

From a Rodent to a Rhetorician:  
An Ideological Analysis of George Alexander Kennedy's *Comparative Rhetoric*

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By  
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This Project is Dedicated to My Family—

Jim Begley, a Hard-Working Father

Olga Begley, a Self-less Mother

Mark Begley, an Honorable Brother

—The Three Most Influential People in my Life

### **Abstract**

George Alexander Kennedy, a professor of classics at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, has given birth to a new understanding of rhetorical studies: he argues for the evolution of rhetoric from animals to humans. Using Sonja Foss's methodology of "ideological criticism," this thesis examined Kennedy's case as presented in his book, *Comparative Rhetoric: an Historical and Cross-Cultural Introduction*. This study discovered that the book was heavily influenced by a secular, pro-evolutionary ideology which dually contributed to its selective use of scientific evidences and production of inconsistent arguments. Evaluated on the basis of Biblical principles, this thesis concluded that the metaphysical assumptions outlined in the Genesis narrative should be encouraged as an alternative explanation for the origins of human and animal communication.

Key Words: ideology, criticism, rhetoric, George Kennedy, evolution, creation, communication, language, animal, human, nature, speech, comparative, analysis, Bible.

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*in principio creavit Deus cælum et terram*

## Chapter 1: INTRODUCTION

Whether it is the good man speaking well, the enchantment of the soul, or the art of persuasion, rhetoric has long been considered one of the oldest learned disciplines in human history. Throughout its centuries of cultivated study, its meaning and nature have inspired lively debate. Some have considered it to be the framing of an argument, the practice of communicating effectively, speech in service of truth, the study of misunderstandings and its remedies, or, generally, the art of human discourse. As time unfolds, the meaning of rhetoric is bound to continue its evolution. But not until modern times has its evolution, in the most Darwinian sense of the word, become a matter of intense controversy, as some scholars today are now beginning to flirt with ideas that could seriously threaten the very foundations of the rhetorical tradition. These ideas, which are being ushered in by the current postmodernist paradigm, are attempting to link the brilliant history of human discourse with the lower languages of the animal kingdom. By proposing an evolutionary continuum that conjoins the ancestral lineage of mankind to that of our fellow creatures, it ought to be considered wise of any communication scholar to examine how this naturalistic model of life-history has affected our understanding and practice of rhetorical studies.

While belief in the spontaneous origin and evolutionary development of mankind has existed for millennia, a naturalistic explanation for the superior powers of human communication has remained an incorrigible mystery. In her book, *The Seeds of Speech: Language Origin and Evolution*, the Oxford University Professor of Language and Communication, Jean Aitchison, admits how some of France's greatest Enlightenment

thinkers reacted toward this insoluble puzzle.

In 1866, a ban on the topic was incorporated into the founding statutes of the Linguistic Society of Paris, perhaps the foremost academic linguistic institution of the time: "The Society does not accept papers on either the origin of language or the invention of a universal language." (Aitchison, 5)

In what may be considered an admission of defeat, Aitchison captures not only the seriousness and complexity of this enigma, but also reveals how the world's fiercest academics had considered any prospect of answering this riddle to be hopelessly undiscoverable. For centuries, some of mankind's most formidable intellects had tirelessly sought to understand how, why, and what brought about the rise of communication. But not until recent times has the study of Charles Darwin's general theory of biological evolution managed to inspire scholars to become more daring in their pursuit of a valid explanation.

One specific voice in these discussions comes from George Alexander Kennedy, a retired professor of classics at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, who argues that "rhetoric" is not an art confined solely to the realm of human speech, but is instead a universal feature of expression, composition, and communication that extends across the organic world. For being the most revolutionary definition of rhetoric to date, Kennedy's ideas *evolved* into becoming the central artifact for this thesis. In order to examine his case, a reading and thorough evaluation of his arguments were analyzed from his provocative treatise *Comparative Rhetoric: an Historical and Cross-cultural Introduction*, a book which in its first two chapters lays the foundations for an

evolutionary model to explain the origins of man, animals, and above all, rhetoric. In summary, he reasons that animals developed communicative potential which, over time, evolved into the superior form we humans share today. Kennedy's work, from a Darwinian perspective, is the first of its kind. To make his arguments, he incorporates a wide range of multi-disciplinary concepts that span everywhere from zoo-semiotics, anthropology, and psycho-linguistics, to animal behavior, philosophy and evolutionary biology.

This paper functions as an analytical study and critique of Kennedy's work, with the goal of answering these primary research questions: (RQ-1) "What sort of ideological message does his text embody?" and (RQ-2) "What objective does Kennedy expect it to accomplish for the audience that encounters it?" In order to attach sufficient answers to these questions, the nature of my research has been organized into a *rhetorical analysis*, more specifically taking on the form of "ideological criticism." This method of analysis works to uncover the presence of ideologies within an artifact. In chapter two of this thesis, relevant literature will be reviewed for sake of providing the function and formal history of ideological criticism as well as a rich description of how other communication scholars have used it in the past. This section then concludes by establishing a thorough explanation of the history and significance of the artifact.

Following from the literature review is the methodology section in chapter three, whereby a series of steps are included to inform the reader of the plans that were used for accomplishing a critical study of the artifact. The fourth chapter, which constitutes the largest portion of the thesis, encompasses the findings of the study. The fifth chapter

highlights the strengths and weaknesses of my methods or analysis, and discusses what manner of recommendations should be made for anyone willing to expand this research project, or use it for exploring other areas in this subject. This chapter then concludes with a recapitulation of the major points in the thesis, along with a summary of a few final thoughts about what this study uncovered.

## Chapter 2: LITERATURE REVIEW

***Introduction***

In order to gain a better grasp of what Kennedy's *Comparative Rhetoric* is about, as well as the method used to analyze it, a review of the past literature is presented here and broken down into four major sections: The first section defines and explores what a rhetorical analysis is and how I planned on using it to study Kennedy's text. The second section highlights noted historical events that played a role in giving rise to the modern practice of ideological criticism being used today. After relaying the history of ideological criticism, the third section is a general examination of ideological criticism, what it means, who has worked with it, and how it has been used in past research studies. The final section of the literature review consists of background research on the artifact itself. By establishing a well-rounded familiarity with rhetorical criticism, its academic history and ideological practice, and the overall significance of the artifact, the reader gains both a better appreciation of this study and a fuller understanding of how I used ideological criticism in my own rhetorical analysis of Kennedy's work.

***Definition of Rhetorical Criticism***

Before I explain the significance of my artifact, I thought the literature review would be more appropriately served by first introducing an explanation of the theoretical method that was used to analyze the artifact. This method or approach is a system of communicative analysis that scholars in the field term "rhetorical criticism." The enterprise of rhetorical criticism is wholly based on the profession of analyzing the meaning and effectiveness of messages found in artifacts such as speeches, literature,

films, gestures, and performances, etc. For a better understanding of general criticism, James Kuypers, a professor of Communication Studies at Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, writes that “[C]riticism is an art, not a science. It is not a scientific method; it uses subjective methods of argument; it exists on its own, not in conjunction with other methods of generating knowledge (i.e., social scientific or scientific)” (Kuypers, 14). The rhetorical critic, Edwin Black, humorously writes that “Criticism is that which critics do.” He continues, “This is one way of answering the question, What is criticism? It is, on its surface, a sportive, perhaps even a suspiciously evasive answer; yet, functional definitions are occasionally useful to inquiry, and however empty this answer may at first appear, it does commit us to a certain approach. It compels us to focus on the critic” (Black, 4). Due to its inspective nature, the goal of rhetorical criticism is multifaceted, as it has brought many scholars to consider it the making of an “evaluation” (Reid, 422), combing “perception and evaluation” (Black, 5), coming to a “verdict” (Rosenfield, 153), or concluding on a “judgment” (Bormann, 229). Other goals of rhetorical criticism can be that of “illumination” (Baskerville, 118), and “understanding” (Kuypers, 13).

In this paper, much of my work was guided by the methods of the rhetoric scholar, Sonja K. Foss, who is a research professor in the department of communication at the University of Colorado, Denver. In its fourth edition now, her masterful contribution *Rhetorical Criticism: Exploration and Practice* outlined rhetorical criticism as being a “qualitative research method that is designed for the systematic investigation and explanation of symbolic acts and artifacts for the purpose of understanding rhetorical

processes” (Foss, 6). Working from this assimilation of definitions, an improved understanding of the demands of rhetorical analysis led me to select ideological criticism as the most appropriate method for examining Kennedy’s artifact.

### ***Ideological Criticism: A Brief History***

Perhaps the most important thing to understand about the history of ideological criticism is that it was not founded by a specific scholar or individual idea. It is fair to say that criticizing people’s ideologies has been around for as long as humans have had the ability to disagree with each other. However, ideological criticism, as an organized sub-discipline of rhetorical studies, did not begin until roughly the end of the French Revolution when the word *idéologie* was coined in 1796 by the French Enlightenment aristocrat and philosopher, Antoine Louis Claude Destutt, Comte de Tracy (Kennedy, *Ideology*, 353-368). Influenced by the philosophical works of John Locke and Étienne Bonnot de Condillac, Destutt de Tracy began examining the nature of the mind.

Originally meant to be understood as “the science of ideas” (Destutt de Tracy, 3), Destutt's theory of *idéologie* had garnered the attention of his colleagues who saw his work as an important foundation for all the sciences. However, because Tracy was a vocal advocate of democratic ideals and anti-monarchism, the new successor of the French crown, Napoleon Bonaparte, saw Tracy's "science of ideas" as a threat to his royal power and religious objectives (Hawkes, 60). Consequently, Tracy's *idéologie* was heavily vilified and was seen as a subversion to Bonaparte's authority. As it shows, historically,

... following the transformation of France from a democratic republic into

a despotic autocracy, a derogatory and contemptuous meaning was attached to the concepts of ideology and ideologue which goes back to Napoleon Bonaparte. ... The hatred with which Bonaparte pursued ideology would scarcely be intelligible had it merely been divorced from the world. (Barth, 1)

However, despite Bonaparte's condemnation of ideology, the science of ideas eventually outlasted the reign of kings and continues to be studied in modern times.

One cannot fully appreciate ideological criticism without being made aware of how the study of ideology first began. But what about that of criticism? Criticism can be regarded as intertwined with ideology, for it too has long been an omnipresent characteristic of human nature. But again, as a professionally studied methodology, the mature practice of criticism did not reach its modern zenith until being inspired by Karl Marx's introduction of 'critical theory' in the 1800's. Marx's advocacy of criticism was revolutionary, influencing literary theory and the social sciences, as well as for giving especial rise to the Frankfurt School in Germany. In his words, "What we have to accomplish at this time is all the more clear: relentless criticism of all existing conditions, relentless in the sense that the criticism is not afraid of its findings, and just as little afraid of the conflict with the powers that be" (Miller, 69). Ironically, however, Marx also venomously opposed Tracy's theory of *idéologie*, possibly for the reason being that Tracy, too, was offering a competing explanation for the origin of ideas.

The young Marx had firsthand knowledge of the French ideologues.

During his exile in Paris in 1844-1845, he excerpted in part Destutt de

Tracy's work, *Eléments d'idéologie*. He was well aware that the term ideology had changed from the description of a scientific discipline into a denunciation of politically embarrassing, theorizing critics. He, too, used it in the derogatory sense Napoleon had first introduced. But it should not be overlooked that the philosophical writings of the young Marx contain a theory about the origin of ideas, the same problem that the "science of ideas" had originally sought to clarify. (Barth, 48)

So, irrespective of the fact that both Marx and Tracy were peddling their own competing theories for the origin of ideas, it may be safe to say that Marx opposed Tracy on strictly academic grounds. However, in light of their contrasting political viewpoints, it remains more probable that Marx, the father of Communism, arduously repelled Tracy's ideological theory because of its integral association with capitalism. “For Tracy, ‘Ideology’ was a liberal social and economic philosophy which provided the basis for a strong defense of private property, individual liberty, the free market, and constitutional limits to the power of the state (preferably in a republican form modeled on that of the USA)” (Hart, 2002). Perhaps this explains why Marx refers to Tracy as “*fischblütige Bourgeoisdoktrinär*—a fish-blooded bourgeois doctrinaire” (Marx, 711). In any case, despite their opposing views, fate would have it that the theories of these two scholars would eventually be wed, giving birth to what the world of rhetorical analysis today calls “ideological criticism.”

***Ideological Criticism: How has it been used?***

Now that a modest history of ideology and criticism has been established, an

explanation for the significance of their fusion is in order. There is no uniform way to define or use ideological criticism, for it varies from scholar to scholar. There is, however, a theme which sheds light upon its function. Common among this brand of critics is the way they focus their attention on revealing the hidden ideologies working within an artifact. For example, in a hypothetical case of analyzing the power of a majority or consensus viewpoint, "...a critical researcher would rely on a theory of institutional or ideological power to provide the analytic guide that would uncover silenced voices, and to inform his or her explanation or understanding of the process by which other voices become dominant. Key to this analysis would probably be the role of various societal structures and ideologies..." (Baxter & Braithwaite, 9-10). For a more elaborate explanation of the role of an ideological researcher, see the Methodology. For a maximum understanding and appreciation for the range, flexibility, and variety of ways in which scholars have used ideological criticism, the following series of studies is provided and explained.

One of many ideological critics is Raka Shome, a professor of communication at Arizona State University, who hones her analyses on the cultural level. "In recent times, the discipline of rhetorical studies - a discipline that for years has celebrated the public voices of white men in power and has derived most of its theories from such foci - is being challenged in various ways" (Shome, 40). Shome uses criticism to uncover the ideology of white predominance in many areas of society, focusing especially on the issue of racism. She introduces the 'theory of Other' whereby she reveals the supremacy of the dominant, white Western male and how all things are contextualized from this

biased framework. One example of this framework is recognizing how a great deal of academia follows “a pattern of Eurocentric intellectual domination” (Shome, 49). In her theory, the ‘Other’ represents all the non-white subjugated natives who are ideologically bound by such neocolonialist rhetoric. Other ideological critics have recognized this too, claiming that the canons of rhetorical studies “[are] overwhelmingly biased towards men, especially towards white men of the Western tradition” (Condit & Lucaites, 214). For Shome, this method of ‘the Other’ is most useful for bringing about social change toward a globalizing culture.

Another one of the several demonstrations of ideological criticism comes from Philip Wander, a professor of communication studies at Loyola Marymount University. In his article, “The Third Persona: An Ideological Turn in Rhetorical Theory,” he brings attention to a concept he calls *the third persona* which represents a neglected audience. While the first persona signifies the “I” (or speaker) and the second persona signifies the “You” (or interlocutor), Wander introduces the idea of a third persona which plays the role of being “the ‘it’ that is not present, that is objectified in a way that ‘you’ and ‘I’ are not” (Wander, 209). Like an audience watching in on a debate, the unacknowledged presence is the crowd who observes the dialectical exchange. Wander seeks to acknowledge this crowd, for without it, he writes, “criticism lapses into eulogy or falls silent” (Wander, 206). This idea is meta-communicative in nature, being that it is a discourse of discourse, and seeks to better understand how others are affected by the ways people communicate with one another (Lucaites, Condit & Caudill, 376).

Janice Hocker Rushing and Thomas S. Frenzt have also made progress in the

field. The late Rushing was a professor in the department of communication with Frenz at the University of Arkansas. Frenz, who still works at University of Arkansas, was recently named Distinguished Scholar by the Rhetoric and Communication Theory Division of the National Communication Association in 2007. As ideological critics, they both co-wrote “Integrating Ideology and Archetype in Rhetorical Criticism,” positing that while the external and internal worlds of psychological processes are separated, they are also interrelated domains of human experience. Rushing and Frenz introduced the concept of the ‘Unconscious’ when examining the divergent views of Frederic Jameson and Carl Jung. “Jung’s amendments to Freud’s model of the psyche are improvements because they grant the Unconscious an existence and a moral potential not totally derived from material circumstances” (Rushing & Frenz, 389). They also explained that using a Jungian perspective for analyzing narratives “requires experiencing narratives ‘by the personality of the whole,’ living with them on an unconscious as well as a conscious level, and then attempting to communicate something of the ‘quality of feeling for the nature of human beings’ contained in them to one’s audience” (Rushing & Frenz, 403). For these scholars, the use of the ‘unconscious’ posits a moral telos for criticism as well as preserves a moral role for the critic.

