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Walter Russell Mead: Power, Terror, Peace, and War for no. 149

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WALTER RUSSELL MEAD: POWER, TERROR, PEACE, AND WAR: STUDY GUIDE, 2006-2008

Steven Alan Samson

INTRODUCTION

Overview

Walter Russell Mead places his latest volume (which builds on *Special Providence*) into the context of the ideological and theological debates that have shaped American history. Like Michael Oakeshott and various conservatives, Mead depicts the contemporary world as the outworking of a “modern temper” or an “Enlightenment project,” two phases of which he focuses on: Fordism (resembling Lewis Mumford’s modern megamachine) and millennial capitalism. Mead’s identification of several competing schools of thought or dispositions in chapter six is somewhat comparable to earlier “models of historical interpretation,” such as Daniel Elazar’s three American “political cultures” and David Hackett Fischer’s four “British folkways” in America. The key to understanding Mead’s complex and sophisticated analysis of American foreign policy is to pay careful attention to how he defines his terminology, how he distinguishes between the major political and cultural dispositions, how they interact with each other, and how he frames the issues that been intensifying the current debates over American foreign policy .

Outline

- A. SURPRISE ATTACK (3-6)
 - 1. Lost Years in American Foreign Policy
 - a. Age of Narcissism and *Hubris*
 - 2. Unipolar World
 - 3. Dangers
 - a. Democratic View: Republican unilateralism would lose Kyoto and the International Criminal Court (ICC)
 - b. Republican View: Democratic fecklessness on defense would open the door to a challenge from China and fail to build a missile defense system
 - 4. Prevailing Illusion: Only One Effective Will (Ours) Operated in the World (Monotheletism=heretical doctrine that Christ had two natures but only one will)
 - 5. The Real Situation
 - a. Radical Muslim Mass Movement
 - b. Fraying Alliances
 - c. Anti-Americanism
- B. AMERICA IS BITTERLY DIVIDED ON FOREIGN POLICY (6-7)
 - 1. Unremitting Months of International Crisis Since 9/11
 - 2. Agonizing Mix of Reactions Among America’s Enemies and Friends: Sympathy, Anger, Incredulity, Hostility
- C. THE IDEA OF AN AMERICAN PROJECT (7-8)

[The latest iteration of the idea of the Enlightenment Project]

 - 1. **Institutionalization of American Power** [as an international organization]
 - 2. Public Support for Building a Safer, Peaceful, Prosperous, and Democratic World
- D. THE CHASM THIS BOOK TRIES TO BRIDGE (8-10)
 - 1. Need for Generalists in a World of Specialists
 - 2. Morality of the American Project
 - 3. Its Failure Would Be Catastrophic

Study Questions

1. What were the “lost years in American foreign policy”? What made them that way? What was the prevailing illusion? (3-5)
2. What were some of the characteristics of the real situation during that same period? Why are Americans bitterly divided over foreign policy? What does the author mean by the “American project”? Why are foreign policy generalists needed? Why does the author, on the whole, support the American project? (5-10)

Review

unipolarity the real situation American project
institutionalization of American power

PART ONE: THE AMERICAN PROJECT

CHAPTER ONE: NO ANGEL IN OUR WHIRLWIND

Overview

The author here articulates a free market perspective by acknowledging that knowledge and practice in politics, as in economics, are “little subject to conscious control.” The physicist and philosopher Michael Polanyi explored the problems and philosophy of knowledge (epistemology) in such books as *Personal Knowledge* and *The Tacit Dimension*. Similarly, F. A. Hayek introduced such concepts as “methodological individualism,” “subjectivism,” and “spontaneous order” in order to strengthen the case for free market economics.

At the level of political practice, Erik von Kuehnelt-Leddihn lamented the wide gap between *Scita* and *Scienda*. “As modern life becomes increasingly complicated across many different socio-political levels, Kuehnelt-Leddihn submits that the **Scita** — political, economic, technological, scientific, military, geographical, psychological knowledge of the masses and their representatives – and the **Scienda** – the knowledge of these matters that is necessary to reach logical-rational-moral conclusions – are separated by an incessantly and cruelly widening gap and that democratic governments are inadequate to the task.” Source:

http://pedia.nodeworks.com/E/ER/ERI/Erik_Ritter_von_Kuehnelt-Leddihn

Outline

- A. GRAND STRATEGY (13-18)
 1. **Carl von Clausewitz** on Tactics vs. Strategy
 2. Joseph Addison’s Poem on Marlborough’s Victory at Blenheim
 3. No Angel in the Whirlwind Today (no central guiding intelligence)
 - a. Clausewitzian grand strategy requires long-term thinking
 - (1) Bismarck could ignore the Reichstag and subordinate the bureaucracy to his will
 - b. Presidents and Congress Lack This Kind of Power
[Lord Macaulay once remarked of the U.S. Constitution that it is all sail and no anchor; Kuehnelt-Leddihn notes that the American government suffers from want of a professionally-educated chief executive; others have noted the lack of continuity due to frequent political turnovers]
 4. Politics Is the Art of the Possible: Public Opinion Determines Its Limits
 - a. American Foreign Policy: A Vector of Impulses and Interests
 - (1) It is a mall rather than a boutique

