who ever
lied us into a war because he did not have the courage to lead us into it.”

On the campaign trail in late September, Governor Bricker described the President’s handling of the episode as “disgraceful,” while in the Senate, Styles Bridges of New Hampshire, announced that Dewey himself was “gathering facts” that might sustain allegations of national scandal.

On 28 September, Dewey, accompanied by trusted advisor Eliot Bell, met with Clarke about Pearl Harbor and the Japanese codes. The Governor, Clarke insisted, must not raise Pearl Harbor as a campaign issue. According to Clarke, the United States had in fact broken Japanese codes prior to Pearl Harbor, and they were still being used by the Japanese. If Dewey exposed this secret, the Colonel continued, the Japanese would change their codes, and the American war effort in the Pacific, would be undermined. Shaken and angry, Dewey “fumed that Roosevelt was ‘a traitor’ who had willingly or accidentally condemned more than a thousand men, and most of the Pacific fleet, to a watery grave.” After repeated assurances from Clarke that Roosevelt had no knowledge of their meeting, Dewey instructed his aides to gather all the information thus far collected, and “put it away securely and forget it.”

Clarke then asked him if he wished to convey a message to Marshall, to which Dewey replied, “No message.” Dewey’s secretary, Lillian Rosse, later recalled the Governor “looked like a ghost.”

In October, Dewey suffered another blow. On 9 October, the Roosevelt administration released the content of the postwar security proposals made by the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and China, at the Dumbarton Oaks Conference. Overall, the conference called for the creation of an international organization similar to the League of Nations, with a general assembly of all member states, an eleven-seat
security council (on which the founders would have permanent representation), and a world court of justice.\textsuperscript{97} The proposals, however, made no mention of voting procedures on the Security Council, and avoided designating an authority responsible for committing troops against an aggressor. Three days later, on 12 October, Republican Senator Joseph Ball of Minnesota-- an internationalist and a sponsor of a 1943 Senate resolution calling for the creation of a United Nations Organization-- released a public statement challenging the presidential candidates to address the question of “Should the vote of the United States’ representative on the United Nations security council commit an agreed upon quota of our military forces to action ordered by the council to maintain peace without requiring further congressional approval?”\textsuperscript{98} Ball was lukewarm at best on Dewey, and the previous year had published a book entitled \textit{Collective Security}, in which he argued that “the right to wage aggressive warfare is the only sovereign right which must be renounced. The only sovereign obligation to be assumed is to join in collective action against aggression, whether actual or threatened.”\textsuperscript{99} Ball, like many other Willkie Republicans, wanted the representative of the Security Council to have real authority.

On 18 October, Dewey delivered a major foreign policy speech before the New York \textit{Herald-Tribune} Forum at the Waldorf-Astoria Hotel in New York City. In his speech, the Republican nominee spoke thoughtfully about America’s new internationalist mission. “Japanese planes launched from a few aircraft on December 7, 1941, struck us a devastating blow at Pearl Harbor,” he said. “If we fail to make secure the peace of the world, the next war will not begin by a surprise attack upon an outlying base. It will begin when robot bombs [intercontinental missiles] launched thousands of miles away suddenly rain death and destruction on our major cities.” That threat, he explained, had
greatly reduced the size of the earth. “If there should ever be a third World War, America would be in the front lines in the very first hour. That is not argument. It is a fact.” Thus, the inescapable conclusion was that the United States must never again run the risk of permitting war to break out in the world. To this end, it must take the lead in establishing an international body to prevent future wars.

Dewey spent most of his speech, however, attacking the various aspects of the Roosevelt administration’s conduct of the war. For example, he criticized Roosevelt’s “secret diplomacy” with Stalin over the future of Poland. “Poland,” Dewey declared, “was the first nation to resist the oppression of Hitler. The restoration of a free Poland is the outstanding symbol of what we are fighting for.” The differences between Poland and the Soviet Union were complex, he acknowledged. Yet the President had undertaken to handle this matter personally and secretly with Stalin. Neither Secretary of State Hull nor Under-Secretary of State Stettinius were present—only former WPA head Harry Hopkins. And what had they gained? Nothing—not even Soviet recognition “of those whom we consider to be the true Government of Poland.” Not content, Dewey next turned to Italy, where he complained reconstruction efforts were improvised and inefficient, and had, fifteen months after Italy’s surrender, failed to prevent “mass unemployment, hunger, despair, degradation, delinquency, and painful disappointment.” He then turned to administration relations with France, noting that Roosevelt’s personal antipathy for General Charles DeGaulle, who was leading the only existing French government, had led to delay in official recognition of that government, and “chaos behind our lines at a critical period of the war.” France, Dewey declared, deserved better. “We need France in our councils and we need her now.”100
Unfortunately for Dewey, most of this rather substantive and eloquent speech was overshadowed by the Ball question, which he—in what turned out to be a major blunder—dodged. Believing the Hull-Dulles agreement of August disqualified him from making any specific statement on the United Nations, Dewey commented only blandly that “The world organization must be enabled, through the use of force, when necessary, to prevent or repel military aggression. It must be supplemented by a world court to deal with international disputes.” The White House immediately sensed an opportunity. The President was scheduled to address the same forum three days later, and if he could, campaign strategists believed, answer Ball’s collective security question in more detail, he might win an important Republican endorsement. In a very close election, aides believed, it might make the difference.

Roosevelt used the New York event as an excuse to campaign in his home state, which was very much in “toss-up” status. He arrived in New York early, and in an attempt to curb rumors of failing health, toured the city in an open car during a cold rain. At Ebbets Field, the President—wearing his old gray campaign hat and navy cape—addressed well-wishers at a rally for Democratic Senator Bob Wagner. From there, Roosevelt traveled to Queens, the Bronx, Harlem, and mid-Manhattan. That evening, 21 October, he spoke to the Foreign Policy Association, and, unlike Dewey, addressed Ball’s concerns squarely. “Peace, like war,” the President explained, “can succeed only where there is a will to enforce it, and where there is available power to enforce it. The Council of the United Nations must have the power to act quickly and decisively to keep the peace by force, if necessary. A policeman would not be a very effective policeman if,
when he saw a felon break into a house, he had to go to the Town Hall and call a town meeting to issue a warrant before the felon could be arrested."\textsuperscript{102}

Once again Dewey was shocked. Roosevelt's statements were, he believed, inappropriate and a violation of the nonpartisan agreement of 25 August. In a speech in Minneapolis on 24 October, Dewey tried to rebound, announcing that the US representative to the United Nations “must not be subject to a reservation that would require... [him] to return to Congress for authority every time he had to make a decision. Obviously Congress, and only Congress, has Constitutional power to determine what quota of force it will make available and what discretion it will give our representative to use that force."\textsuperscript{103} It was too late. That same day, while speaking in Baltimore, Senator Ball formally endorsed Roosevelt for President. Dewey, he said, had failed to clarify his position. If Congress retained the right to decide on each occasion whether to supply troops for collective security, the United Nations would be nothing more than a debating society, lacking power to act, and “future aggressors will sneer at it just as Hitler sneered at the League of Nations."\textsuperscript{104}

Though the Dewey campaign dismissed Ball as an “insignificant voice,” his defection hurt. The Minnesota Senator immediately became the new Willkie, appealing to both liberal Republicans and independents. In addition, Ball undermined Dewey in Minnesota, where on Election Day he narrowly lost the state (and its eleven electoral votes) by 60,000 votes. Also, it revived foreign policy as an issue—a weak point for Dewey anyway—and raised questions, if unfounded, about the sincerity of his commitment to internationalism. Announcing his support for FDR on 21 October, journalist Walter Lippmann, who had supported Willkie in 1940, wrote “I cannot feel that
Governor Dewey can be trusted now with responsibility in foreign affairs... He has so much to learn.” More importantly, the Ball episode as a whole resulted in the very thing Dewey wanted to avoid— it generated controversy (and thus interest in the campaign) and mobilized previously ambivalent Democrats to turn out on Election Day and vote for Roosevelt. For example, both the Nation and the New Republic, skeptical over Roosevelt’s apparent abandonment of the New Deal, found the President’s answer to Ball’s question sufficient ground for endorsing a fourth term. Years later, Dewey himself acknowledged the impact of the affair, recalling that “In the last week of the campaign Roosevelt broke his commitment and said in a very deft way that the town hall didn’t have any power unless it had a policeman, thereby satisfying a great many people who felt that there should be a United Nations army, about which I had a good many reservations. I have been proved right, and he won the election. Not that that [alone] was responsible for his winning the election, but I’m sure it contributed.”