Another prominent ideological critic is Michael Calvin McGee, a member the National Communication Association and co-founder of the American Communication Association. He also held professorships at several different schools such as the University of Alabama, University of Memphis, University of Wisconsin-Madison, and the University of Iowa. In his article, “The ‘Ideograph’: A Link between Rhetoric and

Ideology,” he describes the building and fulfillment of ideological postures. The ‘ideograph’ is a word, adage, symbol, or sentence that attaches itself to an ideological reference so as to create an ideology and/or reinforce its meaning. Through this, the element of social control is revealed when “political language which manifests ideology seems characterized by slogans, a vocabulary of ‘ideographs’ easily mistaken for the technical terminology of political philosophy” (McGee, 3). Also, differentiating between ideologies (interpretations) and ideographs (texts), McGee employs Ideographic Criticism to measure the success value of relatability between certain words and ideologies.

Celeste Michelle Condit, who earned her Ph.D. from the University of Iowa in 1982, is an ideological critic and professor of speech communication at the University of Georgia. She focuses on Women’s studies and has been the recipient of numerous awards such as the Marie Hochmuth Nichols Award, the Golden Monograph Award, and the Douglas Ehninger Award. In her article, “Crafting Virtue: The Rhetorical Construction of Public Morality,” she examines the role of rhetoric in the making of rules which people abide to during their life. She writes that theorists have an affinity for the conversational model of discourse, rather than a more open, public model which is “viewed as a process in which basic human desires are transformed into shared moral codes” (Condit, 311). For Condit, ideological morality is constructed not by private conversations, but by citizens through the use of collective, public discourse. The rhetoric of morality-making “utilizes the capacity of discourse simultaneously to create, extend, and apply moral concepts,” and “is bounded by an inductive historical objectivity” (Condit, 320).

Understanding ideologies as rhetorically constructed systems of morality benefits critics who, in their desire of social change, would do well to remember that ideologies are influenced greater in a social setting than private setting.

Raymie McKerrow is another influential critic in the ideological tradition. As a professor of communication studies in Scripps College of Communication at Ohio University, he was the recent recipient of the National Communication Association Critical and Cultural Studies Division Lifetime Achievement Award in 2008. He was also granted the epithet as Wittenberg Fellow from Wittenberg University in Springfield, Ohio. McKerrow's scholarly work mostly focuses on the rhetorical critiques of domination (analyzing hegemonic discourse) and critiques of freedom (analyzing the oppressed discourse). In his article, "Critical Rhetoric: Theory and Praxis," he writes about the concept of *critical rhetoric* and how it "seeks to unmask or demystify the discourse of power. The aim is to understand the integration of power/knowledge in society -- what possibilities for change the integration invites or inhibits and what intervention strategies might be considered appropriate to effect social change" (McKerrow, 91). The revelation of those possibilities for social change is instructive, in that it "establishes a social judgment about 'what to do' as a result of the analysis [and serves] to identify the possibilities of future action available to participants" (McKerrow, 92). McKerrow's work highlights the presences of two competing ideologies and how one can decipher whether the rhetoric of the dominant is legitimate, or if the rhetoric of the dominant is really after preserving their own control.

Dana Cloud, an assistant professor in the department of speech communication at

the University of Texas, Austin, is another ideological critic whose works focuses on 'materialist ideology criticism.' In her essay, "The Materiality of Discourse as Oxymoron: A Challenge to Critical Rhetoric," she announces that social structures are matters of competing definitions. "When one lets go of the distinction between material reality and the ideal or ideological, the social structure ceases to be recognized as a set of material power relations but becomes instead a set of competing reality definitions that are unfixed, free-floating, and malleable regardless of the material circumstances in which one finds oneself" (Cloud, 151). Presenting materialist ideological rhetoric as an alternative to critical rhetoric, Cloud makes her defense by showing how her model "notices that the construction of discourse happens in strategic ways that serve powerful interests, both political and economic. ... Even when direct knowledge of a counter-ideological reality is unavailable, a materialist perspective holds out the possibility of extratextual reality in theory. In other words, if a bomb falls on civilians in Baghdad, and a critic is not present to see it, the bomb still did, in reality, fall" (Cloud, 147).

A great many other critics explore the influence of ideological rhetoric. For example, the concept of the 'Rhétorique de la Drogue' (or rhetoric of drugs) is another addition to the study of ideologies, introduced by the eminent French philosopher, Jacques Derrida, whose critique states that "Already one must conclude that the concept of drug is a non-scientific concept, that it is instituted on the basis of moral or political evaluations" (Derrida, 229). From a philosophical-linguistic perspective, Derrida throws open the ideological curtains that constitute the discourses on drugs. Another critic, Sharon Crowley, a professor emeritus of rhetoric at Arizona State University, focuses her

work on ‘civil discourse’ where she tries to use ideology in a way that offers common ground to those engaged in social and political conflict. She especially highlights the duties of rhetorical critics as being accountable to people who have no public voice. “To the extent that ordinary citizens are unable to articulate or criticize the discursive conditions that cause and maintain unfair and destructive practices, we academic rhetoricians must bear some responsibility for their silence” (Crowley, 464). Louis Althusser, another French scholar, philosopher and ideological critic, showcases the preservation of ideologies through the use of ‘ideological state apparatuses’ (ISA’s). Althusser references the spheres of reality that work in tandem with the state and organize the propagation of ideologies. Such apparatuses are “the religious ISA (churches), the educational ISA (schools), the family ISA, the legal ISA, the political ISA (parties), the trade union ISA, the communications ISA (press, radio and television), and the cultural ISA (literature, art, and sports)” (Althusser, 143).

A great deal of literature showcases the incredible variety of research methods that have blossomed from the enterprise of ideological criticism. Many other critics in the field, such as Lawrence Grossberg, Sally Caudill, John Lucaites, Stuart Hall, Ernesto Laclau, Roland Barthes, and Terry Eagleton (Foss, 211), are but a few of many reputable scholars who have been diligently steering rhetorical analysis in an ideological direction. In conclusion, a great deal of intellectual literature has expanded the field of rhetorical criticism, especially the ideological subcategory. In the following section, a review of my artifact is provided starting with the background of its author, George Kennedy, and ending with a summarization of the central message promoted in the artifact.

### *Description of the Rhetorical Artifact*

The aim of this paper was to focus my analysis on the work of George Alexander Kennedy, a contemporary scholar of rhetoric and literature, who came to prominence precisely for his unmatched expertise in the realm of ancient rhetorical studies. For example, Kennedy published one of the most valued translations of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* of the 20th century (Kennedy, *On Rhetoric*, 1991). Notable for the precision of its translation and extensive commentary, notes, and references to modern scholarship, it is generally regarded today as the standard scholarly resource on the *Rhetoric* (Van Noorden, 251-252). Born in 1928, Kennedy was an undergraduate at Princeton and received his Ph.D. in classics from Harvard in 1954. Among being associated with the American Academy of Arts, American Philosophical Society, National Council on the Humanities, American Philological Association, and the International Society for the History of Rhetoric, he was also an editor for the *American Journal of Philology* as well as the George L. Paddison professor of classics at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill for nearly 30 years (Enos, 375).

However, while this enviable list of achievements makes for an impressive resumé, I instead developed considerable interest in one of Kennedy's more recent publications, *Comparative Rhetoric: an Historical and Cross-Cultural Introduction*. The objective of this specific book, I learned, was to establish what he called a 'general theory of rhetoric.' Through performing a "cross-cultural study of rhetorical traditions as they exist or have existed in different societies around the world," Kennedy's efforts represented the first major steps to reaching a deeper and more satisfying explanation for

understanding the universal and most basic principles of communication. He also humbly remarked that, "No previous book has attempted to study such a wide range of materials. ...Neither I nor anyone else I know of is competent to give an authoritative account of the rhetorical practices of these many different cultures, primarily because no one has the requisite knowledge of the many languages and societies of the world," (Kennedy, *Comparative*, 2). Nevertheless, the book remained magnetic to a great deal of praise.

For instance, Luming Mao, a professor of English at Miami University, is one reviewer who commended Kennedy's "genuine efforts." In the journal *Style*, he wrote, "Anyone who has read *Comparative Rhetoric* has to admire Kennedy's scholarly dedication to a project that aims to 'identify what is universal and what is distinctive about any one rhetorical tradition in comparison to others'" (Mao, 409). Bruce Krajewski, a professor of the history of rhetoric at Texas Woman's University, wrote in the *Bryn Mawr Classical Review*, "George Kennedy will be familiar to almost any student of rhetoric or ancient literary criticism" (Krajewski, 1998). Other reviewers, such as the associate professor of rhetorical theory and criticism at Wayne State University, Mary Garrett, made similar comments. She reported in *Rhetorica*, "Anyone reviewing George Kennedy's book on this subject must begin by commending him for his scholarly dedication and, even more, his courage, in venturing into such a demanding subject" (Garrett, 431). Also, Margaret Zulick, an associate professor of communication at Wake Forest University, announced in the *Quarterly Journal of Speech* that, "The significance of George Kennedy's achievements in the history of rhetoric can hardly be overstated" (Zulick & Lucaites, 521).

I, too, respect Kennedy' scholarship and admire the objective of his *Comparative Rhetoric*. Surveying and synthesizing the rhetorical traditions of various cultures for the purpose of developing an over-arching meta-theoretical perspective of communication is no light-hearted task. But, be that as it may, there are also some characteristics of *Comparative Rhetoric* which, I think, deserve to be re-examined. As a student of rhetoric myself, I was surprised to discover that the book invested a great deal of interest in more than just the rhetorical traditions of *human* societies. Inspired after many years of eavesdropping on the glorious cacophony of nature's howling, chirping, meowing, roaring, hissing, cawing and barking, a significant portion of the book was the result of Kennedy's quest to answer some deep, troubling, and awfully significant questions about the nature of human speech and its relationship with the vast repertoire of animal communication. What is human speech? Where did it come from? Do animals have rhetorical potential? These mysteries compelled Kennedy to wrestle with ideas and prod forbidden notions about the life of animals and their engagement in rhetorical communication.

In the wake of such profound questions, these thoughts inevitably forced Kennedy into an ideological quandary which led him to confess, "After spending much of my professional life teaching rhetoric, I began to wonder what I was talking about" (Kennedy, *Hoot*, 1). This quote is the opening sentence of a highly esteemed essay he published in 1992 called *A Hoot in the Dark* which showcased the budding stages of Kennedy's initial fascination with animal communication and the ultimate origins of human speech. Several years after Kennedy's *A Hoot in the Dark* was printed in

Pennsylvania State University's journal of *Philosophy & Rhetoric*, the essay reappeared in his ground-breaking seminal masterpiece entitled, *Comparative Rhetoric: an Historical and Cross-cultural Introduction*. This book, published by Oxford University Press in 1998, was arguably Kennedy's most pioneering achievement in relation to the controversial bridging of the gap between human rhetoric and animal communication.

In response to his celebrated text, this 'bridging of the gap' became the subject of this thesis. In accordance with the belief that man evolved from the lower animals, Kennedy reasoned that "human languages developed from animal communication" (Kennedy, *Comparative*, 43). This feature of *Comparative Rhetoric* has been welcomed by various scholars. For instance, the professor of rhetoric at the European Graduate School in Saas-Fee, Switzerland, Diane Davis, penned in *Philosophy & Rhetoric*, "I applaud Kennedy's embrace of what I've been calling the Darwinian revelation and wholeheartedly agree that rhetoric, at its most elemental, takes place at the level of the creature" (Davis, 89). Also, Debra Hawhee, a professor of English at Pennsylvania State University, added in *Philosophy & Rhetoric*: "Such insight is crucial for history as well as for rhetorical theory; historians of rhetoric can now devote energy to rhetoric's nonhuman forebears" (Hawhee, 85). With the rise of this academic following, I became interested in both the persuasive strategies and ideology of Kennedy's text. Examining the ideology of a text was expedient for my analysis because texts are "the mouthpiece for a culture; [texts are] a representative sampling of the overall system of meanings that constitute an ideology or consciousness that is linked to a group" (Brummett, 31). Because the method for analyzing this artifact was about identifying ideological

influences, Kennedy's book became a prime suspect for ideological criticism.

*Comparative Rhetoric* is divided in half, the first part featuring a survey of rhetorical systems employed by non-literate cultures ("Rhetoric in Societies Without Writing") which consisted of people groups like the Aboriginal Australians and North American Indians. In the second part, the book surveys the rhetorical systems of literate cultures ("Rhetoric in Ancient Literate Societies"), such as the ancient near East, ancient China, ancient India and ancient Greece and Rome. Together, both halves of the book amounts to a total of nine chapters; however, my thesis specifically focused its attention on a portion of part one, namely the "Prologue" and the first two chapters — "Chapter 1: Rhetoric among Social Animals" and "Chapter 2: Rhetorical Factors in the Early Development of Human Language." These three specific areas of the book fully composed my rhetorical artifact.

## Chapter 3: METHODOLOGY

*Description of Analysis Process*

There were several genres of criticism which could be used, such as metaphorical criticism, cluster criticism, pentadic criticism, neo-Aristotelian criticism and a few others. However, the method for rhetorical analysis in this particular study was ideologically based. Ideological critics, according to Sonja Foss, follow a guideline or procedure which she labeled into four steps: “1) selecting an artifact; 2) analyzing the artifact; 3) formulating a research question; and 4) writing the essay” (Foss, 214). Therefore, in the analysis process of the methodology, these four categories were established in accordance to Foss’s model of ideological criticism.

In order to organize an optimal analysis of this kind, I first sought to gain a solid understanding of what an ideology was. According to Barry Brummett, a professor of communication at the University of Texas-Austin, “an ideology or consciousness is an interrelated system of meanings that is generated by the system of artifacts that constitute a culture” (Brummett, 26). Some scholars consider ideology to be a "system of illusory beliefs" that are unenlightened by scientific knowledge (Williams, 55). Other scholars regard ideology as not being out of step with science, but rather "a set of ideas that structure a group's reality... a code of meanings governing how individuals and groups see the world" (Littlejohn & Foss, 318). So latent is ideology that it,

touches every aspect of life and is manifested in our words, actions and practices. The existence of ideology encourages us to understand that power is not confined to government or politics, nor is it always overt or

easy to spot. Because it structures our thoughts and controls our interpretations of reality, it is often beneath our awareness. It seems ‘natural,’ and it makes what we think and do seem ‘right.’ ... ideology does not reside in things but ‘in a network of relationships which are systematically connected [and] exists in the practices of everyday life. (Eisenberg & Goodall, 152)

According to the feminist critic Sonja Foss, “ideology is a pattern of beliefs that determines a group’s interpretations of some aspect(s) of the world. ... The primary components of an ideology are evaluative beliefs - beliefs about which there are possible alternative judgments” (Foss, 209). Now that ideology was better understood, I had to learn what an ideological critic did. Foss continued, “When rhetorical critics are interested in rhetoric primarily for what it suggests about beliefs and values, their focus is on ideology. In an ideological analysis, the critic looks beyond the surface structure of an artifact to discover the beliefs, values, and assumptions it suggests” (Foss, 209).

Given the nature of Kennedy’s evolutionary conjectures, his book *Comparative Rhetoric* was one which certainly contained “evaluative beliefs” as well as left traces of biases and preconceptions that, ideologically, went unnoticed. Foss clarified that “[t]he goal of ideological critics is to discover and make visible the ideology embedded in an artifact. As a result of an ideological analysis, a critic seeks to explicate the role of communication in creating and sustaining an ideology and to discover whose interests are represented in that ideology” (Foss, 213). In defense of ideological criticism, Foss compiled a list of scholars and traditions that have grown out of this discipline. Some

prominent academics in this field are “Teun A. van Dijk, Philip C. Wander, Michael Calvin McGee, Raymie E. McKerrow, Janice Hocker Rushing and Thomas S. Frenzt, Lawrence Grossberg, Celeste Michelle Condit, and Dana L. Cloud” (Foss, 211) while the traditions, over time, have expanded to areas of “Structuralism, Semiotics (Semiology), Marxism, Deconstructionism (Poststructuralism), Postmodernism, Cultural Studies, Articulation Theory, and Feminism” (Foss, 211-213).

### ***Applying Ideological Criticism***

In the methodological portion of my thesis, my chosen system of analysis was a rhetorical approach called ideological criticism. An application of this criticism style required my analysis to be split into several categories. According to Foss, critics who explored the manifesting ideology of an artifact typically made their case by honoring this four-fold responsibility: “1) identifying the presented elements of the artifact; 2) identifying the suggested elements linked to the presented elements; 3) formulating an ideology; and 4) identifying the functions served by the ideology” (Foss, 214).

