

# The Problem with Nuclear Diplomacy: Jimmy Carter and Pakistan's Nuclear Program

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April 27, 2012



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## Introduction

As the light rose over the horizon for the second time that morning in 1945, the scientists at Los Alamos celebrated their achievement as the world entered the nuclear age.<sup>1</sup> The United States held on to its nuclear secrets in the beginning, but soon the information and technology spread to the Soviet Union and beyond. Nuclear technology became a desirable symbol of power around the world and countries went to great lengths to acquire it. As a former colonial hold of Great Britain, Pakistan wanted to cement its status as the most influential Muslim nation in the world by acquiring an atomic weapon. During his administration, President Jimmy Carter took on the threat of Pakistani proliferation with vigor. His efforts did not dissuade Pakistan from developing an atomic bomb, but he did warn the entire international community and was effective in temporarily slowing Pakistan's nuclear development program.

The proliferation of nuclear weapons and technology became a significant concern of President Carter during his final two years in office. As more countries requested and traded nuclear information, the threat of nuclear proliferation grew.<sup>2</sup> In order to fully understand the complicated diplomatic situation between the United States and Pakistan regarding Pakistani inquiries into nuclear weapons development, it is crucial to understand previous diplomatic interactions between the two countries and the Carter administration's foreign policy. An investigation of the Pakistan's competition with India, the Carter administration's foreign policy, Pakistan's longing for a nuclear weapon, and the impacts of the Non-Proliferation Treaty reveal the complicated and potentially dangerous relationships between the United States, Pakistan, and other nations of the world.

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<sup>1</sup> Richard Rhodes, *The Making of the Atomic Bomb* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1986).

<sup>2</sup> "Atomic Power: The Spread of Nuclear Technology Hold Promise and Peril for Developing World," *The Washington Post*, December 3, 1978, A1.

Pakistan's early history had a significant influence on its desire for an atomic weapon, especially its relationship with India. The first chapter details the United States previous foreign policy interactions with Pakistan, concentrating on interactions after Pakistan gained independence from Great Britain in 1948 to the early years of the Carter administration. Understanding the rivalry between Pakistan and India is crucial to understanding one of Pakistan's main motivations towards the development of nuclear weapons.<sup>3</sup> Pakistani Prime Minister Bhutto, who first began the atomic program, "claimed that before he was deposed Pakistan was on the verge of 'full nuclear capability.' He pointed out in this context that only the Muslim world was without nuclear capability and said Pakistan would share the technology with Islamic states."<sup>4</sup> The chapter will also examine Pakistan has experienced political instability since its independence in 1948. The constant shifting of power between the civilian and military leadership played a profound role in providing the United States and other countries understandable questions about Pakistan's intentions.

The second chapter details Carter's foreign policy in general, his main foreign policy advisors, and how his policies affected Pakistan's relationship with the United States. One of the two areas covered are Carter's campaign promises to the American people and the foundation for his administration's foreign policies. For example, in one instance Carter halted aid to Pakistan because of its failure to protect human rights, but then reestablished aid when the United States needed Pakistan's support after the Soviet Union invasion of Afghanistan.<sup>5</sup> The chapter introduce Carter's top two foreign policy advisors, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and National

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<sup>3</sup> Scott Kaufman, *Plans Unraveled: The Foreign Policy of the Carter Administration* (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2008), 52.

<sup>4</sup> "U.S. Demarche on Pakistani Reprocessing Plant" November 1978, National Security Archive (hereafter: NSA) <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb352/index.htm>, (accessed November 27, 2011).

<sup>5</sup> "U.S. to Renew Aid to Pakistan," *The Washington Post*, August 25, 1978, A23.

Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski. The two advisors were important in the development of United States foreign policy to Pakistan, but problems developed between them that weakened Carter's administration. The final section of the chapter details Carter's development of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and Pakistan's reaction to the existing Non-Proliferation Treaty. When the original Non-Proliferation Treaty was offered to the international community, developing countries interested in acquiring nuclear power considered it racially motivated and declined to sign.<sup>6</sup> Carter hoped that a new treaty would bring the hold out countries together and end the proliferation of nuclear weapons and nuclear testing.

The final chapter evaluates the diplomatic discussions between U.S. officials and other countries regarding the development of nuclear reprocessing plant in Pakistan. The chapter begins with a focus on the discussions between the United States and France regarding France's sale of gas centrifuges to Pakistan and the plan to build a reprocessing plant, which caused tensions between the two countries.<sup>7</sup> A reprocessing plant would have given Pakistan the capacity to produce weapons grade plutonium suitable for an atomic device. The other intention of the chapter is to discuss the anxieties between Islamabad and Washington D.C. regarding the Pakistani French contract and suspending Pakistan's aid. The final section discusses the international pressure that the United States put on its allies to limit Pakistan's access to atomic materials, including informing the International Atomic Energy Agency of the situation.

Most information utilized for the thesis is from the National Security Archive, which is an archive that compiles released SECRET U.S. documents. Most of the documents released

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<sup>6</sup> "Non-Proliferation Value of a Comprehensive Test Ban." July 10, 1978. Memorandum for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, NSA, 1, <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb333/index.htm> (accessed February 2, 2012).

<sup>7</sup> "French Export of Centrifuges for Pakistani Reprocessing Plant," September 1978, <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb352/index.htm> (accessed November 27, 2011).

regarding this period of the Carter administration were released within the past two years and cover the time period from August 1978 to January 1979, the critical time period regarding Pakistan's inquires into nuclear material. Among the documents are correspondences between State Department officials, including Secretary of State Vance and Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher, and American ambassadors from around the world. Most of the documents are telegrams between the Embassies in Paris, London and Islamabad that discuss the current situation with Pakistan and the most appropriate diplomatic responses.

The Foreign Relations of the United States is another critical source of information that expands upon the history of diplomatic relations between the United States and Pakistan. The documents disclose the diplomatic cables from the Truman through the Ford administrations' and are an invaluable source of information regarding diplomatic relations. For example, several of the early documents discuss the disintegration of the British Commonwealth and the creation of Pakistan and India.

The other documents utilized were newspaper articles that discuss the situation in Pakistan and American reaction to the situation. *The Washington Post* and *The New York Times* both reported on Pakistan and the U.S. response to the current diplomatic tensions. Several of the articles also discussed the current problems with nuclear proliferation in developing countries and concerns that they could not properly maintain a nuclear facility. Newspaper articles also shed light on the political climate in Pakistan and the United States in the late 1970s, and the international reaction to nuclear issues. The newspapers also show the growing strength of the radical Muslim movement before the takeover of the Embassy in Tehran. Some of the information regarding nuclear issues is still classified; so, newspapers are crucial to setting the tone of international relations.

Another source of information regarding the Carter administration will be through the review of memoirs from the former president, Vance, and Brzezinski. Carter served as the president from January 20, 1977 to January 20, 1981 during a time of great political upheaval in Pakistan.<sup>8</sup> In his memoir and published a diary, Carter did not delve deeply into the Pakistan issue, but he did make a couple of passing comments reflecting on the situation. He also discussed his appointment of Vance and Brzezinski and his relationship with the advisors and their respective departments.<sup>9</sup> Vance's *Hard Choices: Critical Years in America's Foreign Policy* offers more detail regarding Pakistan-United States relations.<sup>10</sup> Brzezinski's *Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Advisor 1977-1981* details his term and the decisions he made during his own tenure at the White House.<sup>11</sup> The only drawback to the memoirs is that most of the information provided is limited because of national security issues and each author is biased towards their own position.

Carter administration's foreign policy shows the complicated nature that existed between established nuclear powers and developing countries wishing to bring their countrymen into the nuclear age. Pakistan's wish to acquire atomic weapons was not merely to intimidate its neighbors, but to bring an atomic weapon into the Muslim world. The proliferation of nuclear weapons caused great concern to the international community and challenged the Carter administration's policies. Carter did limit Pakistan's access to nuclear technology and materials.

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<sup>8</sup> "Pakistan's Crisis," *The Washington Post*, February 20, 1979, A14.

<sup>9</sup> Jimmy Carter, *Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President* (Toronto: Bantam Books, 1982); and Carter, *White House Diary* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2010).

<sup>10</sup> Cyrus Vance, *Hard Choices: Critical Years in America's Foreign Policy* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983).

<sup>11</sup> Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Advisor 1977-1981* (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1983).

However, Pakistan did continue its search for atomic materials and successfully detonated its first atomic device in 1998.<sup>12</sup>

In the beginning of his administration, Carter made a variety of promises regarding non-proliferation and told the American people that he wanted to bring morality back to the White House. However, once in office, Carter faced increasing problems around the world with American foreign policy and soon abandoned this practice in favor of a more aggressive approach. His abrupt switch also caused conflict within his own administration and the eventual resignation of his secretary of state. An investigation into his campaign promises shows that the idealism spoken connected to a desire within American hearts, but Carter could not present a comprehensive policy to the American people.

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<sup>12</sup> Rashid, *Descent into Chaos*, 41.

## Chapter 1 – The Foundation for Conflict

After years of research, Pakistan proudly set off an atomic bomb in 1998 and became the first Muslim nation to join the nuclear community.<sup>13</sup> The explosion caused tensions around the world and further strained diplomatic relations between Pakistan and its main rival India, which had detonated its own atomic device in 1974.<sup>14</sup> The original Pakistani effort to build the atomic bomb began in the 1950s and reached a fever pitch during the Jimmy Carter administration when Pakistan made a deal with France for a reprocessing plant that could create fissionable plutonium.<sup>1516</sup> Pakistan's complicated relationship with the United States served as a strong example of its limited understanding of South Asia's political and military history, and the inability of the United States to dissuade Pakistan from developing the atomic bomb.

The people of Hindu and Muslim faiths had previously lived together in peace for centuries under the Hindu and British Empires. At the dawn of the twentieth century, democracy movements began to rise throughout the world and the colonies of the British Empire began to

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<sup>13</sup> John Kifner, "That Pakistan Nuclear Expert May Be a Lowly Accountant," *The New York Times*, July 3, 1998, A6; and Ahmed Rashid, *Descent into Chaos: The U.S. and the Disaster in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia* (New York: Penguin Books, 2009), 41.

<sup>14</sup> "Prospects for Further Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons," December 18, 1975, *Memorandum to Holders: Special National Intelligence Estimate*, NSA, <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb333/doc01.pdf>, (accessed on December 9, 2011), 8.

<sup>15</sup> Scott Kaufman, *Plans Unraveled: The Foreign Policy of the Carter Administration* (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2008), 217.

<sup>16</sup> To date, India and Pakistan are the only two countries in the atomic era that have participated in a hot war against each other while possessing nuclear weapons. Sagan points out that the situation signifies a unique event within atomic history and shows the possibility that a conflict between two nuclear powers can happen. One argument for nuclear weapons is that it limits the ability for two atomic powers to fight against each other because of the possibility of mutually assured destruction. India and Pakistan disproved this theory in 1999 when the Kargil War began and each country had atomic capabilities that were never used. Scott D. Sagan, Ed., *Inside Nuclear South Asia* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009), Loc 64-69.

demand their independence.<sup>17</sup> When free elections came to British India, it required a census of all the people living within the colony and their religious affiliations. The Muslims were aware of their minority status within the territory, but it was ever more evident after the census that put to paper the inequality between the two groups.<sup>18</sup> As the Indians moved towards majority rule, some members of the Muslim population became increasingly paranoid that they would be marginalized within the structure of the new independent India. Nationalism increased through movements around the colonial territory and pro-independence Muslims created a council in order to develop a political presence in the government.<sup>19</sup> The beginning of this differentiation between groups allowed for divisions to grow between the Muslims and the Hindu. Once a united group of people living peacefully under a single leadership, the peoples of India became increasingly divided along religious lines and desirous of separate countries.<sup>20</sup>

The establishment of a distinctly Muslim Congress Party in Indian in 1916, laid the foundation for the creation of two separate countries India and Pakistan.<sup>21</sup> Muslims came together under this banner to contact the powerful Indian/Hindu Congress and originally they wanted to work within India. However, it soon became evident that they needed their own country. T.V.

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<sup>17</sup> Dwight D. Eisenhower, *The White House Years 1953-1956: Mandate for Change* (New York: Double Day, 1963), 495.

<sup>18</sup> “Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State,” The British Embassy to the Department of State, February 20, 1947, *Foreign Relations of the United States* (hereafter: *FRUS*), Volume III, *The British Commonwealth*, <http://images.library.wisc.edu/FRUS/EFacs/1947v03/reference/frus.frus1947v03.i0006.pdf> (accessed on February 12, 2012), 144-145.

<sup>19</sup> T.V. Paul, *The India-Pakistan Conflict: An Enduring Rivalry* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 6.

<sup>20</sup> Pakistan’s name was created by a group at Cambridge University as an acronym for specific territories in Pakistan. PAKSTAN was a code for the various regions that would be used to create the country. Indian Muslim leader Jinnah also insisted that India should be called Hindustan, rather than India. His reasoning was that India represented the two countries together and not separated. Hindustan never became a reality. “The Ambassador in India (Grady) to the Secretary of State,” 161.

<sup>21</sup> Paul, *The India-Pakistan Conflict*, 7.

Paul writes, "in March 1940, at its meeting in Lahore, the (Muslim) League proclaimed as its goal the creation of Pakistan as a separate homeland for Indian Muslims and the Congress-League schism widened even further."<sup>22</sup> Such an arrangement meant not only national separation, but also a political identity free from British control. The British and Indians rejected this course, heightening tensions with the Muslim population.<sup>23</sup>

After the Second World War, Great Britain decided to dissolve its foreign colonies and partition British India. However, the original colony lines were a single territory that included Muslim and Hindu believers under a single political leadership. According to Historian Robert McMahon, "The urbane barrister's dogged insistence that Muslim rights could not be guaranteed in a predominately Hindu India had been instrumental in forcing the Indian Congress Party hierarchy and Lord Louis Mountbatten, the last British viceroy, to accept with great reluctance a partitioned subcontinent."<sup>24</sup> Muslim leader Mohammad Ali Jinnah argued that a Hindu government would not treat its Muslim subjects fairly and persuaded British viceroy Lord Mountbatten that the Muslim population should be given its own country.<sup>25</sup> In accordance with Muslim wishes, Lord Mountbatten drafted new borders and formed West and East Pakistan, as well as the new territorial boundaries of India on August 15, 1947.<sup>26</sup> Unfortunately, the boundary lines made little sense because it divided Pakistan's eastern and western portions, located on either side of India, a thousand miles apart (see map 1). The division of the territories was also not confirmed by the 500 princely states of India, which meant that there were still

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<sup>22</sup> Ibid., 7.

<sup>23</sup> Ibid., 6-7.

<sup>24</sup> Robert McMahon, *The Cold War on the Periphery* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 2.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid.

<sup>26</sup> Paul, *The India-Pakistan Conflict an Enduring Rivalry*, 7.

several disputes over the lines of India and Pakistan.<sup>27</sup> The decision to dissolve the colonial territories of British India caused confusion and laid the foundation for the problems between India and Pakistan over the coming decades.



Map 1 – Southwest Asia<sup>28</sup>

Governing East Pakistan was troublesome because of communication difficulties.<sup>29</sup>

McMahon explains, “Pakistan faced an equally daunting set of structural and political challenges, most of which stemmed from the unusual circumstances surrounding its creation. Essentially, the Muslim League’s insistence on an independent state for India’s Muslims led to a country carved out of the northwestern and northeastern sections of British India, areas with no appreciable industrial infrastructure.”<sup>30</sup> The other significant problem was that the partition did not determine who had the right to claim Kashmir, a territory to the northeast of Pakistan with a

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<sup>27</sup> David W. Lesch, *1979: The Year that Shaped the Modern Middle East* (Boulder: Westview Press, 2001), 107; 39; and Paul, *The India-Pakistan Conflict an Enduring Rivalry*, 7.

<sup>28</sup> Map of India, East and West Pakistan, <http://chishtian.110mb.com/pakistan/pakistan.html> (accessed March 22, 2012).

<sup>29</sup> McMahon, *The Cold War on the Periphery*, 67.

<sup>30</sup> Ibid.

Hindu leader but a mostly Muslim population.<sup>31</sup> Tensions between India and Pakistan began to intensify as each country sought Kashmir in order to help secure its own borders.<sup>32</sup> Pakistan truly believed that it was incomplete without the inclusion of Kashmir, since it was a mostly Muslim country.<sup>33</sup>

The conflict was rooted in the development of nationalist movements in the Indian subcontinent. The main Hindu party wanted to create a government with a secular leadership, and a liberal democracy, but the Muslims worried that this would eventually develop into a Hindu government. The British supported the creation of a Muslim delegation that had limited electoral power.<sup>34</sup> According to the Muslim leader Jinnah, the Muslims could not accept a British Raj being replaced with a Hindu Raj. The United States Charge of Affairs in India George Merrell explained that Jinnah believed “the difference in culture, religion, and way of life between the Muslims and Hindus precludes any possibility of a compromise. He asked why a hundred million Muslims should become a minority in a Hindu dominated government.”<sup>35</sup> Jinnah went on to state that if any Muslim did not join the independence movement, they would be considered traitors of Islam.<sup>36</sup>

When Pakistan gained independence from Great Britain in 1947, it did so in an environment of high tensions with India, and the two countries entered a conflict within a year.<sup>37</sup>

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<sup>31</sup> Ibid., 3.

<sup>32</sup> Victoria Schofield, *Kashmir in Conflict: India, Pakistan and the Unending War* (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2003), 70-72.

<sup>33</sup> Paul, *The India-Pakistan Conflict an Enduring Rivalry*, 9.

<sup>34</sup> Ibid., 6.

<sup>35</sup> “The Charge in India (Merrell) to the Secretary of State,” February 11, 1947, *FRUS 1947*, Volume III, *The British Commonwealth*, <http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu/cgi-bin/FRUS/FRUS-idx?type=goto&id=FRUS.FRUS1947v03&isize=M&submit=Go+to+page&page=161>, (accessed on February 16, 2012), 141-142.

<sup>36</sup> Ibid.

<sup>37</sup> McMahan, *The Cold War on the Periphery*, 2-3.

There is no singular event that caused feelings of animosities between the two religious groups. However, violence has sporadically erupted and Hindus have attacked Muslims and Muslims have attacked Hindus through history. McMahon notes, "Sadly, independence and partition also brought in their wake a human tragedy of grotesque proportions. Deep-seated religious and communal tensions and fears, exacerbated by the irresponsible rhetoric of demagogic politicians and the arbitrariness of the boundary lines drawn by the British, led to an orgy of bloodletting, especially in the Punjab."<sup>38</sup> Great Britain's inadequate and rushed creation of the two countries showed a profound lack of substantive understanding of the history of South Asia, and led to the first conflict over Kashmir and Pakistan's constant feeling of inadequacy.

The U.S. reaction to the creation of Pakistan and its conflict with Kashmir were decidedly mixed. Before Great Britain determined that there would be two separate states of Hindus and Muslims, the United States was aware of several discussions about whether or not Pakistan would be part of India. While not directly influencing the situation, the United States became increasingly concerned that the unstable situation might lead to violence similar to what happened during China's Communist revolution.<sup>39</sup> When the conflict later developed in Kashmir, the United States wished for a settlement quickly as U.S. officials knew that the situation could extend into a full-scale war.<sup>40</sup> At this point the United States did not have a vested interest in either country since its concern was in war-ravaged Europe.<sup>41</sup>

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<sup>38</sup> Ibid., 2-3.

<sup>39</sup> "Elevation of the Status of Diplomatic Missions, the Change in India (Merrell to Secretary of State), New Delhi, January 4, 1947, *FRUS 1947*, Volume III, *The British Commonwealth*, 137, <http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu/cgi-bin/FRUS/FRUS-idx?type=turn&entity=FRUS.FRUS1947v03.p0155&id=FRUS.FRUS1947v03&isize=M> (accessed on January 12, 2012).