Throughout the month of October, Dewey was on the defensive—mainly as it related to a subject he thought he had removed from the campaign in August, foreign policy. Roosevelt, who enjoyed the advantage of already being President and thus capable of making news, repeatedly placed the former New York prosecutor in the uncomfortable position of being on the defensive. For example, Dewey repeatedly felt the need in his speeches to present overviews of past Republican foreign policies-- including those of Secretaries of State Hay, Root, Knox, Hughes, Kellogg, and Stimson-- to point out that the GOP was not the natural home of isolationism. Also, on several occasions he would begin his speeches by saying “I had intended to talk tonight about...,” and then move into a rebuttal of something Roosevelt had said a day or two earlier. He could not stay
focused. Over the course of a couple of weeks in mid-October, he managed to give major addresses on the United Nations, honesty and efficiency in government, the communists, the economic failures of the New Deal, and agriculture. Furthermore, October witnessed positive news from the war front, reinforcing FDR’s campaign image of the President as a competent and successful commander-in-chief. At the end of September, U.S. forces were in Germany, and on 20 October, MacArthur launched the invasion of Leyte Gulf, and began his dramatic recapture of the Philippines. While at first glance it might appear that this situation would have helped his candidacy—especially since he had been so adamant in calling the next administration a peacetime one—it did not, and for two reasons. First, Dewey’s campaign “message of the day” often times could not compete in the media with war stories. His messages, then, were largely ignored. And second, euphoria over positive news from the war front translated into a “rallying effect” for Roosevelt. If the war had ended in August or September, there might have been enough of a time lapse between excitement and election, to have given Dewey victory. Instead, the anticipation of victory, which coincided with the election, generated short-term euphoria and thus aided Roosevelt. As FDR biographer James MacGregor Burns in the early 1970s observed, Dewey, like his three Republican predecessors, “found it impossible to come to grips with his adversary. He had plenty of hard evidence for his charges of mismanagement and red tape and expediency—but words meant little in the face of MacArthur’s and Eisenhower’s triumphs abroad.” By the end of October, Dewey had lost his edge, and it was Roosevelt as commander-in-chief who was defining and dominating the campaign messages.
A key player in keeping Dewey on the defensive was FDR’s feisty running-mate, Harry Truman. Truman’s vice presidential “whistle stop” campaign began quietly in New Orleans on 11 October. The Senator toured local war plants, and delivered a speech before the Mississippi Valley Flood Association, where he declared that flood control “must be given a No. 1 priority in any postwar program.” Then, while en route from Louisiana to the West Coast, Truman’s rhetoric—aimed primarily against Dewey—steadily increased in fervor. In Texas a few days later, Truman insisted that “the Solid South could not go for a fellow like Dewey.” The “only thing that could cause difficulty for the Democratic ticket in the South,” he said at Beaumont, “would be public apathy.” Speaking from the platform of his railcar at El Paso, Texas, Truman turned up the heat, and referred to the New York Governor as “another Harding” that the nation could not afford. Harding, the Senator charged, “made no stand on peace’ and as a result ‘we are now paying for that mistake in blood and treasure… [We] must keep in the White House the man who knows where he is going and what he is doing.”

The climax of Truman’s speaking tour, however, came on Monday night, 16 October, in nationwide address delivered from Los Angeles. In his speech, Truman called Dewey a “doubting Thomas” (pun intended) and a “man of little confidence,” who was “flirting with the isolationists and currying the political support of the Hearsts and the McCormicks.” Truman revealed the increasing bitterness of the campaign early in his remarks when he asserted that an unknown number of lives would have been lost had Dewey been elected President in 1940. Quoting a statement made by Dewey in 1940, in which the Republican hopeful had had expressed skepticism over Roosevelt’s request for the construction of 50,000 airplanes, Truman pointed out that the U.S. was now—in
contrast to Dewey’s prediction that it would take four years to build 50,000—producing 100,000 planes a year. “Under a President like the Republican candidate,” Truman purported, “we would have set our sights too low, and you can imagine the effect on the war effort. No one can even estimate how many lives of our young men that would have meant. Do you want that kind of opposition in the prosecution of the war against Japan?”

From Los Angeles, the Senator traveled north to Oregon and Washington, and then east through the Midwest.

His message in the America heartland focused more on domestic issues, particularly farm concerns, where some politicos believed the President was vulnerable. In Peoria, Illinois, on 25 October, Truman defended the President’s record, and contrasted it with the dark days of Hoover’s Depression:

> You may remember when one of the key speakers at that [Republican] convention solemnly pronounced that under the Democratic administration the farmer works all day and keeps books all night. He did not choose to remind the American farmer that under the administration of Hoover a farmer worked all day—worked all night and had no books to keep.

> This war has brought hardship to every American. The farmer has had to make his own personal sacrifices. He has to overcome many handicaps. That he has done with courage and with skill. Yes, he now keeps books at night and in those books are the entries of cancelled mortgages, saving deposits, war bond purchases, and an income three times greater than in 1932 when the Hoover administration was the doctor at his bedside.

By the end of the month, he was back East, with speaking engagements in Boston, Pittsburgh, and New York City. All over, his message was essentially the same: “We must re-elect Franklin Delano Roosevelt as President of the United States!”
Like his Republican counterpart, Truman endured his own fair share of controversy and embarrassment. On 27 September—unwittingly conforming to the GOP’s message that he was a machine crony—he told reporters, “I am a Jackson County organization Democrat and I’m proud of that. That’s the way I got to be judge, a senator and the candidate for Vice President. A statesman is only a dead politician. I never want to be a statesman.” Then, in late October, while in Peoria—and shortly before his scheduled visit to Boston, where the Irish-Catholic vote was at stake—the Truman campaign was rocked by Hearst news reports claiming: “Senator Took [Ku Klux Klan] Oath in 1922.” The story, spread by an old enemy of the Senator’s from Missouri, was false. The charge, which Truman denounced as a lie, was easily put down, though the candidate and his staff did fail to disclose that he had once paid a $10 initiation fee. Meanwhile, it was reported, correctly, that the Senator’s wife, Bess, was on the Senate payroll. Truman was embarrassed, and was roundly criticized. Republican Clare Booth Luce, whom the Senator despised, began referring to Mrs. Truman as “Payroll Bess.” The Congresswoman also declared that “If, as Truman had said, his mother didn’t bring him up to be a statesman, then she would not be disappointed.” Angry at the attack on his wife, Truman privately commented that Luce should spell her last name “L-O-O-S-E.”

As the campaign drew to close, the role of labor and the influence of the Communist Party in American government took its place. On 5 October, in response to Dewey’s Oklahoma City speech (as well as Bricker’s “acceptance speech” in French Lick, Indiana), Roosevelt addressed the nation from the White House, and spurned “ism” support. It marked the first time in the history of American presidential campaigns that a president used the White House as a backdrop for a campaign speech. “I have never
sought,” the President said, “and I do not welcome the support of any person or group committed to Communism, or Fascism, or any other foreign ideology which would undermine the American system of government or the American system of free enterprise and private property.” However, that would not, he insisted, “interfere with the firm and friendly relationship which this nation has in the war, and will, I hope, continue to have with the Soviet Union. The kind of economy that suits the Russian people is their own affair.” The President also warned of low voter turn-out. “The continuing health and vigor of our democratic system,” he said, “depends on the public spirit and devotion of its citizens which find expression in the ballot box.” He then rather boldly added that “The right to vote must be open to our citizens irrespective of race, color, or creed—without tax or artificial restriction of any kind. The sooner we get to that basis of political equality, the better it will be for the country as a whole.” The most controversial part of the speech, however, involved soldier voting. After decrying the fact that “many millions” of American servicemen would find it “difficult in many cases—and impossible in some cases—to register and vote,” Roosevelt—in a subtle barb at Dewey and the Republicans—prophesied that the American people would know whom to blame, “for they know that during this past year there were politicians who quite openly worked to restrict the use of the ballot in this election, hoping selfishly for a small vote.” Sensing voter movement toward the President, Rupert Hughes reported to Dewey the same week as FDR’s White House address that “The closing rounds of the contest demand the body punches and head-rocking that nobody can put over better than you.” Thus, the last month of the 1944 campaign witnessed a rapid decline from “solemn to silly.”
Speaking in Charleston, West Virginia, on 7 October, Dewey—in his first major campaign appearance since Oklahoma City—launched a scathing attack against Roosevelt and incompetence in Washington. As was typical with most of Dewey’s speeches, he began by countering FDR’s latest statements—in this case, voter turn-out and the spurning of support from the Communists. Dewey reminded voters that in his home state of New York, 77% of all eligible servicemen had already been mailed ballots. “Despite my opponent’s attempt to play politics with the soldier vote,” Dewey argued, “every evidence indicates that we will have an ever larger percentage of soldier votes than we will of civilians. Let’s have no more of this political pretense on a matter so important to us all.” He was not finished. The President, Dewey charged, was “relying for his main support upon a solid block of votes in states where millions of American citizens are deprived of their right to vote by the poll tax and by intimidation. Not once in twelve years has my opponent lifted a finger to correct this and his platform is cynically silent on the subject.” On Roosevelt’s denial of welcoming the support of Communists, Dewey feigned surprise. “Now, that is news,” he said mockingly. “But doesn’t this soft disclaimer come a little late?” The week before, he noted, Earl Browder, head of the Communist Party of America, had told 15,000 cheering supporters in Madison Square Garden that the reelection of Roosevelt was essential to his aims. This was the same Earl Browder who had been convicted as a draft-dodger in World War I, and who had been convicted again and imprisoned for perjury. Pardoned by FDR in time to organize a fourth-term campaign, he was, Dewey complained, “now such a patriot.” Dewey was not simply and wildly making charges. He usually had a point, and in this speech it was that Browder and his ilk were eager for Roosevelt’s reelection because they
sought the continuation of a failed New Deal. “They love to fish in troubled waters,” Dewey explained. “Their aims can best be served by unemployment and discontent.” He then spent the rest of his speech chronicling how “this tired administration bungled” in preparing the nation for war, and how it was currently failing to adequately plan for peace.117