5. Foreign Policy of the American People
 - a. Business World
 - b. Media
 - c. Private Foreign Policies
6. The Most Profound Impact of the U.S. on the Rest of the World Is Unconscious
 - a. Rippling Effects of Pension Funds, Consumer Choices, Capital Markets
7. The United States Helps Set the Economic Agenda for the Rest of the World
8. The Disturbing Messianic Dimension of Grand Strategy
 - a. National Messiah Complex Reached a New High with Nuclear Weaponry
 - b. The High Stakes Involved with Nuclear Proliferation
- B. OUR OVER-ALL ROLE IS LITTLE SUBJECT TO CONSCIOUS CONTROL (18-20)
 1. We Americans Focus on Specific Issues When We Think About Foreign Policy
 2. The President Shapes Our Engagement with the World [But Tolstoy ends *War and Peace* with a theory of history that leaves no room for individual intentions]
 3. Patterns and Structures
 4. Grand Strategy Must Be Inferred
 5. American Grand Strategy Must Be a View of Where American Society Is Headed

Study Questions

1. How did Clausewitz distinguish strategy from tactics? What is required for long-term thinking? What factors make this especially difficult to achieve? What role is played by public opinion and how is it constructed? What are some of the components of the foreign policy of the American people? (13-16)
2. Why is the most profound impact of the United States on the rest of the world unconscious? What are some of the international rippling effects of decisions that seem to be driven by purely domestic consideration? Does it appear that the United States may be regarded as a bull in a China shop? [Some mountains are so high that they are said to generate their own weather. Likewise, some commentators contend that quantitative differences breed qualitative ones]. Thought Question: How is the image of Superman so characteristically American [although changing versions of Superman seem to reflect changing attitudes]? Do Americans have a coherent view of foreign policy? How may grand strategy be inferred? (16-20)

Review

Carl von Clausewitz	grand strategy	lack of a central intelligence
American foreign policy	unconscious impact of the U.S.	national messiah complex
role of the president		

CHAPTER TWO: THE SHAPE OF AMERICAN POWER

Outline

- A. TWO STRIKING FACTS, THREE ALTERNATIVES, AND THE NEW GAME (21-25)
 1. The United States Has Always Been a Global Power [its moods may swing from extraverted to introverted but it has always acted globally]
 - a. Promotion of Global Integration
 - (1) Flirtations with Protection
 - b. Global Ideological Impulses
 - c. **Global Trade** Creates Global Vulnerabilities and Security Interests
 2. Our Long-Standing Relationship with Another Global Power: Britain
 - a. **British World System of Empire and Commerce**

- b. Americans Enjoyed Its Benefits without Paying Its Costs [This is what is unkindly called “sponging”]
 - (1) Britain fought colonial wars and maintained the balance of power in Europe
 - (2) Idea of Free Trade
 - (3) Investment capital from the London financial markets enabled American industry to grow
 - 3. **Three Alternatives** Following the British Decline
 - a. Prop Up the British Empire, Ignore the Problem of World Order, or Do The Dirty, Expensive Job Ourselves
 - (1) Like Britain, America is not the world policeman; it is more of a gyroscope of world order
 - 4. The New Game
 - a. The United States Can Not Be Another Great Power Playing the Old Games of Dominance with Rivals and Allies [this is an expression of what is known as “**American exceptionalism**”]
 - b. Unprecedented Objective
 - 5. Goal: To Build a New System That Would Put an End to Thousands of Years of Great Power Conflicts
 - a. New Wine Requires New Bottles: The United States lacks the power to reduce the world’s countries and civilization to the status of tributary provinces (in the Roman tradition)
 - 6. Joseph Nye on *The Paradox of American Power*
 - a. **Hard Power** vs. **Soft Power** (which makes others want what you want) [cf. René Girard’s **mimetic desire**]
 - 7. Two Types of Hard Power
 - a. **Sharp**: military power
 - b. **Sticky**: economic power
 - 8. Two Types of Soft Power
 - a. **Sweet**: American values, culture, and policy
 - b. **Hegemonic** (leadership or what Girard refers to as “modeling”): It arises from the interplay of sharp, sticky, and sweet power all working together
- B. SHARP POWER (26-29)
 - 1. Ageless Rules of Military Power [understandable by Hittites and the Romans as well as by Clausewitz]
 - 2. **Monroe Doctrine**, 1823: Security Starts at Home [“King’s X” for the New World]
 - 3. Eurasia: No Single Power Should Dominate the Vast Supercontinent (especially the eastern and western fringes)
 - 4. Sea- and Air-Lanes Must Be Secure Against the Interruption of Trade Flows
 - 5. Middle East: Two Potential Dangers
 - a. Outside power (Soviet Union during the Cold War) interfering or gaining control over oil
 - b. A regional power (Egypt, Iran, Iraq) doing the same
 - 6. Osama bin Laden
 - a. **Goal**: Expel the United States from the region and build a unified, theocratic state that would control the resources of the Middle East in order to promote their ideology and power on a global scale
 - b. **Taliban** example: economic stagnation, political oppression, hideous mistreatment of women
 - 7. U.S. System of Alliances and Bases: Quarter Million Military Personnel Stationed Abroad
 - a. Intelligence and Surveillance
 - b. Objective: **Overwhelming Military Superiority**
 - (1) Deterrent Effect
- C. STICKY POWER (29-36)
 - 1. Economic: Not Based on Either Compulsion or a Coincidence of Wills