The findings of my study were organized under her four major prescriptions that structured the analytical process. In the first section, the *presented elements* represented a compilation of Kennedy’s “major arguments, types of evidence, images, particular terms, or metaphors” (Foss, 214). In the second section, the *suggested elements* was an articulation of my “ideas, references, themes, allusions, or concepts that are suggested by the presented elements” (Foss, 216). In the third section, *formulating an ideology* was the phase where I grouped the “suggested elements into categories and organized them into a coherent framework that constitutes the ideology [I] suggest is implicit in [my] artifact.

To discover this ideology, [I] want to figure out what major ideational clusters, themes, or ideas characterize all or most of [my] suggested elements." (Foss, 217) This section of the analysis consisted of grouping themes that are found in association with suggested elements made from Kennedy's text. In the final section, *analyzing the ideology's function*, I dealt with "how the ideology [I] constructed from the artifact functions for the audience who encounters it and the consequences it has in the world" (Foss, 220).

In addition to these four stipulations, which merely examine *how* Kennedy communicates his messages, I felt compelled to undertake an even greater challenge by also confronting *what* Kennedy was communicating. I have included a fifth step in my analysis: *surveying the malfunctions*. The purpose of this additional step was to complement the previous one by revealing the problems in Kennedy's elements and ideology, as well as showcase the strengths of a Biblical perspective. One's means of persuasion are only as important as their content. This moral principle has remained true even from the times of Greek antiquity: Aristotle argued that, among its many purposes, the most important reason for the usefulness of rhetoric was to influence the decisions of men towards *truth* and *justice* (Grimaldi, 1978). Therefore, in service of the "Truth" (John 14:6), I chose to add this fifth step to my analysis for the purpose of accomplishing more than the basic requirements of academia; it was intended to fulfill the Biblical command to "demolish arguments and every pretension that sets itself up against the knowledge of God" (II Corinthians 10:5).

## Chapter 4: FINDINGS

***Introduction***

This section featured the findings of my study and was broken down into five parts: 1) identifying the presented elements, 2) attaching the suggested elements, 3) formulating the hidden ideology, 4) examining the function of the ideology, and 5) surveying the malfunctions of the elements and ideology. These five parts constituted the whole of my findings.

***I. Identifying the Presented Elements***

According to Foss, the *presented elements* signified the "major arguments, types of evidence, images, particular terms, or metaphors." In order to structure the presentation of the elements, I chose to arrange them in the following sequence: 1) the definition of rhetoric, 2) the three branches of rhetoric, 3) the primary persuasive appeals, 4) the five classical canons, and 5) visual rhetoric. These five sections constitute what I believed were the most salient elements presented in Kennedy's book.

***1) The Definition of Rhetoric***

Kennedy's book presented several elements that, I argued, were worthy of analysis, the first one here being his modified definition of rhetoric. As was previewed in the beginning of this thesis, rhetoric is a word which has been used and understood in an assortment of distinctive ways. According to some of the most prominent figures in the discipline, rhetoric has been defined as:

Plato: the art of winning the soul by discourse.

Aristotle: the faculty of discovering in any particular case all of the available means of persuasion.

Cicero: speech designed to persuade.

Quintilian: the art of speaking well.

Francis Bacon: the application of reason to imagination for the better moving of the will.

George Campbell: that art or talent by which discourse is adapted to its end. The four ends of discourse are to enlighten the understanding, please the imagination, move the passion, and influence the will.

I. A. Richards: the study of misunderstanding and their remedy.

Kenneth Burke: Wherever there is persuasion, there is rhetoric, and wherever there is rhetoric, there is meaning.

Richard Weaver: that which creates an informed appetite for the good.

(Stanford.edu)

However, not until Kennedy's scholarship has there arrived a unique and quite unusual definition to the word. In *Comparative Rhetoric*, a totally new vision of the subject is unfolded to reveal its inclusion of the animal kingdom: "Rhetoric in this broader sense is a universal phenomenon, one found even among the animals, for individuals everywhere seek to persuade others to take or refrain from some action, or to hold or discard some belief" (Kennedy, *Comparative*, 3). He articulated further that rhetoric is even "a form of mental and emotional energy." He continued, "...rhetoric is a natural phenomenon: the potential for it exists in all life forms that can give signals, it is

practiced in limited forms by nonhuman animals, and it contributed to the evolution of human speech and language from animal communication" (Kennedy, *Comparative*, 4).

Additional clarification of this concept was found in his 1992 article, *A Hoot in the Dark*, where he described rhetoric as being prior to speech and biological evolution: "Speech would not have evolved among human beings unless rhetoric already existed. In fact, rhetoric is manifest in all animal life and existed long before the evolution of human beings." (Kennedy, *Hoot*, 4) Deviating far from its traditional understandings, Kennedy seemed to interpret in his book that rhetoric was not a form of art at all. Rather, it was a "form of energy that results from reaction to a situation and is transmitted by a code" (Kennedy, *Comparative*, 14).

## 2) *The Three Branches of Rhetoric*

While the redefinition of rhetoric was one of the most revolutionary elements presented in his book, Kennedy also touched on the three branches of rhetoric. Before I presented this element, some clarification was needed as to what the three branches of rhetoric were about. Many years ago, Aristotle classified speech into three central categories: *deliberative*, *forensic*, and *epideictic*. According to the highly respected and comprehensive anthology of important texts covering the history of rhetoric, *The Rhetorical Tradition*, the English professors Patricia Bizzell (of College of the Holy Cross) and Bruce Herzberg (of Bentley College) declared that this triangle of rhetoric had long been considered an established demarcation of the major speech styles. They wrote,

Each are determined by the situation they would be used: deliberative or political oratory, intended to recommend a future course of action;

epideictic or ceremonial oratory, intended to praise or blame a current state of affairs; and forensic or legal oratory, intended to provoke judgment concerning a past action. These were the three main types used in Greek life, and after Aristotle the three dominant categories for all oratorical study. (Bizzell and Herzberg, 30)

The *deliberative* style is one that is noted for its political oratory. The exhortative and dissuasive countenance of the deliberative style is intended to motivate legislative assemblies to future courses of action. This style has been as useful to politicians today as it was thousands of years ago. Unlike forensic and epideictic speeches, deliberative speeches were concerned with the future. This style sought to persuade its audience to take on a particular action, such as Ronald Reagan's speech in Berlin of 1987, when he said "Mr. Gorbachev, open this gate! Mr. Gorbachev, tear down this wall!" (Reagan, 1987). This is an example of how deliberative speeches can bring advantages to an audience who obeys the message of the speech. But while such a style is expedient for influencing people to action, deliberative speeches also have the potential for harm. Adolf Hitler's speeches, indeed the speeches of any tyrannical despot, have called their audiences to believe and, ultimately, act upon various crimes against humanity.

The *forensic* style is different. These speeches do not concern themselves with the future or the calling of an audience to a particular cause or action. Instead, these speeches are concerned with justice, arguing for what is right, true, and provable. The forensic style deals with legality and matters of the past. Thus, while deliberative speeches can be imagined in the setting of the legislative branch, forensic speeches are set in the judicial

branch, or courtroom. Dealing with accusation and defense, this style of oratory focuses on the past in a manner of legal judgment. Imagine the Scopes Monkey trial of 1925: The prosecutor, William Jennings Bryan, argued against the defense attorney, Clarence Darrow, over whether John Scopes was innocent or guilty of violating the Tennessee Butler Act (Linder, 2008). These rhetorical exchanges, including the process whereby the judge and jury would announce their verdicts of the case, are examples of forensic oratory.

The *epideictic* style is also unique in its own right. This kind of speech deals with present, ceremonial events, often times comprising content that either praises or blames someone or something. Eulogies and sermons can be examples of epideictic oratory since such speeches are ceremonial, and deal with the honor and disgrace of current conditions. In the 1970's, when the eminent Southern Baptist minister, Jerry Falwell Sr., would preach about the depravity of man, the necessity of salvation, or the world's presence of evil and goodness, these convocational speeches would have fit under the umbrella of the epideictic style. Also, when Falwell passed away in March 2007 (Libertyflames.com), the procession of speeches that followed in commemoration of him were examples of epideictic prose.

The three branches of rhetoric have long been considered categories within the realm of human speech. But with the advent of Kennedy's *Comparative Rhetoric*, new ways of utilizing these concepts have produced an unusual series of applications. For instance, he writes that the behaviors of honeybees "clearly fall within the traditional Western behavior of 'deliberative' rhetoric" (Kennedy, *Comparative*, 18). This awkward

implementation of deliberative rhetoric onto insects is also conjoined by a host of other views which portray chimpanzees as delivering forensic rhetoric and crows using epideictic rhetoric.

In his section called "Deliberative Rhetoric among Animals," Kennedy carefully describes the intricate language of the honeybees, or what is popularly referred to as 'the waggle dance.' The waggle dance is a form of communication that forager-bees perform in order to raise the awareness of—or persuade—the colony about the location of food, distance to water, and/or possible places to start a new hive. Considered by many scientists to be "the only known symbolic language that exists outside the realm of humans and lower primates" (Shultz, 2007), Kennedy considered the waggle dance to be "one of the best examples of deliberation among animals" (Kennedy, *Comparative*, 18). He concluded that "the analogy to features of a human deliberative assembly seem obvious: a series of recommendations are made by speakers; their evidence is investigated and reported or rejected; a consensus emerges; finally, the administrative official accepts the recommendation and implements it" (Kennedy, *Comparative*, 19).

Secondly, in his section called "Judicial Rhetoric among Animals," Kennedy also applied the concept of forensic rhetoric to chimpanzees where he described an event that portrayed them as decreeing an authoritative judgment on a particular situation. In one specific case, Kennedy retold the story of an incident where a fight broke out between the children of two chimpanzee mothers. Neither mother tried very hard to intervene in the fight while being in the presence of the other mother, so one of them alerted the attention of the matriarch (the head-female). According to Kennedy, the matriarch "gets up, takes a

threatening step forward, waves her arms in the air, and barks loudly. The children immediately stop fighting. Here, we have an appeal to a higher authority, one with the power to act and not only stop the fight, but prevent dispute between the two mothers, each defending her own child" (Kennedy, *Comparative*, 20).

Lastly, in his section called "Epideictic Rhetoric among Animals," Kennedy attributed the behavior of crows as emulating the characteristics of an epideictic speech. He describes an early Saturday morning when he fortuitously witnessed an unusually large gathering of crows on his college campus. "My initial impression of the morning assembly of crows," he writes, "was that they had come together to debate some issue of general interest. There was a great deal of cawing; most of the crows seemed to be facing the center of the group, though I could not identify the chaircrow; some had turned their backs on the proceedings; a few flew off in apparent disgust" (Kennedy, *Comparative*, 20). Kennedy then goes on to entertain a host of possible reasons for this convention of crows, but ultimately resorts to making this conclusion:

Zoologists have identified what is known as an "assembly call" among crows, which consists of a succession of long raucous cries, distinct from the short caws they use as contact calls in their own territory. Their assembly, or "flocking," and the vocalization associated with it seem to be a reaffirmation of group identity analogous to human ceremonial speech on public occasions. Crows, like some other birds, get together to renew their "crownness." (Kennedy, *Comparative*, 21)

According to Kennedy, the behavior of bees, chimps, crows, and a plethora of

other animals, constitute legitimate forms of communication which exemplify the three branches of rhetoric.

### 3) *The Primary Persuasive Appeals*

If Kennedy sees the branches of rhetoric literally stemming from Charles Darwin's "tree of life," then the primary persuasive appeals are certainly its fruit. Originating from Aristotle's classic treatise, *Rhetoric*, the primary persuasive appeals are, too, another set of Western concepts that categorize the rhetorical situation into three main parts. According to Thomas Conley, a professor emeritus of communication and classics at the University of Illinois, these three parts are famously referred to as "ethos," "pathos," and "logos."

The three sources of persuasion that fall within the purview of the art of rhetoric are the character of the speaker as it comes across in the speech (*ēthos*), the disposition of the audience toward the speaker and the matter at hand (*pathos*), and the speech (*logos*) itself 'when we have demonstrated a truth or an apparent truth by means of the persuasive arguments suitable to the case in question.'" (Conley, 15)

By way of clarifying Conley's message, the primary persuasive appeals consist of three entities which are derived from what Aristotle called the *pisteis* or proofs. Classical theorists divided Aristotle's proofs into two categories: "nonartistic proofs" and "artistic proofs."

The nonartistic proofs or evidences refer to external things which predate or are not created by the speaker, such as policies, witness testimonies, history, key documents,

and laws. For this reason, classical theorists called these proofs nonartistic because they did not require any creativity or ingenuity on behalf of the speaker. In contrast, the artistic proofs —such as *logos*, *ethos*, and *pathos*— refer to things which are "created by a persuader and reflect the art or skill of their creator" (Baldwin, Perry, & Moffitt, 81). Therefore, the primary persuasive appeals or artistic proofs represent the speaker's own craftiness for persuasion.

Logos, which was often considered by the Greeks to be the most important form of the artistic proofs, concerns itself with the logic, order, and organization of a message and whether the content of the message is consistent and reasonable. "Given [the Greeks'] emphasis on probability and their general adoption of Aristotle's view that people in uncertain situations, where the truth was unknown, needed to think rationally and support the most probably correct ideas, it was not surprising that logos was highly valued" (Baldwin, Perry, & Moffitt, 82). Some devices of the logos are 1) patterns of reasoning, such as *inductive* and *deductive* logic; 2) the *enthymeme*, a form of deductive reasoning which omits a premise for the engagement of the audience; 3) the *syllogism* which is a general model of reasoning consisting of an observation, a generalization, and an inference; 4) and other techniques of reasoning such as *signs*, *examples*, and *maxims*. Through these devices, the logos is used as a means to enhance the logical power or force of the message content.

Ethos, unlike logos, is a form of proof that concerns itself with the ethicality, credibility or character of a speaker. There are three basic components of the ethos: competence, moral character, and goodwill. Competence deals with "practical wisdom"

whereby the speaker exhibits a thorough understanding or expertise of a topic, rendering the audience with a sense of trust in the speaker's knowledge. Moral character deals with how the audience perceives the speaker's honesty or integrity, thereby allowing them to also trust in the speaker's intentions. Goodwill, lastly, deals with the audience's belief that the speaker respects them and acts in their best interests. Thus, impartial speakers are considered more credible than someone speaking to satisfy their own interests.

Pathos is different from logos and ethos in that it is a form of proof that concerns itself with the passions or emotions of the audience. The use of emotions as a technique of persuasion is indispensable to the process of influence. The Greeks considered pathos to be the trickiest appeal to utilize, for emotions had a bad tendency of interfering or corrupting sound judgment and, thus, posed a threat to Greek ideals of rational decision making. Not even Aristotle was secure with the tools he provided for the effective use of emotion (Baldwin, Perry, & Moffitt, 84). Despite this, however, pathos remains equally important for being able to open windows to the soul of a culture that, according to classical theorists, would grant a speaker essential knowledge for understanding the emotions and/or psychology of specific audiences. Such knowledge would, therefore, prove useful for processes of persuasion.

Having now covered an historical examination of the primary persuasive appeals, I want to transition to Kennedy's *Comparative Rhetoric* and analyze how he interprets these concepts from a Darwinian perspective. Clearly, he began by referencing specific instances of animal behavior which corresponded to the three artistic proofs, starting with analogies of the logos in vervet monkeys. He wrote,

What might be the earliest forms of argument? ...I noted that some animal cries inherently carry reasons in that they can express alarm and the reason for the alarm. Vervet monkeys do not state universal propositions such as "all eagles are dangerous." Instead, they communicate the conclusion —"Danger!"— and the minor premise —"Big bird!" The major premise is assumed and instinctively shared. In rhetorical terms, communication takes the form of an enthymeme. It seems likely that early human reasoning took a similar form. (Kennedy, *Comparative*, 41)

So Kennedy envisioned animals with a sort of primitive ability to apprehend basic logical thinking. But apart from logos, he also went on to describe the animal kingdom as being heavily saturated with precursory examples of the appeal to ethos. He explained that "An important means of persuasion available to early humans, and the rhetorical factor consistently overlooked in all discussions I have read of the origins of speech, is the authority acquired by individuals." Through 'authority' Kennedy showcased what he considered to be the evolutionary development of the ethos in nature:

Authority is achieved and expressed by physical strength and appearance, power of utterance reflecting that strength, success in mating, hunting, gathering and preparing food, defense of the group, and by self-confidence. These qualities can be inherited as the result of selective mating among the most fit, but there is a more or less constant contest among younger animals, especially males, for higher rank. Some form of social hierarchy is found universally among human groups today and can

be assumed to have existed among early humans... (Kennedy, *Comparative*, 40)

Finally, after dedicating a great deal of explanation to the gradual development of ethos, Kennedy added a final —and surprisingly terse— comment about the presence of pathos in the natural world. He referenced the behavior of red deer stags as engaging in all three artistic proofs. Stags (male deer) are armed with dangerous antlers. When two stags confront each other, they compete for the hinds (females) by roaring or "bugeling" so that the opponent stag will be *persuaded* to retreat. If neither accepts retreat, then both stags engage in an antler-clashing duel. For logos, Kennedy purported that "Among the stags there is rational argument only in the sense that one opponent usually concludes from the evidence that he is outmatched and should retire" (Kennedy, *Comparative*, 14). For ethos, Kennedy continued, "There is, however, a strong element of rhetorical ethos in that the contestants' technique is the exhibition of their determination and personal character" (Kennedy, 14). Then, Kennedy produced what appeared to be his only comment about pathos throughout the entire artifact: "Rhetorical pathos is present in that each stag intensifies the emotional state of the other" (Kennedy, *Comparative*, 14).