A few days later, on 16 October, before a crowd in St. Louis, Missouri, Dewey once again spoke on the need for competent leadership in postwar America. Government, he said, should meet three simple tests: Was it honest? Were the people who operated it competent to do their jobs? Did it have faith in the future of America, and “a wholehearted determination to make our system work?” By such standards, he charged, the Roosevelt administration—“the most spectacular collection of incompetent people who ever held public office”—was a miserable failure. He then went on to describe the “constant bickering, quarreling, and back-biting” within the White House, including squabbles between Harold Ickes and Harry Hopkins over money for PWA and WPA, Ickes and Leon Henderson over the title “gasoline czar,” and Henry Wallace and Secretary of Commerce Jesse Jones over the Vice President’s “disgraceful” accusation that Jones had “done much to harass the... effort to help shorten this war...” Central to all this quarrelling and confusion, he continued, was the President’s own “consistent practice of evading responsibility” and passing the buck to his assistants. “What kind of government is this,” Dewey demanded, “that even a war cannot make it sober down and go to work?”118 The administration, he concluded, had degenerated into “little men rattling around in big jobs,” capable of nothing more than “planned, noisy chaos, and bungling.”119
Socialist candidate Norman Thomas, meanwhile, assailed both Roosevelt and Dewey, insisting that he had never seen a campaign conducted at a lower level. “Most of the discussion has been on personalities, he declared. “One would think we were electing a dictator who is under no compulsion to outline policies except in the vaguest terms.” “The policies of both” he predicted in New York on 12 October, “are leading us along the road to a hell of chronic depression and new wars. It doesn’t matter which one is driving.” According to Thomas, unemployment, racial tensions, national debt, and “Communist Machiavellianism” would characterize America’s postwar years and lead to the emergence of a strong fascist movement within the United States by the end of the 1950s. The only positive alternative, he concluded, was “democratic socialism.”

In an effort to energize his organizational support (and to curb rumors about his health), Roosevelt, on 21 October, toured New York City in an open car during a cold rain. That evening, as discussed earlier, he spoke to 2,000 members of the Foreign Policy Association at Park Avenue’s Waldorf Astoria Hotel, where he attacked congressional Republicans for their pre-Pearl Harbor isolationist voting, extolled liberal and internationalist Republicans—such as Secretary of War Henry Stimson, who appeared on the dais with Roosevelt—and warned that the conservative “likes of Joe Martin and Hamilton Fish would have controlling power in Congress if the Republicans won.” It was in this speech too (as mentioned above) that Roosevelt addressed the issue of peacekeeping in the United Nations. After the speech Roosevelt returned to Hyde Park, where he would rest until the following week’s campaign appearances in Wilmington, Delaware, and Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.
Dewey, meanwhile, frantically searched for some other issue with which to attack Roosevelt. At Chicago Stadium on 25 October, he revealed information concerning a Democratic fund-raising organization called the One Thousand Club. “I have here a letter written... last Monday,” Dewey dramatically announced. “It is written on the letter-head of the National Democratic Campaign Headquarters, Little Rock, Arkansas, and signed by H. L. McAlister and Sam J. Watkins, State Finance Directors.” The letter he then read was an invitation to Democratic donors to join the “One Thousand Club.” It revealed that the idea for such a club originated with FDR, who said “I think it would be a good idea to have a list of one thousand persons banded together from all over the United States to act as a liaison to see that facts relating to the public interest are presented factually to the President and members of Congress.” Donations and rewards, of course, were linked to this concept. Members of the One Thousand Club would be “granted special privilege and prestige by party leaders.” Furthermore, members would be called into conference on occasion to “discuss matters of national importance and to assist in the formulation of administration policies.” Most importantly, to be a member one had to donate $1000 to the Democratic National Campaign Fund. “There, in crude unblushing words,” Dewey declared, “is the ultimate expression of New Deal politics by the theory of ‘Who gets what, when, and why.’” To his great disappointment, the story failed to generate any excitement. 

Two days later, FDR addressed a Navy Day crowd in Philadelphia, site of one the country’s largest naval bases. A week earlier, MacArthur had waded ashore the Philippines, and on 25 October, Admiral William F. Halsey, commander of the U.S. Third Fleet, informed Nimitz that the naval battle of Leyte Gulf was over, and that “The
Japanese Navy has been beaten and routed and broken…” Roosevelt happily relayed that information to the American people the following day. Standing in Philadelphia’s Shibe Park on 27 October, he evoked the memory of his late cousin, TR, who would have been eighty-six that day. “I think that Theodore Roosevelt would be happy and proud to know that our American fleet today is greater than all the other navies of the world put together,” he declared. “And when I say all the navies I am including what was—until three days ago—the Japanese fleet.” The crowd erupted in tremendous applause. The President then reminded the audience of his administration’s preparedness for war before Pearl Harbor. “The record will show,” he insisted, “that when we were attacked in December, 1941, we had already made tremendous progress toward building the greatest war machine the world has ever known.” There were those who scoffed, however. “Less than three months before Hitler launched his murderous assault [in 1939], the Republicans in the House of Representatives voted 144-8 in favor of cutting the appropriations for the Army Air Corps. I often think how Hitler and Hirohito must have laughed in those days. But they are not laughing now.”

Speaking from Washington on 30 October, James Byrnes, in his only major appearance of the fall campaign, asserted that the election of Thomas Dewey would delay victory in the war, and put peace in jeopardy. A change in administrations, he argued, would cause cost precious time for the Allies to learn to what extent Dewey would carry out the policies of his predecessor. “Will it not take time,” Byrnes asked, “to convince Stalin that he can work with a man who, as late as 1940, denounced the recognition of Russia by our Government and who is now criticizing the efforts of our Government to bring about a friendly accord between Russia and Poland, on which depend the peace of
Europe and the existence of a free and strong Poland?” If America changed presidents, he continued, our Allies will believe America has changed. Also, if defeated, FDR would remain in office until 20 January, during which time “Allied statesmen would pay little attention to the man who had been rejected as our spokesman.” This, Byrnes concluded, was exactly what Hitler and Hirohito desired—something to disturb the existing unity and harmony of the Grand Alliance: “[Y]ou and I know the defeat of Roosevelt would revive their fading hopes, stiffen their opposition and delay the end of the war.”

That same day, in Detroit, Michigan, vice presidential hopeful John W. Bricker attacked “foreign influence” within the Roosevelt administration— and named names. “Today, as never before, a foreign influence of the most subversive kind is trying to take over our American government by boring from within.” Specifically, Bricker recited “facts” submitted to a House committee (the Dies Committee) investigating un-American activities which, he said, “conclusively prove that FDR and the New Deal are in the hands of the radicals and the Communists.” Evidence presented to the Dies Committee, he declared, “showed that at least 82 leaders of PAC have been affiliated with organizations listed by Attorney General Biddle as Communist Front Organizations.” For the first time in the history of the nation, Bricker concluded, “A foreign fifth column [alluding to Communist Russia]… is trying to swing a Presidential election. The all-out Communist support for the fourth term admits of no other interpretation. There has never been anything like this before because no American party or group has been willing to live as the obedient instrument of the policies of a foreign power.”

On 31 October, RNC Chairman Brownell—still trying to find someway to use Pearl Harbor—criticized the Roosevelt and Democrats for failing to launch a public
investigation into the disaster. “I do not know and the American people do not know who was the Commander-in-Chief at Pearl Harbor,” he declared. “I only know that every New Dealer in Congress has fought bitterly to prevent the court martial which would fix the responsibility wherever it belongs. Long ago the time passed when there was no reason of secrecy to prevent the trial yet the truth is still concealed.”

At a Washington press luncheon, meanwhile, Sidney Hillman defended the CIO-PAC, declaring “Some people think that if the Communist Party is for something we should oppose it. The Communist Party is for the war effort now and was not for it before. I do not feel called upon to oppose the war effort because the Communists are for it.” Hillman also denied the “Clear Everything with Sidney” phrase, stating “there was nothing to it” and that it was “based on pure imagination.” He added that FDR’s opponents were making “bigotry” an issue, and asserted that the election of the “red-baiting and Jew-baiting” Dewey would be “a national catastrophe.”