- a. Analogy of the Carnivorous Sundew Plant [cf. David Kupelian's *The Marketing of Evil*]
2. Both Britain and America Built Economic Systems That Attracted Other Countries
 - a. America was initially drawn into Britain's system of trade and investment
 - (1) America's global trade became hostage to the British navy
 - (2) There was always a strong lobby against war with Britain; New England almost seceded during the War of 1812
3. Germany's Experience in the First World War
 - a. Trade Dependency
 - b. Embargo: Sticky Power was Vital to Britain's Victory [Britain and France used embargos against each other during the Napoleonic wars]
 - (1) Starvation [Herbert Hoover operated a food program in Belgium]
 - (2) U-Boat campaign brought the United States into the war
 - (3) Collapse of morale among German armed forces and civilians
4. China
 - a. Path to Economic Integration: ensuring that it is attractive enough to bring China into the system
 - b. Mutuality: sticky power works both way
5. Two **Reasons** for the Importance of Sticky Power: It Helps Prevent War and, If It Comes, It Helps Us Win
 - a. Old British System was crippled by three blows: two world wars and the Great Depression
 - b. Its reorganization during the Cold War
6. Two Foundations of the New American System: the international monetary system and free trade
 - a. **Bretton Woods** agreements, 1944
 - (1) Dollar made the central currency in the global system
 - (2) The system collapsed in August 1971
 - (3) New regime: floating exchange rates
 - b. Free Trade
 - (1) Legal and economic experts helped build the "invisible infrastructure" of laws and institutions that encouraged investment
7. Requirement: America's Willingness to Open Its Markets
 - a. **Cold War Grand Strategy**: Containing Communism in part through creating a prosperous and integrated noncommunist world
 - b. America became "the locomotive of the global economy" and "the consumer of last resort" [cf. Rushdoony critique]
 - c. American trade [balance of payments] deficits stimulated production and consumption in the rest of the world
8. Opening Domestic Markets to Foreign Competition
 - a. Bitter Opposition [cf. Ross Perot's "great sucking sound" as industry moves South]
 - b. United States converted from a net international creditor to a net debtor during the Reagan Administration
9. The Result: Repetition on a global scale of the conversion of financial debt to political strength
 - a. Two Precedents:
 - (1) Founders of the **Bank of England** in 1694
 - (2) Creation of the Bank of the United States in 1791 following the assumption of state war debts
10. Bank of England: maintenance of the stability of the government guaranteed the value of the debt
 - a. Fear that a Stuart Restoration would undermine their holdings, wealthy Englishmen supported the House of Orange
11. Foreigners Have Acquired a Vested Interest in the Strength of the American System

- a. Collapse of the American economy or American power would inflict enormous, unacceptable damage on the rest of the world
- 12. Its **Fiduciary** [Trust] Character
 - a. The Risk: "Pressed too far or used recklessly, a large national debt can turn from a source of strength to a crippling liability."
 - b. "We have managed to persuade others to trust us with their savings to an unprecedented degree."
- D. SWEET POWER (36-40)
 - 1. Ideals, Culture, Values
 - 2. Ideals [cf. Minogue: stars to navigate by]
 - a. Women's Rights
 - b. Anti-imperialism
 - c. Political Democracy
 - 3. Selective Nature of Their Appeal
 - a. Many find the American approach to gender relations repugnant and frightening
 - b. Anticommunism attracted central and eastern Europeans, but repelled many west European intellectuals
 - c. Universal Human Rights: Some see an agenda of cultural imperialism
 - 4. Culture
 - a. Popular culture: Often hated for its immorality and vulgarity
 - 5. America's Role in the World
 - a. The **private sector** has provided the real energy of sweet power
 - b. MNCs
 - 6. Immigration
 - a. Foreign students
 - b. Remittances sent by immigrants to their families
 - 7. Humanitarian Assistance
 - a. 61% comes from the private sector

Study Questions

1. Was the United States originally introverted? How did America's long-standing relationship with the British world system of empire and commerce shape its development? What were some of the benefits (and cost)? What alternatives did the United States face in view of Britain's decline after WWII? What are some of the rules of the new game the United States has been introducing on the world stage? Distinguish between two kinds of hard power and two kinds of soft power. (21-25)
2. What is the purpose of the Monroe Doctrine? What is the strategic goal of the United States' exercise of sharp power? How does it pursue this goal? What is Osama bin Laden's goal? (26-29)
3. How does sticky power differ from sharp power (coercion) and sweet power (a coincidence of wills)? How were America and Germany similarly and differently affected by Britain's system of trade and investment? [Both were potential rivals but Germany's actions after 1890 posed a more immediate threat]. Why is sticky power so important? What were the economic and legal foundations of the new American system after WWII? What was America's Cold War grand strategy and what sacrifices did it require of the United States? What kind of entanglements does it specifically generate? How does it follow the earlier example of the Bank of England and Alexander Hamilton's economic policies? What is its fiduciary (*fides*=faith) character? [The Constitution has a "full faith and credit" clause that upholds our national debt] (29-36)
4. Identify some of the forms or expressions of sweet power. What might account for the selection nature of its appeal? ["Cultural imperialism" is a common charge; the toxic

character of so much popular culture is often deeply resented. As David Chilton put it: “If this is a culture it belongs in a Petri dish!”. Where does most of the energy behind sweet power come from? (36-40)