In summary, Kennedy saw vervet monkeys as displaying logical appeals through enthymemes and basic thinking processes; male and female animals exhibited their own respective varieties of ethical appeals through hierarchical systems or ranks of authority; and stags utilized tactics which mirror emotional appeals using roars designed to intimidate opponents and secure a mate. Ultimately, however, the propensity to utilize the artistic proofs was, according to Kennedy, evidence that rhetoric is an intrinsic attribute

of nature.

#### 4) *The Five Canons of Classical Rhetoric*

Also rooted in the classical practice of oratory were the five canons of rhetoric. The first century Latin text, *Rhetorica ad Herennium* (which was believed until recently to have been authored by the Roman orator, Cicero), describes the study of rhetoric as involving five related steps: 1) *invention*, 2) *arrangement*, 3) *style*, 4) *memory*, and 5) *delivery*. The canons were components or "lesser arts" which constituted the greater art of rhetoric.

Invention, the first canon of rhetoric, "helps the speaker discover what to say in the speech" (Verlinden, 218) and consists of "the speaker's major ideas, lines of argument, or content" (Foss, 26). This canon is based on the artistic and nonartistic proofs, and included the five topics —or what the Greeks called *topoi*— which were "a series of fundamental questions that a speaker could ask in order to locate the most appropriate ideas to present in a speech" (Baldwin, Perry, & Moffitt, 85). The first topos, *degree*, focused on benefits and disadvantages. The second topos, *possibility/impossibility*, focused on likelihoods and improbabilities. The third topos, *past facts*, focused on whether something did or did not occur. The fourth topos, *future fact*, focused on whether something will most certainly occur. And the fifth topos, *magnitude*, focused on size, expense, and time. Because the five topos were flexible enough to transcend the three branches of rhetoric, they became resourceful devices that speakers could use to aid their search for relevant and proper ideas in a speech. The ultimate purpose of invention was to have "people think for themselves rather than simply

memorize the ideas of others" (Baldwin, Perry, & Moffitt, 86).

Arrangement, the second canon of rhetoric, allows the speaker to determine the sequence of points in a given speech. Also going by the title *organization* or *disposition*, "effective arrangement helps the audience understand the relationship of the ideas to each other to follow your train of thought to avoid confusion" (Verlinden, 219). Thus, the second canon deals wholly with the model of the speech and the order by which information is delivered. Classical theorists standardized speech-arrangement into four basic divisions:

the introduction (designed to secure the interest and favorable feeling of the audience), the narration (examination of the background and relevant factual details of the subject), the proof (the arguments), and the conclusion (recapitulation and final emotional appeal). (Baldwin, Perry, & Moffitt, 86)

Other models have since been developed, "for example, a chronological order, where material is divided into time units, or a problem-solution order, where a discussion of a problem is followed by suggested solutions to it" (Foss, 27). Ultimately, the second canon deals with the structure of a speech.

Style, the third canon of rhetoric, "refers to the way language is used to express ideas. Effective use of style can help make your message more clear, interesting, and powerful" (Verlinden, 219). The canon of style deals with utilizing the figures of speech to enrich the meaning and impact of a message. "Some common figures are simile, metaphor, personification, hyperbole, paradox, and irony" (Gamble & Gamble, 190).

While style "contributes to the accomplishment of the rhetor's goal and helps to create the intended purpose" (Foss, 27), classical theorists were divided into three controversial camps over how and when the canon of style should be used.

One school suggested that style should be very prominent in a speech and that the speech style should be elevated, almost poetic in tone. ...Another school of thought ...argued that persuaders should use very little, if any, style in their presentations. ...The third school [also known as the middle school of style] argued that style must be appropriate to the persuasive situation and must be adapted to the subject matter, the audience, and the occasion. (Baldwin, Perry, & Moffitt, 87)

Cicero was a student of this middle school of style and his speeches were studied for thousands of years as models of effective persuasive speaking.

Memory, the fourth canon of rhetoric, "refers to the devices speakers use to help them remember significant ideas and illustrations throughout their speeches" (Merrigan & Huston, 261). Named after the Greek goddess of memory, Mnemosyne, ancient orators emphasized the use of *mnemonic devices* or mental techniques that aided in the process of learning and remembering. These tools allowed speakers to recall their points more effectively and facilitated the audience's retention of a speaker's message. Memory is also known as the "lost" canon of rhetoric because "the classical period began with the ascendancy of speaking over writing" (Baldwin, Perry, & Moffitt, 87) as well as the fact that memory "was not dealt systematically by Aristotle" (Foss, 27). These days, memory "has more to do with how to use notes or a manuscript instead of relying completely on

memorization" (Verlinden, 219). Despite this, however, "changes in technology and advances in cognitive science have renewed the interest in [this] canon" (Merrigan & Huston, 261).

Delivery, the final canon of rhetoric, "involves the way you vocally and physically present your speech" (Verlinden, 219). This implies the "rhetor's mode of persuasion —whether the speech is delivered impromptu, from memory, extemporaneously, or by reading from a manuscript" (Foss, 27) and most specifically addresses a "speaker's nonverbal and vocal behaviors such as gestures, appearance, and vocal resonance" (Merrigan & Huston, 261). The ancient orator, Demosthenes, was famous for improving his articulation by rehearsing speeches with pebbles in his mouth. He also bettered his breathing by reciting verses while running and practiced his projection by speaking over the roaring waves of the ocean. Because "people pay more attention to ideas presented in interesting and powerful ways" (Verlinden, 219), delivery was concerned with things like eye contact, bodily gestures, volume, pitch, speed, tone, and inflection. When asked what he thought was the most important element of rhetoric, Demosthenes replied three times, "delivery, delivery, delivery" (Duncan, 84).

Even though orators in modern times do not necessarily follow these rhetorical principles in the same way the ancients did, the five canons were paramount concepts in the classical era and dominated the oratorical tradition for thousands of years. In Kennedy's *Comparative Rhetoric*, however, a revolutionary application of the five canons is introduced. Returning to the example of the red deer stags, Kennedy wrote that "In terms of the traditional Western concept of the five parts of rhetoric, the confrontation of

stags seems to contain elements of invention, arrangement, style, memory, and delivery, though these are natural attributes and not conscious 'art'" (Kennedy, *Comparative*, 14).

Invention, according to Kennedy, can be detected in nature by examining the communicative interactions of red deer stags. Because invention concerns the content, ideas, or major arguments of a speech, Kennedy analyzed the elements of the 'debate.'

The inventional elements, the code by which the stag's energy is transmitted, are of the simplest sort: repetition of the same utterance, with increasing volume, for as long as possible, up to about an hour. Here, as in all animal communication and to a considerable extent in human communication, overstatement and redundancy are the means of overcoming distracting noise in the environment, securing attention, and expressing confidence and resolve to prevail. (Kennedy, *Comparative*, 14)

Through this example, Kennedy captured what he thought was a natural reflection of the first canon of rhetoric. Repetition or redundancy with increased volume or overstatement was Kennedy's interpretation of stags utilizing the first canon of invention.

Arrangement, the second canon in the list, was also recognized among the stags. By examining the sequence of the interaction, Kennedy deconstructed and labeled what he saw were phases in the stags' behavior.

Arrangement is by three successive parts: the vocal display, the display of stalking, and, when it occurs, the fight. The stalking might be said to provide 'evidence' of a stag's intention to carry through the struggle; the fight is the ultimate 'proof.' Human beings in the past, and occasionally

today, have resorted to threats and duels as a way to settle disputes and prove something, whether it be their manhood or that God is on their side.

(Kennedy, *Comparative*, 14)

By breaking down the interaction of stags into three consecutive phases and suggesting parallels to human rhetorical interactions, Kennedy showcased nature as employing the canon of arrangement. Kennedy also thoroughly explored the presence of arrangement in the songs of birds (Kennedy, *Comparative*, 23).

The third canon, style, was shown to exist in both the behaviors of stags and birds. For stags, Kennedy elaborated how style brought about a sense of identification. "In terms of style, there are individual variations encoded in most animal calls that enable other members of their species to recognize individuals when out of sight, even if this is generally not evident to human observers. ...both male and female deer can probably recognize each other as individuals by a combination of sound, smell, sight, and behavior" (Kennedy, *Comparative*, 14-15). As for birds, style abounded in their 'music.' Kennedy explained that "bird song exemplifies many figures of speech that are based on sound patterns: anaphora, homoeoteleuton, paranomasia, and the like. ...The ability of birds to combine their themes into different songs is significant because it illustrates in nature the potential to combine sounds into words that is the basis of human speech" (Kennedy, *Comparative*, 23). While Kennedy leans away from the idea that birds can apprehend "figures of thought such as rhetorical question, apostrophe, or irony," he does believe that "synecdoche ...is present in the communication of vervet monkeys and that some other animals understand metonymy" (Kennedy, *Comparative*, 23).

Memory, like style, is another canon of rhetoric that is perceived to be inherent in living creatures. It is unlikely that animals are, or have ever been, capable of employing complex thoughts such as mnemonic devices. Nevertheless, Kennedy expounded on the canon of memory in the lives of stags and birds. "Memory, in the case of the stags, is presumably an innate pattern of behavior imprinted in the brain of the male of the species. Learning, imitation, and recall of appropriate utterances certainly occur among some mammals and birds; I do not know whether young male deer can be said to learn behavior from imitation of their elders" (Kennedy, *Comparative*, 15). The role of memory, according to Kennedy, played an important part in the recognition and development of animal behavior. Whether animals learn from example or possess innate knowledge is still unclear. Nevertheless, the canon of memory is presented as another attribute of the natural world.

Delivery is the final canon which Kennedy propagated as evidence for the ubiquity of rhetoric among the animals. "Delivery," Kennedy wrote, "is clearly an important rhetorical element in the confrontation of the stags and successful delivery largely determines the outcome. The vocal repertory of stags is very limited. Other animals, especially primates and birds, are more versatile and their calls can carry distinct semantic elements that are identified by others of their species" (Kennedy, *Comparative*, 15). For birds, Kennedy clarified that birds "have their own styles of composition and delivery (pitch, volume, rhythm, gestures, etc.). Some simple songs are innate, but more complex styles are learned by imitation of authority figures, just as classical and renaissance rhetorical schools taught composition by imitation of canonical models of

style" (Kennedy, *Comparative*, 23). So it seemed that delivery, according to Kennedy, was indeed another facet in the animal kingdom which illustrated the idea that the canons of rhetoric were woven into the fabric of nature.

### 5) *Visual Rhetoric*

Not until recently has there been a growing academic interest in the visual dimension of rhetoric. Such a new and expansive topic can only demand a definition as broad as the discipline itself. Nevertheless, while the *visual* implies all things which are available to the sense of sight, and *rhetoric* being the art of identifying the optimal modes of persuasion, their combination illuminates the direction of this emerging study. *Visual rhetoric*, therefore, is an evolving scholarly framework which, solely through its two terms, has come to represent,

those symbolic actions enacted primarily through visual means, made meaningful through culturally derived ways of looking and seeing and endeavoring to influence diverse publics. Visual means may include photography, film, posters, cartoons, bodies, drawings, demonstrations, memorials, emblems, advertisements, illustrations, television, and computer screens—in short, any and all communicative forms and media apprehended primarily through vision. (Olson, Finnegan & Hope, 3)

This is by no means an end to the controversial definition of the subject. In fact, there exists an entire anthology dedicated to this area titled *Defining Visual Rhetorics* by the English scholars, Charles Hill and Marguerite Helmers (2004). In this text are many peer-reviewed essays, one of which was written by Sonja K. Foss who went on to clarify that

visual rhetoric actually had two different meanings. In her essay, *Framing the Study of Visual Rhetoric*, she expounded, "In the first sense, visual rhetoric is a product individuals create as they use visual symbols for the purpose of communicating. In the second, it is a perspective scholars apply that focuses on the symbolic processes by which visual artifacts perform communication" (Hill & Helmers, 304). Visual rhetoric and its interpretive nature, thus, remains a provocative area of study.

However, with regard to Kennedy's *Comparative Rhetoric*, even visual rhetoric played a role in the everyday interactions of not just fauna, but also flora. Starting off with the animals, Kennedy commented that the singing of birds "is often accompanied by visual displays, though the most elaborate use of visual rhetoric by birds is found in species that do not sing —the peacock, for example. ...visual displays are indications of the health, strength, and fitness for mating of a male bird" (Kennedy, *Comparative*, 22). Birds, with their incredible diversity of colors and appearances, make out to be some of the most beautiful spectacles in the animal world. However, Kennedy also pushed visual rhetoric to elements that went beyond the enchantment of their feathers. He next directed his gaze towards the communicative nature of bird-nest building. "In some species," Kennedy wrote, "the male builds the nest and the female chooses a mate based on the quality of the housing offered..." (Kennedy, *Comparative*, 24). From this example, Kennedy derived an insight to the birds' potential for recognizing and practicing visual rhetoric through nest-building.

A bird has an idea of what is a good nest and seeks to achieve this in the construction; occasionally a partly built nest is abandoned as

unsatisfactory in some way. This instinct reflects a natural principle of what is "appropriate," equally stressed as an artistic principle in Greek and Latin rhetoric: The rhetor should seek diction and a style of composition that is appropriate to the subject and the occasion. ...The social life of animals ...encourages an innate notion of what is appropriate in action and utterance. (Kennedy, *Comparative*, 24)

By comparing birds' abilities to identify principles of appropriateness, Kennedy had presented an intriguing element that, one could say, redeemed the intelligence of the *bird brain*. In addition to this principle, Kennedy also highlighted bird nests as being more than conglomerates of leaves, sticks, and mud; nests simultaneously exemplified the rhetorical concept of a *text*. Texts, according to some scholars, are also more than linguistic messages. As one cultural theorist put it, "Words are not the only signs, the only entities with meaning. Things other than or in addition to words can be texts as well. *A text is a set of signs related to each other insofar as their meanings all contribute to the same set of effects or functions*" (Brummett, 29). Kennedy made an equally abstract application of texts to the nests of birds. He explained,

The English word "text" derives from the Latin *textum*, which means "woven," and nests can be said to be a natural example of textuality. Basic instruction in how to build a nest is genetically transmitted in each species, and birds do not seem to learn nest building by imitation, but in some species there is a process of experimentation and the building of "play nests" by young male birds who eventually produce a quality structure and

persuade a female to share it. (Kennedy, *Comparative*, 24)

The concept of a text is valuable for understanding the connection between bird nests and visual rhetoric. For example, since texts are a set of signs which contribute to a set of effects or functions, even this very document constitutes a text. "All the words and parts of this [thesis] make a set because they work together to produce certain effects in you at this moment" (Brummett, 29). Therefore, because some birds used nests as a "sign" to attract a mate with the "function" of continuing their biological progeny, Kennedy presented bird nests as a rhetorical device that demonstrated the persuasive elements of visual rhetoric.

Next, Kennedy went even further to examine the rhetorical potential of plants. "Eloquence," he wrote, "contributes to persuasion: as the writer of Proverbs 16:24 puts it, 'Pleasant words are like a honeycomb, sweetness to the soul and health to the body'" (Kennedy, *Comparative*, 22). By presenting this Biblical passage, Kennedy set the stage for analyzing the beauty of plants from a rhetorical perspective. He began by acknowledging the attractive colors of flowers by referencing how rhetoricians of the Renaissance period would label *tropes* (figures of speech) as being the "colors" of rhetoric.

There is in nature an attraction to ornamentation that provided the potential for ornamentation in rhetoric and poetry. Insects and hummingbirds are attracted to bright flowers, not for their beauty but because the color is a sign of the presence of nectar. The nectar is itself sweet, and "honeyed words" is another phrase that has been used to

describe eloquence, as in the passage from Proverbs quoted earlier.