The following day in Boston, Dewey delivered the harshest speech of his entire career. The subject was “Factions and Power-Seeking Groups Which Support the New Deal,” and, of course, it included a major attack on Hillman and the CIO-PAC. Overall, Dewey charged that to perpetuate himself in office for sixteen years, Roosevelt had put the Democratic Party on the auction block, for sale to the highest bidder, and the highest bidders were the PAC and the Communist Party. “In this campaign,” he declared, “the New Dealers attempt to smother discussion of their Communist alliance... They insinuate that Americans must love Communism or offend our fighting ally, Russia. But not even the gullible believe that. In Russia, a Communist is a man who supports his government.

_In America, a Communist is a man who supports the Fourth Term so our form of_
government may more easily be changed [italics added].” The question of Communism in the United States, he continued, had nothing to do with where a man was born. “Every American—every one of us—traces his ancestry to some foreign land.” The proof that Communism was not related to national origin was the “fact that Earl Browder, the avowed leader of Communism in America, was born in Kansas.” Dewey’s main target, however, was Sidney Hillman—a New Dealer, he insisted, who, with the help of the Communists, had taken over the American Labor Party in New York, and was now endorsing Roosevelt’s fourth term bid. The CIO leader, he continued, was the biggest political boss in America, and a “Front for the Communists.” As chairman of the CIO-PAC, “he stalks the country squeezing dollars” for FDR out of the hard working men and women of America, “under threat that if they do not give the dollar, they will lose their jobs.” Hillman and the Communists, he warned, were attempting to seize control of the New Deal, through which they aim to control the whole of American government. “Nazism and Fascism are dying in the world,” Dewey soberly concluded. “But the totalitarian idea is very much alive and we must not slip to its other form—Communism. All of these concepts are enemies of freedom and we must equally reject all of them. They would make the State supreme, give political power only to those who deny the supremacy of God and use that power to force all men to become cogs in a great materialistic machine.”

Dewey’s Boston speech was well-written, hard, accusatory, and true. The CIO-PAC and the Communists were, in fact, working closely together in states like New York, Michigan, and Pennsylvania to raise money, educate voters, and get out the vote. Still, the Communist Party, and not the CIO, was very much the subordinate partner.
Furthermore, while the Communists were strong in some CIO unions, they were not a major factor (or presence) in all CIO unions. Dewey’s speech was a mistake. As one Dewey advisor noted at the time, “You’re speaking in Boston and everybody will know you’re trying to get the Irish Catholic vote. It’s going to look like a cheap play at a time when the Jews in this country are terribly sensitive, when they feel terribly threatened, they don’t even know if they’ll survive this war… and to a group they believe is largely unsympathetic, if not anti-Semitic, you’ve got this stuff.” He was right, and Dewey, of course, was roundly criticized for the speech—even his wife dismissed it as something Bricker could have written. Addressing a full “Everybody for Roosevelt” crowd at Madison Square Garden the following night, Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes charged that “this Dewey smear campaign of hate and prejudice follows the pattern contrived by Adolf Hitler and the unspeakable Goebbels.” Meanwhile, in the White House, Roosevelt “fumed that this was the meanest campaign he’d ever been in, and promised retribution for some of the below-the-belt punches after Election Day.”

Having successfully drawn Dewey into extreme rhetoric, Roosevelt, during “informal” remarks at Bridgeport, Connecticut, on 2 November, appeared—in an obvious appeal to independents—serious and “above the fray.” Alluding to Dewey’s angry speech of the previous day, the President told his audience that “In this campaign, of course, all things taken together, I can’t talk about my opponent the way I would like to sometimes, because I try to think that I am a Christian. I try to think that some day I will go to Heaven, and I don’t believe there is anything to be gained in saying dreadful things about other people in any campaign.” Two days later, in a speech at Fenway Park in Boston,
Roosevelt stepped up his criticism of Dewey, while directly confronting the Governor’s Communist accusations:

Speaking here in Boston, a Republican candidate said—and pardon me if I quote him correctly—that happens to be an old habit of mine—he said, that quote, ‘the Communists are seizing control of the New Deal, through which they aim to control the Government of the United States.’ Unquote.

However, on that very same day, that very same candidate had spoken in Worcester, and he said that with Republican victory in November, quote, ‘we can end one-man government, and we can forever remove the threat of monarchy in the United States.’

Now, really—which is it—Communism or monarchy?

I don’t think that we could have both in this country, even if we wanted either, which we do not.

No, we want neither Communism nor monarchy. We want to live under our Constitution which has served pretty well for and hundred and fifty-five years...

The President then reminded his audience that he had been reluctant to run again for the presidency, but that since the campaign developed, he was “most anxious to win—and I say that for the reason that never before in my lifetime has a campaign been filled with such misrepresentation, distortion, and falsehood. Never since 1928 have there been so many attempts to stimulate in America racial or religious intolerance.” When any politician, he concluded, says that the U.S. government could be sold out to the Communists, “then I say that that candidate reveals—and I’ll be polite—a shocking lack of trust in America.131

Dewey’s last major attack on Roosevelt came on 4 November during an address at Madison Square Garden. He had first alluded to the Morgenthau Plan during the media “hubbub” of late September and early October. In his speech at the New York Herald-Tribune Forum on 18 October, he then had asked, “Did Mr. Roosevelt take the Secretary
of War or the Secretary of State to the [Quebec] conference? As usual, he took neither. Instead, he took with him the Secretary of the Treasury, whose qualifications as an expert on military and international affairs are still unknown… Germany’s propaganda Minister Goebbels has seized upon the episode to terrify the Germans into fanatical resistance. On the basis of the Treasury Department’s ill-conceived proposals, the German people were told that a program of destruction was in store for them if they surrender… We are paying in blood for our failure to have ready an intelligent program for dealing with invaded Germany.” Now in his last major speech of the campaign— and still desperate for an issue to hang Roosevelt upon—spoke out directly and forcefully against the plan. It had, he declared, “been as useful to Hitler ‘as ten fresh German divisions. It put fight back into the German army. It stiffened the will of the German nation to resist. Almost overnight the headlong retreat of the Germans stopped. They stood and fought fanatically.’ The ‘blood of our fighting men’ was being shed for Roosevelt’s ‘impoverished meddling.’”

Considering that the Dewey campaign was daily being attacked as “fascist,” and that polls showed a majority of Americans favored a hard peace for the Axis Powers, this speech too invited last minute criticism. Roosevelt shrewdly ignored both him and the issue.

On Election Eve, 6 November, the candidates made one last appeal to voters. The final Gallup poll reported a race too close to call, with Roosevelt enjoying a slight lead, 51%, to Dewey’s 49%. In a radio address from Hyde Park, Roosevelt distanced himself from partisan politics, speaking instead on “Our Task Now Is to Face the Future as a Militant and a United People.” Roosevelt purposefully did not use all of his allotted radio time, and so, the networks, unable to preempt paid time, had to play slow classical music
(played on an organ) for thirteen minutes, until it was Dewey’s time (11:00 p.m.) to speak. The Democrats believed voters would turn off their radios and go to bed. They may have been right. The Republican program that began at 11:00 was “monotonous and deadly.” Roosevelt listened from his home in Dutchess County, and noticing Fala asleep at his feet, remarked, “They even put my dog to sleep.”133 At the end of the program, Dewey, live and from the Executive Mansion in Albany, delivered his last speech of the 1944 presidential campaign. The election, he said, might be the most fateful in American history. “These years 1945 to 1949 will be important, difficult years. They will require vigorous, hard-working, harmonious leadership, with abiding faith in America. But there has arisen in this campaign an argument that the people dare not change administrations because our country is in the midst of a great ordeal. Of course, there is nothing new in that argument. It was used four years ago, when we were at peace. In other countries, this same argument has been the pretext upon which men, originally voted into power by the people, have suspended popular government and maintained themselves indefinitely in power.” Dewey then concluded with “three simple tests that must govern the decision of every American tomorrow.” In the secrecy of the polling booth, he said, ask yourself these questions:

How can I help shorten the war?
How can I help secure lasting peace?
How can I help give us jobs and opportunity in the years that lie beyond our victory?

He was confident that if the American people soberly reflected upon those questions a Dewey victory was certain. 134
Election Day 1944, clear and mild throughout the country, witnessed a near record turnout at the polls (over 48 million people in total). Roosevelt received 53% of the popular vote (and 432 electoral votes) to Dewey’s 47% (and 99 electoral votes). Dewey won twelve states, and carried the West North Central section of the country, as well as the Mid-Atlantic region. He tied FDR in the East North Central section. Incidentally, the Mid-Atlantic region (with Dewey won) and the East North Central section (with was a tie) constituted 51% of the total national vote. The biggest improvement for Republicans came in the county votes. In Roosevelt’s first presidential election, 1932, he carried 2,721 counties—more than any other candidate for President up to that time. The incumbent, Herbert Hoover carried only 372. In 1944, Roosevelt’s last election, Republicans won 1,344. While Democrats still held a majority of the nation’s counties (1,750), most of them came from the Solid South. Outside the South and Mountain (where Republicans tied Democrats) sections, Democrats carried only 390 counties. Overall, the President carried a majority of the women’s vote, which was the largest voting block in the country, as well as the black and city votes. Dewey was favored more by men and rural populations. Dewey also carried the towns of Hyde Park, New York, and Independence, Missouri. In the House of Representatives, Republicans lost twenty-two seats, and in the Senate gained one. Of those elected for the first time to the Senate was Democratic Congressman J. William Fulbright of Arkansas, who would, before his defeat thirty years later, become a leading opponent of the Vietnam War, and a mentor of President Bill Clinton.