<sup>40</sup> "India-Pakistan Dispute over Kashmir," The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in India, December 2, 1947, 182-183, Ibid., <http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu/cgi-bin/FRUS/FRUS->

The conflict over Kashmir seemed slight in comparison with the rest of the world's problems, but its impact reverberated throughout Pakistan's history and profoundly affected diplomatic relations with the United States and India.<sup>42</sup> Great Britain's creation of India and Pakistan did not include ceding Kashmir since the Maharajah, or leader of the region could not decide which country that he wanted to align himself. As a Hindu leader with a mostly Muslim population, Pakistan seemed the obvious choice; however, the Maharajah's indecision seemed to mean that he would move towards India.<sup>43</sup> The disagreement over Kashmir worried American leadership and had a profound impact on future Pakistan, Indian, and U.S. relations.<sup>44</sup>

President Harry Truman inherited several international problems in the aftermath of the Second World War and the disintegration of Britain's colonial empire confounded the international situation. The partition of Pakistan and India did not come as a shock to the administration and Truman sent a brief congratulatory note to both countries in celebration of their independence.<sup>45</sup> Truman wrote, "On this auspicious day which marks the emergence among the family of nations of the new Dominion of Pakistan, I extend on behalf of the American people sincere best wishes to you, and through you, to Prime Minister Liaquat Ali

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[idx?type=goto&id=FRUS.FRUS1947v03&isize=M&submit=Go+to+page&page=182](#) (accessed on January 12, 2012).

<sup>41</sup> Melvyn Leffler, *Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War* (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 1993), 1.

<sup>42</sup> Robert Trumbull, "Pakistan Worried by Kashmir Split," *New York Times*, November 19, 1948, 4; and Paul, *The India-Pakistan Conflict an Enduring Rivalry*, 5.

<sup>43</sup> A.M. Rosenthal, "India and Pakistan Accept Mediation By 3 On All Issues," *New York Times*, January 20, 1948, 1. Mr. Mohammad Ibrahim believes that it was unlawful Indian occupation and an invalid accession of a Hindu ruler.

<sup>44</sup> "Elevation of the Status of Diplomatic Missions, the Change in India (Merrell to Secretary of State), 137.

<sup>45</sup> McMahan, *The Cold War on the Periphery*, 3.

Khan and the people of Pakistan.”<sup>46</sup> Another press release stated that the United States would immediately set up an embassy in Karachi, Pakistan and would appoint Charles W. Lewis as the first ambassador.<sup>47</sup> When it came to developing foreign relations, the United States first leaned toward India as its primary country of interest, since India had more natural resources.<sup>48</sup> The United States recognized Muslim political and economic aspirations, "but that atmosphere for creating necessary safeguards can never be achieved unless the concept of union itself is generally accepted by principal parties."<sup>49</sup> However, after the Kashmir dispute dragged on and India seemed to treat the Soviet Union and China equally with Western powers, the United States became increasingly frustrated with India, and moved closer to Pakistan.<sup>50</sup> India also angered the United States when they began to give Truman unsolicited advice on America's war in Korea.<sup>51</sup> The increasing friction between India and Truman's administration caused frustrations and concerns over the future of South Asia.

In order to combat the possible loss of Kashmir, a group of ten thousand tribesmen from Pakistan invaded the north country in order to force the Maharajah to pick Pakistan as its

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<sup>46</sup> "Good Wishes Extended to the New Dominions of India and Pakistan," August 14, 1947, *U.S. Office of Official Communications July 6 – December 28, 1947*, Volume XVII, Numbers 418-443, 396, <http://archive.org/stream/departmentofstat1747unit#page/396/mode/2up> (accessed on March 1, 2012).

<sup>47</sup> *Ibid.*, 396.

<sup>48</sup> India was the only colony of Great Britain's that ever produced any revenue for the country.

<sup>49</sup> "Interest of the United States in the Emergence of the Dominions of India and Pakistan," The Charge in India (Merrell) to the Secretary of State," January 4, 1947, *FRUS 1974*, Volume III, *British Commonwealth*, 136, <http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu/cgi-bin/FRUS/FRUS-idx?type=goto&id=FRUS.FRUS1947v03&isize=M&submit=Go+to+page&page=136> (accessed on January 12, 2012).

<sup>50</sup> Donald R. McCoy, *The Presidency of Harry S. Truman* (Lawrence: University of Kansas, 1984), 204.

<sup>51</sup> *Ibid.*, 268.

country.<sup>52</sup> When the Muslim tribesmen invaded, the Maharajah's army lowered its arms and joined their Muslim brothers. Pakistan's military supported the involvement of the tribesmen until military commanders received reports from the front lines of looting and rape.<sup>53</sup> In a desperate attempt to regain control over the situation, the Pakistani military tried to reassert itself over the tribesmen.<sup>54</sup> Pakistan's efforts were for naught when the Maharajah ceded the territory to India and the Indian army defeated the Pakistani tribesmen. Although the conflict was never considered a war, Pakistan lost the territory of Kashmir to India and thus a considerable amount of power in the region. The loss also encouraged a massive military build up in Pakistan and compromised any future attempt at democracy because the military felt that its control over the decisions of Pakistan was critical.<sup>55</sup>

The Pakistani military has always been a powerful presence within the country and any civilian leader faced significant problems controlling the military apparatus. As a former colony of the British Empire, Pakistan maintained a strong military structure even after the transfer of power in 1947. Nawaz explains, "the Pakistan Army, the largely Muslim rump of the British Indian Army too was saddled at birth with this paradoxical identity: the symbols of Islam but the substance of a colonial force, quite distant from the body politic of the fledgling state."<sup>56</sup> History in Pakistan has shown that civilian power will arise for a period of time, but the military

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<sup>52</sup> Robert Trumbull, "Hindu-Muslim Conflict May Bring War in India: The Religious Struggle is Basic in Kashmir and Hyderabad Disputes," *New York Times*, September 12, 1948, E4.

<sup>53</sup> Robert Trumbull, "Kashmir Tests Future of India and Pakistan: If War Comes, Moslem Dominion Will Be at Disadvantage in Resources," *New York Times*, January 11, 1948, E4.

<sup>54</sup> Robert Trumbull, "Tribesmen Waging Holy War On India: Moslem Warriors Make Cause With Pakistan – Declare They Will Never Leave Kashmir," *New York Times*, November 23, 1948, 19.

<sup>55</sup> Nawaz, *Crossed Swords*, 73.

<sup>56</sup> *Ibid.*, xxvii.

will stage a coup d'état at some point in order to gain control over the country again.<sup>57</sup>

Understanding the dominant role of the military in Pakistan's early history is crucial to understanding its development of the atomic bomb and Pakistan's relationship with the United States.<sup>58</sup>

During the administration of President Dwight D. Eisenhower, Pakistan became increasingly close to the United States and an active participant in the Cold War. Pakistan allowed the Central Intelligence Agency to fly U2 planes on spy missions over the Soviet Union from bases in its territory.<sup>59</sup> CIA officials were looking for "atomic energy installations along the Trans-Siberian Railway and a large downrange radar array that was a terminal site for missile firings from Kapustin Yar."<sup>60</sup> Conversations between the two countries allowed for the cementing of the relationship and led to the use of Pakistani land to support American intelligence interests in the Soviet Union.<sup>61</sup> In September 8, 1954, Eisenhower worked to create the Southeast Asian Collective Defense Treaty, more commonly known as the Manila Pact, which included Pakistan, Thailand, Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, and the United States. The purpose of the pact was protecting against possible Communist aggression in the region. In the event of an attack on one country, the others recognized it would endanger the peace and safety of other pact countries.<sup>62</sup>

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<sup>57</sup> Ibid.

<sup>58</sup> Ibid., xxvii.

<sup>59</sup> "Memorandum of a Conversation: Call by Pakistan Foreign Minister Qadir on the Secretary: The U-2 Incident and Soviet Pressures on Pakistan," June 2, 1960, *FRUS 1960*, Volume XV, *Documents South and Southeast Asia*, 812, <http://digioll.library.wisc.edu/cgi-bin/FRUS/FRUS-idx?type=turn&entity=FRUS.FRUS195860v15.p0844&id=FRUS.FRUS195860v15&isize=M&q1=Eisenhower&q2=U-2&q3=pakistan>, (accessed on March 21, 2012).

<sup>60</sup> Michael R. Beschloss, *Mayday: Eisenhower, Khrushchev and the U-2 Affair* (London: Faber and Faber, 1986), 147.

<sup>61</sup> Ibid., 145.

<sup>62</sup> Eisenhower, *The White House*, 374.

Early in his presidency, Eisenhower sent Vice-President Richard Nixon on a tour around South Asia in order to assure allies that the United States was concerned about their needs.<sup>63</sup> Throughout his presidency, Eisenhower was conscientious of the need to keep relations between India, Pakistan, Iran, and Afghanistan balanced, and he would often schedule tours that would visit all three countries in order to keep the equilibrium. Eisenhower explains, “it would be almost unthinkable for an American President to make a courtesy call on India without including Pakistan in his itinerary. Both nations were our friends each looked to the United States for private and public investment, and each, because of their mutual distrust heightened by differences over Kashmir, was watchful of every acquisition by the other of military supplies - or any other relative advantage.”<sup>64</sup> As a president, Eisenhower made sure that the relationship between Pakistan and the United States remained similar with its neighboring Muslim countries. His balanced relationship with Pakistan was probably one of the most stable periods in the relations between Pakistan and the United States.

The Kashmir conflict flared again in 1965 as Pakistan renewed its claim to the territory. President Lyndon Johnson reflected in his memoirs that the conflict “raised grave doubts about military assistance as well as economic aid” that the United States had given to Pakistan.<sup>65</sup> The other large problem facing the United States was the lack of a grain surplus. Previously, the United States had the ability to send economic aid in the way of grain to countries in need, but since the amount of grain produced in the United States had decreased since the 1940s, Congress looked at foreign aid with critical eyes.<sup>66</sup> The lack of support from the international community

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<sup>63</sup> Ibid., 3.

<sup>64</sup> Ibid., 487.

<sup>65</sup> Lyndon Johnson, *The Vantage Point: Perspectives of the Presidency 1963-1969* (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1971), 225.

<sup>66</sup> Ibid., 224.

increased the tensions in Washington D.C. regarding supportive aid to Pakistan. The Kashmir conflict of 1965 also worried the United States and the Johnson administration because Pakistan was using U.S. weapons in the conflict.<sup>67</sup>

One large disruption in Pakistani relations with the United States happened during military talks in 1965 and eventually resulted in massive anti-American demonstrations in the Asian nation.<sup>68</sup> Before the collapse of the United States and Pakistan negotiations, there were steady trilateral talks that occurred between India, Pakistan, and the United States regarding weapon deals.<sup>69</sup> During the Kennedy Administration, Pakistan became increasingly frustrated with the United States when it made an economic and military aid deal with India. H.W. Brands explains, “After Kennedy initiated military aid to India, the Pakistanis didn’t have to bother equating bread and bullets, since India now received both from Washington, (So did Pakistan, but far less bread and, before long, fewer bullets too).”<sup>70</sup> The Johnson administration attempted to provide equal aid to Pakistan and India. However, information later leaked that the United States and India had reached a secret agreement, which angered the Pakistanis. The United States determined that India would receive \$10 million of credit for military weaponry in 1965 and promised of \$50 million more in the next fiscal year. Pakistani reaction to the pact was swift, explosive, and emotional, and anti-American demonstrations were common. Pakistan leader Ayub Khan stated that, “Americans do not hesitate to let down their friends.”<sup>71</sup> What the Pakistanis chose to ignore was that the conflict began with Pakistani soldiers entering the

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<sup>67</sup> Ibid., 225.

<sup>68</sup> McMahon, *Cold War on the Periphery*, 327. Massive anti-American rallies began after Ayub made a speech condemning America for not understanding Pakistan's position.

<sup>69</sup> Ibid.

<sup>70</sup> H.W. Brands, *Wages of Globalism: Lyndon Johnson and the Limits of American Power* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 126.

<sup>71</sup> Ibid., 318.

Kashmir disguised as mujahedeen. Knowing this, the United States felt this was an aggressive action that did not fall under the provisions of SEATO.<sup>72</sup>

The United States admitted several faults in the relationships between the two countries before the war began.<sup>73</sup> Some of the diplomatic blunders committed by the United States included the cancellation of a trip to Washington D.C. Khan, and finally, Pakistan was frustrated that the United States did not come to its defense when India committed aggressive actions in 1965.<sup>74</sup> A previous deal between the United States and Pakistan stated that any military deal with India would be discussed with the South Asian country so Pakistan believed it had been betrayed by the United States. Evidence shows that relations between the two countries became considerably strained because the United States perpetuated Pakistani beliefs that the U.S. government did not support Pakistan or a Muslim government.

The United States further angered Pakistan when it demanded that the Pakistani's not use U.S. weaponry in the civil war with East Pakistan and India in 1971. The weaponry included tanks, rifles, airplanes, and other war material.<sup>75</sup> India did receive some of her weaponry from the United States, but some of her military materials also came from the Soviet Union and other countries; so, the U.S. restrictions on weapons use did not affect the country much.<sup>76</sup> The United

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<sup>72</sup> Jeffrey Goldberg & Marc Ambinder, "The Ally from Hell: What to do About Pakistan," *The Atlantic*, December 2011, 56; and "Military Supply Policy For South Asia," April 16, 1969, *FRUS 1969-1972*, Volume E-7, *Documents on South Asia*, 1, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve07/d17>, (accessed on January 11, 2012).

<sup>73</sup> Ibid.

<sup>74</sup> Ibid. and Robert Dallek, *Nixon and Kissinger: Partners in Power* (New York: Harper Collins, 2007), 335. The reason the U.S. did not come to Pakistan's aid is because Pakistan was the first to commit aggressive action. "Military Supply Policy for South Asia," 1.

<sup>75</sup> "Decision on South Asian Arms Supply," March 16, 1970, *FRUS 1969-1972*, Volume E-7, *Documents on South Asia*, 1, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve07/d54> (accessed on January 12, 2012).

<sup>76</sup> McMahon, *Cold War on the Periphery*, 324.

States seemingly biased position against Pakistan was detrimental in the war of 1965 and later civil war, and played a key role in Pakistan's belief that the United States did not support her Muslim allies.<sup>77</sup>

Pakistan's largest crisis was the civil war that began in 1971 between East and West Pakistan, which resulted in the creation of Bangladesh. The civil war proved to be disruptive to the country in several ways and began with East Pakistan's quest for greater autonomy and the growing divisiveness between the Western Pakistan's Punjabis and East Pakistan's Bengalis.<sup>78</sup> A slow reaction to a cyclone that killed over two hundred thousand East Pakistanis also played a crucial role in the belief that the West Pakistani government was ineffective and unsupportive of the East.<sup>79</sup>

An election in 1970 was the water shed moment when Western and Eastern Pakistan relations began to break down. The election resulted in a loss for the Western Pakistani government in East Pakistan in favor of the Bengalis. Current Pakistan leader Mohammad Yahya decided to reject those election results.<sup>80</sup> The contention soon resulted in conflict as West Pakistani forces moved in "with stunning brutality" to crush the rebellion.<sup>81</sup> Steve Weissman and Herbert Krosney reports, "They had burned Bengali villages, raped Bengali women, killed and mutilated unarmed Bengali men."<sup>82</sup> The Western Pakistan forces also began a cleansing process of arresting intellectuals, students, spiritual leaders, and separatist leaders, including Sheik Mujibur. The government also outlawed the Awami League, which had just won the first free

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<sup>77</sup> "Military Supply Policy For South," 1.

<sup>78</sup> McMahon, *Cold War on the Periphery*, 327.

<sup>79</sup> Dallek, *Nixon and Kissinger*, 335.

<sup>80</sup> Ibid.

<sup>81</sup> Steve Weissman and Herbert Krosney, *The Islamic Bomb: The Nuclear Threat to Israel and the Middle East* (New York: Times Books, 1981), 39.

<sup>82</sup> Ibid.

election in the territory and held its leaders for execution.<sup>83</sup> One million people became casualties and ten million refugees from East Pakistan sought refuge in India.

East Pakistan's quest for liberation drew support from India. In December 1971, Western Pakistani forces launched an air attack against India and turned the civil war into a full-scale conflict with its neighbor.<sup>84</sup> Pakistan lost this war with India as well which further perpetuated its feeling of inferiority to its South Asia neighbor. The United States was less than pleased with the action, especially when Pakistan called upon America to honor the Manila Pact, even though Pakistan was the aggressor when they invaded Kashmir.<sup>85</sup>

The Nixon administration had perhaps the closest relationship to Pakistan, and it played a crucial role in the United States relationship with China. At the time, Pakistan was the only country in the world that was allied with both China and the United States.<sup>86</sup> Nixon sent Secretary of State Henry Kissinger on a mission through Pakistan to China in order to reestablish diplomatic relations and make preparations for President Nixon's historic visit to Peking.<sup>87</sup> In order to fly to China and begin the process of reconciliation, Kissinger feigned digestive distress and with the knowledge of a small amount of American and Pakistani officials, flew to China.<sup>88</sup> Nixon recalls, "On October 25 (1972) President Yahya Khan of Pakistan came to see (Nixon), and I used the occasion to establish the 'Yahya channel.' We had discussed the idea in general terms when I saw him on my visit to Pakistan in July 1969. Now I told him that we had decided

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<sup>83</sup> "India and Pakistan: Over the Edge." *Time* 98:24 (December 13, 1971): 37.

<sup>84</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>85</sup> Eisenhower, *The White House Years 1953-1956*, 374.

<sup>86</sup> Henry Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2000), 46.

<sup>87</sup> "National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1320, NSC Unfiled Material, 1969," August 1, 1969, *FRUS 1969*, Volume E-7 Document 31, *Documents from South Asia*, 9, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve07/d31> (accessed on April 5, 2012).

<sup>88</sup> Fredrik Logevall and Andrew Preston, *Nixon in the World: American Foreign Relations, 1969-1977* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 261.

to try to normalize our relationship with China, and I asked for his help as an intermediary.”<sup>89</sup>

During the civil war in Pakistan, India had called upon the Soviet Union to support its intervention and to humiliate Pakistan over the loss of Bangladesh.<sup>90</sup> Nixon also ordered that diplomats side with Pakistan over India in order to avoid the forced dismantlement of West Pakistan and “to demonstrate to China that we supported our strategic partners in times of crisis.”<sup>91</sup> The civil war in Pakistan occurred during the period of reconciliation between the United States and China, and the Nixon administration wanted to demonstrate that the United States would support its allies during a crisis period.

The U.S. reconnection with China also played a crucial role in the war between India and Pakistan during the Pakistani Civil War. After the Sino-American relationship was reestablished between 1973-1978, the Soviet Union determined that it needed to reestablish its position as the dominant Communist power in the world; so, it offered military aid to India. In order to limit possible Chinese involvement in the war, the Soviet Union moved troops to the Chinese border to prevent them from aiding the Pakistanis.<sup>92</sup> According to President Nixon, the United States took the position as a supporter of Pakistan in order to discourage “Indian aggression and Soviet adventurism.”<sup>93</sup> But as the conflict wore on it became increasingly evident that West Pakistan would lose its Eastern half and Nixon recommended to Yahya Khan that West Pakistan move its forces out of the East and in order to protect it from Indian aggression.<sup>94</sup> The United States had

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<sup>89</sup> Richard Nixon, *The Memoirs of Richard Nixon* (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1978), 546.

<sup>90</sup> Kissinger, *Years of Renewal*, 81-82.

<sup>91</sup> *Ibid.*, 82.