(Kennedy, *Comparative*, 24)

According to this passage, Kennedy clearly indebted man's rhetorical proclivities to our natural attraction to beauty or "ornamentation." Moreover, he corresponded "nectar" with "honeyed words" as a way to bridge the divide between flowers and the concept of eloquence. When it came to visual rhetoric, Kennedy casted plants and bird nests in a very credible light. Because a successfully built nest would increase a bird's chances of courting a partner and bringing about offspring, Kennedy saw visual rhetoric as playing an extremely relevant role in the process of natural selection. The same, he thought, was true for plants: " ...Since the activity of insects and birds is essential to disseminating pollen and thus to the survival of the plants' species, by coloration and sweetness even plants can be said to practice a rudimentary form of rhetoric" (Kennedy, *Comparative*, 24). Thus, without rhetoric being in some way integral to the realm of nature, it would seem that biological life itself would not be able to function.

## **II. *Attaching the Suggested Elements***

In the above section, I listed several elements which Kennedy presented in his book: 1) The definition of rhetoric, 2) the three branches of rhetoric, 3) the primary persuasive appeals, 4) the five classical canons, and 5) visual rhetoric. These elements represented what Foss called the "major arguments, types of evidence, images, particular terms, or metaphors" of the artifact. However, in this section, I also examined the elements and drew conclusions about what I thought these elements *suggested*. Foss clarified that this secondary step was an articulation of my "ideas, references, themes,

allusions, or concepts that are suggested by the presented elements." Therefore, this section contained my interpretations of Kennedy's presented elements.

There are several suggestions that can be derived from Kennedy's presented elements. In fact, the most salient theme in all of Kennedy's writing was his insistent usage of "analogies." This theme blended itself with every one of Kennedy's presented elements and was seen at work starting from the beginning pages of his book: "Readers may be surprised to discover that I begin with analogies to human rhetoric in animal communication" (Kennedy, *Comparative*, 2). Being one of those surprised readers, I can see why he so vigorously exploited the use of analogies. With a book that had the word "comparative" in the title, what better rhetorical device to abuse than one that is designed to illustrate similarities between two non-related things? The use of analogy was even caught buttressing the credibility of Kennedy's definition of rhetoric: "Analogies between features of nonhuman behavior and traditional concepts of rhetoric among human beings suggest that rhetoric has its basis in natural instincts and supports the hypothesis that it is a form of energy" (Kennedy, *Comparative*, 26). After establishing the general use of analogies as a strong suggested theme, I began scrutinizing the five presented elements for more specific and distinct suggestions, starting off with Kennedy's definition.

#### 1) *The Definition of Rhetoric*

One suggestion that arose in my mind from Kennedy's definition of rhetoric was "multiculturalism." Multiculturalism is the basic belief that all cultures are of equal value and that people generally ought to "require tolerance of individual and group differences (Boss, 442). Moreover, multiculturalists say that "the curriculum in our schools and

colleges has focused exclusively on Western culture. In short, it is 'Eurocentric.' ...What is needed... is an expansion of perspective to include minority and non-Western cultures. [Multiculturalism is therefore] an attempt to give all students a more complete and balanced education" (D'Souza, *Letters*, 48).

The notion that Kennedy's book contains multiculturalistic undertones is evident by his desire to expand the definition of rhetoric into one that captures "what is universal" (Kennedy, 1) or what is rhetorically common among varying cultures. Such an endeavor would demand the assumption that all cultures have rhetorical methods that are equally valuable and worthy of integration. Also, it would require much exposure to and evaluation of rhetorical practices from around the world and, in the process, may be easily perceived as a move to incorporate influences not part of the Western tradition. However, despite Kennedy's overwhelming coverage of non-Western rhetorical systems, I would rather consider this multiculturalistic suggestion as being *too suggestive*: obviously, the search for universal truths need not be equated with the political drive of changing curricula. And since Kennedy's book is in fact a "comparative study," it seems fair to keep such a suggestion on the backburner rather than the forefront.

What may instead be a more serious suggestion is what Kennedy's new definition reveals about himself. Figures of the ancient world (Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, Quintilian) and the modern world (I. A. Richards, George Campbell, Kenneth Burke, Richard Weaver) have collectively categorized rhetoric as an art form dealing in one way or another with the principles, faculties, and overall study of persuasion. But Kennedy, in clear departure from this tradition, proposes a new and radically alternative definition:

rhetoric is some kind of *universal phenomenon* apprehensible to all living things, not just humans. The originality of this definition says a few things about Kennedy's character. In one way, he can be seen as a "non-conventionalist." In spite of ancient traditions and contemporary authorities, Kennedy is a "free-thinker" and does not allow his peers or predecessors to withhold him from exploring new areas of inquiry. He also can be seen as a "pioneer" or "trailblazer" for not only making headway into different perspectives, but also leading the way for others to follow. On the other hand, going against the grain of tradition, majority, and authority can sometimes land one into less admirable waters. It may be equally valid to consider Kennedy's definition as suggesting "eccentricity" or "revisionism." Clearly, his definition is the newest of its kind and is, therefore, as "precedential" as it is "unorthodox." Not only that, but it can be argued as having a "deforming" or "distorting" effect on the study of rhetoric. Lastly, the definition exposes Kennedy's ideological bias against a Biblical history of mankind by endorsing a "Darwinian" or "evolutionary" history.

A secondary way to consider this element is by showcasing what the definition is, itself, suggesting. There are several ideas that can be derived from Kennedy's re-defining of rhetoric as an *energy* or *phenomenon*. The first is "eternality." Kennedy has, at various times, eluded to the idea that rhetoric predates humans, such as when he posited, "Rhetoric thus existed in Greece before 'rhetoric,' that is before it had the name to designate it as a specific area of study" (Kennedy, *Comparative*, 3). He also reminded the reader elsewhere that "Rhetoric is biologically prior to speech and to conscious intentionality" (Kennedy, *Comparative*, 26). With eternality underway, a second

suggestion is "causality." This suggested element became visible when Kennedy wrote that rhetoric "contributed to the evolution of human speech and language from animal communication" (Kennedy, *Comparative*, 4). As a contributory force, rhetoric became a causal element. In fact, the eternality and causality of rhetoric was pre-emphasized in his 1992 article, *A Hoot in the Dark* when he wrote that, "Speech would not have evolved among human beings unless rhetoric already existed. In fact, rhetoric is manifest in all animal life and existed long before the evolution of human beings" (Kennedy, *Hoot*, 4). After eternality and causality, a third suggestion may be "naturalness." Kennedy has occasionally expressed that he would "like to push the definition of rhetoric beyond an abstract concept of art, skill, or technique of composition to try to identify a place for it in nature" (Kennedy, *Comparative*, 3). By doing this, he arrives at the conclusion that "We [all] share a 'deep' natural rhetoric" (Kennedy, *Comparative*, 13) because the essence of rhetoric "is a form of mental and emotional energy" (Kennedy, *Comparative*, 3); a "form of energy that results from reaction to a situation and is transmitted by a code" (Kennedy, *Comparative*, 14); "a form of mental energy, sparked by an emotional reaction to a situation," (Kennedy, *Comparative*, 26). Because energy is a property of nature, rhetoric too becomes an additional dimension of the natural world.

## 2) *The Three Branches of Rhetoric*

After establishing the "natural basis of rhetoric" (Kennedy, *Comparative*, 2), a handful of implications can also be derived from Kennedy's portrayal of the three branches of rhetoric: *deliberative*, *forensic*, and *epideictic*. The first and foremost suggestion here is "Aristotelianism." The branches of rhetoric are rooted in the work of

Aristotle, but are used by Kennedy to describe the varied styles of animal communication. This fact runs contrary to my former, hesitant notion about Kennedy's multiculturalism because, as other scholars have pointed out, such an application demonstrates Kennedy's own "unexamined ethnocentrism" (Garrett, 432). It was one thing to say that animals practiced rhetoric; it was quite another to propose that they practiced "not just rhetoric, but *Aristotelian* rhetoric" (Hawhee, 82). In other words, Kennedy's standard for establishing a universal rhetoric was limited to his own Western understandings. "Kennedy consistently uses terms like *judicial*, *deliberative*, and *epideictic* to make sense of those other traditions..." which, if continued, "may create a rhetorical hierarchy that values one set of terms and systems over other sets" (Mao, 411). It would appear that Kennedy cannot help but be shackled to his own terminology. Perhaps he can now sympathize with the frustrations of a particular Frenchman who penned, "As soon as I learn a language I am deprived of my freedom... I am forced to enter a prefabricated scheme; I am taught to speak according to a certain model. Scandalous!" (Ellul, 173). Ultimately, I return by concluding that Aristotelianism or "ethnocentrism" can be accepted as valid suggestions from Kennedy's work.

Another suggestion that can be made from this element is "symbolic evolution." In Kennedy's example of deliberative rhetoric, honeybees interact, convey, and apprehend symbolic messages through an unusual form of dance-communication which, ultimately, allows them to also hold meetings, develop consensuses, and persuade monarchs. Contrary to Kenneth Burke's idea that man is the "symbol-using animal," Kennedy introduced the notion of insects as partaking in this qualification. The

implication of this example bleeds into what can be described as the evolution of symbolic languages from animals to humans. Kennedy argued that "the enlargement of vocabulary" lead to the symbolic development of "syntax" (Kennedy, *Comparative*, 37) through a series of evolutionary steps.

The history of writing in both the East and West provides a parallel: first picture writing, then simplification, stylization, and the creation of conventional symbols; eventually, alphabets and the creation of new, largely arbitrary symbols to signify sounds. (Kennedy, *Comparative*, 35)

By describing animals as engaging in symbolic and deliberative behavior, suggestions such as "anti-speciesism" or "biological egalitarianism" can be evoked.

Another suggestion that can be made is "moral evolution." In his example of forensic or judicial rhetoric, Kennedy described a dispute between two chimpanzees whereby the verdict of a more authoritative chimp was implemented to settle their case. Animals' ability for feeling entitled to justice reveals something about their knowledge of morality. By bridging morality from animals to humans along an evolutionary continuum, Kennedy takes advantage of this implication by asserting how mankind's powers of moral action and recognition may have been developed.

The ability to distinguish truth from falsehood is probably fundamental to the development of a sense of right and wrong, which resulted over time among early humans from experience of what was in the best interest of the society and was then imposed and reinforced by hierarchical leaders in the interest of order, discipline, and power. (Kennedy, *Comparative*, 43)

Further analysis into this example sheds light onto Kennedy's ideology which, I think, reveal him to be concluding that moral laws are neither objective nor absolute, but rather constructed naturally by people, especially those in power or with some manner of advantage. From this example, the philosophies of "ethical relativism" and even "Marxism" are possible suggestions to be grasped.

Another suggestion that can be proposed is "ritual evolution." In his example of epideictic rhetoric, Kennedy talks about an experience where he witnessed a council of crows gathered on the lawn of his campus for the purpose of "renewing their crowness." This *ceremony*, so to speak, reflects the nature of epideictic rhetoric which consists of eulogies, sermons, celebration, praise, and honor, as well as disgrace and even blame—or in this case, 'scapegoat.' The epideictic branch of rhetoric opens the door for Kennedy to interpret the crows as partaking in a kind of ritual, therefore enabling him to postulate about the origins of rhetoric as emerging from primitive religion, especially the act of ritualistic sacrifice. In fact, Kennedy thinks that "ritual and song are likely to have been the contexts in which figures of speech originated" (Kennedy, *Comparative*, 38). Citing the work of the philosopher René Girard, Kennedy wrote,

sacrificial religion originated in an act of violence: A band of human beings experienced some crisis in their ways of life, perhaps from an act of nature. They suddenly and collectively turned their anger and fear on one person, killed the offender, and immediately felt better. ...The bizarre conclusion seems to be that the first human word was "kill!" Girard's theory of the origin of sacrificial religion deserves respect... (Kennedy,

*Comparative, 37)*

By seeing crows as engaging in lower forms of ritual practice, Kennedy bridged possibilities about the origin of communication through religion, concluding that this act of violence was both "the birth of symbolic thought" and "the origin of language through 'the mechanism of the surrogate victim'" (Kennedy, *Comparative*, 36-37). This brow-raising example elicits a brew of provocative suggestions such as "heresy," "selectivity," and "demystification." Certainly, the view that evolution brought forth man's religious or spiritual consciousness is not supported by the Scriptures. Secondly, Kennedy's choice of sources gives off the impression that he is only interested in research that agrees *a priori* with his overall theory. And finally, his selective adoption of heretical —and at times, preposterous— interpretations also suggest some possible intimations about Kennedy's visceral obsession with explaining every aspect of the fundamentally mysterious.

### 3) *The Primary Persuasive Appeals*

A slew of other suggestions can also be made about the primary persuasive appeals. One suggestion that deserves reiteration is "Aristotelianism" or "ethnocentrism." The reason for this is because the primary persuasive appeals also originate from Aristotle. Therefore, like the branches of rhetoric, the primary persuasive appeals must also follow suit. Based on the presented element, *logos*, another suggestion to be made is "intellectual evolution." Kennedy portrayed enthymemes as being a kind of 'soft' or underdeveloped form of logic utilized by vervet monkeys. Because animal communication omits premises, inferential particles, and syntax, this led Kennedy to ponder the capacities of primitive human reasoning. He wrote, "At some point in human

history individuals began to formulate and state universal propositions. ...[but this must be] a relatively late development, since it has not fully taken place in some still existing societies (Kennedy, *Comparative*, 41). An interesting implication from this passage is "Vestigial logic." This suggestion is made clear by the fact that Kennedy seems to be classifying logic into evolutionary phases by characterizing enthymemes as distant *ancestors* of modern, syllogistic logic. Furthermore, "progressivism" is another term which, I think, adequately describes Kennedy's position for rejecting the brilliant yet mysterious ingenuity of ancient man, such as when he wrote that, "Systematic inductive logic in which evidence is collected and some generalization formulated to account for it is clearly a very late development in human intellectual life, not much cultivated until the scientific revolution of the seventeenth century in Europe (Kennedy, *Comparative*, 42). Conversely, some scholars have regarded ancient man as being quite intelligent (Chittick, 41). Overall, these references generally suggested strong themes about the evolution of logic. It was not entirely clear to me whether the *laws* of logic were also seen as products of evolution, so I conceded that suggestion far too speculative.

An additional suggestion from this element is "ethical evolution." The appeal to *ethos* —which deals with the ethicality or credibility of a speaker— was illustrated earlier by examining how strength, power of utterance, and a disposition toward truthfulness led to the acquisition of individual authority and the eventual development of social hierarchies. Because *ethos* is so closely related to one's ethical reputation, Kennedy wrote that "Ethos, or the artistic creation of credibility and sympathy by a speaker, probably developed slowly over time with the growth of moral values" (Kennedy, *Comparative*,

43). Moral values like honesty would empower credibility and enable bonds of trust, ergo making the principle of ethos realized. For this reason, Kennedy regards ethos as a plausible catalyst behind the phenomenon of human communication.

The rhetoric of a high-ranking animal carries greater weight than that of others. Since higher ranking animals usually produce more offspring, their genes are more often reproduced. This was probably the mechanism by which rhetorical ability evolved: Some genetic mutation enhanced the ability of some animals to gain advantage by utterance, and this advantage was handed on to their descendants and further developed. Authority has remained a major means of persuasion in human society. (Kennedy, *Comparative*, 27)

A major suggestion to be realized from this passage is "blind forces." Kennedy re-emphasizes the notion that nature alone, through a series of blind, fortuitous steps, produced man's exquisite propensity for communication.

Based on the artistic proof dealing with the stirring of emotions, Kennedy describes *pathos* as being an exploited form of confrontational persuasion among red deer stags: "Rhetorical pathos is present in that each stag intensifies the emotional state of the other" (Kennedy, *Comparative*, 14). This example, in conjunction with Kennedy's mantra about the *emotional energy* of rhetoric, immediately raises the suggested element, "emotional evolution." The evolution of emotion is clearly demonstrated by the fact that Kennedy addresses rhetoric as a pre-existent emotional energy which can be "felt" by all creatures and "is then transferred into action, either bodily action or utterance" (Kennedy,

*Comparative*, 26). Citing the work of Eugene Morton and Jake Page, Kennedy also moves on to identify the emotional states of animals: "Animal calls identify the state of mind of a speaker and convey information; ...In other words, increasingly complex social life will lead to increasingly subtle expression of an animal's mood" (Kennedy, *Comparative*, 15). This passage correlates with my next suggested element, "behaviorism," which is a view in psychology that does not distinguish between the pathos-driven or emotional potentials of humans and animals. Kennedy's behaviorism is further evidenced by his interest in the emotional dimensions of bird songs: "Poets and bird fanciers have long seen in bird song expressions of joy and sadness. Many biologists have been doubtful, but it is clear that the informational content of animal communication includes the animal's state of mind. Birds express panic and anger, and it seems unreasonable to suppose that they do not also sometimes express gentler emotions" (Kennedy, *Comparative*, 22).