According to the National Opinion Research Center, which conducted a national election study in conjunction with the Psychology Department of Harvard University, the
leading causes for voting for FDR included: “Because of the war—we should not change
during the war, best man at this time,” “Because of his past-record—better man for the
job, more experienced,” and “Because he is for the common man.” Those who supported
Dewey, meanwhile, emphasized: “We need a change—four terms is too much—we are
heading toward a dictatorship, tired of the New Deal, Anti-Roosevelt, Roosevelt won’t
live 4 years, hate to see Truman take over,” and “To get rid of wasteful spending…
balance the budget… efficiency in government, houseclean Washington, states’ rights.”
Interestingly, only 4% of NORC’s post-election survey indicated that Roosevelt’s health
was a factor in their voting decision, while 45% of those questioned expressed the belief
that Communists would not have more influence under Roosevelt (only 24% said they
would). Sixty-four percent of those surveyed, meanwhile, believed that FDR waged the
better campaign, while nearly 80% maintained that Dewey had waged the most negative
one. Most voters received their news from the radio (59%). Newspapers came in second
with 27%, and magazines last with 7%. Sixty-five percent indicated that they decided
their presidential choice after the conventions. Of that number, 31% decided in the last
four to six weeks of the campaign. One of the most interesting questions asked by the
NORC was “If the war had been over, do you (Roosevelt voter) think you would have
voted for Dewey?” While only 28% of those who voted for FDR answered this question,
of that percentage, 21% indicated that they would have changed their vote, while 79%
said no. Translated into real (if small) numbers, it would have swung about 1.6 million
votes to Dewey, and in the popular vote, at least, created a virtual tie.\textsuperscript{136}

Shortly after 3 a.m., Dewey appeared in the ballroom of the Roosevelt Hotel in
Manhattan, and conceded defeat.
It is clear that Mr. Roosevelt has been reelected for a fourth term, and every good American will wholeheartedly accept the will of the people. 

I extend to President Roosevelt my hearty congratulations and my earnest hope that his next term will see speedy victory in the war, the establishment of lasting peace, and the restoration of tranquility among our people...

The Republican Party emerges from the election revitalized and a great force for the good of the country and for the preservation of free government in America.

I am confident that all Americans will join me in the devout hope that in the difficult years ahead Divine Providence will guide and protect the President of the United States.  

Dewey had not sent the traditional telegram of congratulations, and at Hyde Park, the President was not amused. “Always meticulous about the amenities,” aide William Hassett noted in his diary, Roosevelt telegraphed the Governor, “I thank you for your statement, which I have heard over the air a few minutes ago.” Forgetting about the Christian restraint he had talked about at Fenway Park a few days earlier, Roosevelt told Hassett, “I still think he is a son of a bitch.”
The presidential campaign of 1944 reveals that campaigns do matter, in both theoretical and literal ways. First, in the theoretical, it challenges the theory of the predictable campaign through renewed emphases on Electoral College strategies and campaign uncertainties. At first glance, the 1944 race seems to conform to the predictable campaign theory—it was a wartime campaign and the popular incumbent (Franklin Roosevelt no less) was seeking reelection; the race was close from June to November, with an early and almost constant Roosevelt lead, and the conventional wisdom among a majority of voters was that Roosevelt would win, and he did. A close examination of the election by individual states, however, reveals that Dewey’s hard work among local party leaders almost paid off. Indeed, in twelve states totaling 201 electoral votes, Roosevelt won with less than 52.5% of the vote. A shift of 500,000 votes in the right states (including Michigan, New York, Illinois, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Missouri, and Pennsylvania)—all of which had Republican governors—would have given Dewey an Electoral College win and the presidency. These numbers, combined with the outcome of the election itself and the fact that in Great Britain’s parliamentary elections just a few short months later, Prime Minister Winston Churchill was defeated by a relatively unknown politician named Clement Atlee, beg these questions in regard to the 1944 race: What did Dewey do wrong? What did Roosevelt do right?

There were at least four mistakes made by the New York Governor that undermined his efforts to unseat Roosevelt. One was that for all his emphasis on speech writing,
was unable (or unwilling) to narrow his focus to one or two issues. Thus, his message was scattered, and he talked about everything from Roosevelt’s age and health to ending one-man rule and saving America from the Communists. Like other challengers in wartime presidential elections, Dewey faced the charge—which he unwittingly seemed to encourage—that he was indecisive, inexperienced, and contradictory. After Roosevelt’s Fala speech before the Teamsters, Dewey was easily rattled, and by the end of the campaign, he was swinging madly in all directions, resulting in (1) independent and undecided voters—turned off by Dewey’s “negative” campaign—turning to Roosevelt and (2) aid to frantic Democratic efforts to get out the vote on Election Day. Incidentally, his lack of focus contributed to Democratic charges that he lacked conviction and a “clear stand” on the issues.

A second mistake made by Dewey was his unshakeable faith in the accuracy of news stories. For example, in late September, he told reporters that the administration was purposefully limiting MacArthur’s capacity to fight in the Pacific, for fear of ending the war quicker, and electing Republicans. This assertion was silly, and costly for Dewey in that (1) it embarrassed Dewey when MacArthur successfully retook the Philippines a few days later, (2) it highlighted Dewey’s youth (and gullibility) and relative lack of experience in foreign affairs, and (3) it reminded voters that while the war in Europe was approaching an end—a plus for Dewey—the war in the Pacific was far from over, and would require wartime leadership for probably another two years at least. The effect of this, of course, was to negate his message that the next administration would be a peacetime one. Also, the Roosevelt team was quick to point out his “exaggerations.”
Dewey missed an opportunity to entice disgruntled blacks back to the party of Lincoln. Though historian Nancy Weiss, in her superb *Farewell to the Party of Lincoln* (1983), correctly observed that many African-Americans of the New Deal era were not guided by civil rights issues, expecting little, as much as by economic issues, there were, by 1944, growing expectations among blacks concerning civil rights, and thus some dissatisfaction with Roosevelt. Black Americans were especially bitter about segregation, discrimination, and humiliation in the armed services. Furthermore, there was a policy of black exclusion from most of the war housing projects developed with federal funds. To make matter worse, Roosevelt had dumped Vice President Wallace, who was a champion for the rights of the common man of whatever race, color, and creed. It had been Wallace who had declared at the Democratic National Convention: “The future belongs to those who go down the line unswervingly for the liberal principles of both political and economic democracy regardless of race, color, or religion... there must be no inferior races. The poll tax must go.” Finally, the Democrats had a weak civil rights plank in their party platform. Though the Republican platform was rather progressive on civil rights, Dewey failed to forcefully speak on those issues on the campaign trail. He did boldly highlight FDR’s hypocrisy on this issue in early October, and he did, in fact, have the support of some black newspapers, including the Pittsburgh *Courier* and Baltimore *Afro-American*, but he did not build a strong bridge to the black community and black leaders. There was no significant organization or effort to get out black voters. According to Henry Lee Moon in a post-election analysis, “The masses of the race were unconvinced of the ills of which they complained would be corrected by a Republican victory. They realized that all the discriminations which irked them had persisted under
Republican administrations. Roosevelt, they knew, had not created their difficulties; he simply inherited them.\textsuperscript{2} Herbert Brownell, chairman of the RNC, noted too that "a shift of 303,414 votes in fifteen states outside the South would have enabled Governor Thomas E. Dewey to capture 175 additional Electoral College votes and to win the presidency with an eight electoral-vote margin."\textsuperscript{3} In eight of those fifteen states, the black vote exceeded the number needed to shift the balance toward Dewey. For example, in Maryland, the 50,000 black votes cast in Baltimore alone for Roosevelt were more than doubled the President’s 22,500 state plurality.

In contrast, Roosevelt won because he \textit{campaigned}, and because he was master at putting his opponents on the defensive. This was especially damaging for Dewey, who excelled at prosecutions. Throughout the late summer and early fall, Dewey the Prosecutor had been methodically making his case against Roosevelt. The President, waging a Rose Garden strategy that was meant to emphasize his importance as the incumbent, seemed tired, disinterested, and vulnerable. After polls in early September showed Dewey with a slight lead, Roosevelt abandoned his Rose Garden strategy and began campaigning, beginning with the Fala speech in late September. In fact, FDR was the first president to use the neutral White House in partisan politics, and deliver radio addresses. Furthermore, he not only campaigned, but he campaigned effectively. Roosevelt seized the high ground on the UN armed forces issue when Dewey bungled it. He played the role of the dutiful president. And he successfully identified Dewey with isolationists and thus wooed independents and Willkie Republicans into his campaign. Simultaneously, Roosevelt’s backers, including Sidney Hillman’s CIO-PAC, were able—due to the excitement of the campaign—to interest more people, and increase turnout. In
those key states, big CIO-PAC cities like New York, Philadelphia, Chicago, Detroit, St. Louis, and Boston, made the difference, giving him his fourth and final White House victory. Also, Roosevelt was impacted positively by what Dewey did not do—i.e. to share with the American people what he knew about Pearl Harbor and the administration’s lack of preparedness.