<sup>92</sup> Nixon, *The Memoirs of Richard Nixon*, 526.

<sup>93</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>94</sup> *Ibid.*

discovered that India was planning an invasion of West Pakistan, a worst-case scenario for the United States considering all the potential casualties.<sup>95</sup>

West Pakistan's civil war with East Pakistan garnered international attention and caused further tension between Pakistan and India. In a review of the conflict, the Pakistani military determined that the West's defeat was based mostly on its slow reaction to the developing crisis and its inability to effectively communicate with its forces in East Pakistan.<sup>96</sup> After the war, Bangladesh considered itself a client state of India and the two continue to have a strong relationship.<sup>97</sup> When it came to negotiating the deal with India and Bangladesh, Pakistan was at a distinct disadvantage and the new Pakistani Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto waited to finalize the treaty because he did not want to incur domestic disfavor by dealing with the enemy.<sup>98</sup> After losing Bangladesh, the army took the defeat harshly and continued to increase its size.<sup>99</sup>

When Bhutto came to the United Nations Security Council in order to discuss the current situation with East and West Pakistan, he stated that he wanted to mend relations with the United States. Special Assistant to Bhutto, Rafi Raza, explains, "He placated the United States by expressing sorrow for 'strained relations' in the past: 'I am prepared to do everything in my power to repair those relations in Asia for the United States and in my country where...I speak in my right as the authentic voice of the people...The time will come. We cannot forget it.'"<sup>100</sup>

Bhutto's recognition of the importance of United States and Pakistan relations shows the value of

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<sup>95</sup> Ibid.

<sup>96</sup> Nawaz, *Crossed Swords*, 311.

<sup>97</sup> Weissman and Krosney, *The Islamic Bomb*, 40.

<sup>98</sup> "Wrapping Up the War," *Time* 102:12 (September 17, 1973), 52.

<sup>99</sup> "In the process, Pakistan's security threat from India grew, forcing it to meet India's rapid growth of military might on the one hand, and on the other the appearance of the Soviet armed forces in Afghanistan to its west in the 1980s further propelled its expansion." Nawaz, *Crossed Swords*, xxxvii.

<sup>100</sup> Rafi Raza, *Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and Pakistan 1967-1977* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1998), 126.

U.S. support in the civil war.

Towards the end of the war, Pakistan attempted to acquire more weapons from the United States. However, Nixon did not have the ability to provide the weapons Pakistan requested because of previous embargo on foreign military sales was still in effect. Nixon attempted to circumvent this by telling CIA officials to arrange for Iran, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia to supply Pakistan with the weapons.<sup>101</sup> Despite his efforts, the request was denied and Pakistan quickly agreed to a cease-fire. President Nixon did attempt to help the Pakistan's against the foreign aid laws of the United States, but the Pakistani governments did not readily recognize his clandestine approaches.<sup>102</sup>

Bhutto came to power as a national hero and a popular opposition leader against the previous government after the civil war in 1971, but his heavy-handed approach to leadership and his handling of the election in 1976 severely affected the length of his tenure.<sup>103</sup> The best description of Bhutto is that he was "a charismatic, brilliant, flamboyant, but deeply flawed politician."<sup>104</sup> Henry Kissinger also described Bhutto as "a man of extraordinary abilities whose ruthlessness was matched by his brilliance."<sup>105</sup> Kissinger goes on to discuss how Bhutto's destroyed his own authority by calling for a popular election before manipulating the result.<sup>106</sup>

Bhutto intensified Pakistan's efforts to gain atomic power to counter India's advancements in nuclear technology. But, the main reason why Pakistan wanted the atomic bomb was because she wanted to enter into the prestigious nuclear club. The ability for a

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<sup>101</sup> Nixon, *The Memoirs of Richard Nixon*, 526.

<sup>102</sup> Ibid.

<sup>103</sup> "Sir, the Troops Have Come!" *Time* 110:3 (July 18, 1977): 35.

<sup>104</sup> Ahmed Rashid, *Descent into Chaos: The U.S. and the Disaster in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia* (New York: Penguin Books, 2009), 37.

<sup>105</sup> Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval*, 676.

<sup>106</sup> Ibid.

country to advance into a nuclear power meant that it had emerged from a Third World status.<sup>107</sup> Bhutto's former press secretary Khalid Hasan said, "He wanted the bomb, you know, because he wanted Pakistan to walk tall. He knew that proliferation will come, and that more countries will become nuclear, and that there's nothing that can stop it. So, if everybody's going to have a bomb in the basement, he said, 'Okay, if we have the capability, let's do it.'"<sup>108</sup>

In order to have effective diplomacy in South Asia, the United States had to maintain relationships with both Pakistan and India without offending either country. India's problem with U.S. policy did not rest only on the selling of weapons to Pakistan, but India's belief that Pakistan would use any acquired weapons for aggressive actions.<sup>109</sup> According to the U.S. Ambassador to India, Kenneth Keating, "American officials know full well why Pakistan wants these (nuclear weapons)...Pakistan has openly said its arms build-up is aimed against India."<sup>110</sup> Regardless of beliefs to the contrary, the competitive nature of India and Pakistan has caused constant tension between the two countries and if either acquired military weapons or a military contract with a foreign country, the other one would make a formal complaint in the international community.<sup>111</sup> Some of the weapons the United States considered selling to the Pakistani's in 1970 included 6 replacement F-104 fighter-interceptors, 300 armored personnel carriers, and 4 anti-submarine patrol aircraft. Other weapons options included 7 B-57 bombers and 100 M-48.<sup>112</sup>

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<sup>107</sup> Vance, *Hard Choices*, 23.

<sup>108</sup> Weissman & Krosney, *The Islamic Bomb*, 49.

<sup>109</sup> "U.S. Arms For Pakistan," October 26, 1970, *FRUS 1969*, Volume E-7, *Documents on South Asia, 1969-1972*, 1, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve07/d91> (accessed on January 21, 2012).

<sup>110</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>111</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>112</sup> "Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs: Arms Supply Policy for South Asia," June 11, 1970, *FRUS 1969-1972*, Volume E-7, *Documents On South*

The Indian government specifically warned about a possible backlash against the U.S. government if word of the diplomatic exchanges became public knowledge.<sup>113</sup> In order to voice their grievances, the Indians even publicized their criticisms of the United States in order to cause an over reaction within their own media.<sup>114</sup> According to William Spengler, the Country Director for Pakistan and Afghanistan, “on October 8, 1970, the Indians issued a press statement announcing their protest and indicating that they were not satisfied with U.S. explanations for the sale. The statement alleged that our decision was against the interest of peace in South Asia. It said "the resumption of inflow of arms" to Pakistan, which has committed aggression against India three times, is of grave concern; Pakistan is armed only against India.”<sup>115</sup> Every action of the United States towards Pakistan was interpreted by India as a possible aggressive action unless it was favorable towards India’s viewpoint.

India’s concern over the military developments in Pakistan spilled into Indian and U.S. relations and began to negatively affect American diplomacy with India. In one particularly tense occasion, Indira Gandhi told the U.S. news show, “Meet the Press,” that the sale of weapons to Pakistan would harden India’s attitude towards the United States.<sup>116</sup> The Indian press in particular seized upon this negative situation regarding the selling of U.S. weapons to Pakistan and exploited it at home.<sup>117</sup> Other diplomatic failures like the accidental non-appearance

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*Asia*, 1, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve07/d63> (accessed on January 31, 2012).

<sup>113</sup> “U.S. Arms For Pakistan,” October 26, 1970, *FRUS 1969-1972*, Volume E-7, *Documents on South Asia*, 1, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve07/d91> (accessed January 31, 2012).

<sup>114</sup> “U.S. Sale of Military Equipment to Pakistan - Information Memoir,” October 26, 1970, *FRUS 1969-1972*, Volume E-7, *Documents on South Asia*, 1, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve07/d81> (accessed January 31, 2012).

<sup>115</sup> *Ibid.*, 1.

<sup>116</sup> “U.S. Arms For Pakistan,” 1.

<sup>117</sup> *Ibid.*

of an ambassador at the airport to greet Mrs. Gandhi and the failure of President Jimmy Carter to accept Mrs. Gandhi's dinner invitation served as examples of the tense Indo/U.S. relations.<sup>118</sup>

The actions by the U.S. government were not deliberate, but the Indian press seized upon the subtle message in order to confirm their anti-American beliefs.

The other diplomatic problem that the United States had was keeping a steady relationship with Pakistan while maintaining a relationship with India and avoiding a possible Pakistan-Soviet or Pakistan-Sino alliance.<sup>119</sup> Cold War sentiments were still a basic part of U.S. foreign policy and avoiding a communist leaning Pakistan meant maintaining strong diplomatic connections. The fear of Pakistan developing a close relationship with China or the Soviet Union kept the United States engaged in talks to avoid an unfavorable situation.<sup>120</sup> In previous talks with the Johnson and Nixon administrations, Pakistan had been promised weapons and materials that they never received.<sup>121</sup> The consistent promise of weapons between U.S. presidential administrations to the Pakistanis also caused tensions with India. However, U.S. policy officials believed a disgruntled India was okay if it prevented a Pakistani/China/USSR alliance.<sup>122</sup> Regardless of America's willingness to deal in atomic material, Pakistan wanted a weapon in order to represent its power international community.

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<sup>118</sup> Ibid.

<sup>119</sup> "Telegram From the Embassy Office in Pakistan to the Department of State," March 11, 1964, *FRUS 1964-1968*, Volume XXV, *South Asia*, 1, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v25/d27> (accessed on April 1, 2012).

<sup>120</sup> "Military Supply Policy," July 2, 1969, *FRUS 1969-1972*, Volume E-7, *Documents On South Asia*, 1, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve07/d69> (accessed January 31, 2012); and Logevall, *Nixon in the World*, 252, 256.

<sup>121</sup> "Memorandum of Conversation: Discussion with Ambassador Joseph S. Farland," May 21, 1970, *FRUS 1969-1972*, Volume E-7, *Documents On South Asia*, 1, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve07/d60> (accessed January 12, 2012).

<sup>122</sup> "National Intelligence Estimate 31/32-70," October 20, 1970, *FRUS 1969-1972*, Volume E-7, *Documents on South Asia*, 1, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve07/d85> (accessed January 12, 2012).

For a country like Pakistan, the prospect showing off an atomic bomb appealed to their inferiority complex with India and allowed them to cement their position as a world power. An atomic test would only confirm its power in the world and was at the core of Pakistan's efforts to achieve a nuclear weapon.<sup>123</sup> S.P. Seth explains, "Bhutto's promise that Pakistan will have a 'bomb' even if its people have to eat grass neatly summed up this determination."<sup>124</sup> The Pakistan quest to achieve the atomic bomb was based in a desire to achieve the ability to stand tall with Western powers and to achieve the first atomic bomb in the Islamic world. Dr. A. Q. Khan claimed, "If Pakistan had such a weapon, it would reinforce the power of the Muslim world." He added, "All the Western countries, including Israel, are not only Pakistan's enemies but also enemies of Islam...All this is part of the Crusades which the Christians and Jews initiated against the Muslims 1,000 years ago."<sup>125</sup> Pakistan, therefore, not only symbolizes the aspirations of the entire Islamic world, but also makes a strong claim to its leadership

The formation of British India into two separate countries laid the foundations for the conflicts between Pakistan and India during the twentieth century. Encounters over Kashmir, civil war with East Pakistan, and a military coup d'état in the 1970s in Pakistan escalated tensions between the two South Asian countries and challenged diplomatic relations with the United States. The successful Indian detonation of an atomic bomb and Pakistan's nuclear quest all eventually contributed to a difficult presidency for incoming President Carter.

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<sup>123</sup> "Non-Proliferation Value of a 3-Year Comprehensive Test Ban," October 4, 1978, NSA,2, <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb323/doc09.pdf>, (accessed on December 9, 2011).

<sup>124</sup> S. P. Seth, "The Indo-Pak Nuclear Duet and the United States," *Asian Survey*, 28:7 (1988): 713.

<sup>125</sup> Ibid.

## Chapter 2 – The Carter Question

On the day of his inauguration in 1977, Jimmy Carter faced the American people with excitement, a powerful vision, and hope for the future. The last several years had been filled with scandal and the violent uprisings of the 1960s, and the new president sensed the fatigue and hope of the American people. "The world itself is now dominated by a new spirit," the President said in his Inaugural Address. "Peoples more numerous and more politically aware are craving and now demanding their place in the sun—not just for the benefit of their own physical condition, but for basic human rights."<sup>126</sup> Carter came to the presidency with limited experience, but he brought a new passion to the White House and a desire to reestablish America's role as the world's most righteous government.<sup>127</sup>

Carter had been governor of Georgia in the early 1970s, but his ultimate goal was to become the president of the United States.<sup>128</sup> As a candidate with state governance experience only, Carter had a significant disadvantage against the Republican candidate President Gerald Ford.<sup>129</sup> Known more as a businessman than a politician, Carter seemed an odd choice as the Democratic Party's nominee for president.<sup>130</sup> Leslie Gelb of *The New York Times* argued that Carter had great potential as president, but his view of America's foreign relations remained relatively unknown. Despite his limited foreign policy experience, Carter received a nomination to the Trilateral Council, an organization dedicated to furthering relations between Western Europe, America, and Japan. Carter first met Zbigniew Brzezinski at the Trilateral

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<sup>126</sup> Jimmy Carter, *Inaugural Addresses: President Jimmy Carter First Inauguration Address* (Charles River Editors, 2011), loc 89.

<sup>127</sup> Gaddis Smith, *Morality, Reason, and Power: American Diplomacy in the Carter Years* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1986), 4-5.

<sup>128</sup> Jimmy Carter, *Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President* (Toronto: Bantam Books, 1982), 66.

<sup>129</sup> "Uneasy Homecoming," *The New York Times*, May 16, 1976, 139.

<sup>130</sup> "Notes on People: Jimmy Carter's Foreign Policy," *The New York Times*, May 29, 1975, 31.

Commission, which became a key advisor to Carter on his foreign policy.<sup>131</sup> Brzezinski later noted Carter began his candidacy with only 2% recognition from the general population when he signed on to support the candidate.<sup>132</sup> Carter's utilized Brzezinski's in regards to foreign policy, and promised the American people a change in American diplomacy around the world. Although the future president presented vague notions, it never resulted in an explicit plan to the American people and thus unexpected changes developed over time.<sup>133</sup>

During his campaign, one of Carter's greatest strengths was his ability to gather support as the anti-establishment candidate. Following the scandal of Watergate and Nixon's resignation, Carter seemed an exciting alternative to the establishment members of Washington politics. John Herbers of the *New York Times* reported, "Nevertheless, Watergate, like the Great Depression of the 1930s and the Vietnam War, became implanted in the national psyche, as a unique event that raised basic questions about the American government."<sup>134</sup> Carter represented a change from a presidential administration that had made the public previously question the integrity of the government.<sup>135</sup>

The other large focus of Carter's foreign policy during his campaign was to be the antithesis to the Nixon/Ford/Kissinger administrations. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's seemingly heavy handed and secretive approach in foreign policy gave him the nicknames the "Lone Ranger" and "a one-man policy of international adventure," and a reputation for

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<sup>131</sup> James Wooten, "Carter Pledges an Open Foreign Policy," *The New York Times*, June 24, 1976, 69; and Brzezinski, *Power and Principle*, 6-7.

<sup>132</sup> Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser 1977-1981* (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1983), 7.

<sup>133</sup> Kaufman, *Plans Unraveled*, 12.

<sup>134</sup> John Herbers, "Without Watergate, the Campaign Is Part Illusion," *The New York Times*, March 21, 1976, 135.

<sup>135</sup> James Wooten, "Carter Pledges an Open Foreign Policy," *The New York Times*, June 24, 1976, 69; and "Notes on People: Jimmy Carter's Foreign Policy," *The New York Times*, May 29, 1975, 31.

“excessive secrecy in foreign affairs.”<sup>136</sup> If elected president, Carter promised that his administration would include more conferences and summits to discuss important policy issues at all levels.<sup>137</sup> He also wanted to rejuvenate partnerships with several U.S. allies in Western Europe, the Americas, and Japan.<sup>138</sup> He also campaigned on the belief that the United States should include other democracies in foreign policy decisions.<sup>139</sup> Although Carter wanted to model his administration differently, he still wanted to keep several of Ford/Kissinger’s policies on détente and opposed Congress interfering with the United States economic relations with Moscow.<sup>140</sup>

Carter focused on America’s position in the world, human rights, deemphasizing the Cold War, and morality during his campaign.<sup>141</sup> Carter hoped that his foreign policy would encourage a “more active participation by other democracies in the resolution of international problems.”<sup>142</sup> David Skidmore explains, “The notion that the U.S. faced new limits on American power abroad spread widely through academic and foreign policy circles during the seventies.”<sup>143</sup> He added, “America’s failure in Vietnam was only partly responsible for these perceptions. The rise of the Soviet Union to military parity with the U.S., the economic revival of Europe and Japan, as well as the growth in the number of newly independent and increasingly nationalistic Third World countries all played a role in reinforcing the belief that the U.S. must adapt its policies to reflect

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<sup>136</sup> “Notes on People,” 31.

<sup>137</sup> “Excerpts From Carter’s Speech and His Replies,” *The New York Times*, June 24, 1976, 22.

<sup>138</sup> “A New Beginning: Foreign Policy...” *The New York Times*, December 30, 1976, 15.

<sup>139</sup> Wooten, “Carter Pledges an Open Foreign Policy,” 69

<sup>140</sup> Leslie H. Gleb, “Carter, Ford May Differ Widely on Foreign Policy,” *The New York Times*, August 1, 1976, 119.

<sup>141</sup> “A New Beginning: Foreign Policy...,” 15.

<sup>142</sup> Wooten, “Carter Pledges an Open Foreign Policy,” 69.

<sup>143</sup> David Skidmore, *Reversing Course: Carter’s Foreign Policy, Domestic Politics, and the Failure of Reform* (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1996), 33.

new global circumstances.”<sup>144</sup> During Carter’s campaign, he stated, “the United States should not ‘become militarily involved in the national affairs of another nation’ nor back a leader who uses ‘repressive force against his own people.’”<sup>145</sup>

In reaction to the Vietnam War, Carter campaigned on the promise to avoid the mistakes of the previous administration. The president stated, “We will not behave in foreign places so as to violate our rules and standards here at home, for we know that the trust which our Nation earns is essential to our strength.”<sup>146</sup> He did not adhere to the earlier administration’s standards of trying to impose American style constitutional democracies around the world while ignoring the human rights violations of those countries.<sup>147</sup> For example, the Nixon administration maintained strong ties with South Korea and Chile despite of their appalling human rights records.<sup>148</sup> Charles Mohr of the *New York Times* reported, “Mr. Carter said some regimes, such as South Korea and Chile, ‘openly violate human rights’ and that the United States should not ‘condone repercussions’ but should use ‘our tremendous influence to increase freedom, particularly, in those countries that depend on us for their very survival.’”<sup>149</sup> After winning the election, Carter went further to explain that the U.S. perception of another country would “shape our own people’s attitude toward that nation’s government.”<sup>150</sup>

Carter’s election as president came as a reaction against an era of government mistrust and secretive administrations that left many Americans disenchanted with their own

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<sup>144</sup> Ibid.

<sup>145</sup> “Notes on People: Jimmy Carter’s Foreign Policy,” 31.

<sup>146</sup> Carter, *Inaugural Addresses: President Jimmy Carter First Inauguration Address*, loc. 89.

<sup>147</sup> Skidmore, *Reversing Course*, 52.

<sup>148</sup> Charles Mohr, “Carter Suggests That U.S. Foster Rights Overseas: Sees Foreign Policy as Lever to Aid Others,” *The New York Times*, September 9, 1976, 81; “Notes on People: Jimmy Carter’s Foreign Policy,” *The New York Times*, May 29, 1975, 31.