#### 4) The Five Canons of Classical Rhetoric

Similar to the two former sections, the five canons of rhetoric are unique in that they are rooted in the works of Cicero, although still not without some share of Aristotelian influences. So it can now be said that animals, according to Kennedy, also practice a bit of "Ciceronianism" as well. Another suggested element in this section is psychological or "creative evolution." Creativity is a human skill indispensable to the use of the five rhetorical canons: *invention*, *arrangement*, *style*, *memory*, and *delivery*. But from Kennedy's view, which holds fast to the assumption that animals, too, employ these canons, it only becomes logical then to conclude that cognitive creativity is the result of

biological evolution.

For example, Kennedy characterized repetition as the simplest sort of canonical invention: "the most common rhetorical device of prehistoric society was doubtless repetition, as it is in animal communication and indeed as it remains in human communication: repetition with increased emphasis, or repetition with some variation, as in bird song" (Kennedy, *Comparative*, 42). Immediately after identifying birds as practicing repetitiveness, Kennedy compares this to human usages of rhetorical repetition: "Archaic songs, as found, for example, among Australian aboriginals, and magical incantations all over the world are characterized by repetition and variation" (Kennedy, *Comparative*, 42). This juxtaposition of bird repetition with human repetition suggests that the canon of invention evolved from the animals. Curiously though, because man's creativity is able to make the best use of the rhetorical canon of invention, the origin of creativity itself becomes mysterious. This puzzle of man's inventiveness forced Kennedy to wonder,

how human beings discovered that distinct groups of sounds —the equivalent of phonemes and syllables— could be combined in different ways to specify or modify meaning, opening up the possibility of numberless combinations that create the power and flexibility of modern languages. Primates do not do this in their natural environment, but as noted in the previous chapter, some birds combine acoustic segments in a variety of ways. Although these do not carry semantic differences, they show that there can exist in nature an inclination to acoustic

experimentation and recombination that could provide a potentiality for human language in creatures with greater mental development. (Kennedy, *Comparative*, 31)

By looking to the birds as an example of nature's ability to produce animals with complex vocal repertoires, Kennedy conclusively theorized that man's ultimate advantage over the animals came fortuitously from possessing superior vocal apparatuses like the birds, except this time wielded by a much more intelligent brain. This explanation is highly suggestive of "subversion" for its blatant, counter-Biblical position that natural forces, not God, gave man "dominion over the animals" (Genesis 1:26).

The remaining canons of rhetoric also follow suit from my suggested element, "creative evolution." Animal creativity is apparently utilized in arrangement and style (Kennedy, *Comparative*, 14, 23) just as much as memory (Kennedy, *Comparative*, 15) and delivery (Kennedy, *Comparative*, 15, 23, 36). These analogous instances, where singing birds and competitive stags were seen to employ the canons of rhetoric, led Kennedy to focus on the overall evolution of speech. This "oratorical evolution" constitutes another suggested element precisely for the great deal of attention that Kennedy dedicates to it. By looking to 20th century research in *glossogenetics* (the scientific study of speech origins) Kennedy explained that "the ability of apes to reason and communicate has strengthened the view that a potentiality for speech evolved naturally over millions of years and that changes in the human brain, mouth, and throat ...facilitated the development of more complex forms of oral communication perhaps a hundred thousand years ago" (Kennedy, *Comparative*, 33). Various glossogenetic

theories were subsequently defined and surveyed: "bow-wow" theory, "pooh-pooh" theory, "ding-dong" theory, "yo-he-ho" theory, and "la-la" theory (Kennedy, *Comparative*, 33-34). For the canons of style and arrangement, some musical and onomatopoetic theories attempted to explain the coinage of early human words. Other theories suggested that the "nearness or openness of the lips unconsciously represents relative distance" (Kennedy, *Comparative*, 35). A myriad of alternate hypotheses attempted to reconstruct possible scenarios of human communicative development, some of which considered the constraints of early human speech (Kennedy, *Comparative*, 40), or the "natural emergence of vocabularies" (Kennedy, *Comparative*, 32), or the roots of eloquence in birds (Kennedy, *Comparative*, 21). The canon, memory, is not that much discussed, although early human memorization of symbols and referents seem to be implied with the evolution of the brain. Also, a strong case is made for the evolutionary function of gestures and their precursory relationship with the rhetorical canon of delivery (Kennedy, *Comparative*, 36).

In summary, this strict devotion to natural explanations for the origins of speech suggest to me an element of "scientific determinism" which, according to the physicist Stephen Hawking, is a view that excludes "the possibility of miracles or an active role for God" (Hawking, 30). *Comparative Rhetoric* only cites and incorporates data from other evolutionary scholars and researchers. Therefore, with Kennedy's seeming rejection of miracles such as the divine creation and *imago dei* of human beings, scientific determinism is arguably a valid suggested element from his text.

##### 5) *Visual Rhetoric*

Unlike the second, third, and fourth sections above, visual rhetoric is not rooted in the works of any Greek or Roman philosophers. Visual rhetoric, as was explained earlier, is a recent movement in rhetorical studies that seeks to understand the visual (rather than oratorical) principles of persuasion. However, in *Comparative Rhetoric*, Kennedy made exceptional use of visual elements by first describing the provocative display of peacock feathers. He also thoroughly examined the persuasive effects of bird-nest building and floral coloration. These illustrations echo the dual distinction which Sonja Foss noted earlier about the "product" versus "perspective" of visual rhetoric. The product is what individuals create for the purpose of communicating, and the perspective is a framework scholars use to interpret visual artifacts. Nature, too, it seems, reflects a similar distinction with *badges* and *displays*. According to biologists, "There are two types of visual communication. 1) *Badges* include the color and shape of the animal. This involves morphology. They are structural adaptations. 2) *Displays* are the things or acts animals do to communicate. They are behavioral adaptations" (Mathur, 56). Therefore, the colorful or morphological appearance of an animal corresponds with what Foss calls "products" and the behavior or performance of an animal corresponds to "perspectives."

In relation to Kennedy's visual rhetorical examples, the aesthetic appearance of the peacock would be a "badge" while the dance and fanning out of its tail-feathers would be a "display." By better understanding the conceptual relationships between the biological and rhetorical, we can better comprehend how Kennedy's examples illustrate the overwhelming presence of visual rhetoric in nature and the vital influence it plays in the daily interactions of animal life. Various suggestions can be made from these

examples, the first being "visual evolution." Though Kennedy's book does not devote any explicit arguments to the iconic evolution of the eye, visual evolution nevertheless seems to be a logical inference to make alongside his argued evolution of oral and vocal apparatuses.

Aside from the assumption that our sense of sight evolved, another suggestion to be grasped from this element is "anthropomorphism" or the tendency of ascribing human attributes to animals, plants, or inanimate objects. This suggestion is clearly evident when Kennedy describes nest-building birds as seeking a standard of "appropriateness" in much the same way a rhetor seeks to compose a speech that is appropriate for the occasion at hand (Kennedy, *Comparative*, 24). To ascribe birds with an ambitious drive for excellence in a given situation is, I think, an overstating attribute. A similar overstatement is made from Kennedy's introduction of flowers as employing the art of eloquence by their use of brightly colored petals to signify the presence of nectar, thereby *persuading* insects and hummingbirds to feed from them and, in so doing, assisting in the process of pollination. Kennedy reported that "even plants can be said to practice a rudimentary form of rhetoric" (Kennedy, *Comparative*, 24). Alongside the element of anthropomorphism, I think another suggestion to add is "equivocation." Equivocation, the habit of fallaciously playing with semantics, is an additional suggestion brought about by Kennedy's use of words such as "texts" to denote nests, or "honeyed words" to denote eloquence, or the "color" of flowers to denote rhetorical tropes. These examples capture Kennedy's peculiar usage of words in order to connect or confuse two arguably unrelated topics.

### **III. *Formulating the Hidden Ideology***

In the two previous sections, I undertook a gathering of various elements. The first section, *identifying the presented elements*, required me to collect the basic observable features of the artifact. The second section, *attaching the suggested elements*, showcased the meanings of the artifact's presented elements and how these meanings served as the basis for Kennedy's ideological tenets. Now, according to Foss, the purpose of this third section was to show how I grouped the "suggested elements into categories and organized them into a coherent framework that constitutes the ideology I suggest is implicit in my artifact." Therefore, this section required me to discover what major ideational clusters, themes, or ideas characterized all or most of my suggested elements. Thus, the collection of suggested elements were able to be clustered into three major categories —*rationalism*, *Darwinism*, and *naturalism*.

Rationalism, or the doctrine that reason is the only source of knowledge and the supreme authority in matters of opinion, belief, or conduct (Lawhead, 55), was the first category established from the suggested elements. Kennedy exhibited 'pioneering,' 'trailblazing,' and 'freethinking' attributes; his goal was 'non-conventional,' 'unorthodox,' and 'precedential' for producing the first work to undergo a study that compared the rhetorical traditions of the world. These descriptions reflected Kennedy's rationalism because of his value and devotion to the ultimate power of human reasoning and its ability to answer or make sense of the mystery of the origins and universal principles of communication. Other suggested elements which contributed to the category of rationalism was his 'Aristotelian,' 'Ciceronian,' or 'ethnocentric' approach to

understanding the natural basis of rhetoric through animals. By exploring "the extent to which some categories of Western rhetoric might apply to communication practices among social animals" (Kennedy, *Comparative*, 13), Kennedy sought to use his rationality, or expert knowledge in classical rhetoric, to reveal what may be understood as the universal elements of persuasion.

Additional elements reflected his rationality, such as his 'anti-speciesism' or 'biological egalitarianism' when Kennedy, for sake of consistency with his evolutionary views, would often use words or phrases to equalize the status of animals with the status of humans. One example of this 'behaviorism' was the affirmation of his "sentimental approach to animal life" and his implicit opposition to "the radical humanism that draws a sharp line between nonhuman and human animals, sometimes on the basis of religious doctrine of the soul, sometimes on the assumption that animals lack reason because they lack human speech" (Kennedy, *Comparative*, 12). Even Kennedy's phraseology of "human animals" and "non-human animals" —terms which are peppered throughout the artifact— bear witness to his status-neutralizing agenda. Alongside the persistent habit of de-privileging the status of humans to animals, Kennedy is also seen using words to elevate the status of animals to humans, such as when he labels the first half of his book, "Part I: Rhetoric in Societies Without Writing" (Kennedy, *Comparative*, 9) and the second half of his book, "Part II: Rhetoric in Ancient Literate Societies" (Kennedy, *Comparative*, 113). By rationalizing groups of animals to be considered "societies" is another testament of Kennedy's ideology. These verbal strategies are further substantiated by the elements of 'analogies,' 'anthropomorphisms,' and 'equivocation.'

The second category, Darwinism, or the theory contending that all living species descended from a single common ancestor through the undirected processes of genetic mutation and natural selection (Dewitt, 98), was derived from a collection of other suggested elements. Darwinian rhetoric saturated the text with talk of the evolution of 'symbols,' 'morals,' 'ethics,' the 'intellect,' 'rituals/religion,' 'logic,' 'emotions,' 'psyche/creativity,' 'oratory,' and the 'visual.' Kennedy's views on Darwinian theory were made explicitly clear when he wrote out, quite generally, the basic tenets of evolution:

Life on earth has evolved from simple to more complex forms. We are closest in most ways to primates, especially to chimpanzees, with whom we share about 98% of our DNA, but we have shared physical characteristics and mental faculties with all creatures that have brains. We are not, of course, descended from any existing species of animal, though it is likely that humans, chimpanzees and gorillas share a common ancestor perhaps 5 to 7 million years ago; each of us has evolved in our own natural environment. But insofar as there are shared characteristics among a variety of species, including human beings, these point to a common source in nature that established basic potentialities, functions, and forms of rhetorical communication. (Kennedy, *Comparative*, 13)

By *comparing the historical and cross-cultural* elements of rhetoric, Kennedy needed to investigate —and at times re-conceptualize— the nature, source, and divergent lineages of communication among the animals. He also used a 'selective' variety of sources to come to certain conclusions. Therefore, Darwinism was arguably the most salient of the

ideological categories in the artifact.

Naturalism, or the philosophy that accounts only the natural elements and forces of the world and excludes the supernatural or spiritual (Sire, 61), was the final component in Kennedy's secular apotheosis. Several suggested elements, such as 'scientific determinism' and the 'eccentric' portrayal of rhetoric as an 'eternal,' 'causal,' and 'natural' form of energy, led me to conclude that Kennedy was actually trying to theologize rhetoric into a substitutive entity for God or the soul. As was aforementioned, Kennedy interpreted rhetoric as some kind of energy that was *pre-existent*; it *contributed* to our self-realization; and it *naturally* indwells or upholds all living things. Based on this interpretation, Kennedy's ideology might be able to be stretched into the realm of pantheism. However, he already admitted subscribing to a philosophically materialistic perspective: "Any hypothesis of the origin of speech is a rhetorical act that inscribes the hypothesis within some totality of meaning to which the author is already committed. In my case, I suppose this includes the belief in the material basis of life, in human evolution from primate ancestors, and in the importance of rhetoric in human society" (Kennedy, *Comparative*, 30).

Materialism, a subcategorical view of naturalism which purports that matter and energy are all that exist, also follows from the suggestions of 'demystification' and 'blind forces.' Based on these elements, Kennedy's ideology becomes wholly consistent with an atheistic worldview. And alas, the confession that puts the last nail in his coffin:

Nature as a whole is purposive: That is, evolution occurs because certain random mutations prove useful in improving the ability of the descendants

of an organism to survive in the environment. Among the phenomena of life that have evolved are those of communication, with a natural advantage over physical acts in conserving the energy of forms of life. I do not myself think that nature is consciously *purposeful*, working out a grand design with some ultimate meaning and end, though many others so believe, or would like to. The evolution of rhetoric, however, has made it possible for human beings to act and speak in a purposeful way, to defend themselves, secure what seems in their best interest, and give meaning to their lives. (Kennedy, *Comparative*, 25-26)

The book does not make clear why Kennedy believes in a purposive, rather than purposeful, universe. However, the suggested elements, 'heresy,' 'subversion,' 'revisionism,' 'deformity,' 'distortion,' and 'progressivism' shed some light as to why Kennedy may reject the authority of Scripture. In his book, Kennedy explained how the credibility of a message can be increased by the use of a rhetorical device or trope called "archaism." One obvious example of the exploitation of archaism is the historical figure, Joseph Smith, the founder of the present Church of Latter Day Saints, who published the Book of Mormon in the 19th century, but clearly penned the text in the rhetoric of 17th century English. This example, likely one of many others, may be the reason for Kennedy's rejection of Biblical authority. He wrote,

Similarly, religious ritual all over the world proclaim their sacred qualities by otherness from ordinary language, commonly in the form of archaism. The rhetorical effect is twofold: Archaism seems to validate the account of

events of the mythical past by conveying them in the language first used to describe them (usually an illusion, since orally transmitted songs change over time); and it increases the authority of the singer, priest, or bard, since he or she, with special knowledge unavailable to others, seems to have direct access to the truth, which can then be interpreted to the [commoners] as the singer wills. Sometimes, as in Israel and early Greece, the bard claims, and doubtless often believed, direct inspiration from a god or the muses, further authenticating the song. (Kennedy, *Comparative*, 38)

While it would appear that this passage only provides a subtle glimpse into Kennedy's overall ideology, it may contain an unstated reason for Kennedy's dismissal of belief in God, His Word, and a purposeful world. This unfortunate fact, at least, does not stifle Kennedy from exploring and publishing scholarly material on religious subjects, such as his *Greek Rhetoric under Christian Emperors* (1983), his celebrated text *New Testament Interpretation Through Rhetorical Criticism* (1984), or his updated second edition of *Classical Rhetoric & Its Christian and Secular Tradition from Ancient to Modern Times* (1999). In conclusion, however, the ideology of *Comparative Rhetoric* is one which reflects heavy themes of rationalism, Darwinism, and naturalism.