Review

United States: a global power	British world system of empire and commerce
benefits to the United States	America’s choices following Britain’s decline
the new game	hard power vs. soft power sharp power
sticky power	sweet power hegemonic power
Monroe Doctrine	Bin Laden’s goal Taliban’s rule
U.S. alliances and bases	Germany’s experience with Britain during WWI
why sticky power is important	Bretton Woods Cold War grand strategy
Bank of England	role of the private sector

CHAPTER THREE: HEGEMONIC POWER AND HARMONIC CONVERGENCE

Outline

- A. HEGEMONY (41-44)
 - 1. **Antonio Gramsci**
 - a. Power of “bourgeois” [middle-class] concepts like parliamentary democracy
 - 2. Legitimacy of the Order Is Based on Consent
 - 3. **Hegemonic Power**: the power that creates and flows from this consent
 - a. Sense of Inevitability: Rooted in military power, technological prowess, and broad historical development or economic power that cannot be challenged
 - 4. **Synergy**: interplay of sharp, sticky, and sweet power [Althusius set forth the political theory of synergism in *Politica*]
 - a. U.S. military-to-military ties embracing almost every country [note National Defense University]
 - (1) NATO expansion as an illustration
 - b. Middle East
 - (1) U.S. interest: maintaining the security of the oil trade
 - c. **Bottom Line**: The sharp power of military American supremacy has helped create both the sticky power of the world’s integrated energy market and the sweet power that flows from the reduction of military competition under the *Pax Americana*
- B. AMERICA’S KEY DOMESTIC PROJECT: FORDIST PROGRESSIVISM (44-49)
 - 1. **New Kind of Economy, Prosperity, and Democracy**: Based on a combination of mass production and mass consumption
 - a. America’s most important export during the Cold War
 - 2. **Fordism**: Based on organized mass production and high wages
 - 3. **Social Changes**
 - a. **Laissez-faire government** weakened
 - b. Unionization encouraged to prevent an anti-capitalist labor movement
 - c. Cultural changes that supported mobility and mass consumption
 - (1) Anarchic, cutthroat capitalism gave way to the “managerial revolution” [James Burnham]
 - d. Oligopoly: three broadcast networks, one phone company, etc.
 - e. Regulation of banks, airlines, and utilities

4. White-Collar Managers [C. Wright Mills, William F. Whyte, Jr.]
 5. **Progressive Reformers:** Patronage appointees of the old spoils system were increasingly replaced by a professional civil service with life tenure
 - a. Role of politicians shrank as government was to be conducted along objective, scientific principles as revealed by the new social sciences
 6. Civil Service
 - a. "In an age of universal suffrage, this system was a way of reconciling democratic politics with the need of the state to manage sophisticated enterprises that average voters and elected officials did not appreciate or understand."
 7. Educational Establishment: Training and comfortable, well-paying employment for intellectuals who might otherwise organize revolutions
 8. Fordist Ambition: **Means and Ends**
 - a. Stability and Prosperity
 - b. Anti-Trust Laws
 - c. **Regulated Economy:** Protection of Big Companies from Aggressive Start-Up Rivals [cf. Gabriel Kolko's *The Triumph of Conservatism*: for example, Pure Food and Drug Act protected Swift and Armour against upstarts that cut corners and gave U.S. meats a bad reputation]
 - d. **Work:** Hard, Monotonous, Rigid, But Better Paid
 - e. **Petite Bourgeoisie:** The broker of the Fordist class compromise
 - f. Intellectuals
 - g. Social Sciences
 9. Cold War: In Large Part a Competition Between Fordism and Communism
 - a. Fordist Advantage: Combination of the dynamism of markets with the stabilizing effects of government macroeconomic policy and ever more lavish social safety nets
 10. **Pax Americana:** Capitalist countries no longer tore themselves apart in recurring wars under its umbrella
 - a. Communist propoganda exploited the misery and instability resulting from these wars [**Lenin's theory of imperialism** is summarized here]
 - b. Fordism provided the United States with a persuasive argument that capitalism is better than communism at bringing peace to the world
 11. American System
 12. Concept of **Harmonic Convergence** [once used to announce a New Age spiritual transformation]
 - a. The spearhead of capitalism in its ideological war with Communism [e.g., the "perfect harmony" of the "world of Coke": "It's the real thing"; earlier it was the Harmonial Philosophy of the 19C American spiritualist, Andrew Jackson Davis]
- C. THE DOCTRINE OF HARMONIC CONVERGENCE (49-52)
1. Attractive Implications: Its Idealism
 - a. Capitalism creates the social wealth for universal education and mass affluence
 2. **Rockefeller Republicans and Acheson Democrats:** American Establishment envisioned a domestic as well as an international transformation in a more progressive and cosmopolitan direction
 - a. Vision of Eden: Post-Historical [cf. Roderick Seidenberg and Francis Fukuyama], secular, with a social welfare state *à la* Western Europe
 - b. The result was to be "more intellectually **meritocratic** [rule by an educated elite], less driven culturally by the mix of popular taste and entrepreneurialism. The values of the educated, liberal, and progressive social engineers would replace the values of the 'great unwashed.'"
 3. Progress: The rise of the rational and the retreat of the irrational forces in human nature
 - a. Fundamentalism would disappear