<sup>149</sup> Mohr, “Carter Suggests That U.S. Foster Rights Overseas,” 81.

<sup>150</sup> Ibid., and Burton I. Kaufman, *The Presidency of James Earl Carter, Jr.* (Lawrence: University of Kansas, 1993), 151.

government.<sup>151</sup> Former President Nixon and Secretary of State Kissinger embodied the characteristics that Carter campaigned against and the feeling of government suspicion that inundated the country, especially in regards to foreign policy. Kevin Mattson explains, “The past kept torturing the present with memories. The failure in Vietnam, the fears and conspiracies nurtured by Watergate, the assassinations and violence in the 1960s – all these things pressed in on the nation’s psyche during the decade.”<sup>152</sup>

After he successfully campaigned for President, the vagueness of Carter’s foreign policy campaign promises began to create tensions on Embassy row, the area of Washington D.C. where most of the foreign embassy offices are located. His questionable position on American relations with other countries raised several questions within the international community about how they would be treated by the new president. *New York Times* author Bernard Gwertzman explained, “Jimmy Carter’s victory has already caused a problem for virtually every foreign embassy here. Whether it liked the Ford Administration’s policy toward its government or not, at least each embassy knew what it was and had grown accustomed to it.”<sup>153</sup> Carter did not help his situation by refusing to meet with several foreign ambassadors before taking office and his notably off-hand approach throughout his entire presidency offended several ambassadors.<sup>154</sup>

In his Inaugural Address, Carter noted that, “The world is still engaged in a massive armaments race designed to ensure continuing equivalent strength among potential adversaries. We pledge perseverance and wisdom in our efforts to limit the world's armaments to those

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<sup>151</sup> Henry Kissinger even had members of his staff poll the public in regards to foreign policy and they discovered, “We found distrust of this Government’s effectiveness in carrying out policies intended to express the public’s humanitarian concerns.” Leslie Gelb, “Kissinger Aides Find Americans Distrust Policy,” *The New York Times*, September 16, 1976, 81.

<sup>152</sup> Kevin Mattson, *What the Heck Are You Up To, Mr. President?* (New York: Bloomsbury, 2010), 10.

<sup>153</sup> Ibid.

<sup>154</sup> Ibid.

necessary for each nation's own domestic safety. And we will move this year a step toward ultimate goal—the elimination of all nuclear weapons from this Earth.”<sup>155</sup> Morality and the arms race were unavoidably tied together for President Carter, and he spent most of his presidency trying to change the world towards his goal of ridding it of weapons of mass destruction.

Carter believed emphasizing human rights would bring the government together. Carter later reflected, “judging from news articles and direct communications from the American people to me during the first few months of my administration, human rights had become the central theme of our foreign policy in the minds of the press and public.”<sup>156</sup> The progress towards human rights did have broad support from the American public, but Carter had a limited impact on the atrocities of the genocide in Cambodia and apartheid in South Africa. “But the victims who survived and who had enough freedom to speak out applauded the American policy and believed that conditions would have been far worse had the United States remained silent.”<sup>157</sup> Carter’s human rights initiative did have some impact on the international community, but it remained a confusing and disjointed effort until the end of his administration.<sup>158</sup>

Morality was also the central focus of his administration because the new president thought it would be easier to unite the country around ideals that had been lacking due to the scandals of the early 1970s.<sup>159</sup> Carter also tied his moral views to the arms race.<sup>160</sup> Hedrick Smith reported that for Carter, “this meant not just reducing the number of strategic nuclear weapons held by the United States and the Soviet Union, but also curbing conventional arms

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<sup>155</sup> Jimmy Carter’s Inaugural Address, January 20, 1977, <http://www.bartleby.com/124/pres60.html> (accessed on February 15, 2012).

<sup>156</sup> Carter, *Keeping Faith*, 145.

<sup>157</sup> Smith, *Morality, Reason, and Power*, 55.

<sup>158</sup> *Ibid.*, 50.

<sup>159</sup> *Ibid.*, 14.

<sup>160</sup> Hedrick Smith, “Carter Shapes Foreign Policy: Washington is Impressed by His Initial Efforts,” *The New York Times*, February 11, 1977, A9.

sales to Third World nations and preventing the proliferation of nuclear technology.”<sup>161</sup> Carter was not only interested in the moralism of atomic weaponry, but he was also interested in reestablishing the moral authority of American citizens. In *Reversing Course*, Skidmore argues that overemphasis on moralism does not completely explain Carter’s foreign policy decisions, since he was both a liberal policy maker and an idealist. Skidmore further explains, “Carter’s moralistic embrace of human rights was motivated not only by his own intense moral convictions but also by the belief that these sorts of appeals would bolster his own political fortunes and win support for his foreign policy reforms.”<sup>162</sup> Carter believed that the proliferation of nuclear weapons threatened the future of the world.<sup>163</sup> In a message to Congress, Carter argued “...if our (nuclear) policy is too weak, we could find ourselves powerless to restrain a deadly worldwide expansion of nuclear explosive capability.”<sup>164</sup>

The untested and unclear nature of Carter’s foreign policy was apparent before he took office, but his managerial style also affected the way he dealt with foreign issues.<sup>165</sup> Carter’s background as an engineer taught him a different approach to management and problem solving, which affected his ability to give a comprehensive foreign policy. When any foreign crisis came to his attention, Carter handled the problem as its own separate situation and did not include broader context in his evaluations. He had vague notions like human rights, arms control, and peace in the Middle East, but there was never any long term goal or structure given to the American people that they could readily understand and follow in the media. Scott Kaufman

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<sup>161</sup> Ibid., 14.

<sup>162</sup> Skidmore, *Reversing Course*, 29-30.

<sup>163</sup> Ibid., 14-15; and Kaufman, *Plans Unraveled*, 55.

<sup>164</sup> “Nuclear Non-Proliferation – Message to the Congress,” April 27, 1977, 1, Jimmy Carter, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=7408&st=nuclear&st1=carter#axzz1rU1Z7bgO> (accessed April 8, 2012).

<sup>165</sup> Leslie H. Gleb, “Carter, Ford May Differ Widely on Foreign Policy: Disagreements May Be More Real Than Apparent,” *The New York Times*, August 1, 1976, 119.

explains, “Maybe most important, he saw himself as someone whose job it was to solve individual problems rather than to give the American people a vision of where he planned to take the country. The American public thus saw, more often than not, contradictory and inconsistent policies. If Carter had a better grasp of both the possible and of Washington politics, his foreign policy record might have proven more successful.”<sup>166</sup> There were also some instances in which a policy Carter strongly believed in failed, like when talks regarding SALT II fell through and the failure of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

One other signature of Carter’s managerial style was his tendency to try to acquire all the necessary information from his advisors and provide a plan of action that the cabinet would be responsible for executing. His Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance, recalls, “He listened carefully and wanted the fullest discussion before making decisions. He was, if anything, willing to permit debate to go on too long and to try and absorb every detail and nuance before making his decision.”<sup>167</sup> This style had mixed results because the president had to rely on others in order to implement his policy, and they would often bring their own interpretations into the equation.<sup>168</sup> Kaufman states, “He tended to stitch together alternatives rather than make choices, which caused confusion as to what his policies were. Instead of taking time to vet policies before trying to implement them, he sought to enact many initiatives at once. As a result, policies interfered with one another or had to be so revised that they became inconsistent in their implementation.”<sup>169</sup> The difficulty with the president trying to dictate all aspects of his policy caused increasing problems within the administration.

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<sup>166</sup> Kaufman, *Plans Unraveled*, 4.

<sup>167</sup> Vance, *Hard Choices*, 35.

<sup>168</sup> Kaufman, *Plans Unraveled*, 3.

<sup>169</sup> *Ibid.*, 4.

In order to create the feeling of a shared partnership and equality among the government departments, Carter attempted to craft a system where all of the White House staff members had equal access to the President.<sup>170</sup> Jean Garrison explains, “Carter’s open, spokes-in-the-wheel system was organized to produce a collegial system in which the president was in the center of the wheel of information and advice. In reality the president often left the policy details to his advisory group.”<sup>171</sup> White House advisor Jody Powell explained, Carter designated his White House in a spokes and wheels approach in order to “make sure that no one or two people will be able to cut him [Carter] off from dissenting opinions.”<sup>172</sup> Carter’s spokes-in-the-wheels approach lacked effectiveness because not every member of his cabinet had easy access to him, and it did not limit fighting within the bureaucracy. Those staff members with offices in the White House had significantly more access to the president than other groups. For example, Brzezinski’s office as National Security Advisor was located within the White House, while Secretary of State Vance’s office was located within the State Department building. Further, his constant traveling also kept him away from the White House.<sup>173</sup> In comparison, Brzezinski stopped by the Oval Office so often for a quick chat with Carter that the staff stopped recording their meetings due to the frequency.<sup>174</sup> The unevenness between the national security advisor and the secretary of state meant that one group achieved its goals more than the other.

Carter also had a different interpretation of his role as president than his predecessors, and this change dictated how he governed and how he interacted with congressional leaders.

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<sup>170</sup> Ibid., 16-17.

<sup>171</sup> Jean A. Garrison, “Framing Foreign Policy Alternatives in the Inner Circle: President Carter, His Advisors, and the Struggle for the Arms Control Agenda,” *Political Psychology*, 22:4 (December, 2001): 779.

<sup>172</sup> Glad, *An Outsider in the White House*, 7-8.

<sup>173</sup> Kaufman, *Plans Unraveled*, 21-23.

<sup>174</sup> Betty Glad, *An Outsider in the White House: Jimmy Carter, His Advisors, and the making of American Foreign Policy* (New York: Cornell University Press, 2009), 29.

Charles O. Jones explains that, "President Carter interpreted his representational role as that of the trustee - an official entrusted to represent the public or national interest, downplaying short-term electoral considerations."<sup>175</sup> Being a trustee president also meant that he felt that it was his responsibility to determine what the policies would be, and he tended to look down upon congressional leaders. Kaufman states, "Carter did do a poor job of confronting governmental infighting, and he did see himself as a trustee of the American people, which caused problems with Congress."<sup>176</sup> His inability to compromise and work with congressional leaders made implementing his policies more difficult as his presidential tenure continued. He also did not develop a strong relationship with his own party member, which also contributed to problems with gathering support for his policies.

Carter's foreign policy suffered in the transition from Secretary of State Henry Kissinger to Cyrus Vance. When Vance was first announced as the secretary of state, he did have a brief meeting with Kissinger on foreign policy issues, but several international ambassadors were nervous about the transfer of power.<sup>177</sup> The majority of the embassies in Washington D.C. raised questions about Carter's administration because Kissinger's departure caused great change without a concrete foreign policy being set in place by the new government.<sup>178</sup> According to Bernard Gwertzman of *The New York Times*, "even his detractors [Kissinger's] are saying that with his flair for the dramatic, his demanding criteria for excellence, and his ability to appoint good men to important jobs, he has left a mark on Foggy Bottom that will never be erased."<sup>179</sup>

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<sup>175</sup> Charles O. Jones, *The Trusteeship Presidency: Jimmy Carter and the United States Congress* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1988), 217.

<sup>176</sup> Kaufman, *Plans Unraveled*, 4.

<sup>177</sup> James Carter, *White House Diary* (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2010), 35.

<sup>178</sup> Gwertzman, Bernard, "The Folks at Foggy Bottom View Life Without Kissinger," *New York Times*, November 9, 1976, 10.

<sup>179</sup> *Ibid.*

Each embassy knew its place within Kissinger's sphere of influence. Kissinger was extremely clear to foreign ambassadors about what their position was to the U.S. government and how they would be treated.

In order to create a strong foreign policy team, Carter appointed several individuals who had significantly more foreign affairs experience. Secretary of State Vance was a successful attorney with Foreign Service experience.<sup>180</sup> Carter described Vance as, "cool under pressure, he had also served as special troubleshooter for more than one President when there were crises in Cyprus, Korea, and Vietnam. Cy was very knowledgeable in both military matters and foreign affairs."<sup>181</sup> Carter reflects that Vance's experience in law as a trial lawyer and his position on the Preparedness Investigation Committee, contributed to the decision for his appointment. Started during in the 1950s, the Preparedness Investigation Committee became a powerful voice for defense issues and studied into missile and satellite weapons.<sup>182</sup> His former appointments as Secretary of the Army and deputy defense secretary under Lyndon Johnson also made him a strong addition to Carter's administration. Vance became a partner on the development of the more idealistic impulses of Carter's diplomacy. However, the president and Vance did not have a close personal relationship, and they were no more than acquaintances throughout Vance's tenure as Secretary of State.<sup>183</sup>

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<sup>180</sup> Carter, *Keeping Faith*, 52.

<sup>181</sup> *Ibid.*, 50.

<sup>182</sup> "Committee Resource Guide: Committees of the U.S. Senate," A Brief History of the Committee: The Russell Era, 1955-1968, <http://www.archives.gov/legislative/finding-aids/reference/senate/armed-services/1955-1968.html>  
<http://www.archives.gov/legislative/finding-aids/reference/senate/armed-services/1955-1968.html>, (accessed on March 27, 2012).

<sup>183</sup> Vance eventually resigned his position as Secretary of State in 1980 over Carter's handling of the Iranian hostage situation. Carter accepted his resignation and did not attempt to talk him out of it. Carter, *White House Diary*, 420.

Betty Glad, a political scientist from South Carolina, explains that Vance was, “an able and experienced diplomat, dedicated to the task of fulfilling Carter’s more idealistic goals.”<sup>184</sup> When Carter and Vance first came together to discuss foreign policy issues, they agreed on most issues and both sought a more balanced relationship with the Soviet Union. Vance recalls, “Carter shared my belief that we should continue to work for a reduction in tensions with the Soviet Union, while vigorously defending our global interests and maintaining an unquestioned military balance.”<sup>185</sup> Carter described his own view of the Secretary of State, “my own preference was that one of the roles of the Secretary of State be the education of the American public about foreign policy.”<sup>186</sup> President Carter’s view on the leader of the Department of State fit perfectly with what Vance brought to the administration.

When he accepted his position as Secretary of State, Vance made one request of the new president. He wanted the responsibility for defining the administration’s foreign policy to fall to Carter and himself. As Carter lost wide support from the national and international community, Brzezinski inserted himself more and more into the decision making process causing tension within the White House.<sup>187</sup> Vance explains, “it also became a political liability, leaving the Congress and foreign governments with the impression that the administration did not know its own mind. I warned the president of this danger and the confusion it was causing.”<sup>188</sup>

Vance represented Carter’s more idealistic notions of a closer relationship with the Soviet Union and the growth of human equality around the world. He strongly believed that the United States could create friendlier diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, which could limit

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<sup>184</sup> Glad, *An Outsider in the White House*, 1.

<sup>185</sup> Vance, *Hard Choices*, 31.

<sup>186</sup> Carter, *Keeping Faith*, 54.

<sup>187</sup> Brzezinski, *Power and Principle*, 37.

<sup>188</sup> Ibid.

military expansion in both countries. He also believed that the United States had a limited amount of power, which restricted its ability to intervene in conflicts around the world, an observation similar to Carter's.<sup>189</sup> During his campaign, Carter told the American people that the United States had to come to terms with the rise of other democracies and leaders around the world that might challenge the United States.<sup>190</sup> Carter explained, "we must learn to live with diversity and to cooperate' as long as such parties and leaders respect the democratic processes, uphold existing international commitments and are not subservient to external political direction."<sup>191</sup>

Vance came to the White House with similar ideals and thoughts on the direction that American foreign policy should take during the Carter administration. He later reflected, "Carter shared my belief that we should continue to work for a reduction in tensions with the Soviet Union, while vigorously defending our global interests and maintaining an unquestioned military balance."<sup>192</sup> The other aspect of Soviet relations that Carter and Vance wanted to conclude was the new SALT agreement in order to limit the spread of nuclear technology into Third World countries.<sup>193</sup> Vance also strongly argued that the Third World should be given the proper attention from the international community, instead of the focus being focused on the East-West divisions of the Cold War.<sup>194</sup> Vance recalls, "Carter shared my feeling that we should redefine and give higher priority to nuclear proliferation, international arms transfers, human rights, and international economic development and cooperation."<sup>195</sup>

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<sup>189</sup> Ibid., 25; Skidmore, *Reversing Course*, 30.

<sup>190</sup> Wooten, "Carter Pledges an Open Foreign Policy," 69.

<sup>191</sup> Ibid.

<sup>192</sup> Vance, *Hard Choices*, 31.

<sup>193</sup> Ibid.

<sup>194</sup> Ibid., 33.

<sup>195</sup> Ibid.

To fill the position as his National Security Advisor, Carter chose Brzezinski. Considered a controversial choice at the time, Brzezinski was brilliant and informed, but his personal style had the potential to cause tensions within the administration. A professor at Columbia University and a prolific author on the Soviet Union, Brzezinski soon became the backbone of the administration. The new national security advisor also brought many young men from New England to the new administration, in the hopes that they could bring new perspectives to the government and American foreign relations.<sup>196</sup> Carter claimed the National Security Council and Advisor; “Zbig was a first-rate thinker, very competent in his choice of staff members and able to work harmoniously with them (I do not remember any dissension at all).”<sup>197</sup>

Brzezinski had a decidedly aggressive view towards the Soviet Union and came to represent Carter’s more forceful policy.<sup>198</sup> Carter described Brzezinski as “astute in his analyses, particularly knowledgeable about broad historical trends affecting the industrialized nations, and a firm believer in a strong defense for our country and in the enhancement of freedom and democratic principles both here and abroad.”<sup>199</sup> In contrast to Vance, Brzezinski did not support any type of pro-Soviet initiatives and constantly struggled with Vance over foreign policy.<sup>200</sup> According to Betty Glad, Brzezinski viewed “the Soviet Union as a megalomaniac state bent on world domination, and he viewed U.S. military power and the threat that it might actually be utilized as one of the most important factors in shaping Soviet policies.”<sup>201</sup>

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<sup>196</sup> Leslie H. Gleb, “A Team of Young Experts Aids Carter on Foreign Policy Plans,” *The New York Times*, August 18, 1976, 20; Most of his advisors were also outsiders from the general Washington community and came with Carter from the campaign trail. Glad, *An Outsider in the White House*, 14.

<sup>197</sup> Kaufman, *Plans Unraveled*, 53.

<sup>198</sup> *Ibid.*, 21-23.

<sup>199</sup> *Ibid.*, 51.

<sup>200</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>201</sup> Glad, *An Outsider in the White House*, 25.

When making his final decision for national security advisor, most of Carter's advisors welcomed the suggestion with a few reservations. Several individuals told Carter, "Dr. Brzezinski might not be adequately deferential to a secretary of state."<sup>202</sup> This actually served to Carter's greater purpose as president, as he wanted "the final decisions on basic foreign policy would be made by me in the Oval Office, and not in the State Department."<sup>203</sup> Brzezinski's aggressive stance as that national security advisor came from his anti-Soviet policies, and ultimately he used his leverage to gain control over the foreign policy of the United States.

Carter's description of the State Department bureaucracy was decisively different than his rather favorable view of the smaller and more selective National Security Council. He explains the State Department was, "a sprawling Washington and worldwide bureaucracy, with compartmentalized regional and national desks" and he "rarely received innovative ideas from its staff members about how to modify existing policy in order to meet changing conditions."<sup>204</sup> In contrast to Carter's positive view of the National Security team under Brzezinski as a smaller, more contained unit. Carter explains, "Brzezinski and his relatively small group of experts were not handicapped by the inertia of a tenured bureaucracy or the responsibility for implementing policies after they were evolved. They were particularly adept at incisive analyses of strategic concepts, and were prolific in the production of new ideas, which they were always eager to present to me."<sup>205</sup> The opinions Carter had on the two departments laid the foundation for future problems. Kaufman explains, "Yet Carter never effectively reconciled the approaches of his secretary of state and NSC adviser, resulting in a policy that was inconsistent, incoherent, and

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<sup>202</sup> Carter, *Keeping Faith*, 52.