Finally, the campaign mattered in a literal sense in that, although the Democrats won, Dewey’s low-key, reformist style, helped modernize the GOP without upheaval—something Wendell Willkie could not have achieved. Shortly after the election, Ford Bond, Dewey’s radio director, wrote that the objective of the Governor had been to rebuild the party so as to be worthy of national trust. According to Bond, the Saturday before the election, Dewey took him aside, put his hands on his shoulders, looked him in the eyes, and said, “Ford, I don’t want you to be too disappointed—I want to tell you now: We may not win this election. But win or lose, it will not be until some time after November 7th that a great many of the voters will be with us, in what we are telling them now. Even though we might lose now, it’s worth all the fight we’re putting into it. So don’t be too disappointed if the vote is against us on the seventh of November.”

Encouraged, Bond noted that “the 1944 campaign was only the beginning—the take-off—the ‘D’ day of a mighty effort. An arduous campaign to get on the road once again to better things—to the things for which America seems so have been designed. To a reawakening and sharpening of the [Republican] effort to drive ever onward and upward toward the American ideal…”

On 12 April 1945—just five months after his victory over Dewey—Franklin Delano Roosevelt died of a cerebral hemorrhage at his presidential retreat in Warm Springs,
Georgia. He was sixty-three years old. Vice President Truman, who had been in office less than three months, was then sworn in as the Thirty-third President of the United States. Despite Republican charges of poor health the previous fall, the nation was stunned. "Shocked," "sudden," "unexpected," and "tragic" were words repeatedly used when Americans heard the news of the President’s death. The New York Times, predicting that "Men will thank God on their knees, a hundred years from know, that Franklin D. Roosevelt was in the White House," reported under its banner headline on 13 April that the "End Comes Suddenly at Warm Springs." In the U.S. Senate, Democrat Alben Barkley declared that he was "too shocked to talk." Republican Arthur Vandenberg, meanwhile, mourned "his untimely death." Addressing reporters on 13 April, the President’s physician, Ross McIntire said the President’s death “came out of a clear sky.” Though he paid his respects, announcing that “With a deep sense of tragedy the nation learns of the loss of Franklin Delano Roosevelt,” Thomas Dewey was not terribly surprised. Shortly thereafter he also wrote to the new president, pledging his assistance and loyalty “in every action you may take in the interest of the winning of the war and the establishment of a sound and permanent peace.” Truman warmly replied that he hoped to become better acquainted with the Governor.

Thomas E. Dewey never became President of the United States. In 1948, he won the Republican nomination for a second time—the first defeated GOP candidate to ever do that—and was the favorite to win over Harry Truman and a divided Democratic Party. He was a “new Dewey” then, however—more polished, less bold. He lost. Incidentally, the 1948 loss was grounded, at least in part, in his misunderstanding of 1944. Dewey regretted his “gloves-off” style—as epitomized by his Boston speech late in the 1944
campaign—and four years later decided to follow instead the Rose Garden strategy that FDR employed in 1944 before Fala speech. It had nearly doomed “the Champ’s” candidacy, and for whatever reason, went unnoticed by Dewey and his advisors. Dewey remained Governor of New York through 31 December 1954, and then retired to private life at his beloved Dapplemere estate in Pawling. He declined two offers by President Dwight Eisenhower to serve as Secretary of State, and one to become Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court. Instead, he practiced law in New York City. Throughout the 1960s, he continued to express support for both the death penalty and the Vietnam War. In 1969, Dewey once again turned down an offer—this time by President Richard Nixon—to serve as Chief Justice. He was too old, he explained. Besides, “I’m a warrior… I don’t want to be up there judging. I want to be down there in the arena, fighting.” Meanwhile, he struggled with writing his memoirs, and in the end, never finished it. On 16 March 1971, while vacationing in Florida, he died of a heart attack.

In his classic 1972 study, The Presidential Character, James David Barber articulated the pattern of style, character, and world view to determine models (or classifications) of presidential behavior. Barber’s so-called “Active-Negative” would apply most aptly to Dewey: “He seems ambitious, striving upward and seeking power. His stance toward the environment is aggressive and he has a persistent problem in managing his aggressive feelings. His self-image is vague and discontinuous. Life is a hard struggle to achieve and hold power, hampered by the condemnations of a perfectionist conscience.” This was the same classification into which Richard Nixon, Dewey’s young apprentice and friend, fell. In fact, the personality similarities between Dewey and Nixon—though beyond the scope of this study—were quite striking. Both men were highly intelligent,
painfully shy, and very secretive. That is not to suggest that a President Dewey would have become entangled in a Watergate-like scandal, but it does shed light on what kind of president Dewey might have made in style and temperament. He would have been serious, hard-working, and very far-removed from the media and the American people.

Dewey was the architect of Dwight Eisenhower's “Modern Republicanism.” Writing on the two-party system in 1966, Dewey articulated his definition of Republicanism, expressing the belief that all problems could be solved “locally and voluntarily by community action, and by public opinion. When these are inadequate, then the solution is first to be attempted by local government, secondly by state and lastly by federal action.” Democrats, meanwhile, sought to solve problems through “federal funds, federal personnel, and federal controls.” However, there were only two domestic responsibilities of the national government, he argued, that towered above the others. One was to rely on general (and not direct) controls to influence and maintain business and employment. By this he meant that the government “should influence the economy mainly through sound monetary and fiscal policies. It should not set up an endless series of direct controls over prices, wages, costs, investments, and the like.” The other responsibility was to maintain a stable currency by pursuing sound budget policies. “History,” he wrote, “is strewn with the wreckage of nations which failed to keep a sound currency.” Craig Shirley in a recent study of Ronald Reagan’s unsuccessful quest for the presidency in 1976 disapprovingly referred to Republicans such as Dewey, Nelson Rockefeller, and Gerald Ford as “Tories,” who were pale attempts at Democracy. What kind of President would Thomas Dewey have made? He would have been like Dwight Eisenhower in
management style (efficient), like Richard Nixon in temperament (shy and secretive), and like George H. W. Bush in foreign policy ("realistic" and prudent).

From the ashes of defeat—including his own—Dewey rebuilt the party of Hoover, to fit into (and to be a relevant alternative within) the post-World War II, New Deal order. He kept the party unified, while stirring it away from the Midwestern, isolationist influences of Senators Robert Taft, Joseph McCarthy, and Everett Dirksen, and guiding it towards the more internationalist, "pragmatic" conservatism of Dwight Eisenhower, Richard Nixon, and George H. W. Bush. He did this in at least two ways. First, Dewey, through his "nonpartisan" foreign policy arrangement with Secretary of State Cordell Hull in August 1944, moved beyond Republican orthodoxy and set foreign policy outside the political arena. In doing this, he not only helped establish the precedent of a bipartisan approach to foreign policy in Cold War elections, but also eliminated—at least from headlines—the constant bickering within the GOP on foreign policy. The general internationalist contour of that policy was no longer subject to political debate. Politics had now stopped "at the water’s edge"—and that was good for the future of the Republican Party.

And second, he was an important agent of party modernization. As Dewey’s modern biographer, Richard Norton Smith, observed in the late 1970s, the electoral viability of a party is grounded in its “willingness to discard something of its ideological past and advocate new policies that improve upon those of the dominant party. This willingness to expand the existing framework of political consensus is accompanied, at the same time, by fealty to basic party traditions.” Dewey employed this theory of party modernization, for example, at the Mackinac Conference of September 1943 when —
three months before Tehran and Roosevelt’s “Four Policeman” pronouncement— he fully embraced internationalism and called for a postwar organization including Great Britain, China, and the Soviet Union. According to Smith, Dewey, by 1942, had already dropped the “fuzzy isolationism” of his 1940 primary campaign, and had philosophically “caught with and passed Willkie”—all the while holding to traditional Republican values in his rhetoric. For instance, his call for international participation at Mackinac was coupled with reminders of the potential for economic benefits abroad. Speaking with a Republican voice, Dewey repeatedly told audiences that economic prosperity could be rescued from the artificial wartime levels through international trade and investments, and thus justified internationalism to GOP skeptics as financially healthy. There were few other, if any, Republicans who could have done that, and kept the party together in 1944—not Taft and certainly not Willkie.