- b. Mainline religious traditions would converge under the gradual progress of enlightenment
 - c. Nationalism would become more “civilized” and nuanced
 - 4. American Power: Kinder, Gentler, Less Arbitrary
 - 5. *Pax Fordiana* Promised a Bright Future for Europe
 - a. Economic logic and historical experience suggested that Europe would catch up to the United States
 - b. As our relative economic power declined, we would conduct foreign policy through increasingly dense networks of institutions; sovereignty would be pooled; international life, like capitalism at home, would become less like a jungle and more like a garden party
 - 6. During the Cold War, this vision looked realistic
 - a. European Union seen as the leading edge
 - 7. This Vision Is Central to the Idea of Progress as It Has Been Understood Since the Defeat of European Fascism
 - a. It Assumed That the United States Would Gradually Become Domesticated
 - 8. **American Exceptionalism** [America as a “City Upon a Hill,” the First New Nation] Was Expected to Become a Thing of the Past
 - a. “The features of the world system that looked like an American empire were temporary, passing phenomena.” It would dissolve at the end of history into a liberal, Fordist order
- D. FORDISM AND A SECURITY BLANKET (52-53)
 - 1. Solution to Europe’s Most Vexing Problems
 - a. National and class arrogance exchanged for American security blanket
 - 2. **Hegemony of Bourgeois Democracy:** “Fordism choked Marxism (and fascism) with butter.”
 - 3. The Trade-Offs: limited national independence for the First World, enhanced national independence and a development model for the Third World
 - 4. Centrality of Local Elites: elite-guided large development projects and a state-controlled credit system
- E. IMAGE OF AN ENDURING ORDER (53-55)
 - 1. **Francis Fukuyama:** *The End of History and the Last Man* [the title evokes Hegel and Nietzsche]
 - a. Liberal Capitalist Democracy: The Culmination of History
 - 2. The American Project Is a Distinguished Moral Initiative
 - 3. Crimes and Errors
 - a. Support for dictatorial regimes
 - b. Uneven benefits
 - c. Mixed consequences of development advice
 - d. Unfair trade and investment policies
- F. POST-COLD WAR CONFIDENCE (55)
 - 1. Americans Remain Proud of This History
 - 2. Collapse of the Soviet Union Was Thought to Remove the Final Obstacle to Convergence
 - 3. The Came 9/11

Study Questions

1. How is hegemony legitimized? What did the Communist intellectual, Antonio Gramsci, recognize about bourgeois democracy? [This is why he emphasize the strategic importance of what has been called “the Long March through the institutions”]. What is the originating power and the synergy that undergird hegemonic power? (41-44)
2. What was America’s most important export during the Cold War? Why? What are the chief components of Fordism? What social and cultural changes resulted? What are

- some of their consequences? How were the values of the Progressive reformers reflected in the new civil service system? In education? What advantage did Fordism have in the Cold War competition with Communism? What did Progressives seek to accomplish through the Fordist social welfare state – both domestically and internationally? How did the Communists fight back? (44-49)
4. What does the author mean by the concept of harmonic convergence? What made it attractive, both to the American ruling elite and to others? What evidence of human progress was commonly anticipated? What was supposed to happen to American exceptionalism? (49-52)
 5. How was Fordism supposed to solve Europe's most vexing problems? Thought Questions: What do you imagine were some of the consequences of American deference to local elites? What kind of resentments might have resulted? (52-53)
 6. What was Francis Fukuyama's vision for the "end of history." What were some of the moral failings of this otherwise distinguished moral initiative? What brought it up short? (53-55)

Review

Antonio Gramsci	hegemonic power	synergy
Fordism	Fordist social changes	Progressive reformers
Fordist means and ends	Fordist advantage in the Cold War	
<i>Pax Americana</i>	harmonic convergence	meritocracy
American exceptionalism	hegemony of bourgeois democracy	
Francis Fukuyama		

PART TWO: THE GATHERING STORM

Overview

"The Gathering Storm" is the title of the first volume of Winston Churchill's History of the Second World War. In his earlier work, *Mortal Splendor*, Mead cites Jeane Kirkpatrick's quote from that volume (p. 151): "The Sermon on the Mount is the last word in Christian ethics. Everyone respects the Quakers. Still, it is not in these terms that Ministers assume their responsibilities of guiding states." A rebuttal of sorts is provided in one of Christ's sermons: "Behold, I send you forth as sheep in the midst of wolves; be ye therefore wise as serpents, and harmless as doves." (Mt. 10:16) The confusions to which many Christians are subject were addressed by the theologian Reinhold Niebuhr in a number of books on human nature and foreign policy, including *The Children of Light and the Children of Darkness*.