<sup>203</sup> Ibid.

<sup>204</sup> Ibid.

<sup>205</sup> Ibid., 53.

even contradictory.”<sup>206</sup> The limitations that Carter put on the State Department in his own mind permitted a fracture within the administration’s spokes-in-the-wheel approach.

In the creation of his administration policies, Carter initially relied on Vance to inform the American public and international community regarding the decisions of the administration. As the administration continued to suffer problems, Brzezinski became the voice of the administration by 1980. Brzezinski reflected, “His reluctance to speak up publicly, to provide a broad conceptual explanation for what our Administration was trying to do, and Carter’s lack of preparation for doing it himself, pushed me to the forefront. (I will not claim I resisted strongly.) That in turn fueled resentments, if not initially on Cy’s part, then clearly so on the part of his subordinates.”<sup>207</sup> Carter also notes, “Brzezinski was always ready and willing to explain our position on international matters, analyze a basic strategic interrelationship, or comment on a current event.”<sup>208</sup> The development of Carter’s collegial environment began to suffer increasing organizational problems when Brzezinski overshadowed Vance as the voice of the administration.

Vance and Brzezinski did have problems between their different perspectives on foreign policy and the natural competition between their departments, but their personal relationship remained intact. Brzezinski reflects, “I must say [Vance] is really a very pleasant person to deal with. It would be difficult to imagine someone better as Secretary of State in terms of the personal relationship, even though I am often frustrated by what the Department of State stands

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<sup>206</sup> Ibid., 3.

<sup>207</sup> Brzezinski, *Power and Principle*, 37.

<sup>208</sup> Ibid.

for. There is no doubt he is a very good person-extremely loyal, highly dedicated, and willing to do what the President wishes without too much questioning.”<sup>209</sup>

When the international situation began to deteriorate, and Carter’s poll numbers dropped the president began to look towards Brzezinski.<sup>210</sup> Glad explains, “A hardline Cold Warrior at heart, Brzezinski used his superior access and ability to frame issues, control agendas, and find allies to move Carter in the direction Brzezinski desired.”<sup>211</sup> He also became a close friend with the president and the two would often spend time together outside the White House. Carter reflects in his memoirs that, “Zbig had been my primary foreign affairs advisor during my presidential campaign and continued in this role as national security advisor. He and I were in close contact throughout each day and had an excellent personal relationship.”<sup>212</sup> He went on to discuss how, next to his family members, “Zbig would be my favorite seatmate on a long distance trip; we might argue, but I would never be bored.”<sup>213</sup> Brzezinski became the dominant force in the administration.

Carter’s position on foreign affairs weakened in the late 1970s, as he dealt with several international crises that challenged American power and influence abroad. The Iranian Revolution that began in 1978 and resulted in Islamic fundamentalists seizing the U.S. Embassy in Tehran in November 1979 and taking of 50 hostages.<sup>214</sup> Then in December 1979, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan. The situation in the Middle East deteriorated further with the storming of the holy site of Mecca by Muslim extremists in 1979. False reporting in Pakistan that Americans led the attack on the holiest site of Islam resulted in the storming of U.S. Embassy in

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<sup>209</sup> Ibid., 39.

<sup>210</sup> Kaufman, *The Presidency of James Earl Carter, Jr.*, 162.

<sup>211</sup> Glad, *An Outsider in the White House*, 1.

<sup>212</sup> Carter, *White House Diary*, 24.

<sup>213</sup> Ibid.

<sup>214</sup> Carter, *White House Diary*, 367.

Pakistan.<sup>215</sup> As Carter dealt with each of these situations, problems within his own administration became more apparent and led to American disillusionment with his policies.

In the beginning, Carter relied more heavily on Vance over Brzezinski in regards to policy; however, as criticism of his foreign policy increased after the takeover of the U.S. Embassy in Iran, Carter turned to Brzezinski in order to gain more public support.<sup>216</sup> For example, Vance was a strong supporter of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and he thought that the Soviets would more readily agree to the treaty because it had an ending date within five years of its implementation.<sup>217</sup> Glad explains, “But Cyrus Vance found his way blocked by a national security advisor who employed all the tactics noted in the management literature to move Carter in an anti-Soviet direction.”<sup>218</sup> Vance also believed in continuing of the U.S. prohibition of trading uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing facilities and technologies.<sup>219</sup> Brzezinski’s opposition to the treaty contributed to its eventual demise and is an example of the increased difficulties between Carter’s two top foreign policy advisors.

It became evident even during his early years as president that his policy on human rights would also experience problems. In one instance, Carter supported Soviet dissidents because he felt that it was their human right to protest against their government, and he immediately angered the Kremlin.<sup>220</sup> The policy on human rights became inconsistent because even when the U.S. government chastised a government for human rights violations, American corporations would continue to funnel money into the government in order to fulfill contracts.<sup>221</sup> In certain

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<sup>215</sup> Ibid., 371.

<sup>216</sup> Skidmore, *Reversing Course*, 29.

<sup>217</sup> Vance, *Hard Choices*, 453.

<sup>218</sup> Glad, *An Outsider in the White House*, 1.

<sup>219</sup> Vance, *Hard Choices*, 453.

<sup>220</sup> “Human Rights and Good Intentions,” *The New York Times*, January 13, 1978, A22.

<sup>221</sup> Ibid.

situations, Carter was also willing to abandon his moral policies in order to save face or protect American interests.<sup>222</sup> For instance, the damage that Carter's position on human rights caused meant that any nuclear negotiations were tainted with pessimism by non-nuclear countries.<sup>223</sup> For example, Carter's interference with the governments of Argentina, Brazil, and Chile in their efforts to acquire atomic weapons caused problems in diplomatic relations. All three country's were chastised by the U.S. government for human rights violations.

While Carter did bring change to the White House, he also had a difficult time implementing his foreign policy. He committed several diplomatic gaffes during his administration, and he failed to sway his Middle Eastern and Indian allies to follow his policy decisions. For example, during a Middle East tour in 1978, he failed to get King Hussein of Jordan to join him for peace negotiations in Cairo or Indian Prime Minister Desai to agree to his nuclear goals of using the atom for peaceful purposes by allowing the International Atomic Energy Agency to inspect all nuclear weapons and materials.<sup>224</sup> Also, Carter was caught telling Secretary Cyrus Vance that he wanted to send a terse and cold letter to India regarding American concerns with their nuclear program.<sup>225</sup> This statement circulated through the international press and negatively affected Carter's image. Perhaps moving the Middle East countries in line with his policies was unlikely since India's relationship with Pakistan inhibited any possibility that a deal would be possible. The rivalry between Pakistan and India was escalated by India's

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<sup>222</sup> Kaufman, *Plans Unraveled*, 4.

<sup>223</sup> *Ibid.*, 14-15, 55.

<sup>224</sup> "India, the Atom and a Candid Microphone," *New York Times*, January 4, 1978, A18; and James Wooten, "Crowds In India Hail Carter Upon Arrival for 2 Days of Talks: President Gets Biggest Welcome of Trip So Far-Hussein Hints at a Failure in Teheran," *New York Times*, January 4, 1978, 1.

<sup>225</sup> "Carter Caught Unawares in 'Blunt' Remark," *The Washington Post*, January 3, 1978, A12, <http://proquest.umi.com.ezproxy.liberty.edu:2048/pqdweb?index=0&did=136939512&SrchMode=1&sid=10&Fmt=10&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQT=309&VName=HNP&TS=1333820280&clientId=20655> (accessed on April 7, 2012).

acquisition of a nuclear bomb, and Carter did not understand that it was unlikely to give up the nuclear power it had acquired.

In comparison, Carter's broad and undefined foreign policy alienated several foreign officials before he officially took office. When asked what his foreign policy would entail, he told diplomats that it would be similar to Kissinger's and changes would be minimal. However, Carter also discussed the importance he would place on elevating human rights issues around the world, which eventually created problems with the international community. For example, Carter's administration asked the Brazilian government to forgo their nuclear reprocessing aims and torturing its dissidents, but since most Brazilian citizens did not experience their government's violence, they did not understand America's stance.<sup>226</sup> Carter's decision to keep most aspects of Kissinger's foreign policy did help alleviate the transition between the administrations, but the choice to emphasize human rights did put unnecessary strains on relations with U.S. allies.

Carter also had difficulty conveying his ideas and beliefs to the American people. Andrew Katz argues that Carter was unable to gain popular support for any of his foreign policy decisions because he misinterpreted the nature of a post-Vietnam War public opinion.<sup>227</sup> Katz continues, "One key problem for Carter was that presidential leadership of public opinion had become problematic owing to the breakdown of elite consensus on foreign policy and greater public awareness of foreign policy issues."<sup>228</sup> The American public could no longer be convinced of a president's position on his word alone, as it had become pessimistic and

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<sup>226</sup> "Human Rights and Good Intentions," *The New York Times*, January 13, 1978, A22.

<sup>227</sup> Andrew Z. Katz, "Public Opinion and the Contradictions of Jimmy Carter's Foreign Policy," *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, 30:4, (December, 2000) 662.

<sup>228</sup> Ibid.

untrusting of political leadership.<sup>229</sup> In one particular speech from the Oval Office in April 1979, he essentially told the American people that they needed to find alternative sources of energy and limit oil consumption because of an oil crisis.<sup>230</sup> Carter's falling poll numbers and his difficulty swaying Americans towards his ideas limited his ability to convince the American public that his nuclear views were viable.

One of Carter's main concerns, nuclear proliferation, did not become a primary focus of the United States in the Southeast Asian region until India detonated its atomic device in 1974.<sup>231</sup> India began research into atomic power soon after it gained independence. However, the country needed help in order to get the atomic program running and turned to the United States. It signed a thirty-year agreement with the United States in 1959 to build two nuclear reactors in India to provide power fuel.<sup>232</sup> When the United States submitted the nuclear non-proliferation treaty to the world in 1968, India refused to sign the agreement stating that the treaty violated its sovereignty. Instead, India used the technology given to them by the United States to create and detonate an atomic device.<sup>233</sup> The American agreement with India for nuclear power caused tensions with Pakistan and further fueled Pakistan's quest for its own nuclear weapon.<sup>234</sup>

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<sup>229</sup> Ibid., 666.

<sup>230</sup> Mattson, "What the Heck Are You Up To Mr. President?" 20-21.

<sup>231</sup> Kaufman, *Plans Unraveled*, 51.

<sup>232</sup> Ibid., 52; "Telegram from Department of State to the Embassy in India," May 15, 1959, *FRUS 1958-1960*, Volume XV, *South and Southeast Asia*, 491-492, <http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu/cgi-bin/FRUS/FRUS-idx?type=turn&entity=FRUS.FRUS195860v15.p0522&id=FRUS.FRUS195860v15&isize=M&q1=india&q2=reactor&q3=nuclear> (accessed on April 7, 2012).

<sup>233</sup> Ibid. There are only three countries in the world that have not signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Israel, India and Pakistan they and believed that signing the treaty would infringe on their sovereign rights.

<sup>234</sup> "Progress Report on U.S. Policy Towards South Asia," March 30, 1956, *FRUS 1955-1957*, Volume VIII, *South Asia*, <http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu/cgi-bin/FRUS/FRUS-idx?type=goto&id=FRUS.FRUS195557v08&isize=M&submit=Go+to+page&page=8> (accessed January 12, 2012).

Although it happened before Carter's time in office, the impacts of the non-proliferation directly impacted Carter's negotiations concerning of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

One of Carter's early goals was to extend arms control and increase the power of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. According to Hedrick Smith, "The President...has an almost "theological belief" in arms control."<sup>235</sup> This strong belief in limiting the expansion of arms to non-nuclear countries became the focus of his administration with Pakistan and its fledgling nuclear program being one of the most important. He also wished to limit China's ability to spread nuclear information to the rest of the world. At the time, China was clandestinely feeding information to Pakistan, which was contrary to his policy of ending the spread of nuclear weapons and information.<sup>236</sup>

In order to combat the weaknesses of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, Carter's administration began to create a new treaty, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Carter first discussed it during his presidential campaign and described as a five-year deal to halt all nuclear explosions and to continue limits on the proliferation of weapons.<sup>237</sup> The end result was the development Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, which included guidelines for nuclear testing and limited test explosions. Several countries had refused to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty and Carter hoped that the new treaty would bring the international community together in agreement on nuclear issues.<sup>238</sup> According to State Department officials, "We believe that states, which accept a CTBT, will have less incentive to develop nuclear weapons. For example, to acquire the full "prestige" of possessing nuclear weapons, a state would need to demonstrate its

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<sup>235</sup> Smith, "Carter Shapes Foreign Policy: Washington is Impressed by His Initial Efforts," A9.

<sup>236</sup> Ibid.

<sup>237</sup> "Uneasy Homecoming" *The New York Times*, May 16, 1976, 139.

<sup>238</sup> "Non-Proliferation Value of a 3-Year Comprehensive Test Ban," 1.

capability with a nuclear test.”<sup>239</sup> The influence of the nuclear prestige factor on Indian and Pakistan laid the foundation for the development of atomic weapons. Possessing a nuclear weapon could move a country away from the stigma of poverty and into the twentieth century. The memo goes on to explain, “In addition, states motivated by national security concerns would encounter substantial uncertainties in perfecting their untested nuclear devices or designing more sophisticated weapons without testing.”<sup>240</sup>

The hope for the CTBT was to create an agreement that could be signed by Non-Proliferation Treaty countries in order to help limit the spread proliferation. The CTBT became Carter’s answer to the lingering doubts regarding the Non-Proliferation Treaty in the international community. The problem with the previously created Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty was the feeling among Third World countries that the treaty was designed to favor Western countries. Kaufman explains, “Nonetheless, as in the case of human rights, the president never seemed able to come to grips with implementing the nuclear nonproliferation initiative. Indeed, as in the case of human rights, he found he could not compartmentalize policies; rather, he had to compromise one initiative in the name of another. Such became apparent in U.S. nonproliferation policy toward South Asia.”<sup>241</sup>

Kaufman continues, “In general, the inability to test would reduce the advantages of acquiring nuclear weapons and would therefore diminish the incentive to undertake a weapons development program.”<sup>242</sup> For example, India, Israel, and Pakistan did not sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty because they believed the treaty violated their sovereignty and there was also a belief that the treaty put developing countries at a disadvantage to established nuclear

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<sup>239</sup> Ibid., 2.

<sup>240</sup> Ibid.

<sup>241</sup> Kaufman, *Plans Unraveled*, 52.

<sup>242</sup> Ibid., 2.

nations.<sup>243</sup> India specifically objected to the treaty because it allowed Western countries to detonate weapons for stockpile maintenance but not for weapons development, which is what India needed in order to complete its program.<sup>244</sup> The CTBT also served to extend Carter's strong beliefs in non-proliferation that he proclaimed during his campaign. The administration claimed, "By demonstrating the willingness of the nuclear powers to accept restraints on their own nuclear capabilities Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty would put the U.S. in a stronger position to carry out our non-proliferation strategy. We could better press key non-nuclear states to accept restrictions on their activities."<sup>245</sup>

The successful test of an Indian nuclear weapon in 1974 alarmed Pakistan and turned its attention from nuclear energy to the quest for an atomic bomb that could compete with India's. Pakistan's quest for nuclear energy began in 1965 when it negotiated a deal with Canada to create a "heavy water reactor, the Karachi Nuclear Power Plant (KANUPP)."<sup>246</sup> Pakistan was at a distinct disadvantage with India in the race for an atomic bomb because it lacked the capacity to reprocess the nuclear waste from the reactor.<sup>247</sup> Pakistan had to reach an agreement with another nuclear power to turn its irradiated uranium into weapons grade plutonium. The United States wished to limit Pakistan's ability to create a weapon and imposed harsh economic sanctions in 1978; so, Pakistan looked to other, more favorable governments, for a deal. France

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<sup>243</sup> General David. C. Jones, U.S.A.F. Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of Defense, "The Secretary of State," 1, NSA, <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb333/index.htm> (accessed December 9, 2011).

<sup>244</sup> Ibid.

<sup>245</sup> "Non-Proliferation Value of a Comprehensive Test Ban," July 10, 1978, Memorandum for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1, NSA, <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb333/index.htm> (accessed February 2, 2012).

<sup>246</sup> Ibid., 52.

<sup>247</sup> Ibid.

eventually did brokered a deal with Pakistan in order to create a reprocessing facility; however, American pressure forced it to abandon the project.<sup>248</sup>

Carter was particularly uneven in his handling of Pakistan and India because in most situations he leaned favorably towards India, in spite of its weapons program. Kaufman writes, “Strategically, Carter determined that close relations with India were more vital to the protection of U.S. interests in the region than ties with Pakistan.”<sup>249</sup> Kaufman also argues that during his tenure as president, Carter’s inclination towards India could be attributed to his own fascination with India since his mother spent time in the country as a member of the Peace Corps.<sup>250</sup> Carter also supported the recent return to democracy and fair elections in India after the previous Prime Minister, Indira Gandhi, declared a two-year state emergency and did not allow elections. Pakistan was relatively stable under the leadership of General Zia, but his regime was brutal and free government elections were not held during his ten-year rule.

Carter also had significant problems with India in terms on the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty since the country did not want to limit its nuclear expansion. In a memo detailing the benefits of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, “Indian adherence to a CTB (Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty) would formalize Desai's (the Prime Minister of India) promise not to explode any more nuclear devices and extend this pledge beyond his term in office; only within the context of a comprehensive and non-discriminatory treaty would we expect India to adhere to a CTB.”<sup>251</sup> Carter hoped that getting India to agree to the CTBT would influence Pakistan’s desire to acquire an atomic device. In another memo,

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<sup>248</sup> Ibid., 53.

<sup>249</sup> Ibid.

<sup>250</sup> Ibid.

<sup>251</sup> “Non-Proliferation Value of a Comprehensive Test Ban,” July 10, 1978, NSA, 5, <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb333/doc03.pdf>, (accessed on December 9, 2011).

“Prime Minister Desai has indicated India is likely to agree to an adequate CTB, which would at least temporarily obligate India to refrain from further nuclear tests. In addition, a CTB and a successful conclusion of SALT II are two of Desai's conditions for acceptance of full-scope safeguards on India's nuclear facilities. While we cannot predict the final Indian decision, a limited duration CTB would clearly be more likely to influence the Indians than no treaty at all.”<sup>252</sup>

Carter's shelved several of his initiatives as he began to move towards a more hardline, Soviet centric policy in the latter half of his administration.<sup>253</sup> The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty was one of several initiatives that hit a dead end in favor of trying to contain the Soviet threat after the invasion Afghanistan.<sup>254</sup> The policy also failed because of opposition from “Congress, the Pentagon, and the Energy Department to any proposal that might indefinitely suspend nuclear testing.”<sup>255</sup> Carter's efforts to limiting the testing and acquisition of atomic weapons received some positive reviews, but the policy was a failure in the reality of the international climate of Soviet pressure and proliferation.

In order to help determine what U.S. aid would be given abroad, the Glenn Amendment became the standard document to determine what countries would be eligible for aid. Originally called the Symington Amendment, the Congress renamed the amendment for its strongest supporter, former astronaut and then Senator John Glenn; the Glenn Amendment stated that no aid could be given to a country actively seeking nuclear technology or a country that abused human rights.<sup>256</sup> “The Symington [Glenn] Amendment,” the NSA noted in June 1977. “Requires

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<sup>252</sup> “Background Paper, Non-Proliferation Value of a 3-year Comprehensive Test Ban,” 2.