In recent years, Willkie has become the internationalist favorite of many historians. More recently, journalist Charles Peters, in Five Days in Philadelphia: The Amazing “We Want Willkie!” Convention of 1940 and How It Freed FDR to Save the Western World (2005), argued (as his lengthy subtitle suggests) that Willkie, by supporting a military draft and breaking opposition to it in Congress and within the Republican Party, helped forge an American army of 1.6 million on the eve of Pearl Harbor (as opposed to the previous 270,000). The 1940 Republican National Convention in Philadelphia was, he argued, equally important as the Battle of Britain in defeating Germany. Those were five days that saved the Western world, Peters stated with great hyperbole, and Willkie was the “necessary man.” Though Willkie was bold and visionary—and does indeed deserve credit for this stand in 1940— he was not as effective as Dewey in transforming the GOP
into a more internationalist party. Willkie—described favorably by historian John
Morton Blum in the 1970s as a “Republican heretic”—was not a true party man. He had
very shallow roots in the GOP and was thus suspect by a majority of the party faithful. In
fact, the Hoosier had been a lifelong Democrat until just shortly before the 1940
campaign. Furthermore, at the time of his death in the fall of 1944, he was flirting with
the possibility of creating, with Roosevelt no less, a third party made up only of
“progressives.” A party “heretic,” he could not persuade the party “faithful.”

It was the “faithful” Dewey who made the Republican Party safe for internationalism
(and thus transformed the party permanently) by his two campaigns for the presidency in
1944 and 1948, and in engineering the nomination of Dwight Eisenhower to the
presidency in 1952. Furthermore, Eisenhower’s administration was full of Dewey men:
Jim Hagherty (White House press secretary), John Foster Dulles (Secretary of State), and
Herbert Brownell (Attorney General). Dewey himself turned down offers by Eisenhower
to head up the Justice Department and the Supreme Court. He also became the mentor of
a young Senator from California, and Eisenhower’s Vice President, Richard Milhous
Nixon. In 1964, he tried, unsuccessfully, to prevent Barry Goldwater’s nomination to the
presidency, and in 1968, recommended to Nixon a young Texas Congressman named
George Bush for vice president. Thomas Edmund Dewey never became President of the
United States, but his influence upon the Republican Party from Eisenhower’s “Modern
Republicanism” to George Bush’s “Thousand Points of Light” was great.
NOTES

Chapter One


9 *Ibid*.


Chapter Two


8 Ibid.


10 Ibid., 266.

11 Ibid., 65.

12 Ibid., 390.

13 Ibid., 390-391.


17 Ibid.

18 Ibid.

19 Zevin, 302-303.

20 Stoler, 822.
21 Zevin, 313-314.

22 Ibid., 323.

23 Ibid.


25 Ibid., v.

26 By the time of the 1944 election, the United States had suffered 538,178 casualties, 119,578 of whom had been killed (and another 70,000 missing). E. Eastman Irvine, ed., *World Almanac and Book of Facts for 1945* (New York: New York World Telegram, 1945), 38.

27 Zevin, 398-399.


31 Ibid.


42 Sitkoff, 307.

43 Sitkoff, 323-324.


69 *Ibid*.


74 Ibid., 56.

75 Ibid., 57.


77 Freda Kirchwey, “Program for Action,” The Nation, CLVIII (March 11, 1944), 382.

78 Mortimer J. Adler, How to Think About War and Peace (New York, Simon and Schuster, 1944), xiii.

79 Divine, Second Chance, 105.

80 Ibid., 104.


82 Ibid., 179.

83 Ibid., 180.

84 Other important “realist” works included America’s Strategy in World Politics (1942) and The Geography of the Peace (1944), by Nicholas John Spykman, The Super-Powers (1944), by William T.R. Fox, and Total Peace (1944), by Ely Culbertson.

85 Adler, How to Think About War and Peace, 13.


88 Ibid., 9.

89 Ibid., 10.


111 Gerald W. Johnson, *Woodrow Wilson: The Unforgettable Figure Who Has Returned to Haunt Us* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1944).
112 Divine, Second Chance, 168.

113 Ibid., 169.


116 Ibid., 4.

117 Ibid., 323.

118 Darryl F. Zanuck, Wilson. Motion Picture. Twentieth Century Fox, 1944.


120 Smith, Thomas E. Dewey and His Times, 303.

121 John Foster Dulles, War, Peace and Change (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1939), 81-82.


124 Ibid., 22.


126 Immerman, John Foster Dulles, 22.

127 Ibid., 23.

128 Ibid., 81.

129 Ibid.

130 Tom Reynolds to Steve Early, September 24, 1944, Thomas E. Dewey Papers, Rhees Library, University of Rochester.

132 Ibid.


136 Markowitz, *The Rise and Fall of the People’s Century*, 47.


139 Browder, *Teheran and America*, 18.

140 Markowitz, *The Rise and Fall of the People’s Century*, 83.


144 Ibid., 1.


146 Flynn’s remarks were evidently spurred by a statement made by the new publicity director of the Republican Party, Clarence Budington Kelland, in late January 1942. According to Kelland, “Politics is good in time of peace; in time of war politics is indispensable. When political unity comes in at the door, human liberties go out of the window. It is political unity which has plunged this world into war.” Donald Bruce

147 Polenberg, *America at War*, 66.


149 Ibid., 204.


159 For example, in early 1942, Willkie announced the names of twelve men who, he believed, qualified to serve as New York's governor. Dewey's name was not on the list.


162 Best, *Herbert Hoover: The Post-Presidential Years, Volume One*, 211.


164 Ibid., 492-493.


167 The conference was officially known as the Republican Advisory Council.

168 In March 1943, Senators Ball and Burton, along with Democratic Senators Carl A. Hatch of New Mexico and Lister Hill of Alabama introduced in the U.S. Senate what became known as the “Ball Resolution.” Overall, the resolution called for the immediate creation of an inter-allied organization to be already in place when the war ended, and to, in the meantime, deal with current war problems. The proposal was met with wide criticism from both sides of the isle. Senator Alben Barkley, Senate Majority Leader and Democrat from Kentucky, questioned the need for a wartime organization, while Senator Arthur Vandenberg, Republican from Michigan, argued: “I think the first job is to win the war; and though I concur in the belief that we must have a large measure of post-war cooperation, I am unwilling to do anything which might disunite the war effort by premature peace efforts. Vandenberg, The Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg, 45-45.

169 Vandenberg, The Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg, 55.


171 Ibid., 84.


174 Divine, Second Chance. 132.


176 Westerfield, Foreign Policy and Party Politics, 149.

177 Ibid., 159.


Chapter Three

1 Taft was correct. He did in fact face a difficult bid for reelection in 1944, winning by a margin of only 17,740 votes. James T. Patterson, *Mr. Republican: A Biography of Robert A. Taft* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1972), 278.


3 Ibid., 530.


6 Davies, *Defender of the Old Guard*, 83.

7 Ibid.


16 Incidentally, MacArthur’s victory in Illinois was smaller than Dewey’s 86% victory in that same primary four years earlier.


21 *Ibid*.


23 “Republicans,” *Time* (November 1, 1943), 15.


26 Thomas E. Dewey Papers, Rhees Library, University of Rochester.


32 Ibid.

33 Martin Van Buren, Horatio Seymour, Samuel Tilden, Grover Cleveland, Theodore Roosevelt, Charles Evans Hughes, Alfred E. Smith, and Franklin D. Roosevelt had all served as New York Governor before becoming presidential nominees. Van Buren, Cleveland and the two Roosevelts were the ones who actually won.


35 Other important members of the Dewey team included Elliot Bell, a college friend and neighbor who served as financial advisor, Jim Hagerty as press secretary, and John Foster Dulles as foreign policy advisor.

36 Smith, *Thomas E. Dewey and His Times*, 389.

37 Dewey desperately wanted to be the Republican nominee for President, but he did not want an open primary fight. He was a "consensus politician," who "harbored an almost obsessive concern over the appearance of party unity. He wanted to gain the nomination... by working behind the scenes, and wanted to directly control any effort exerted on his behalf." Furthermore, he believed "that individual contests in time of war could serve only to disunite the Republican Party," and thus both weaken the party’s chances for victory in November, and undermine the party’s success in office should it prevail. Anderson, "The Presidential Election of 1944, 154, 156.


39 Ibid., 83.

40 Ibid.


42 "Dewey Snaps GOP From Coma, But Enormous Task Lies Ahead," *Newsweek* (July 10, 1944), 35.

43 Ibid.

44 Ibid., 37.


46 Ibid. 145, 141.
Dewey’s advisors considered Warren’s reason for declining the nomination—his promise to his state two years before—a slap at the New York Governor, who in 1942, had made a similar promise.

John W. Bricker to Thomas E. Dewey, October 5, 1944. Thomas E. Dewey Papers, Rhees Library, University of Rochester.


Newsweek (July 10, 1944), 35.


68 The book was a collection of speeches from Dewey’s unsuccessful bid for the Republican presidential nomination in 1940.