CHAPTER FOUR: FAULTY TOWERS

[Title is after a 1975 British comedy, "Fawlty Towers"]

Outline

- A. INNER WEAKNESS AND CONTRADICTIONS (59-62)
 1. Dual Nature of America's Role in the World
 - a. The United States sees itself, accurately, as the chief **change agent** in a global revolutionary process spreading liberal capitalism and liberal

- democracy
 - b. Conservative Dimension: We want change **and** stability
 - c. "Americans are rarely able to solve these problems elegantly."
- 2. Fall of the Berlin Wall
 - a. History Did Not End
 - b. Capitalism Is Not Stable and Placid: it is "driven unpredictably but dynamically by changes in technology, institutions, and practices."
- 3. Perils of Progress
 - a. Weapons of Mass Destruction
- 4. Progress in Weapons Development Undermines the Efficacy of International Cooperation for Nonproliferation
 - a. "Without progress, the United States would not increasingly face the wrenching choice of acting unilaterally against proliferators or allowing states with ties to terrorists to acquire nuclear weapons."
- 5. Potentially Destructive New Technologies
 - a. "We are nowhere near the climax of this roller coaster ride."
 - b. Scientists have access to ever-more sophisticated and cheaper equipment, ever-faster access to information about research
 - c. More capital is available in more efficient capital markets, enabling inventors get backing for promising technologies more quickly
- 6. Continual Reinvention of the American Project
 - a. We must never turn a blind eye to the revolutionary nature of the American project or the appalling nature of the threats
- B. TWO STRATEGIES (62-63)
 - 1. Age-Old Contest of Nations for Dominion and Conquest
 - a. Under the conditions of modern warfare, it might wipe out mankind if it continues
 - 2. The United States Seeks to Bring This History to an End
 - a. Foreigners look with alarm at the way American defines and seeks its goals; they look at the influence of ethnic lobbies and the growth of military power
 - b. European shock at the lack of consultation
- C. THE AMERICAN SYSTEM FACES TWO DANGERS: TOO LITTLE AND TOO MUCH POWER (63-69)
 - 1. The Liberal Hegemon: Effort to maximize consent and consultation without being seen as seeking permission to act
 - 2. Tension Between the Imperial and Cooperative Aspects of America's Role
 - a. Importance of **International Institutions**
 - (1) Their usefulness in building stronger and more effective coalitions
 - (2) Their drawbacks: They include countries that do not share America's sense of values and priorities
 - 3. Two Groups That Are Out of Step [cf. Reinhold Niebuhr's *The Children of Light and the Children of Darkness*]
 - a. **Party of Heaven** (e.g., countries like Germany and Canada): Goal of a harmonic convergence that subordinates might to right and a world Government that puts an end to war [idealism]
 - b. **Party of Hell** (e.g., Russia and France): Goal of limiting American hegemony from the standpoint of traditional power politics [realism]
 - 4. The Annoying Behavior of Both Groups
 - a. Russia, France, and other old-fashioned powers would rather see the world system revert to the old anarchic habits of multipolar competition
 - b. Official moralizing by the idealists
 - 5. How the Two Parties Combine

- a. The Party of Hell (forces of darkness) is cynical about the ability of international institutions to manage conflicts, but believe that establishing such institutions can weaken and hobble the United States
 - b. The Party of Heaven (armies of light) resists American attempts to preserve its freedom of action
 - c. The United States gets caught in a damaging crossfire between them
 - d. **Negative Coalition:** Their diametrically opposed visions of the world [cf. Thomas Sowell's *A Conflict of Visions*] could never permit them to develop together a constructive alternative to the American project
6. Neither Group Has a Logical Position
- a. The Party of Heaven's position means putting the Party of Hell in charge
 - (1) The **UN Security Council** gives the Party of Hell an advantage ("a permanent veto of expediency over principle")
 - b. If the Party of Hell insists on the game of dirty power politics rather than high-minded international law, then the United States has the right to play, too
7. **Basic American Position**
8. America Must Pay a Price Whatever It Chooses to Do
9. These Problems Tend to Surface at Moments of Crisis

Study Questions

1. What is the inherent tension (some would say contradiction) in liberal capitalism and America's commitment to it? What are some of the perils of progress and the increasing efficiency of capital markets? What unpleasant reality has led the United States to see an end to the age-old contest of nations for dominion and conquest? (59-63)
2. How does the need for international institutions the tension between the imperial and cooperative aspects of America's role? What does the author mean by his distinction between the Party of Heaven and the Party of Hell? What makes them so annoying and self-contradictory? Why would a coalition between them never accomplish anything positive? What is the basic American position? (63-69)

Review

America as a change agent	two strategies	America as a liberal hegemon
Pluses and minuses of international institutions		Party of Heaven
Party of Hell	negative coalition	UN Security Council
basic American position		

CHAPTER FIVE: THE DECLINE OF FORDISM AND THE CHALLENGE TO AMERICAN POWER

Outline

- A. STAGES OF CAPITALISM (70-79)
 1. Feudalism
 2. Industrial Revolution
 3. Fordist Era
 4. Difference Between Fordism and **Millennial Capitalism**
 - a. Two Views
 - b. Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher
 - (1) Contributing Factors: computer technology, international trade