<sup>253</sup> Kaufman, *Plans Unraveled*, 241.

<sup>254</sup> *Ibid.*, 215.

<sup>255</sup> *Ibid.*, 129.

<sup>256</sup> Brzezinski, *Power and Principle*, 133.

us to terminate economic and military assistance if Pakistan receives reprocessing equipment, material or technology.”<sup>257</sup>

Brzezinski explains, "Seeking to bolster its position in and around the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf, Carter sought to restore ties with the government of Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq. Citing human rights violations by Islamabad as well as Pakistan's apparent effort to develop nuclear weapons, the Carter administration in 1977 had suspended economic aid to Pakistan, and withdrawn an offer to sell A-7 fighter jets to that nation.”<sup>258</sup> After reviewing Pakistan’s economic and military situation, Carter decided to reestablish aid to Pakistan, but in a later review he decided to rescind his promise of monetary aid only to reestablish support after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. This backwards and forwards approach showed the Pakistanis that the United States was an unstable ally that would give and take monetary aid quickly without much concern for the Pakistanis. Carter only decided to aid Pakistan when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan and the U.S. government used Pakistan in order to help smuggle weapons and supplies to the freedom fighters in Afghanistan.<sup>259</sup>

President Carter began his presidency with a belief in a new world order, free from the fear of an atomic attack and based in strong moral leadership from the United States. The development of this ideal world did not come to fruition despite valiant efforts. Carter campaigned on his belief in the limitations of atomic weapons and the CTBT showed his dedication to the mission and his desire to include all countries including Pakistan. The failure of the treaty was due to a variety of factors, but Carter’s push for a potentially unpopular treaty

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<sup>257</sup> “Pakistan’s Purchase of a Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing Plant: The Symington Amendment and Consultations with Congress,” June 23, 1977, NSA, 2, <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb333/doc03.pdf>, (accessed on December 9, 2011).

<sup>258</sup> Ibid., 217.

<sup>259</sup> Ibid.

shows his dedication. Although he was not entirely successful with his goals and agenda, his passion impacted America as he tried to lead it to a future without atomic weaponry.

### Chapter 3 – Pakistan, A Nuclear Country

The proliferation of nuclear weapons was an international trend that President Jimmy Carter sought to end during his presidency. When it became clear that Pakistan had devoted itself to the acquisition of nuclear materials with the ultimate goal of building an atomic weapon, the Carter administration began the difficult task of trying to rein in a country that believed nuclear weapons meant security. A contract between France and Pakistan to build a nuclear reprocessing facility, a plant that could take spent nuclear fuel rods and turn them into weapons grade plutonium, became a great concern to the international community and especially the United States.<sup>260</sup> In order to try and contain the threat, the United States began an international campaign to limit Pakistan's access to nuclear materials. Messages and briefings between the U.S. government and her allies abroad showed great concern regarding a nuclear Pakistan and reveal the variety of steps the international community took to slow down the South Asian country. The international interaction also shows the failure of the Carter administration to halt Pakistan's nuclear ambitions and demonstrates that Carter's policies had minimal effects on a country dedicated to the development of a nuclear weapon.

Pakistani Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's greatest goal while in office was to develop an atomic weapon for Pakistan and he began his efforts soon after he came to power in 1971.<sup>261</sup> Pakistan had a strong history of scientific endeavors, which laid the groundwork for Bhutto's atomic quest.<sup>262</sup> In January 1972, Bhutto hastily called together fifty of Pakistan's top scientists and government officials for what was to be a secret meeting to discuss the country's

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<sup>260</sup> Milton R. Benjamin, "Pakistan Says France Killing Controversial Nuclear Deal," *The Washington Post*, August 24, 1978, A1.

<sup>261</sup> Weissman and Krosney, *The Islamic Bomb*, 42.

<sup>262</sup> *Ibid.*, 43.

nuclear options.<sup>263</sup> Pakistan's nuclear program began to intensify after 1974 as a reaction to India's detonation of an atomic device. In order to justify its ambitions to the international community, Pakistan argued publically that its need for security against India and the prestige of being a nuclear country justified its actions. The United States believed that Pakistan's motivation in its quest for nuclear weapons was the prestige factor, which would allow it to move beyond its Third World status.<sup>264</sup> However, other reports suggested that the country was more strongly influenced by its belief that India threatened its national security.<sup>265</sup> With several conflicts occurring between 1949-1971, Pakistan felt constantly threatened by its Hindu neighbor and hoped that by developing its own atomic device the countries would again be equal rivals.

The unpublicized reason Pakistan wanted an atomic weapon was to cement itself as a powerful member of the Muslim community.<sup>266</sup> This was probably the most troubling to the Carter administration since it had no reasoning other than to promote antagonism with non-Muslim countries, specifically Israel and India, and to eventually spread nuclear technology to unstable Middle Eastern countries.<sup>267</sup> Before he was disposed, Pakistani Prime Bhutto also supported the Muslim theory as he claimed that Pakistan was close to becoming a nuclear state and "he pointed out that only the Muslim world was without nuclear capability and said Pakistan would share the technology with Islamic states."<sup>268</sup> He also stated that Pakistan would "eat

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<sup>263</sup> Ibid., 42.

<sup>264</sup> Vance, *Hard Choices*, 23.

<sup>265</sup> "Pakistan Nuclear Study," April 26, 1978, 3, NSA, <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb333/doc05.pdf>, (accessed on December 9, 2011).

<sup>266</sup> Ibid.

<sup>267</sup> Nawaz, *Crossed Swords*, xxxvi.

<sup>268</sup> "U.S. Demarche on Pakistani Reprocessing Plant," November 4, 1978, NSA, <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb352/doc12.pdf>, (accessed on December 9, 2011), 3.

grass” in order to acquire a nuclear weapon.<sup>269</sup> Bhutto’s successor, General Zia, explained his country’s Muslim outlook in an interview in July 1978. Zia stated, “No Muslim country has any (atomic arms). If Pakistan possesses such a weapon it would reinforce the power of the Muslim world.”<sup>270</sup> The United States considered this comment to be a political gaffe for Zia and found all these statements disquieting.<sup>271</sup>

In the mid-1960s, Pakistan placed an order with Canada to build a nuclear power plant that would largely be financed by the Muslim world.<sup>272</sup> At the time, the Canadians were actively looking for nuclear export orders and the facility would eventually supply some 137 million watts of electricity for the Pakistanis.<sup>273</sup> They built the civilian standard Candu natural uranium reactor at the Karachi Nuclear Power Plant [KANUPP] in February 1974. The benefit of this reactor for Pakistan is that the design allowed it to potentially build nuclear weapons covertly.<sup>274</sup> This plant design left large caches of irradiated fuel that could be reprocessed into weapons-grade plutonium.<sup>275</sup> Steve Weissman and Herbert Krosney explain, “[Prime Minister] Bhutto’s plan... was to use the plutonium from the Candu reactor to make his first atom bombs.”<sup>276</sup> However, Pakistan needed a reprocessing plant to recycle the spent fuel rods before they could develop nuclear weapons. France soon agreed to fill this void and supply the reprocessing facility that would allow Pakistan to expand its fledgling nuclear program.

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<sup>269</sup> William Burr, “The United States and Pakistan's Quest for the Bomb,” NSA, <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb333/index.htm>, (accessed on December 9, 2011).

<sup>270</sup> “Nuclear Reprocessing,” August 6, 1978, NSA, <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb333/index.htm>, (accessed on December 9, 2011).

<sup>271</sup> Ibid.

<sup>272</sup> Weissman and Krosney, *The Islamic Bomb*, 63, 66.

<sup>273</sup> Ibid., 66.

<sup>274</sup> Ibid., 67.

<sup>275</sup> Ibid.

<sup>276</sup> Ibid.

In 1976, Pakistan signed the deal with France to build a reprocessing facility that would process irradiated nuclear reactor fuel into plutonium suitable for weapons or energy.<sup>277</sup> There were immediate concerns in the international community that Pakistan wished to use the French plant to create weapons-grade nuclear material. *New York Times* reporter Jonathan Kandell explained, “Despite Pakistani assertions that the plutonium extracted from its French plant would not be used for military purposes, there have been widespread fears that Pakistan would seek to build a nuclear bomb to counter India’s breakthrough.”<sup>278</sup> The fuel produced from the French process would not be useable for fifteen to twenty years, but the Carter administration saw the reprocessing as an unnecessary risk.<sup>279</sup> The potential of the plant worried President Carter and was in contrast to his non-proliferation goals.

At the time the original reprocessing deal with France was completed, Pakistan was under the leadership of Bhutto. When Bhutto came to power in 1971, the country was in disarray after the civil war in 1971 and Bhutto soon became the dominant political power as the leader the Pakistan’s People Party. Bhutto played a strong leadership role during the war and he became a critical force in the rebuilding of Pakistan. When he called for elections amidst mounting political pressure in 1976, his influence over the people had waned.<sup>280</sup> Bhutto was confident that his countrymen would vote for his party in overwhelming numbers, but the opposition party managed to gain traction at the last minute and seemed headed to victory the election.<sup>281</sup> Bhutto’s party, the Pakistan’s People Party, won the election in 1977 with a remarkable 93% of

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<sup>277</sup> “Approach to Pakistan Concerning Sensitive Nuclear Facilities,” February 19, 1976, *FRUS 1973-1976*, Volume E-8, *Documents on South Asia*, 1, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve08/d224>, (accessed on April 9, 2012).

<sup>278</sup> Jonathan Kandell, “French Seek to Add Safeguards to Nuclear Pact with Pakistan,” *The New York Times*, January 10, 1978, 1.

<sup>279</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>280</sup> “Bhutto Hangs On, but His Troubles Grow,” *Time* 109:18 (May 2, 1977): 46.

<sup>281</sup> “Bitter Victory,” *Time* 109:15 (April 11, 1977): 56.

the vote.

Allegations of rigged elections soon abounded since the opposition party strongholds went suspiciously to the Pakistan's People Party.<sup>282</sup> Opposition party members took to the streets and began riots that resulted in looting and civilian deaths.<sup>283</sup> According to Henry Kissinger, "Bhutto destroyed himself by seeking a popular mandate too rapidly and then manipulating the electoral result."<sup>284</sup> The military responded to the mixed election results by leading a coup d'état's in March 1977. On July 5, 1977, military officials arrested Bhutto for the attempted murder of a political opponent, Ajmad Raza Kasuri, and tampering with election results.<sup>285</sup> Another charge against Bhutto was that he was a Muslim in name only, and he did not have the right to represent a Muslim country.<sup>286</sup> The military, under the command of General Mohammad Zia, committed a bloodless coup in order to stabilize the country and established martial law.<sup>287</sup> The arrest and eventual trial of Bhutto showed the strength of the military in determining the course of the country.

The Bhutto trial commenced in 1977. During the trial, Bhutto argued that any judgment would be biased towards a guilty verdict because General Zia and other generals thought that Bhutto's obstructed their future plans for an indefinite rule.<sup>288</sup> One of the court judges and General Zia both expressed their belief in a guilty conviction and any evidence Bhutto was

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<sup>282</sup> "Sir, the Troops Have Come," 35.

<sup>283</sup> Ibid.

<sup>284</sup> Kissinger, *Years of Renewal*, 676.

<sup>285</sup> "Pakistan Bans All Political Activity for One Month," *The Washington Post*, March 1, 1978, A16.

<sup>286</sup> "Bhutto Appeals His Death Sentence, Saying Judges Were Prejudiced," *New York Times*, March 26, 1978, 2, "Of the Court's 406-page judgment, the appeal said an implication that Mr. Bhutto was a Moslem in name only and therefore not fit to be Prime Minister of this Islamic country was a strong legal reason for reversing the conviction."

<sup>287</sup> William Borders, "Pakistani Faces Biggest Decision," *New York Times*, March 25, 1978, 2.

<sup>288</sup> Borders, "Pakistani Faces Biggest Decision: Whether Convicted Bhutto Will Die," 2.

allowed to submit at trial was in a closed court session.<sup>289</sup> Most of the evidence provided in the trial was hearsay and would not have been admissible in most Western courts of law.<sup>290</sup>

Reporter Hugh Trevor-Roper reflects that, “The basic fact is that the army is the sole public force in Pakistan, and having generally ruled the country, presumes that it has a natural right to rule.”<sup>291</sup> Bhutto’s arrest and trial proved that the military would retain power at any cost and that all public officials were subject to its whims. The Pakistani court ultimately found him guilty and sentenced him to death.

Bhutto initially refused to appeal his death sentence on the basis that his appeal would legitimize a process that he thought was biased from the beginning.<sup>292</sup> After a review with his attorneys, Bhutto decided to file an appeal. Bhutto’s lawyers insisted that countries around the world, especially the United States, should raise concerns over the ruling. Attorney Yahya Bakhtiar stated, “the countries that care about human rights-and especially the Americans-should raise their voices against it.” He declared, “The man never had a fair trial and he must not be killed.”<sup>293</sup> Amnesty International protested the death sentence on humanitarian groups and condemned the government for its decision that “it saw as the high-handed authoritarianism of the Zia government.”<sup>294</sup> Other countries that protested the decision were Libya and the United Arab Emirates and as Islamic states, they carried a lot of weight. President Carter reacted with great concern to Pakistan’s treatment of Bhutto. In line with his policy of encouraging and engaging in human rights, Carter sent several letters to General Zia and requested clemency for

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<sup>289</sup> “Bhutto’s Fate and Pakistan’s Future,” *The New York Times*, March 21, 1978, 34.

<sup>290</sup> Hugh Trevor-Roper, “Bhutto’s Fate,” *New York Times*, June 24, 1978, 19.

<sup>291</sup> Ibid.

<sup>292</sup> “Bhutto’s Fate and Pakistan’s Future,” 34.

<sup>293</sup> William Borders, “Bhutto’s Lawyer Urges World Pressure to Save Him,” *The New York Times*, March 20, 1978, A3.

<sup>294</sup> Borders, “Pakistani Faces Biggest Decision” 2.

the deposed Prime Minister. In his diary, Carter states; “I sent another message to General [Muhammad] Zia [in Pakistan], asking him on humanitarian grounds to spare the life of [former president Zulfikar Ali] Bhutto.”<sup>295</sup> The president’s request did not move Zia, and Bhutto was hung a week later.<sup>296</sup>

Bhutto’s arrest brought about a string of extremist violence to the country. In one instance, four young men doused themselves with gasoline and burned themselves alive in a protest against Bhutto’s conviction and impending execution. As the young men died, they chanted “Free Bhutto now” and vowed that more violence would happen if Bhutto were executed.<sup>297</sup> *The New York Times* also reported that, “already there are reports of thousands of new jailing’s by the Zia regime.”<sup>298</sup> Bhutto’s arrest also stunned the Pakistani people because he was the leader who pulled Pakistan out of its demoralizing defeat over Bangladesh and had successfully led the country for five and a half years. The idea that he would be put to death troubled large sections of the population.<sup>299</sup> Instability in the region also increased as the government struggled to maintain control over a radicalized population influenced by the growth of conservative Islam within the government.<sup>300</sup> Islam had always been an important part of life in Pakistan and influenced the decision to create a separate Muslim country from India, but as Islam became increasingly radicalized in the late 1970s it was incorporated into the government of Muslim dominated countries.<sup>301</sup>

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<sup>295</sup> Carter, *White House Diary*, 309.

<sup>296</sup> *Ibid.* 364-365.

<sup>297</sup> Borders, “Bhutto’s Life-and Pakistan’s Future-in the Hands of Eight Judges,” *The New York Times*, November 29, 1978, A23.

<sup>298</sup> “Bhutto’s Fate and Pakistan’s Future,” *The New York Times*, March 21, 1978, 34.

<sup>299</sup> William Borders, “Pakistani Faces Biggest Decision,” 2.

<sup>300</sup> Lesch, 1979, 105.

<sup>301</sup> Goldberg and Ambinder, “The Ally from Hell,” 52.

Zia played an important role with the development and governance of Pakistan during the Carter administration and was a key figure in Pakistan's development of the atomic bomb.<sup>302</sup> A journalist described Zia as “a tough professional soldier in the spit-and-polish tradition of the British-trained Pakistan Army.”<sup>303</sup> Zia took his opportunity in the confusion after the election to take control of the country and enforce martial law. Under military leadership, Zia's government drastically changed it from a Western tradition to an ideological regime based on traditional Muslim beliefs. Rashid explains, “He (Zia) frequently invoked a ‘divine mission’: ‘I have a mission, given by God, to bring Islamic order to Pakistan,’ he said in 1978. Zia banned politics and censored the media, while his new Islamic laws victimized non-Muslim minorities and women.”<sup>304</sup>

A devout Muslim, Zia also increased the presence of Islam in every part of Pakistan's government including the inclusion of Islamists in the military and the sponsorship of militant Islam. Rashid states, “after launching a coup against Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Mohammad Ziaul Haq, once an obscure general known for his personal piety, religiosity, and humility, turned into a ferocious instrument of change for Pakistan.”<sup>305</sup> For example, Pakistan sent military supplies to Afghanistan to help them resist the Soviet invasion in December 1979; and censorship, public floggings, and torture became more common forms of punishment as the government became more extreme.<sup>306</sup> Zia also used Islam in order to justify the military dictatorship that he created

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<sup>302</sup> Nawaz, *Crossed Swords*, 359.

<sup>303</sup> Borders, “Bhutto's Life-and Pakistan's Future-in the Hands of Eight Judges,” A23.

<sup>304</sup> Rashid, *Descent into Chaos*, 38.

<sup>305</sup> Ibid.

<sup>306</sup> Rashid, *Decent into Chaos*, 38. A new article on [dailymail.co.uk](http://www.dailymail.co.uk) explains that Zia is remembered by the Pakistani people as a dictator who would throw couples in jail for failing to produce their marriage certificates. Daniel Miller, “‘Are you married?': Pakistani TV host dubbed the 'vigil-auntie' sacked after haranguing couples for 'immoral behaviour' in parks” <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2093498/Pakistani-TV-host-sacked-haranguing->

and lavished millions of dollars in gifts on his generals, creating a new class of wealthy generals who increased the power and influence of the military for future generations.<sup>307</sup>

Pakistan's complicated history of conflict between an underdeveloped political system and an overly developed military system, allowed the power of the military apparatus to grow. Shuja Nawaz reports, "Pakistan's history is one of conflict between an underdeveloped political system and a well organized army that grew in numbers and political strength as a counter weight to a hostile India next door in relation to the domestic political system." Former Army Chief General Jehangir Karamat claimed: "Whenever there is a breakdown in stability, as has happened frequently in Pakistan, the military translates its potential into the will to dominate, and we have military intervention followed by military rule."<sup>308</sup> Pakistan's military state played an important role in the development of Pakistan's atomic bomb as the dominate power in the South Asian country.

The U.S. reaction to Pakistan during the Carter administration varied from a close relationship to a slightly hostile one over the nuclear issue. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance explained, "In South Asia, mutual suspicions between India and Pakistan harm the security of both and heighten the regional danger. We will continue to support their efforts to resolve the issues dividing them. We seek good relations with both. Our assistance to either one is not directed at the other."<sup>309</sup> The recognition of these tensions showed that the Carter Administration had a basic understanding of the roots of the Pakistani atomic program.<sup>310</sup>

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[couples-immoral-behaviour-public-parks.html](#), (accessed on 30th January 2012).

<sup>307</sup> Nawaz, *Crossed Swords*, 360.

<sup>308</sup> *Ibid.*, xxvii.

<sup>309</sup> Cyrus Vance, *Hard Choices*, 507.