#### ***IV. Examining the Function of the Ideology***

Now that the above section set forth the ideology of the artifact, the purpose of this section was to analyze the ideology's function. In order to do this, Foss instructed that I expose "how the ideology I constructed from the artifact functions for the audience who encounters it and the consequences it has in the world." The ideology I discovered in

Kennedy's *Comparative Rhetoric* was an unholy trinity of three secular perspectives—rationalism, Darwinism, and naturalism—and the primary function of this ideology, I'd wager, was to operate as an isthmus between two great continents: *rhetoric* and *communication*; the *impulse* and the *utterance*; the *arts* and the *sciences*. He clarified,

Rhetoric can be distinguished from communication and communication would not take place without a rhetorical impulse to drive it. There is no 'zero degree' rhetoric in any utterance because there would be no utterance without a rhetorical impulse. ...There are varying degrees of communications. ...Its rhetorical energy is dependent on how it is said and the context in which it is said. ...Thus they also involve different degrees of expenditure of physical energy in their utterance. Rhetoric, in the most general sense, may thus be identified with the energy inherent in an utterance (or an artistic representation): the mental or emotional energy that impels the speaker to expression, the energy level coded in the message, and the energy received by the recipient who then uses mental energy in decoding and perhaps acting on the message. Rhetorical labor takes place. (Kennedy, *Comparative*, 5)

By using an evolutionary ideology, Kennedy managed to bridge the divide between these two worlds, showing how rhetoric and communication, while being distinctively separate entities from each other, are in fact *ancestrally* united in man's primordial history. All throughout *Comparative Rhetoric*, Kennedy sounds like a scientist who examines rhetoric under a microscope; and yet simultaneously like an artist who expresses

communication on a canvas. This unique interplay is characteristic of Kennedy's writing, and one which challenges the conventional synonymy of rhetoric and communication (Foss, 5).

A secondary function of the ideology was to demonstrate that rhetoric is a natural element of the universe so that Kennedy's evolutionary perspective or agenda would not be questioned. His definition—that rhetoric is a kind of impulsive energy which coalesced in living things through the processes of evolution— would serve as but the ancillary basis for Kennedy's more primary goals: to usher in the "sentimental approach to animal life" and put to an end the tyranny of "radical humanists" who insist on defending the axiological gap between humans and animals. Based on the elements that composed Kennedy's ideology and the rhetorical mannerisms which characterized his writing, there seemed to exist an implicit demand to equalize the status of mankind with the beasts. However, due to the nature of the rhetorical discipline, this is an arduous task indeed: scholars of the arts are naturally disinclined toward the Darwinian scientific paradigm. In his speech about the infectious spreading of viral religious ideas (i.e., memes), the atheist philosopher, Daniel Dennett, expressed sharing Kennedy's sentiments: "I think we can see why a ruthlessly evolutionary approach to culture looks pretty dismal to many people, particularly people in the humanities, who don't find this an attractive vision at all: our brains are just meme-nests; they are just infested with all these parasites that are competing to replicate. Not a very appealing vision in many regards" (Dennett, 2008). Kennedy's ideology functions to challenge this integral aspect of the humanities by incorporating evolutionary theory into rhetorical studies, provoking

discussion and hopefully transforming the artistic realm from the inside out.

A final function of the ideology, at least in terms of the origins of speech, was to present only one side of the debate. By showcasing only evolutionary arguments for the source and development of human communication, this facet served strictly the interests of those who imbibed a Darwinian worldview. However, by contextualizing rhetoric in this way, the ideology—as I've hinted at before—has a distorting effect on the art of persuasion and thus produces negative consequences for the discipline: for instance, the re-definition of rhetoric is quite obviously a heuristic failure.

In her 1993 response to Kennedy's *A Hoot in the Dark*, Jo Liska, a research professor in the department of anthropology at the University of Colorado, wrote in *Philosophy & Rhetoric*, “While I find Kennedy’s discussion of the literature on animal communication thorough and adept, and while I am entirely sympathetic to his suggestion that understanding human codes will be facilitated by examination of nonhuman codes, I believe that his characterization of rhetoric as ‘an energy existing in life,’ including plant and animal life, is far too broad to be conceptually useful” (Liska, 31). According to Liska, Kennedy's ideology does not improve the function of rhetoric; instead, it incapacitates it. The art of persuasion is, thus, rendered useless. Liska makes a powerful objection, one which resonates with the ideas of the professor emeritus of philosophy at the University of Windsor, J. Anthony Blair. In his essay, *The Rhetoric of Visual Arguments*, he agrees: “This is an important theoretical point. Words and concepts have meaning in historical contexts; they are situated in the conventions of their usage communities. To be sure, community conventions, including conceptual and linguistic

ones, can change, and often should. But if words are stretched too radically, they break their connection to their anchorage and drift anywhere, meaning anything" (Hill & Helmers, 45).

Together, Blair and Liska unveil the backfiring effects of Kennedy's ideology: by 'trying to find a place for rhetoric in nature,' the classical understanding of an *art* becomes disfigured. Is rhetoric an art or an energy? Or, in the profound words of Benjamin Disraeli, "Is man an *ape* or an *angel*?" (Britannica.com). Art constitutes the challenge to humans "of creatively articulating their feelings and ideas about themselves and the world around them. ...people everywhere have developed aesthetic forms —visual, verbal, musical, movement, and so on— to symbolically express, appreciate, and share experiences of beauty in all its variety" (Haviland, Prins, Walrath, and McBride, 366). However, the function of Kennedy's ideology is a disservice to this idea, and remains the inevitable result of trying to interpret the rhetorical arts from a Darwinian perspective. This is evident by the thematic objections raised by every reviewer of his book, with some reviewers attempting to improve his definition (Davis, 89; Liska, 34). Liska added "I think it untenable to suggest that, for example, plant photosynthesis is a rhetorical act, which one must if Kennedy's definition of rhetoric is adopted" (Liska, 32). So radical is Kennedy's revisionism that it compelled another scholar to ask: "What was Kennedy doing? Was our distinguished leader, translator of the Sage himself, going off some deep end and taking the discipline with him?" (Hawhee, 81).

It would seem that the ideology in *Comparative Rhetoric*, despite its numerous accolades, does not function for the audience as well as Kennedy had hoped.

Evolutionary theory, which has at times been described as a *universal acid* precisely for its corrosive effects on religious faith, is not without having similar deleterious effects on rhetoric as well. One scholar noted that “Such an approach to the study of rhetoric, in spite of Kennedy’s good intentions, is highly problematic because it seems to be promoting what may be called ‘an ideology of rhetorical Darwinism’” (Mao, 410). This ‘rhetorical Darwinism,’ which unwittingly influenced Kennedy to shoulder animal communication beside the rhetoric of Australian Aboriginal humans, is a dangerous card to play. Mao pointed this out when he highlighted that,

A corollary of this ideology is that some cultures are innately more capable of producing a mature, fully developed rhetorical system than some others. To be fair, Kennedy never states that he is promoting this kind of assumption. Nevertheless, one cannot help but associate his approach with the ideology of rhetorical Darwinism, because the resemblance between the two is just too eerily strong to be ignored. A project that aims to develop a theory of rhetoric for all cultures simply cannot afford to promote such resemblance or even the semblance of it—his disclaimers notwithstanding. (Mao, 410)

Other critics also took notice of the consequences of Kennedy's ideology and the negative implications it had on less developed human societies. For if “the origins of human language [are] along an implicit evolutionary continuum, [this] leaves Kennedy's theory subject to the racial implications that have plagued evolutionary theory since Herbert Spencer. If the intention is to induce us to rethink our understanding of animal

communication, it is poorly served by this failure to question an outmoded progressive model of evolution” (Zulick & Lucaites, 521-522). Kennedy's Darwinian approach to rhetoric has clearly incited the admonishments of his colleagues; admonishments which, one could say, reveals a particular side of the humanities that Kennedy has been trying to challenge all along. But, given the history of his resilience stretching from his 1992 essay *A Hoot in the Dark* to his 1998 book *Comparative Rhetoric*, it would appear that this challenge is not one Kennedy is likely to back down from anytime soon.

#### ***V. Surveying the Malfunctions of the Elements and Ideology***

Jerry Coyne, an atheistic professor of biology at the University of Chicago and author of the book *Why Evolution is True* (2009) was reported to have said that in order "to make evolution palatable to Americans, you must show that it is not only consistent with religion, but also no threat to it" (Coyne, 2009). In principle, a similar disclaimer can be made for scholars who try to smuggle evolution into rhetorical studies. Kennedy's book certainly underwent great lengths to show its readers how evolution was a consistent, non-threatening approach for understanding the principles of persuasion. However, this approach was met with some amount of rejection and suggested the notion that Kennedy was uninterested in countenancing alternatives. As one critic put it, “My own sense is that once Kennedy posits rhetoric's ubiquity without exploring counter-arguments, his case is made for him. With a view that human speech arises ‘out of already existing primate practices,’ Kennedy declares himself an evolutionist, more scientist than rhetorician” (Krajewski, 1998). Therefore, I chose to explore some of these counter-arguments. With the artifact's ideology already brought to light, the purpose of

this final chapter was twofold: 1) to expose the malfunctioning nature of Kennedy's ideology and elements used to support it, and 2) to introduce a rivaling Biblical perspective that could, in essence, demonstrate a superior and more consistent interpretation of the scientific evidence.

Among a variety of specimens highlighted in Kennedy's book, there were three specific evidences that were reinterpretable through a Biblical framework: the existence of Adam and Eve, the uniqueness of human beings, and the Tower of Babel. The first evidence that deserved re-examination was "Adam," the world's first name-giver, and "Eve," the mother of humanity. Kennedy, who despite his rejection of the Genesis creation account, has made some interesting concessions toward the possible existence of mankind's original parents. For instance, in reference to the character Adam (Genesis 2:19-20), Kennedy wrote that "All the mythologies of the world tell of name-givers" (Kennedy, *Comparative*, 30) and that "The classical philosophers who proposed that a primeval wise man gave names to things and led humanity from brutishness to civilization may not have been entirely wrong" (Kennedy, *Comparative*, 41). Moreover, in reference to the parenthood of Adam and Eve (Genesis 1:28), a second concession was made in Kennedy's reporting of two historical progenitors who gave birth to the human race.

Genetic evidence has recently been published pointing to the conclusion that all human beings are ultimately descended from one woman and one man who lived in Africa between 100,000 and 200,000 years ago, whether from the copulation of these two individuals or from that by two of their

descendants. If the genetic origin of the human race in two individuals is accepted as fact, the theory of a single origin of human languages would be strengthened but not proved. (Kennedy, *Comparative*, 32)

Contrary to Kennedy and the many scholars he cites in his book, it seems fair to conclude that, based on these passages, a Biblical perspective on the origins of human communication is not only an equally rational approach to operate from, but also an interpretation that is validly based on modern genetic research.

The second evidence worthy of note was the "uniqueness of human beings." Kennedy attempted to obfuscate this notion in two different ways, the first being through his use of rhetoric itself. As was mentioned earlier, Kennedy exhibited an overwhelming tendency to analogize, equivocate, and use language in an overall dehumanizing manner, such as his reference to habitats as "societies" and to people as "human animals." Though it may not be realized at first, Kennedy's exploitation of this rhetorical strategy bears witness to his ideological godlessness. The late American philosopher, Richard Taylor, illustrated how ideologies are reflected in our language use: imagine a group of people living in an amoral society. Suppose one person killed another and took his goods. Taylor comments,

Such actions, though injurious to their victims, are no more unjust or immoral than they would be if done by one animal to another. A hawk that seizes a fish from the sea *kills* it, but does not *murder* it; and another hawk that seizes the fish from the talons of the first *takes* it, but it does not *steal* it—for none of these things is forbidden. And exactly the same

considerations apply to the people we are imagining. (Taylor, 14)

By showing the fundamental relationship between terminology and ideology, Kennedy's misappropriation of words between humans and animals makes better sense. For without God, "Our whole vocabulary of praise and blame, admiration and contempt, approval and disapproval would have to be eradicated" (D'Souza, *Christianity*, 248). Not only did this example demonstrate how worldviews influenced our communication, but it also helped me to grasp why the language in *Comparative Rhetoric* was chosen in the careful manner that it was. However, despite all this, and in an instance of undeniable hypocrisy, I found it almost humorous that Kennedy would dare author a precaution as audacious and contradictory as this: "Animal lovers are prone to anthropomorphize their pets and unscientifically attribute to them qualities they are unlikely to have" (Kennedy, *Comparative*, 12). After having pronounced this foot-shooting remark, I lament to say that Kennedy spent the first two chapters of his book doing exactly that. Crows, honeybees, red deer stags, vervet monkeys, bird nests and even vegetation were described as *debating, composing, feeling*, and literally *practicing* the branches, proofs, canons, and visual principles of rhetoric.

While the methodology in the artifact already does a fine job testifying against itself, a secondary way in which Kennedy attempted to obscure the distinction between humans and animals was through science. He claimed that the great advantage humans had over animals was precisely our physiological ability to produce a "large variety of words." However, he added, "The primary reason that apes cannot learn to speak is not that they have nothing to say, nor that they cannot combine simple ideas, nor that their

brains lack the requisite neurological structure for uses of language at the level of two-year-old human children; the primary impediment is the structure of their mouths and throats, which do not permit them to voice many of the sounds, especially consonants, of human language" (Kennedy, *Comparative*, 29). This excerpt, even in the glory of its overtly sympathetic tone, is nevertheless undercut by one of Kennedy's previous statements: "conversely, human beings are inept at employing most systems of animal communication" (Kennedy, *Comparative*, 13). These two passages, I think, are helplessly problematic due primarily to the diametric nature of their messages. In other words, they cancel each other out. Moreover, one cannot help but wonder why Kennedy would blame the apes' reticence on their severely limited vocal structures when, but a few pages earlier, Kennedy cited Noam Chomsky—an atheist, MIT professor, and one of the most renowned linguists in the world—for arguing that the real reason apes cannot speak is because "human language is not a higher stage of evolution of animal communication, but a result of a specific type of mental organization lacking in animals" (Kennedy, *Comparative*, 13). Of course, now, one may not have to wonder for long. By noticing that both Chomsky's evidence and "humanist" views squarely contradict Kennedy's general theory and "sentimental" views, it becomes all too clear why this classicist would shrug away from the linguist, in effect re-advertising his tendency of practicing 'selective exposure.'

The final evidence to be observed from a Biblical approach was, of course, the "Tower of Babel," an epic event that was as historical as it was miraculous. One of the intriguing elements about the Babel account was its suggestion that, at one point in

human history, "the whole earth was of one language, and of one speech" (Genesis 11:1). Kennedy, who ironically does not imbibe a Christian worldview, nevertheless indicates that modern schools of thought share "an underlying hope of showing that all known languages derive from a single source" (Kennedy, *Comparative*, 32). Kennedy elaborates,

...Post classical theories were for long strongly colored by the biblical account. In chapter one of Genesis, God creates by speech (in what language was for long a vexing question, perhaps Hebrew); in chapter two God orders Adam to give names to all living creatures; in chapter eleven then comes the account of the building of the Tower of Babel, God's anger, and his decision to "confuse" human languages so that mortals will no longer join in concerted action against his will. Seventeenth- and eighteenth-century accounts were also influenced by contemporary assumptions about the nature of mankind, the soul, the human spirit, or other idealistic or metaphysical theories, all of which were abstract and lacked scientific evidence. (Kennedy, *Comparative*, 30)

From these words, I gathered that Kennedy had some adequate knowledge about the Tower of Babel as a *classic story*, but surely not as a *historical account*. The Tower of Babel marked a period in human history where God, who was displeased with man's resistance to heed His command of spreading across the Earth, sought to provoke their dispersal by relieving mankind of his 'common tongue': "Behold, the people *is* one, and they have all one language; and this they begin to do: and now nothing will be restrained from them, which they have imagined to do. Go to, let us go down, and there confound

their language, that they may not understand one another's speech" (Genesis 11:6-7). It was in this moment where God, through His divine power, splintered man's *universal grammar* into several different languages, thus forcing several populations of people to depart from each other in several different directions. This is why "Babel gives us our word 'to babble,' meaning 'to utter meaningless sounds'" (Brown, *Beginning*, 320).

