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Franklin has written a massive examination, explanation, interpretation and application of the difficult and profound metaphysical vision of Whitehead. The real impetus behind this formidable work is Franklin’s own concern to explain how human language can speak of God. Against the positivists and the later Wittgenstein, Franklin has found in Whitehead “a profound metaphysical vision which allowed for the possibility of God-language conveying genuine claims about what is the case . . . set in a nuanced description of human language in general.” From this conclusion Franklin examines Whitehead’s insights, through which he constructs what he hopes will be a solid basis for evangelical and orthodox use in order to express faith and doctrine. Such use of Whitehead is surely a breaking of new ground.

The book develops in four major parts and twenty chapters. The word “develops” is crucial here. Every chapter, every subdivision, in a sense every page, is critical to the argumentation that follows. Part 1 sets forth the Whiteheadian or “processive” view of reality and then within that background the place of proposition. This is the most difficult part of the entire book for two reasons: (1) because of Franklin’s discussion of Whitehead’s very abstract metaphysical perspective with its specialized vocabulary, and (2) because, having read through part 1, the reader is “educated” or ready for what is Franklin’s central concern and contribution to the theological task. Propositions, for Whitehead’s scheme, are more basic within the larger processive view and to the “prehension” by actual entities of the past than are symbolism, language or the application of such in religion. As Franklin focuses on the “process” understanding of the nature and stages of “concrescence” (“concrete-izing” in a sense) to “satisfaction” and the relation between this development in actual entities (especially human beings) and the way the past is “prehended” (incorporated) into the present, it is connected particularly to truth, consciousness, objectification and actuality in opposition to the modern tendency in western thinking whereby nature or reality is bifurcated (cf. Kant). Still the question of adequacy of such for Christian theology is evident. Monism is not a legitimate choice for Christians.

Parts 2–3 work together to advance and narrow Franklin’s analysis and interpretation of Whitehead. Truth, consciousness and objectification must be reckoned in relation to human experience, sense perceptions and language, all of which are forms of “symbolism.” In a nontechnical sense the discussion of symbolism forms more acutely the “present,” both relationally to the prehended past, to the future entities, and in relation to the “extensive continuum” within which all is perceived as occurring and wherein an actual entity concresces to later stages and “satisfaction.” For humans, consciousness and intellectual feelings develop as are required for coherence, symbolic reference and the critical emergence of language.
In part 3 many seemingly disparate parts begin to be drawn together by Franklin. Here he establishes the crucial Whiteheadian conclusions upon which the subsequent discussion of “religion” and religious language (part 4) are based. As part of symbolism, language is that by which a person experiences and understands the world. This is just as true for metaphysical language as for ordinary discourse. The “initial subjective aim” that God gives to all actual entities can only be made explicit in the advanced stages of concrescence (in humans) by means of language. Franklin, through Whitehead, is seeking to show that a real connection exists between experience and the linguistic structures arising from it. For Whitehead experience is always first, but how we experience and the content of our experience are in large measure formed by language, which is itself a culturally received way of seeing the world. Whitehead’s comparison of ordinary and metaphysical language is of great importance for Franklin’s argument. In contrast to positivistic perceptions of language, Whitehead shows how ordinary language and metaphysical language are similar in some ways and different in others.

Upon Whitehead’s explanation of the act of understanding, Franklin finalizes his discussion with chapters on “Religious Experience,” “God and Religion” and “The Language of Religion,” each of which seems to conclude a different aspect of Franklin’s purpose. For Whitehead “religion” has to do not so much with one’s relation and response to God as with patterns of coordinated values of which God is the basis or explanation. This seems reminiscent of Schleiermacher’s method (i.e. God as the “whence” or source). Whitehead understands religious experience to be the datum to be studied whereby God is introduced in order to aid in the understanding of this experience of the concrescing human being of the “patterns of coordinated value” in the world. Here Franklin rightly points out that Whitehead clearly lacks any sense of what R. Otto termed the “numinous” experience of the mysterium tremendum, the attractive and fearful “wholly other.”