<sup>310</sup> *Ibid.*

Zia believed Pakistan's ability to develop a reprocessing facility was crucial for the country's ability to become an atomic power and reacted negatively when the United States began to pressure France in 1977 to end its contract with Pakistan.<sup>311</sup> In September 1977, French Prime Minister Raymond Barre mentioned to Carter privately the sale of nuclear reprocessing equipment to Pakistan.<sup>312</sup> The United States experienced some success in dissuading France from completing the contract, and France announced in January 1978 after a visit from President Carter that it would possibly consider altering Pakistan's contract.<sup>313</sup> Jonathan Kandell reported, "President Carter, who visited here [France] last week, has been seeking the cooperation of other Western countries in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons by the sale to developing countries of reprocessing equipment that produces fissionable plutonium."<sup>314</sup> For example, Carter also put pressure on West Germany to end its contract with Brazil, leading to a considerable cooling of the relations between the United States, West Germany, and Brazil.<sup>315</sup>

The United States was aware of the strict differences in the danger between a simple weapons ready device that could only be tested once and a weapons system that could attack other countries systematically.<sup>316</sup> As the Pakistanis ran out of nuclear materials, the United States knew that they would look to other countries, like China, in order to alleviate the strain or they would develop other materials that were not up to international standards.<sup>317</sup> The Pakistanis had made a recent discovery of a 150-ton deposit of uranium that could be mined and refined for weapons grade energy. Pakistan had also approached Niger for uranium since the mining in

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<sup>311</sup> "Pakistan Nuclear Study," April 26, 1978, 3, NSA, <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb333/index.htm>, (accessed on December 9, 2011).

<sup>312</sup> Carter, *White House Diary*, 98.

<sup>313</sup> Kandell, "French Seek to Add Safeguards to Nuclear Pact with Pakistan," 1.

<sup>314</sup> Ibid.

<sup>315</sup> Ibid.

<sup>316</sup> Ibid., 5.

<sup>317</sup> Ibid.

Pakistan would take time and the African nation did not have strong restrictions on its uranium exports.<sup>318</sup>

In a letter to the Deputy Secretary of State, the special presidential representative for non-proliferation matters Gerard Smith tried to explain that Pakistan's development of nuclear weapons posed one of the greatest international threats since 1945.<sup>319</sup> Smith believed that rewarding Pakistan with military and economic aid would not end Pakistani's quest for the atomic bomb, although he believed that an Indian/Pakistani alliance could have the potential to end the nuclear stand off.<sup>320</sup> Smith claimed, "If Pakistan persists, India is bound to develop nuclear weapons and then where does the process stop."<sup>321</sup>

For its nuclear power facility KANUPP, the United States estimated that Pakistan's supplies would be exhausted by the summer of 1978 since Canada was no longer supplying the nuclear fuel. Pakistan had previously relied upon Canada for heavy water, fuel, spare parts, and emergency repairs for the reactor since the Canadians originally built the reactor.<sup>322</sup> After India detonated its atomic bomb from a plant and material supplied by Canada, the Canadian government decided that it would end its nuclear cooperation program and generally limit its own ability to spread nuclear technology.<sup>323</sup> Pakistan's dedication to a nuclear reprocessing plant only solidified Canada's decision.<sup>324</sup> The United States considered China as a potential replacement for Canada as the supplier of fuel for the reprocessing facility.<sup>325</sup> The Chinese had

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<sup>318</sup> "Pakistan Nuclear Study," 4.

<sup>319</sup> "Memorandum to the Deputy Secretary," March 27, 1979, NSA, <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb333/doc32c.pdf>, (accessed on December 9, 2011).

<sup>320</sup> Ibid., 1.

<sup>321</sup> Ibid.

<sup>322</sup> Ibid., 13.

<sup>323</sup> "Pakistan Nuclear Study," 1; and Weissman and Krosney, *The Islamic Bomb*, 166.

<sup>324</sup> Weissman and Krosney, *The Islamic Bomb*, 166.

<sup>325</sup> Ibid.

limited experience utilizing heavy water reactors and the facility they built lacked all the technical achievements of Western nuclear powers. Pakistan's nuclear power facility was only the first step in the quest for an atomic device, but the international community's decision to restrict exports of nuclear material limited Pakistan's ability to expand its nuclear pursuit.

The close relations between France and the United States in regards to the Pakistani issue meant that American officials learned of France's decision to suspend its contract before the Pakistanis.<sup>326</sup> U.S. officials met with French officials for a couple of days to discuss the issue of the reprocessing plant and if France would honor the original contract. The French informed the United States that it would end the contract for the reprocessing facility on May 29, 1978, before Pakistan officially was scheduled to receive the news on May 31. Two American goals after Pakistan received the news were to temper the Pakistani reaction to France and to dissuade them from trying to develop the nuclear option on their own.<sup>327</sup> In keeping with Carter's foreign policy, the United States kept the Iranian Shah informed of the decision as well as reassured India regarding its security concerns.<sup>328</sup>

The French were upset that U.S. Ambassador Art Hummel informed the Chinese Ambassador to Pakistan regarding the French decision to end the reprocessing deal before the Pakistanis were informed.<sup>329</sup> The initiative that Hummel took damaged French-Pakistan relations because the decision was supposed to be confidential and France looked like it bowed

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<sup>326</sup> Ibid., 172-173.

<sup>327</sup> "Reprocessing Issue," May 1978, NSA, 1-2, <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb333/index.htm>, (accessed on December 9, 2011) 1.

<sup>328</sup> Ibid., 2.

<sup>329</sup> Ibid.

to pressure from the United States, something the European country was desperate to avoid.<sup>330</sup>

The French also expressed their belief that the Chinese sided with Pakistan on the security concerns and supported Pakistan's quest for an atomic bomb.<sup>331</sup> Close relations with France did allow the United States to influence the cessation of France's Pakistan deal, although the decision had unforeseen consequences for the U.S. relations with the European country.

In order to offer an official response, France's Prime Minister Giscard sent a letter to Pakistan explaining the reasoning for the cessation of the reprocessing plant and followed this with a visit by Andre Jacomet, the Secretary of France's official Council on Foreign Nuclear Policy.<sup>332</sup> The Giscard letter actually held little information on the processing plant and instead discussed the possibility of changing the processing plant from one "capable of producing pure weapons-grade plutonium." The purpose of the facility is the manufacture of the byproduct of the enriched uranium from the power plants and reprocessing the material into "'dirty' plutonium mixed with uranium that is unsuitable for atomic arms."<sup>333</sup> The implications in the letter were clear. There would be no more shipments to the plant and the contract was terminated. Pakistan's initial opposition to Giscard's letter was because the Pakistanis were interested in the development of atomic weapons and not just atomic energy like they claimed. Pakistan demanded that the French review the decision, reinstate the original contract, and build the plant. It argued that all international guidelines had been followed to prevent the misuse of the plutonium, and there was no need cancel the project.<sup>334</sup>

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<sup>330</sup> "French Complaint Concerning U.S. Action on Pakistan Reprocessing Plant," August 1, 1978, 1-2, NSA, <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb333/index.htm>, (accessed on December 9, 2011).

<sup>331</sup> Ibid.

<sup>332</sup> Weissman and Krosney, *The Islamic Bomb*, 171-172.

<sup>333</sup> Ibid.

<sup>334</sup> "French Complaint Concerning U.S. Action on Pakistan Reprocessing Plant," 2.

The United States wanted an official Pakistani response to the letter in order to make sure that the understanding of the termination was clear. French representative Jacomet explained that there would be no official response from France in order to avoid public backlash by the Gaullist opposition supported by Jacques Chirac.<sup>335</sup> The French did not believe an official response would be necessary in order to inform the United States that all nuclear exports from France had ceased and they also believed that there would be no more word from Pakistan on the issue.<sup>336</sup> Jacomet believed that the entire situation with Pakistan had resolved itself with minimal problems and that the United States should move toward the resumption of assistance in order to increase the probability of moderation.<sup>337</sup>

The United States did not confirm if it had made any decisions regarding demarches following the France's decision to terminate the contract.<sup>338</sup> The State Department claimed, "We are now reviewing our position on resumption of aid and military sales to Pakistan but have not yet taken any firm decisions. An assurance from the French that the reprocessing deal is definitely off and that no transfers of equipment, materials or technology have been made since enactment of the Glenn Amendment (August 4, 1977) would be very useful when we consult with key members of congress."<sup>339</sup> Regardless of France's termination of the contract, the

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<sup>335</sup> "Smith-Jacomet Meeting: French Position On Cancellation of Pakistan Reprocessing Plant Contract," September 13, 1978, *Cold War International History Project*, 1-2, <http://legacy.wilsoncenter.org/va2/docs/Doc%204-B.pdf> (accessed on March 28, 2012).

<sup>336</sup> Ibid.

<sup>337</sup> "Exdis Handle as Nodis," September 1, 1978, 1, NSA, <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb333/index.htm>, (accessed on December 9, 2011).

<sup>338</sup> "Background of the French Decision had Stressed that the GOF had Offered the Paks Various Alternatives Consistent with the Contract," September 24, 1978, NSA, <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb333/index.htm>, (accessed on December 9, 2011).

<sup>339</sup> "Next Steps on Pakistan Reprocessing Deal," September 1978, NSA, 2, <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb333/index.htm>, (accessed on December 9, 2011).

United States was still nervous about reestablishing aid with Pakistan based upon its history and the beliefs of congressional members and intelligence reports.<sup>340</sup>

Since the French reprocessing plant option had been eliminated, the United States expected Pakistan to research other options including the development of an “indigenous centrifuge enrichment capability.”<sup>341</sup> The threat of an indigenous facility was not immediate since the Pakistani’s lacked the suppliers and sensitive equipment needed to finish the plant. However, there was some concern that the Pakistani’s would try to finish the French plant, even if it they would be a smaller, less efficient, and less sophisticated one.<sup>342</sup>

In November 1978, the French officially reaffirmed to the United States that its decision to end the reprocessing plant contract with Pakistan was absolute and there were no plans to move away from that decision.<sup>343</sup> There were still some questions because some French technicians were still working in Pakistan and the United States wanted them removed. France assured the United States that the two French technicians still in Pakistan were working only on civil engineering projects based at the nuclear site, but they did not have access to any sensitive material.<sup>344</sup> Zia wrote a response to French Prime Minister Valery Giscard that he wished to continue Franco-Pakistani relations and wished to continue their cooperation in other fields. The

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<sup>340</sup> Ibid.

<sup>341</sup> “Consultations on Pakistan: Details on Indigenous Nuclear Capabilities,” October 6, 1978, NSA, 1, <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb333/index.htm>, (accessed on December 9, 2011).

<sup>342</sup> Ibid., 1.

<sup>343</sup> “Next Steps on Pakistan Reprocessing Deal,” September 1978, NSA, 2, <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb333/index.htm>, (accessed on December 9, 2011).

<sup>344</sup> Ibid., 3.

State Department reported, “France still hoped to avoid a confrontation with Pakistan and thus was continuing to maintain a dialogue with the Pakistani government.”<sup>345</sup>

Ambassador Hummel relayed to his superiors in Washington his concern that in order to obstruct Pakistan’s nuclear ambitions they needed to discuss their concerns with India. However, it would have been detrimental to U.S./Pakistan relations if the information were leaked to the press that America discussed Pakistan’s security concerns with India.<sup>346</sup> At this point, India did not have any solid information regarding the program, but the United States was willing to disclose this information but only in a confidential way.<sup>347</sup> The problem was that the information would most likely be funneled back to Pakistan.<sup>348</sup>

On November 4, 1978, the United States sent a letter to its nuclear allies explaining Pakistan’s quest for an atomic weapon and its need for gas centrifuges. The goal of this message was to prevent Pakistan from receiving materials from other countries. It hoped to discourage its allies from exporting nuclear materials in violation of international nuclear non-proliferation agreements.<sup>349</sup> A State Department memo states, “In addition we are increasingly concerned about the geopolitical situation in South Asia, as a result of the Afghan Revolution and growing instability in Iran. We believe it is critical to stability in the region and to our non-proliferation objectives to inhibit Pakistan from moving closer to the threshold of nuclear explosive capability.”<sup>350</sup> It added, “We are in close touch with following governments on this matter:

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<sup>345</sup> “Pakistan Reprocessing Plant,” November 1978, *NSA*, 2, <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb333/index.htm>, (accessed on December 9, 2011).

<sup>346</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>347</sup> “Achieving USG Nonproliferation Objectives in Pakistan,” 141100Z, November 1978, *NSA*, 1, <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb333/index.htm>, (accessed on December 9, 2011).

<sup>348</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>349</sup> “U.S. Demarche on Pakistani Reprocessing Plant,” November 4, 1978, *NSA*, 1, <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb333/index.htm>, (accessed on December 9, 2011).

<sup>350</sup> *Ibid.*, 1.

Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, France, Italy, Japan, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, The Netherlands, U.S. and West Germany.”<sup>351</sup> The memorandum concluded, “The U.S. believes that your government should be in possession of these facts in order that it may exercise vigilance and appropriate control to deter Pakistan from acquiring sensitive facilities which would permit then to develop nuclear explosive capability.”<sup>352</sup> The United States also requested any further information on the matter that these countries could provide and stated that the United States would and any exports to countries that sent nuclear materials to Pakistan.<sup>353</sup>

The United Kingdom also had information that the Pakistanis were in the pursuit of gas centrifuge and an enrichment facility.<sup>354</sup> Ambassador to the United Kingdom Kingman Brewster stated, “If Pakistan were to succeed in its efforts, we believe a particularly dangerous risk of nuclear proliferation would arise in Pakistan, with profound implications for the Middle East as well as the subcontinent.”<sup>355</sup> As a close ally to the United States, the United Kingdom discussed the gas centrifuge situation with American representatives frequently and supported the U.S. position.

Sweden responded to the American report by stating that it understood the implications and would follow the U.S. recommendations.<sup>356</sup> The United States also determined that the Swedes were not going to extend their weapon sales especially for inverters. The Swedes were

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<sup>351</sup> Ibid.

<sup>352</sup> Ibid.

<sup>353</sup> Ibid., 4-5.

<sup>354</sup> Ibid., 3.

<sup>355</sup> Ibid., 3.

<sup>356</sup> “U.K. Demarche on Pakistani Reprocessing Plant; REF: (A) Stockholm 4456, (B) State 281962,” November 1978, NSA, <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb333/index.htm>, (accessed on December 9, 2011).

reluctant to extend their controls over exports without more information and British support. It was agreed that communication would be continued.<sup>357</sup>

The Indian government was aware for some time that Pakistan was bent on achieving nuclear weapons capability. In the beginning, the Indians did not seem concerned that about Pakistan's intention for an atomic weapon. India's concern only arose when it became apparent that Pakistan might be within two to three years of becoming an atomic power.<sup>358</sup> India also named an undisclosed country to the United States that was assisting in Pakistani efforts (most likely China). The ambassador to India reflected that the Indians tended to think the worst of Pakistan and would enforce their foreign policy as such.<sup>359</sup>

In Belgium, the Foreign Ministry official "Who was last Ambassador to Peking and knows Asia from long experience, endorsed our reasons for concern Pakistan. He said he had no doubt that Bhutto, a demagogue, had set his sights on a nuclear capability for Pakistan. What he set in motion there was not likely to be scrapped voluntarily." The Belgium government reiterated its position on non-proliferation and declared it would not participate in the trade of nuclear weapons or materials to Pakistan.<sup>360</sup>

The Austrians had not previously been aware of Pakistan's efforts to build an atomic bomb. The United States requested that Austria contact U.S. officials if Pakistan asked to purchase nuclear materials. Alois Reitbauer, an Austrian official, replied that, "he clearly understood the dangers of Pakistan becoming a nuclear power, and said 'we shall do everything

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<sup>357</sup> Ibid.

<sup>358</sup> Ibid.

<sup>359</sup> "Achieving USG Nonproliferation Objectives in Pakistan," November 10, 1978, NSA, 1, <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb333/index.htm>, (accessed on December 9, 2011). Most likely the country interested in supporting Pakistan was China since Pakistan had a fairly rough relationship with the Soviet Union.

<sup>360</sup> "US Demarche on Pakistani Reprocessing Plant," Brussels, November 1978, NSA, 1, <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb333/index.htm>, (accessed on December 9, 2011).

possible to prevent export' from Austria. He said that he was not aware that the Pakistanis had made any attempts to get material in Austria, but that he would try to find out and let us know."<sup>361</sup> Austrian Ambassador Milton Wolf reported, "I concluded by telling Reitbauer that we are contacting all countries who could supply materials or technology to warn them about the Pakistani intentions."<sup>362</sup> Reitbauer also questioned if the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) had been informed about the Pakistani situation, and stated that Austria would not inform it without U.S. confirmation. The ambassador concluded the cable, "Finally (Reitbauer) said that Austria takes its obligations under the non-proliferation treaty very seriously and said that we can be assured on the fullest Austrian cooperation in this matter."<sup>363</sup>

The information passed to Japan regarding Pakistan received a different reaction than most Western countries. Due their shared status' as Asian countries, Japan and Pakistan had recently had bilateral negotiations and the Pakistani foreign ministry did not mention their motivations toward becoming a nuclear power. The only other item they discussed was the reprocessing plant from France, and Pakistan expressed annoyance regarding American interference. Japan's Ambassador reported, "Takashima said that GOJ [Government of Japan] shared U.S. views on dangers of Pakistani moves, although he conveyed his impression that Pakistan felt particularly threatened by recent events in Afghanistan and instability in subcontinent."<sup>364</sup>

The Netherlands Foreign Minister Van Der Klaauw shared U.S. concerns about

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<sup>361</sup> "U.S. Demarche on Pakistani Reprocessing Plant," Department of State, Vienna, November 1978, NSA, 1, <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb352/doc13j.pdf>, (accessed on December 9, 2011).

<sup>362</sup> Ibid.

<sup>363</sup> Ibid.

<sup>364</sup> "U.S. Demarche on Pakistani Reprocessing Plant," Tokyo, November 1978, NSA, 1, <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb352/doc13i.pdf>, (accessed on December 9, 2011).

proliferation and strongly agreed with the principles of non-proliferation.<sup>365</sup> Van Der Klaauw also believed that former Prime Minister Bhutto had exaggerated regarding Pakistan's nuclear proficiency, but stated he was not convinced. He also supported the U.S. position that the Comprehensive Test Ban was important in controlling Pakistan. The Ambassador reported, "During his recent visit to India, he said to the Indians that it would be important for them to adhere to the CTB in the future: the Indians were non-committal in their response and said only that they would have to study the matter."<sup>366</sup> The diplomatic cable went on to state, "Nuclear technology was still considered the mark of a truly industrialized culture. In addition, it would help them meet their very real energy needs and they ask why they, the poorer countries, should be excluded from the benefits of nuclear powers. He said this is a psychological question which must be addressed by the West."<sup>367</sup>

As a country with a previous relationship with Pakistan, Canada was largely aware of Pakistan's quest to become a nuclear state. Canadian Under-Secretary Klaus Goldschlag, supported U.S. measures and stated that he was under the impression that Canada had already cut off any nuclear assistance to Pakistan. He added that any efforts on the part of Pakistan to gain more assistance would be dismissed. He also asked that any information the United States had regarding Pakistani attempts to contact Canadian sites be relayed to them immediately.<sup>368</sup>

Ambassador to West Germany Walter John Stoessel "made the point and repeated it later that it could do serious damage to West's relations with Pakistan, were news of USG approach to leak (regarding French relations). Headline 'U.S. and Federal Republic of Germany in nuclear

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<sup>365</sup> "Demarche on Pakistani Reprocessing Plant," The Hague, November 1978, 1, NSA, <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb352/doc13h.pdf>, (accessed on December 9, 2011).

<sup>366</sup> Ibid.

<sup>367</sup> Ibid., 2.