73 TED to Henry Turnbull, October 4, 1944. Dewey Series 4, Box 187, Folder 18, Rhees Library, University of Rochester.

74 Carl Byoir to Herbert Brownell, August 17, 1944. Dewey Series 2, Box 15, Folder 8, Rhees Library.

75 Moley, *27 Masters of Politics*, 56.

76 Ibid., 57.

Chapter Four


3 Ibid.


5 Ferrell, *Choosing Truman*, 15.

7 Pauley memorandum for Daniels, 7. Quoted in Ferrell, Choosing Truman, 13.


9 Ibid., 306.

10 Ferrell, Choosing Truman, 14.

11 Ibid., 15.

12 Ibid., 22-23.


14 Ferrell, Choosing Truman, 20.

15 Ibid., 21.

16 Ibid.

17 Ibid., 28-30.

18 Ibid., 33.


21 Ibid., 38.

22 Ibid., 32.


25 Dewey Series 2, Box 15, Thomas E. Dewey Papers, Rhees Library, University of Rochester.
Dewey Series 2, Box 15, Thomas E. Dewey Papers, Rhees Library, University of Rochester.


McCullough, Truman, 310.


McCullough, Truman, 308.

Ibid.

Ibid.


Ibid., 79.

Ibid., 78.

Former Roosevelt intimate James Farley received one vote from New York.


Official Proceeding... DNC 1944, 192-193.

Rosenman, Working With Roosevelt, 462.

Truman quoted in Ferrell, Choosing Truman, 89.

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4 Tom Reynolds to Steve Early, September 24, 1944. Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library.

5 *Public Papers of Thomas E. Dewey 1944,*

6 Confidential and Personal Files. Memo to Stanley High, September 5, 1944. Thomas E. Dewey Papers, Rhees Library, University of Rochester


8 Mark Ethridge, “For What the Hell Should we Apologize?” Pamphlet, Democratic National Committee, 1944. TED Papers, Rhees Library, University of Rochester.


12 Polenberg, *War and Society,* 189.


14 Polenberg, *War and Society,* 195.


17 *Public Papers of TED 1944,* 594.


21 "What is the P.A.C.?” Pamphlet, TED Papers, University of Rochester


24 Ford Bond to TED, 24 July 1944, Dewey Series 4, Box 24, TED Papers, Rhees Library, University of Rochester.

25 Ibid.

26 Harlan Phillips Chronology of 1944 Campaign, 2 November 1944, Dewey Series 13, Box 8, TED Papers, Rhees Library, University of Rochester.


28 Ibid., 339-340.


30 Ibid.

31 Roosevelt’s home in Hyde Park is twenty-seven miles northwest of Dewey’s home, Dapplemere, in Pawling.

32 Blum, "V" Was for Victory, 273.

33 Ferrell, *Choosing Truman*, 3.

34 Moley, *27 Masters of Politics*, 57.

Chapter Six

1 *Public Papers of TED 1944*, 725.

2 Ibid., 717.

3 Bricker quoted in Davies, *Defender of the Old Guard*, 100.
4 Bricker quoted in Ibid., 100-101.

5 Public Papers of TED 1944, 596.


7 Brownell Interview, TED Papers, Rhees Library, University of Rochester.

8 “Dewey’s Talk With Governors Lays Groundwork of Campaign,” Newsweek, August 7, 1944, 34.

9 Public Papers of TED 1944, 596.


16 Silber, Songs America Voted By, 277.


18 Black, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, 977.

19 MacArthur quoted in Black, Ibid., 978.

20 Rosenman, Working with Roosevelt, 461.

21 Ibid., 462.

22 Ibid.
23 Ibid.

24 De Gaulle quoted in Black, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, 982.

25 Public Papers of TED 1944, 598-599.


27 Public Papers of TED 1944, 600.

28 Hull, Memoirs, 1690.

29 Public Papers of TED 1944, 604.


31 Hull, Memoirs, 1693.

32 Ibid., 1690.

33 Ibid., 1693.

34 Ibid.

35 Ibid.

36 Norman Thomas, “Foreign Policy Planks of the Major Parties,” Human Events, July 26, 1944, 92-94.

37 Beschloss, The Conquerors, 119.


39 David McCullough, Truman, 327.


41 Hamby, Man of the People, 285.

42 Ibid.


46 Dewey Papers, 13:8:13, the Harlan Philips Interviews, January 14, 1959, Rhees Library, University of Rochester.


49 According to the Society of Actuaries, the average blood pressure levels for males Roosevelt’s age were 132/80 mmHg. *Ibid.*, 66.

50 Others speculated that he might run, but—sick of domestic affairs—resign after the inauguration and devote himself to world affairs. *Ibid.*, 65.


52 Evans, *The Hidden Campaign*, 61.


57 Hugh E. Evans, a physician, believes it was an attack of angina pectoris (chest pain) caused by stress, fatigue, and hardening of the arteries supplying blood to the heart.

58 Evans, *The Hidden Campaign*, 79.


61 Ibid., 125.

62 Ibid., 131.

63 Ibid., 144.

64 Roosevelt and Stimson quoted in Ibid., 149.

65 Most journalists on the Dewey Special, including Warren Moscow of the New York Times, Tip O’Neill of the Philadelphia Record, John Barry of the Boston Globe, and Tom Reynolds of the Chicago Sun, were liberals very sympathetic to FDR.

66 Public Papers of TED 1944,

67 Tom Reynolds to Steve Early, September 24, 1944. FDRL.

68 Public Papers of TED 1944, 731.

69 Smith, Thomas E. Dewey and His Times, 418-419.

70 Ibid.

71 Ibid., 736.

72 Tom Reynolds to Steve Early, September 24, 1944, FDRL.

73 Ibid.

74 Public Papers of TED 1944, 739.

75 Ibid., 740-743.

76 Reynolds to Early, FDRL.

77 Smith, Thomas E. Dewey and His Times, 420.


79 Smith, Thomas E. Dewey and His Times, 421.

80 Ibid.

81 Rosenmen, Working With Roosevelt, 478.
82 Smith, *Thomas E. Dewey and His Times*, 420.

83 *Public Papers of TED*, 746-750.


86 Smith, *Thomas E. Dewey and His Times*, 425.


89 “TED, General Marshall and Pearl harbor in the 1944 Campaign” Timeline. TED Papers, Rhees Library, University of Rochester.


95 Smith, *Thomas E. Dewey and His Times*, 429.


100 *Public Papers of TED* 1944, 759-761.
Along this route, some in the President's party, including members of the press, were alarmed when a well-dressed man placed a carefully wrapped package in Roosevelt's car. Some worried it might be a bomb, others thought it might be a secret weapon. It was learned that the man was a secret service agent, and the package was a change of clothes for the drenched Roosevelt.


*Public Papers of TED 1944*, 762.

Ball quoted in Divine, *Foreign Policy and U.S. Presidential Elections 1940-1948*, 151.


Challener Interview with TED, Dulles Project, Rhees Library, University of Rochester.

In fact, a 1944 survey conducted by the National Opinion Research Center (as well as one by Gallup) indicated as much.


"Truth About Truman" Leaflet, TED Papers, Rhees Library, University of Rochester.

McCullough, *Truman*, 331.


Hughes quoted in Smith, *TED and His Times*, 430.

*Public Papers of TED 1944*, 752-755.


*Public Papers of TED 1944*, 771-774.


News Dateline, TED Papers, 110.


*Public Papers of TED, 1944*, 781-785.


*Ibid.*, 434. Dewey did not see “Reds” everywhere, and was not a forerunner of Senator Eugene McCarthy of Wisconsin. In fact, in 1948, while in a tough primary fight against the “more progressive” Harold Stassen, it was Dewey—in one of the first great debates of modern politics—who eloquently argued against the outlawing of the Communist Party in the United States. Still, his actions in 1948 do not remove him from criticism for his Red baiting in 1944. Dewey raised the Reds issue in Boston in 1944 because—aside from being desperate—he wanted to break unity of the Democrats—many of whom, like Joseph Kennedy of Massachusetts, believed that New Dealers had surrounded FDR with “Jews and Communists and alienated the Catholics... They will write you down in history, if you don’t get rid of them, as incompetent, and they will open the way for the Communist line.” Kennedy told Arthur Krock in late October that he was voting for Dewey. Beschloss, *The Conquerors*, 162.


*Public Papers of TED*, 793-794.
National Election Study, 1944. In late October 1944, the NORC performed a wave of pre-election interviews with a sample of 2564 people. 60% of those surveyed were male, while 97% were white. 57%, meanwhile, were forty years of age or older. A couple of weeks after the election, in late November, it conducted a second wave of interviewers, in which 534 of the original respondents did not participate. Their report was one of the first of its kind, and thus not as sophisticated as later ones, such as those by Columbia University and the University of Michigan. Still, it provided valuable information—and aside from Gallup and a few other polling organizations—the only non-Election Night statistical data available on the 1944 presidential election.

Public Papers of TED, 795


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2 Ibid., 35.

3 Ibid.

4 Bond to TED, “Politics Made Easy,” November 18, 1944, TED Papers.

5 Evans, The Hidden Campaign, 103.

6 Ibid.

7 Smith, Thomas E. Dewey and His Times, 449.

8 Dewey quoted in Ibid., 605.


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