- c. Obstacles to Progress: labor unions, state ownership, state-guided investment strategies
- 5. Globalization of Production
 - a. Destruction of the Fordist Economy [Joseph Schumpeter referred to capitalism as “creative destruction”]
- 6. New Burst of Growth
- 7. Features of the New Capitalism
 - a. Why the Author Calls It “Millennial Capitalism”
 - b. It Is Not a Return to Laissez-Faire Capitalism
 - c. It Is Not Simply a Matter of Deregulation
- 8. Role of Regulation
 - a. Protection of Consumers by Promoting More Competition
 - (1) Abuses
 - b. New Forms of International Regulation
- 9. Demographic Shift
 - a. Medical and Pension Insurance Programs: Increasingly Less Viable
 - b. Investment Decisions Need to Move from State Allocation and Subsidy Programs to Market-Driven, Yield-Sensitive Investments
- 10. Millennial Capitalism Is a Natural Outgrowth of Fordism Itself
 - a. Fordist Society Is a Consumer Society
 - b. Consumer’s Psychology Increasingly Bears on Social Institutions,
 - (1) Baby Boom: regimentation, discipline and passivity disappear
 - (2) **Daniel Bell: cultural contradictions**
- 11. Globalization Distinguished from Millennial Capitalism
- 12. Unpopularity of the Shift from Fordism
 - a. Governments and Elites: Asia, Western Europe, Latin America, Africa
 - b. Resentment of and Resistance against “**Neoliberal Globalization**”
 - c. **Marginalization of These Elites**
 - d. Beneficiaries of the Fordist System
 - (1) Anti-American Scapegoating
- 13. Developing World
 - a. “Neoliberals” and “Washington Consensus” Bureaucrats Get the Blame
- 14. The Real Culprit: Fordism Is No Longer the Most Efficient Method to Organize Capitalist Production
 - a. Subsidies Created a Web of Costs, Corruption, Vested Interests, and Irrational Allocation of Resources That Can No Longer Be Tolerated
 - b. Capital Seeks the Places in Which It Can Earn the Best Returns
- B. ARAB FORDISM AS A CASE STUDY: XENOPHOBIC HATRED OF “MADE IN AMERICA” GLOBALIZATION (79-82)
 - 1. Middle East
 - a. **Failed Fordism**
 - (1) **Pseudo-Middle Class:** dependent on government jobs or patronage [to a large extent this is true in America’s urban areas, where middle class housing is shrinking]
 - b. In Its Heyday It Managed the Transition from Colonialism to Independence
 - 2. **Costs of Fordist Subsidies:** Hidden and Direct [cf. Bastiat’s *The Law*]
 - a. Vested Interests Fight to Preserve Privileges
 - b. Costs Are Hard to Measure But Visible in the Decay of Quality [e.g., Yugos]
 - c. Political Machines Protect Themselves through Control over Credit Allocation and Economic Activity
 - 3. Population Explosion in the Arab World has Worsened These Problems
 - a. Stagnant Businesses and Bureaucracies Can Only Absorb a Fraction of Young Graduates
 - (1) By Contrast: Full Employment in the West

- b. Rise of an Educated Proletariat
 - (1) Marginalization of Professionals [they are creatures of a Fordist welfare state, part of Ortega's "mass man" phenomenon]
- c. Alternative Islamist Establishment
- 4. Boiling Cauldron
 - a. American **Demand for Open Economies** [and transparency]
- 5. Cultural Clashes of Fordist Society Intensified
 - a. Difficulty of Defending **Traditional Values**
 - (1) Increased Access to Foreign Media
 - b. The American Presence Is Made All But Unendurable to Conservatives

Study Questions

1. How does millennial capitalism differ from Fordism? What aspects of Fordism have become obstacles to progress? How has regulation been changing? Why does the author call millennial capitalism a natural outgrowth of Fordism? How does the consumer psychology (a product of Fordism) create what Daniel Bell calls cultural contradictions? Why is the shift from Fordism so unpopular in much of the world? Why is Fordism being undercut and replaced? (70-79)
2. What does the Arab Fordism of the Middle East exemplify the serious defects of the Fordist model? In what way was it once more successful? What are some of the costs of Fordist subsidies? Thought Question: How does the population explosion play into the hands of the alternative Islamist establishment? How are the cultural clashes of Fordist society being intensified? [A look at such books as David Kupelian's *The Marketing of Evil* and E. Michael Jones's *Degenerate Moderns* show how deep-seated these clashes are] (79-82)

Review

millennial capitalism
pseudo-middle class
traditional values

cultural contradictions
costs of Fordist subsidies

marginalization of elites
demand for open economies

CHAPTER SIX: BUSH, THE NEOCONS, AND THE AMERICAN REVIVAL

The four schools of foreign policy described in this chapter (although Jeffersonian isolationism is only briefly mentioned) coincide, in many ways, with the four British folkways described by David Hackett Fischer in *Albion's Seed*. Mead's Jacksonian populist nationalists closely resemble Fischer's English-Scottish Borderlands/Appalachian Backcountry folkway. Mead's Wilsonian idealistic internationalists are the liberal and secularized descendants of Fischer's East Anglia/Massachusetts Bay folkway that is represented by the Puritans, even though Wilson's ancestors hailed from the Borderlands. The idealistic internationalists are also representative of the moralistic subculture (associated with New England), as described by Daniel Elazar in *American Federalism*. The Hamiltonians are certainly one variety of Elazar's individualistic subculture, which he associated with the middle colonies. The individualistic subculture's counterpart in Fischer's scheme is the North Midlands/Delaware Valley folkway that is represented by the Quakers. But according to Fischer, Alexander Hamilton himself was "a native West Indian, naturalized New Yorker and extreme nationalist who had no roots in any regional culture." Thomas Jefferson, on the other hand, was "descended from Virginia's 'distressed cavaliers'" who left the South of England to settle in Virginia and the Carolinas. The Southern

regional identity of the Jeffersonians makes them less susceptible to launching or joining moralistic crusades overseas.