While discussing many topics related to God and religion, Franklin seems to consider it of utmost importance to show how, despite some statements and formulations, “God” is not simply or only an explanation for the intuitions of religion and for coordinated values but rather is absolutely necessary for the whole of Whitehead’s metaphysics. Among points of interest for me were Franklin’s discussions of how the union between Whitehead’s understanding of “God” and “creativity” would do much to bring the process view of God into basic alignment with orthodoxy, and Whitehead’s implicit and explicit arguments for God’s existence.

This work is so densely packed in its argument and content that it is difficult to grasp fully, let alone review. No review could begin to relate to the massive effort Franklin has invested in this ground-breaking project. This book is in no way an introduction to either Whitehead or process thought. It is (as it claims) a “scholar’s monograph,” which assumes (rather, requires) that the reader has some knowledge of “process” thought already—the more the better. The book must therefore be assessed from that intention. Franklin’s courage and philosophical-theological purpose must be commended because he has not only faced squarely a critical issue, a major concern in modern theology, but he has also sought to bring an answer for orthodoxy by making skillful and discerning use of a difficult thinker who has had and is having much influence in the twentieth century. Franklin’s use of Whitehead’s metaphysical description of reality to deal with the dilemma of God-language for the current theological task falls, it would seem, within the tradition of making use of a prominent philosophical perspective to bring about effective contemporary expression to the faith once for all given (cf. Augustine, Aquinas). The problem has always
been, of course, the question of the maintenance or loss of the gospel in the process. Franklin's desire here is surely to follow Augustine's example. One will have to wait for the fruit.

Finally, the possibilities Franklin opens for the evangelical use of Whiteheadian thought are, at crucial junctures in the discussion, expressed in overly brief terms. After all that work in preparatory, dense discussion (and reading) the conclusions were little more than pointers—brief pointers at that. In addition, many will find Franklin's careful synthesis of certain Whiteheadian insights with Christian orthodoxy and its results questionable. Clearly Franklin must bring what he believes to be the fruits of his labor to the fuller light of day, to fuller theological expression whereby the results may be assessed.

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Billy Graham has had a significant and extended impact on American culture. For almost fifty years he has enjoyed not only worldwide fame but also worldwide respect. He has consistently ranked high in opinion polls and enjoys (endures?) celebrity-like status not only here in North America but all over the world. Even his harshest critics concede his respectability. This book traces his life and ministry.

Martin's interest in Billy Graham is understandable. Although other biographies on Graham have been published, this one is the "official" biography, for the Graham organization solicited Martin and made no stipulations whatever on the book. He received no funding and in fact paid all of his own travel and other expenses. In return Graham made himself available for extensive interviews and gave letters of introduction encouraging others to do the same.

Martin likes Billy Graham. He presents Graham in a largely positive manner as one who is smart but not brilliant, trusting but not naive, godly but not perfect. Martin correctly places Graham in the evangelistic tradition begun by C. Finney, in which evangelism was a matter of methods—organize the facilities, the advertising, the program and the follow-up—and conversions will occur. This book gives the reader a peek behind the scenes of the Billy Graham Evangelistic Association and the precise planning and execution that takes place in crusades.

As one who has been a student of revivalism in America and an interested observer of Billy Graham, I found three surprises in the biography. First, I was surprised at the honesty and candor of Graham. Looking back on a half century of ministry, Martin presents Graham as one who not only easily acknowledges mistakes of the past but also confesses earlier sins of pride and presumption. Not every crusade went perfectly, and sins of early arrogance were many. But Martin presents Graham as one able to look candidly at himself and even laugh at some of the mistakes he made.

A second surprise was the degree to which Graham was intimate with former presidents, particularly Eisenhower, Johnson and Nixon. In later years Graham concedes he was naive, but according to Martin his familiarity with presidents and presidential politics went well beyond occasional photo-ops. On a similar note, Graham's access into Eastern Bloc countries and the communist powers of the Soviet Union and China in the 1970s and 1980s received mostly support from the highest levels within the State Department. And while Graham recognized the delicate role he was assum-