The account of the Tower of Babel surely played an integral role in the history of human civilization, from the formation of various cultures to the diversification of sub-languages and dialects. But due to the supernaturalness of this world-changing phenomenon, the Babel account is often relegated to the margins as mythological or superstitious. Instead Kennedy, like so many others who reject the possibility of miracles, ends up adopting and constructing models and theories that are based solely on naturalistic and uniformitarian assumptions of earth history in order to conform the world, of course, to his *a priori* held ideology. Kennedy hinted at this point when he wrote that it was "characteristic of Western logocentric thought to want to find origins, and preferably a single originative principle, to which everything can be traced" (Kennedy, *Comparative*, 30). This framework, which at first would seem to be congenial to a Biblical perspective —with God as the *single originative principle*— becomes instead the means by which God can be discounted and replaced with the demand to validate the scientific identification of a presumptuous antediluvian mother-language from whence all other languages came. This endeavor constitutes the hallmark difference between Kennedy's approach and a Biblical approach: evolutionists interpret history to be like a great "tree" with branches that all connect to a single common trunk, while

creationists interpret history to be like an "orchard" of smaller individual trees (Dewitt, 158-159). By discarding the Holy Writ in general and the account of Babel in particular, Kennedy's history of languages is, in essence, a house of cards built on a "hypothetical reconstruction of proto-Indo-European to the even more hypothetical reconstruction of a common ancestor of several language groups, called "Nostratic," and beyond that to "proto-World" (Kennedy, *Comparative*, 32). With all this construction of theory upon theory and hypothesis upon hypothesis, I dare wonder if this proverbial house of cards is rather beginning to take on the form and shape of a *tower* itself.

While Kennedy's ideology in one way or another continues to serve its own demise, the strength of the Biblical framework remains steadfast. One reason for this, quite frankly, is because it is true (II Timothy 3:16). The second and perhaps more empirical reason why a Biblical framework is superior to Kennedy's is because it makes better sense of the law of *entropy*, or the principle that all things over time tend toward decay and disorder. Kennedy's evolutionary model requires that the language capacity in man should exhibit an upward slope of communicative complexity with the more that man transitioned from the apes. But is not this increase in mental capability a counter-entropic process? Even Kennedy admits, "It seems possible, however, that the history of language is dominated by entropy" (Kennedy, 34-35). How, then, could the evolution of human communication undergo such gradual steps of self-improvement when the laws of nature themselves govern that all things —with exception to intelligent agency or intervention— should tend to gradually degenerate? The British researcher and fellow of the Geological Societies of London and America, Paul Garner, makes note of this:

Several different families of languages can be recognized today. Since each of these groups appears to be distinct and well developed upon its first appearance, they may represent the language groups that were created at Babel. Since the dispersion, many changes have taken place within the language families, but the natural tendency is for languages to become simpler over time rather than more complex. Where languages have grown or increased in complexity, this is invariably the result of conscious and intelligent human input. (Garner, 229)

Thus, Kennedy's framework falls short in responding to the origin of communication or generally make sense of language evolution within an entropic universe. The Biblical framework, on the other hand, provides a more reasonable interpretation of the origin of human communication, including a better competing explanation for the reason why science measures human languages as having been deteriorating, not ameliorating.

A final reason why a Biblical approach rivals, if not, supersedes Kennedy's treatment of the Babel account is because it respects the advanced intelligence and ingenuity of ancient man. To Kennedy, the art of human oratory began as nothing more than the squawking and grunting of a few knuckle-dragging primitives. But if we were to entertain the idea of God's existence, along with supposing the reality of a literal Adam (which science seems to indicate there was), it may not be farfetched to imagine "Adam possess[ing] a vocabulary at least large enough to understand the Creator's communication" (Chittick, 41). In reference to the Tower of Babel, the eminently regarded father of modern creationism, Henry Morris, expounded:

This faculty of human speech and language is truly one of the most amazing attributes of mankind. The evolutionist is utterly unable to explain the unbridgeable gulf between the chatterings of animals and human language. The unique and fundamental essence of speech in the very nature of man is underscored in the revelation of God to man through His *Word*. Christ Himself is the *living Word*! "God has *spoken* to us by his Son" (Hebrews 1:2). It is not too much to say that this was the very reason man was created able to speak and to hear; that is, in order that there might first be communication between God and man and, secondarily, between man and man. But when men began to prostitute this divine gift in order to cooperate in rebellion against their Maker, in a most appropriate judgment God confused their tongues and thereby forced them to separate from each other. (Morris, 267)

Such postulations might be wholly rejected by Kennedy for their lack of "scientific evidence." But as he himself admits, "We cannot directly study the early stages of human language [either]" (Kennedy, *Comparative*, 29). It stands to reason, then, that the scientific evidence touted in *Comparative Rhetoric* is, in fact, no more in favor of Kennedy's ideology than it is for a Biblical ideology. As for me, by looking at the monumental wonders of the ancient world or the brilliant philosophers of antiquity like Socrates, Plato and Aristotle, I find it hard to swallow that mankind, in all his splendid capacity, started off as anything other than divine. Like the words of William Shakespeare, "What a piece of work is a man, How noble in Reason, how infinite in

faculties, in form and moving how express and admirable, In action how like an Angel!

in apprehension how like a god, the beauty of the world, the paragon of animals"

(Gutenberg.org). Perhaps I fall into that undesirable category Kennedy labels "radical

humanist." But if I had to ask myself if I was an *ape* or an *angel*, my choice would indeed

be the rest of Disraeli's quote: "I, my Lord, am on the side of the angels."

## Chapter 5: FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

***Summary***

The purpose of this final chapter was to provide a synopsis of the findings, as well as address "the study's limitations, and suggested directions for future research"

(Merrigan & Huston, 14). Therefore, in summary of the study, the overall goal of this ideological analysis was to pick apart Kennedy's artifact, piece together the traces of his ideology, and ultimately weave the unearthed suggestions about his worldview in a way that showcased how they influenced his text and, thus, his audience. Sonja Foss's process of ideological criticism was the chosen methodological approach for analyzing Kennedy's text. While my artifact constituted only a portion of the text, Foss's approach nevertheless managed to extract several key findings: By gathering suggestions from the five major elements, —the definition of rhetoric, the three branches of rhetoric, the primary persuasive appeals, the five canons of classical rhetoric, and visual rhetoric— I was then able to cluster their fundamental themes into a triune body of values. These values —rationalism, Darwinism, and naturalism— marked the central tenets of the book and thereby came to represent the overarching ideology latent within the artifact. In addition to this discovery, a further step was amended to the analytical process which succeeded in highlighting the inconsistent and often times contradictory arguments and evidence used to support the ideology.

***Limitations of the Methodology***

There may have been some possible limitations in this study. The first limitation was the impartial analysis of the artifact by virtue of my own Evangelical ideology. With

an Evangelical ideology, I harbor a number of metaphysical assumptions that are contrary to the ones Kennedy enforced throughout his book. Some of the assumptions in an Evangelical ideology are: 1) belief in the existence of God, 2) belief in the inspiration, inerrancy, and authority of the Scriptures, 3) belief in the creation rather than evolution of human beings, 4) belief in the possibility of miracles, 5) belief in the existence of the soul, and 6) belief in the Biblical timescale of earth history. These beliefs run counter to the metaphysical assumptions laid out in Kennedy's *Comparative Rhetoric* which instead depend on the inexistence of God or the soul, the impossibility of miracles, the theory of biological evolution, and the science of uniformitarian geology. However, with the ubiquity of ideology, Kennedy's text cannot be analyzed without some form of foundational bias. Because "ideology is never neutral" (Eisenberg & Goodall, 152), it is therefore impossible for anyone's perception of either this thesis or Kennedy's text to be divorced from an *a priori* network of beliefs.

A secondary limitation may be that the study did not account for all the elements presented in Kennedy's text. Only the prologue and first two chapters of the book constituted the artifact of this study. There may have existed other presented elements elsewhere in the book that might have revealed more about Kennedy's ideology. For instance, in the rest of part one, Kennedy examines the "Rhetoric in Aboriginal Australian Culture" (Kennedy, *Comparative*, 46), the "Formal Speech in Some Nonliterate Cultures" (Kennedy, *Comparative*, 62), and "North American Indian Rhetoric" (Kennedy, *Comparative*, 83). Also, in part two, Kennedy examines the rhetorical aptitudes of literate societies such as the "Literacy and Rhetoric in the Ancient

Near East" (Kennedy, *Comparative*, 115), the "Rhetoric in Ancient China" (Kennedy, *Comparative*, 141), the "Rhetoric in Ancient India" (Kennedy, *Comparative*, 171) and the "Rhetoric in Greece and Rome" (Kennedy, *Comparative*, 191). By analyzing and gathering the presented and suggested elements from these areas of the book, a few more insights on Kennedy's ideology could have been discovered.

Also, there were some elements within the artifact itself that did not receive any coverage for what they suggested. A few examples of these ignored elements were Kennedy's references to 'Shamanism,' 'Intentionality,' the 'Principle of Veracity,' 'Cultural Evolution,' the 'Rhetorical Situation,' and rhetoric as an 'Energy-Conserving Mechanism.' These elements, as interesting as they were, only seemed to repeat much of what was already incorporated into the study. Additional elements, such as Kennedy's sources, also did not receive a great deal of coverage. Jean Jacques Rousseau, Charles Darwin, Daniel Dennett, Noam Chomsky, and many other secular researchers cited in the book were not heavily expounded upon. By critically analyzing the spectrum of ideologies composed in Kennedy's sources, a greater knowledge of Kennedy's own ideology could have been realized.

A final possible limitation may have been due to the nature of the artifact being a book. Due to the processes of peer review and revision, books can undergo a series of editions which may not totally represent the author's original thoughts or ideas. Such processes can sometimes place an increased pressure to censor an author's personal opinions, or conversely encourage authors to promote opinions which they themselves do not advocate. For example, in Nothstine, Blair, and Copeland's anthology *Critical*

*Questions* (2003), Philip Wander submitted a commentary about his troublesome experience of trying to publish "a politicized and polemical manuscript about the American government's Vietnam war rhetoric." Wander's essay "collided unsuccessfully with journal editors and reviewers for years. Then after shelving the project for a decade, Wander discovered that it might be 'safely' reintroduced as 'historical scholarship,' rather than as a politicized and polemical statement" (Nothstine, Blair & Copeland, 179). Based on the reality of costly demands which authors are expected to meet, the authenticity of *Comparative Rhetoric* —as having accurately represented Kennedy's ideology— is wholly assumed.

#### ***Recommendations for Future Research***

For the prospective analyst interested in adding to this study or performing a similar study of their own, there are several alternative ideas for future research in this area. The first recommendation would be to examine Kennedy's text using a different critical approach. There is a myriad of alternative criticism methods that can be experimented with, such as generic criticism, pentadic criticism, neo-Aristotelian criticism, feminist criticism, cluster criticism, fantasy-theme criticism, narrative criticism, metaphorical criticism, or generative criticism. Using any one of these unique methodologies might produce a wider variety of clues about the rhetorical elements in Kennedy's artifact. A feminist critique may unveil possible gender role influences or expectations that are not readily apparent in the text, or a metaphorical critique can read subtle inferences about Kennedy's ideology based on manners of his rhetorical self-expression.

A second recommendation would be to perform another ideological analysis on another text dealing generally with the topic of evolutionary communication. This kind of study may reveal differing degrees of ideological transparency as well as expose the researcher to a greater range of persuasive techniques, depending on the topic and author. Better still would be to do an ideological analysis on one of Kennedy's older texts, such as his popular translation of Aristotle's *On Rhetoric*. Does Kennedy exhibit a similar ideology in his *On Rhetoric* as he does in his *Comparative Rhetoric*? By performing an ideological analysis on another one of Kennedy's older books, it may bring an additional insight by conducting a comparative study and evaluate the levels of ideological influences in either texts. There are, however, some ideas that may avail scholars who are less interested in qualitative analyses.

A third recommendation for future research would be to perform a quantitative study on how origins-literature affects a person's ideology. This study might demand the use of a survey to measure participants' opinions of a book dealing with human origins. The survey could be constructed in the form of a five point Likert scale, whereby differing levels of 'like' and 'dislike' can quantify an overall estimate of rhetorical persuasiveness. Possible questions worth considering may be: Does the author present a significant number of arguments? Was the author candid about their ideological objectives? Are the ideas in the book delivered in a clear and concise fashion? Were the author's statements substantiated by credible evidence? Did you think the book came off as being too preachy? Did the arguments demonstrate a strong sense of coherency? These are but a few questions that could be asked in such a survey. Also utilizing more personal

methods, like interviewing, may be an effective way to record individual assessments. By performing an interview, the methodological options may even expand to including a discourse analytical study.

Additional suggestions for future study would be to individually analyze the variables of gender, age, and culture, and examine how each of these variables relate to ideology. For analyzing the relationship between gender and ideology, this fourth recommendation might demand a researcher to study the work of a female author and decipher whether her writing style exudes a more or less ideological pervasiveness. Having already studied Kennedy's ideology, a gender analysis may be rather useful if one decides to carry out a study measuring how often or how strongly males and females promote their ideologies through textual artifacts. Are males more open about their ideologies than females? Are females more prone to ideological conformity than males? Which gender is more ideologically coercive and why?

A fifth recommendation would be to analyze the rhetorical relationship between ideology and age. To study the variable of age, a researcher may want to begin their study by first ruminating on a few key research questions such as: At what age do people start exhibiting ideological concerns? What age groups promote their ideologies more than other age groups? Between what ages do people exhibit the highest tendency of altering their ideologies and why? These questions can help give the researcher a clearer scope as to how they may exercise a study measuring the effects of age and its influence on ideology. It may also be interesting to study how ideology affects our perception of age. What kind of ideologies tend to grant old age a higher status in society? Why are some

ideologies aversive to the idea of getting old? How do ideologies help people cope with their own age groups? How many years does it take for ideologies to be cemented in someone's life?

A sixth recommendation would be to analyze the rhetorical relationship between ideology and culture. The variable of culture is one which may require the researcher to first develop an understanding of the history and customs of foreign societies. By making sense of the many contexts which constitute a culture, a researcher will be more equipped to theorizing or answering experimental questions such as: Is being forward with one's ideology characteristic of Western culture? How does the East handle ideology? Are some ideologies forbidden or illegal in certain parts of the world? How do the ideologies of low-context cultures compare to high-context cultures? Studies that attempt to answer such questions can be conducted in a plethora of ways, ranging from quantitative to qualitative research methods.

A final recommendation for future research would be to study whether an evolutionist's or creationist's text is more ideologically persuasive than a documentary of the text. Is the textual more influential than the visual? What media succeed better at influencing ideology? What ideologies succeed better at interpreting media? A plethora of recommendations can be made about the art and science of ideology and how to study it. A researcher could either analyze an autobiography of the author for a more accurate reflection of their ideology, or examine the ideological implications from a historical analysis comparing the ratios of evolutionary publications and creationary publications. Whatever the scenario, these recommendations for future research will hopefully act as a

springboard for any and all scholars who are prospective of the goal to furthering their own knowledge or contributing to the literature on rhetorical, critical, and ideological studies.

### ***Conclusion***

George Kennedy's text, *Comparative Rhetoric: an Historical and Cross Cultural Introduction*, was a powerful piece of literature that intended to liberate the art of rhetoric from the shackles of orthodoxy and tradition. This agenda, in accordance with the findings of this study, was no doubt learned to have a root connection with a specific underlying motive; a motive driven by secular ideology which compelled Kennedy to venture far beyond the familiar realm of classics and rhetoric to the new and scientific world of evolutionary linguistics. By combining the knowledge of these two distant domains into a single overarching tapestry of theory and history, Kennedy managed to produce the world's first meta-theoretical construct for explaining the ultimate evolutionary origins of human communication. This general theory of rhetoric served as the basis of his book as it surveyed the gradual development of rhetoric from primitive to civilized societies. To this day, *Comparative Rhetoric* is on the shelves of every academic library and remains the subject of much discussion in classrooms across the globe.

But as this study has revealed, *Comparative Rhetoric* is not all that it appears. Within the pages of this text lie a latent ideology that is geared not toward the praise or revival of classical humanism, but toward a deep-seated intent of converting classical humanists into *secular* humanists. The book, therefore, is but a mask hiding a personal campaign to further what some have been identified as an "ideology of rhetorical

Darwinism." The ideology invites us to view ourselves as animals; to trust only in man's ability to reason; and to deny our spiritual reality. With such an ideology, I cannot help but pause for Kennedy, who should by now be eighty-four years old. Having lived a long and prestigious life, one can only wonder why God should be unworthy of his gratitude. For years, Kennedy has been an ambitious scholar, a high-profile teacher, and celebrated writer. Yet, amidst the applause of his colleagues and the resounding commendations from universities around the world, Kennedy not only ignores the One audience member who matters most, but uses his *Comparative Rhetoric* to subtly encourage others to follow in his example. So if one should be so fortunate as to come across this text, may this study serve as a reminder to exercise a bit of caution, —for beneath its modest cover, one soon learns that even a Trojan Horse can come in the humble shape of a book.

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