<sup>368</sup> "U.S. Demarche on Pakistani Reprocessing Plant," Ottawa, November 1978, 1-2, NSA, <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb352/doc13f.pdf>, (accessed on December 9, 2011).

boycott of Pakistan' was last thing he wanted to see at this juncture in relations with Pakistan and its neighbors. We heartily concurred."<sup>369</sup> Assistant Secretary Laustenschlager stated that the FRG [Federal Republic of Germany] would take the U.S. "approach fully into account should there be any attempt by Pakistan to acquire reprocessing technology, or equipment in FRG."<sup>370</sup> He reemphasized West Germany's 1977 decision to not export sensitive technology and equipment and it would evaluate any Pakistan request by reviewing the IAEA guidelines and supplier club rules.<sup>371</sup> He also stated that West Germany had more control over the exports of other nuclear materials and information to other countries, given the stringent requirement for permits and licenses.

Italy had reports similar to United States assertions regarding Pakistan's development of the atomic bomb, but had received no request from Pakistan regarding weaponry, technology, or information.<sup>372</sup> Australia received notification in an oral brief by acting Deputy Secretary Roy Fernandez and reiterated Australia position as a Non-Proliferation Treaty country.<sup>373</sup> The Spanish had heard from the British and agreed with its assessment of the situation and the steps taken to prevent Pakistan's acquisition of the atomic bomb.<sup>374</sup> Spain was grateful for being informed but it did not offer any further information.<sup>375</sup> Several of the countries contacted did not have any relevant information to give to the United States regarding the situation and merely extended support.

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<sup>369</sup> "U.S. Demarche on Pakistani Reprocessing Plant," Bonn, November 8, 1978, NSA 1,, <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb352/doc13e.pdf>, (accessed on December 9, 2011).

<sup>370</sup> Ibid., 2.

<sup>371</sup> Ibid.

<sup>372</sup> "U.S. Demarche on Pakistani Reprocessing Plant," Rome, November 7, 1978, 1, NSA, <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb352/doc13c.pdf>, (accessed on December 9, 2011).

<sup>373</sup> Ibid., 1.

<sup>374</sup> "US Demarche on Pakistani Reprocessing Plant," Madrid, November 13, 1978 1-2, NSA, <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb352/doc14.pdf>, (accessed on December 9, 2011).

<sup>375</sup> Ibid., 1-2.

The Pakistanis were frustrated by the lack of U.S. support for their position regarding the reprocessing plant, and Hummel explained that normalizing relations with the United States would be the first step towards the revival of economic and military aid.<sup>376</sup> According to Congressmen Clement Zablocki from Wisconsin and Senator John Glenn from Ohio, it would be difficult for Pakistan to receive aid because Congress was still deeply suspicious of Pakistan's nuclear intentions.<sup>377</sup> According to Brzezinski, in 1978, "American non-proliferation policy was further strengthened by the Glenn/Symington Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act, which called for a cutoff of economic assistance to any country which did not accept safeguards on dangerous nuclear technology."<sup>378</sup> Pakistan was the first major test to this new foreign policy and the decision was made to eventually suspend aid in 1979. Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher stated in the memo, "In order to receive aid, Congress and the American people would insist upon a public declaration that Pakistan would halt its nuclear aspirations."<sup>379</sup>

Senator Glenn helped to establish the Glenn Amendment and became the key monitor of nuclear issues in the Senate. According to the Brzezinski, the Glenn Amendment "...called for a cutoff of economic assistance to any country which did not accept safeguards on dangerous nuclear technology."<sup>380</sup> Brzezinski goes on to state, "After it became clear that Pakistan was in the process of developing a nuclear weapons capability, we implemented the requirements of the Glenn amendment and quietly terminated aid. Realizing that the amount of this assistance was too small to give us real leverage, we tried to orchestrate a diplomatic campaign against

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<sup>376</sup> "FON SEC Says Reprocessing Problem is Solved," Department of State, August 1978, NSA, <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb333/index.htm>, (accessed on December 9, 2011).

<sup>377</sup> "Pakistan Reprocessing," Department of State, August 1978, NSA, <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb333/index.htm>, (accessed on December 9, 2011).

<sup>378</sup> Brzezinski, *Power and Principle*, 133.

<sup>379</sup> Ibid.

<sup>380</sup> Ibid.

Pakistan's nuclear policy."<sup>381</sup> Pakistan did not directly violate the Glenn Amendment since there was no active nuclear weapons facility to inspect, but the U.S. government still utilized the Amendment in order to try and limit Pakistan's ambitions.

Under Secretary of State David Newsom and Pakistan's Secretary General for Foreign Affairs, Agha Shahi, discussed the possibility of the United States resuming aid to Pakistan in August 1978.<sup>382</sup> However, there were several political problems with resuming aid, especially with the unresolved reprocessing issue.<sup>383</sup> In the meeting, Shahi claimed that Pakistan was surprised by Ambassador Hummel's departure from the conventional standards and felt that United States was going beyond the Glenn Amendment by making demands that no country would accept. Shahi stated that he would report Newsom's remarks to General Zia and added that Pakistan would not inform the United States of any disruption in the status of the reprocessing plant.

Shahi went on to chastise the United States for not assisting Pakistan like the rest of the world. Christopher revealed, "Shahi asserted that the U.S. alone among creditor nations had been quote 'odd man out' unquote. It was pointed out to Shahi that our decision on debt rescheduling was made on economic grounds and was related to Pakistan's unexpectedly high level of remittances."<sup>384</sup> Newsom explained that the United States was not trying to penalize Pakistan or force it to admit shortcomings, but it was trying to find a way to normalize relations.<sup>385</sup> Pakistan not only had to deal with the legal restrictions of the Glenn Amendment, but also a skeptical

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<sup>381</sup> Ibid.

<sup>382</sup> "U.S. to Renew Aid to Pakistan," *The Washington Post*, August 25, 1978, A23.

<sup>383</sup> "Discussion Between Under Secretary Newsom and Pakistan's Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Agha Shahi on the Reprocessing Issue," August 1978, 1, NSA, <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb333/doc13.pdf>, (accessed on December 9, 2011).

<sup>384</sup> Ibid., 4.

<sup>385</sup> Ibid.

political climate in Congress. The legal reality was the Glenn Amendment that referred to the transfer of reprocessing technology and equipment to a country from outside the already established nuclear nations. Christopher reported, “The Glenn amendment would be triggered by such transfers to Pakistan and it was in anticipation of the Glenn amendment being activated that certain decisions were taken in Washington last year.”<sup>386</sup>

The Carter administration’s suspension of economic and military assistance to Pakistan was an “effort to persuade Islamabad to cancel plans to purchase the plant” and the U.S. stated that it would not begin the process of renewing aid until the reprocessing situation had been resolved.<sup>387</sup> At this time, the U.S. government had no interest in publicizing Pakistan’s reprocessing situation or the growth of the Glenn amendment to cover more proliferation. Vance recalls, “Shahi stated flatly and repeatedly that no government of Pakistan could give even a private assurance not to engage in reprocessing and still survive in the face of public opinion. Unfortunately, if the United States could not offer aid and the extension of aid did not achieve the expected result, it had no leverage with Pakistan.”

By late 1978, the United States informed the International Atomic Energy Agency of the developments and diplomatic exchanges with Pakistan regarding the atomic bomb. IAEA officials were shocked by the extent of Pakistan’s ambitions. The IAEA director, Sigvard Eklund, had signed a letter to Pakistan stating that the IAEA had to be informed of the design, construction and/or operation of any reprocessing plant.<sup>388</sup> When the French visited Pakistan in 1978 to check on the progress of civil structures under the original contract that were not nuclear

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<sup>386</sup> “PAK Ambassador’s Call on Undersecretary Newsom, August 1,” August 1, 1978, NSA, <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb333/index.htm>, (accessed on December 9, 2011).

<sup>387</sup> “Pakistan Reprocessing Plant – USG Stipulations,” August 5, 1978; and “U.S. to Renew Aid to Pakistan,” *The Washington Post*, August 25, 1977, A23.

<sup>388</sup> “IAEA Safeguards in Pakistan,” November 6, 1978, NSA, 1, <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb333/index.htm>, (accessed on December 9, 2011).

related, the Pakistanis denied them access to certain parts of the plant, and they saw laboratories that were equipped with heavy shielding for plutonium oxide. There was also information that Pakistan attempted to contact a German weapons producers in order to get more processing equipment.<sup>389</sup> The IAEA grew increasingly concerned about the information coming from Pakistan.<sup>390</sup>

The IAEA sent several questions to Pakistan. In response, Pakistan claimed that they did not need inspections because there was no facility that required safeguards. In the IAEA briefing, “In musing over the seriousness of the situation and the limited tolerance of the world to accept such developments, Eklund wondered whether public disclosure would not be appropriate at some point. Smith indicated that it might be effective in the future but for now he reminded Eklund of the sensitivity and care with which we must continue to deal with the issue.”<sup>391</sup> Eklund believed that a nuclear free South Asian zone suggested by Ambassador Smith would not be feasible because China’s and India’s attitudes and the atomic weapons they held.<sup>392</sup>

Eklund’s conclusion was that the information on Pakistan should announced to the rest of the world so responsible parties could put pressures on Pakistan in order to limit its goals.<sup>393</sup> In telegram regarding the conversation between Ambassador Smith and Dr. Eklund, “Ambassador Smith noted that he felt we still had some time, as he doubted the Pakistanis would be able to explode a device for two to three years.”<sup>394</sup> Eklund stated that the more time Pakistan had to work on a weapon design the harder it would be to stop their efforts, and Eklund wanted to

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<sup>389</sup> Ibid., 2.

<sup>390</sup> Ibid., 3.

<sup>391</sup> “Pakistan Nuclear Issue: Briefing of IAEA Director General Eklund,” July 7, 1979, *NSA*, 1 <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb333/doc40.pdf>, (accessed December 9, 2011).

<sup>392</sup> Ibid., 3.

<sup>393</sup> Ibid., 2.

<sup>394</sup> Ibid.

support whatever decision the United States made. The telegram went on to state, “Eklund was clearly shocked and upset by this information. He sees a Pakistan explosive capability as a serious threat to nuclear power programs of the future.” When the United States finally included the IAEA in its feelings regarding Pakistan, the United States had full international support.

Pakistan’s quest for an atomic weapon sent the international community scrambling to try and contain the South Asian country. For most of 1978, the United States moved to force the cancellation of France’s deal with Pakistan and then sent a letter to all of the United States nuclear allies to try and stop any exporting of nuclear material. The United States also terminated any aid to Pakistan. However, despite its efforts the Carter administration had little success in stopping Pakistan’s nuclear program.

The developments of the 1970s showed the international community that Jimmy Carter talked tough on nuclear proliferation, but if the country benefited the United States then nuclear ambitions could be overlooked. The coup d’état committed by Muhammad Zia further destabilized Pakistan and increased U.S. concerns with Pakistan’s attempt to acquire an atomic weapon. The reprocessing deal with France further increased tensions in the international community as the United States tried to influence its allies to avoid the sale of any nuclear materials to Pakistan. Carter did succeed in slowing down Pakistan’s quest for an atomic weapon, but he not succeed in dissuading Pakistan from its nuclear ambitions.

## Conclusion

After decades of resisting international pressure, Pakistan rejoiced on May 28, 1998 as it successfully tested its first atomic device.<sup>395</sup> A country that spent most of its recent history as a colony of the British Empire entered the nuclear age. The United States and the international community saw the test as a demonstration of years of failed policies towards limiting the inevitable. Pakistan had become the first Muslim country with an atomic weapon in its military arsenal.<sup>396</sup> In 1978, President Jimmy Carter attempted to halt Pakistan's nuclear ambitions, but his efforts had only a limited effect and were unrealistic given Pakistan's religious motivations. Pakistan's enthusiasm for the project was not solely based on increasing military prowess or the country's prestige around the world, but it was to acquire a nuclear weapon for the Muslim faith.<sup>397</sup> While the financial pressures on Pakistan did have some success in limiting the speed of growth, Carter failed to fully understand the determination of the Pakistani government to acquire an atomic weapon and thus failed in his quest to end the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Throughout 1978, the United States continued to hold diplomatic discussions with Pakistan, but problems developed as crises in the Middle East and South Asia escalated. In an attempt to halt the development of atomic weapons, in 1979 the United States decided to suspend aid again in hopes of changing Pakistan's course. In a letter to French President Giscard and other international leaders, Carter stated, "I am very concerned about the mounting evidence that the Pakistani nuclear program is aimed at developing a nuclear weapons option. There is very good evidence that the Pakistanis have a well-financed, highly secret program to build a gas

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<sup>395</sup> Sagan, *Inside Nuclear South Asia*, loc 64.

<sup>396</sup> Weissman and Krosney, *The Islamic Bomb*, 67.

<sup>397</sup> Ibid.

centrifuge enrichment plant, and that they are continuing efforts at the reprocessing capability as well.”<sup>398</sup> After a brief suspension, Pakistani President Zia successfully lobbied the United States for the resumption of aid in early 1980. The situation with Afghanistan specifically moved the United States towards rebuilding its relationship with Pakistan since the Soviet Union became the greater enemy.<sup>399</sup> In late 1979, Carter attempted to mend relations and offered Zia \$400 million dollars in aid. Zia turned down Carter’s aid package and called the deal “peanuts” to the international community.<sup>400</sup> President Ronald Reagan later offered Pakistan a larger deal of \$3.2 billion and forty F-16 fighters.<sup>401</sup> This increase in the deal largely came from the U.S. reliance on Pakistan to support the Afghanistan rebellion against the Soviet invasion and Reagan’s more aggressive approach to foreign policy.<sup>402</sup> The deal was not an incentive for Pakistan to stop its atomic program nor did the deal request that it halt its nuclear program. The fear of Soviet aggression outweighed any threat of a nuclear Pakistan, and it continued to work towards an atomic weapon.

General Zia continued work on a nuclear devise until his death in 1988 and put control over the program exclusively under the military.<sup>403</sup> Scott Sagan explains, “It is therefore not surprising that common military biases can be seen to have influenced Pakistani crisis behavior, its development of its nuclear arsenal, and the doctrine that guides the potential use of nuclear weapons in war.” Sagan continues, “the Pakistani military has maintained virtually complete and

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<sup>398</sup> “U.S. Demarche on Pakistani Reprocessing Plant,” Department of State, November 4, 1978, NSA, 1, <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb352/doc12.pdf>, (accessed on December 9, 2011).

<sup>399</sup> Kaufman, *Plans Unraveled*, 241.

<sup>400</sup> Rashid, *Descent into Chaos*, 38.

<sup>401</sup> Ibid.

<sup>402</sup> Carter, *White House Diary*, 273.

<sup>403</sup> Rashid, *Descent into Chaos*, 39.

independent control over Pakistan's nuclear arsenal, shunning the input of civilian leaders.”<sup>404</sup>

After Zia’s death in 1988, the next elected civilian leader Benazir Bhutto, the daughter of former prime minister, received the first brief on Pakistan’s atomic weapons programs from the United States and not from the military.<sup>405</sup> There has not been an official confirmation on when Pakistan finally completed its first atomic weapon, but it was largely rumored that Pakistan had completed the weapon several years before the test.<sup>406</sup>

The quest for a Pakistani nuclear weapon was an important factor in Carter’s desire to limit the proliferation of atomic weapons, but Carter’s inconsistent dealings with Pakistan by trying to utilize economic aid and sanctions limited its effectiveness. The reprocessing plant deal between France and Pakistan caused international tension and the United States used the situation to justify the suspension of aid to Pakistan in 1977 and again in 1979, but the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan changed the situation.<sup>407</sup> Curbing Soviet aggression became a top priority and as the neighbor to Afghanistan, Pakistan became the primary means for funneling supplies into the embattled country.<sup>408</sup> Carter campaigned on the promise of human rights and ending nuclear proliferation around the world; however, his resumption of aid to Pakistan proves that the policy ideas were short lived and that the Cold War conflict truly drove American foreign policy.

Carter also failed to fully account for the religious motivations in Pakistan’s quest for an atomic device. Pakistani leaders Bhutto and Zia both made aggressive proclamations regarding an atomic bomb for Pakistan and thus the Islamic world. He famously stated that Pakistan would

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<sup>404</sup> Ibid.

<sup>405</sup> Rashid, *Descent into Chaos*, 287.

<sup>406</sup> Sagan, *Inside Nuclear South Asia*, loc 87.

<sup>407</sup> Weissman and Krosney, *The Islamic Bomb*, 192.

<sup>408</sup> Kaufman, *Plans Unraveled*, 163.

“eat grass” before it would give up its atomic dreams.<sup>409</sup> Bhutto also proclaimed that if all other religious groups had an atomic weapon the Muslim world should as well.<sup>410</sup> While the growth of extreme Islam was relatively new to Carter and his administration, the words of Pakistan’s leaders showed that their quest for atomic weapons would come at the cost of the people.<sup>411</sup> Thus making Carter’s non-proliferation initiative and economic restrictions on Pakistan mostly useless.

As Carter had to change his policy in order to respond to aggressive Soviet actions, Carter’s national security team became fractured. His spokes-in-the-wheels approach deteriorated as his top two top foreign policy advisors began to fight for time with him. Eventually, Vance left the White House after increasing tensions regarding moral differences with Brzezinski and the president regarding the Iranian Hostage crisis.<sup>412</sup> The administration held a crucial meeting while Vance was on vacation, effectively minimalizing him from significant policy decisions and directly led to his decision to resign from the Department of State.<sup>413</sup> The resignation of Vance sounded the alarm of a disjointed administration and led to questions about Carter’s ability to be re-elected in 1980.<sup>414</sup>

Carter’s belief in ending proliferation helped guide many of his policies, but the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan changed the course of his administration.<sup>415</sup> To the American people, limiting the expansion of atomic weapons no longer seemed like a viable option.<sup>416</sup> Soon Carter began actively expanding the military, something strictly contradictory to his previous campaign

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<sup>409</sup> Burr, “The United States and Pakistan's Quest for the Bomb,” 1.

<sup>410</sup> “U.S. Demarche on Pakistani Reprocessing Plant,” November 1978.

<sup>411</sup> Mattson, *What the Heck Are You Up to Mr. President?*, 14.

<sup>412</sup> Kaufman, *The Presidency of James Earl Carter, Jr.*, 151.

<sup>413</sup> Vance, *Hard Choices*, 409.

<sup>414</sup> *Ibid.*, 410-411.

<sup>415</sup> Kaufman, *Plans Unraveled*, 241.

<sup>416</sup> *Ibid.*

promises and administration's policies. The growth of the armed forces continued into the Reagan administration, along with U.S. military aid to Pakistan for its covert support of the Afghan Mujahedeen.<sup>417</sup>

President Jimmy Carter had attempted to halt the proliferation of nuclear weapons around the world, but on his watch Pakistan set course towards what he desperately wanted to stop. Most likely there was nothing that could be done to stop Pakistan's from obtaining nuclear technology and materials, but Carter failed to dissuade the country from even considering a change in its program. Any other course of action taken by Carter towards Pakistan could have been disastrous, particularly a military intervention; so, the administration had limited options. However, had Carter been willing to stay the course on his policies it could have set a precedent for policy in the future. Carter showed Pakistan that as long as the country served a purpose to the United States, it would get a slide on sensitive issues and set the foundation for diplomatic relations.

Carter began his presidency with a variety of hopes and aspirations that were soon dashed by an unstable world. He wished to end the proliferation of nuclear weapons, but he failed to move Pakistan towards the nuclear free world that he envisioned. As the Middle East situation grew grimmer between in 1979 and 1980, Carter lost any leverage he had in dissuading Pakistan from developing atomic weapons. A nuclear free world is a wonderful vision, but the reality of ancient rivalries and underdog ambitions limited his ability to manipulate a determined Pakistan.

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<sup>417</sup> Carter, *White House Diary*, 401.

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