Outline

- A. INCREASING DOMINANCE OF MILLENNIAL CAPITALISM (83-85)
 - 1. Social Attitudes and Values
 - a. Revival of Traditional Individualism
 - b. Conservatives vs. Liberals
 - 2. New Movement
 - a. Not a Throwback to Anti-Capitalist Agrarianism
 - 3. **American Revivalists:** Supporters of Millennial Capitalism
 - a. Assertive, Self-Confident Ideology
 - 4. New Debate
 - a. Revivalists Seek to Claim Terrain over Which Both Parties Contend
 - b. Old Foreign Policy Debates: **Four Schools:**
 - (1) economic nationalists [**Hamiltonians**],
 - (2) idealistic internationalists [**Wilsonians**],
 - (3) isolationists [**Jeffersonians**], and
 - (4) populist nationalists [**Jacksonians**]
 - c. The American Revival Has Its **Roots** in the Hamiltonian Party
 - (1) Theodore Roosevelt and the Progressives
 - (2) **Structural Changes** in the Economy Are Driving and Shaping the New Ideologies
- B. REVIVAL HAMILTONIANS (85-88)
 - 1. Institutionalization of American Business
 - a. **Rent-Seeking:** Rents of Large Oligopolies and Monopolies Were Shared Among the Key Stakeholders in the Stable Regulatory Climate of the New Deal
 - b. Old Rockefeller Republican/Moderate Democrat Establishment, 1940-1975 [The “Yankees” of Carl Oglesby’s *The Yankee and Cowboy Wars*]
 - 2. Renewed Dynamism: Wall Street’s Embrace of Unfettered Competition
 - a. Flexibility more important than macroeconomic stability
 - b. EU no longer seen as the automatic prime trading partner
 - 3. Hi-Tech Military-Industrial Complex [Oglesby’s “Cowboys” associated with the aerospace and petroleum industries of the Southwest with the addition of the more recent electronics revolution]
 - 4. Confidence
 - a. Cold War era
 - b. Tables Turned: American economy has again outdistanced its rivals
 - (1) Structural weaknesses of the European economies; institutional weaknesses and political problems of the others
- C. REVIVAL WILSONIANS (88-96)
 - 1. American Wilsonian Tradition of Progressive Internationalism
 - a. Decline of the mainline Protestant denominations that shaped it
 - b. Crisis and change in the Catholic Church, another source of support for institutionalized multilateralism
 - c. **Revival Wilsonians** are a coalition of conservative Christian and Jewish supporters of Israel
 - (1) They have changed the traditional Republican approach to the Israeli/Palestinian question
 - (2) They are developing a new version of the Wilsonian agenda
 - 2. **Three Traditional Wilsonian Ideas**
 - a. Linkage between American security and the pursuit of American values
 - b. Rule-based global institutions should play a growing and ultimately

- decisive role in international life
 - c. Questions of value should be addressed primarily in secular terms rather than using Protestant Christian terms
 - (1) Reason: Protestants lost their theological zeal and non-Protestants hopped aboard the Wilsonian bandwagon
 - 3. Neoconservative Policy Intellectuals
 - a. Idealism/security linkage on steroids
 - (1) Revival Wilsonians are confident in American values
 - 4. International Institutions
 - a. Wilsonians have traditionally belonged to the Party of Heaven
 - 5. Passionate Dissent of Revival Wilsonians to the Old Wilsonian Orthodoxy
 - a. **“Sectarian” Protestant Tradition:** Built on suspicion of universal institutions like the Catholic Church, and the rejection of the ideal of a single world state
 - b. **Modern European Jewry:** “World community” stood aside as millions of Jews perished in the Holocaust
 - 6. Common Ground of Christian and Jewish Revival Wilsonians
 - a. The United States must enforce universal principles and values in the teeth of bitter opposition
 - 7. Realist Means in Pursuit of Idealist Ends
 - a. Strange Bedfellows of **Neoconservative Thought:** Alliance of **realpolitik** with a values-based foreign policy is widely seen as an unlikely and unsustainable combination
 - 8. Activist, Interventionist U.S. Policy
 - a. In the old Wilsonianism, the interventionist impulse was checked by Wilsonian ideas about international law
 - b. **Revival Wilsonianism** is less inhibited; “it can only be dissuaded from activist foreign policy on pragmatic grounds
 - 9. Rise of a Wilsonian Realpolitik
 - a. Promotion of more specifically Christian rather than liberal secular humanist values in foreign policy
 - b. 19C missionary roots
 - c. Cultural hegemony of **liberal Fordist ecumenism** is being challenged by a millennial, conservative ecumenism
 - 10. Power of This Ideology Is Easily “Misunderestimated”
 - 11. Evangelical/Orthodox Jew Alliance
 - a. Premillennial Dispensationalism
 - 12. **Deinstitutionalization of the Wilsonian Project**
 - a. Wilsonian human rights and democratic values are more popular than Wilsonian institutions
 - b. Run-up to the Iraq War shows the weakness of American support for international institutions
 - c. Unilateralism
 - 13. Shallowness of **Principled Multiculturalism**

[Some in evangelical circles similarly refer to “principled pluralism”]

 - a. e.g., moralistic rhetoric of the Diocese of New Hampshire
 - 14. **Neoconservative Movement:** Cutting Edge of Revival Wilsonianism
 - 15. The Rise of Conservative Religious Movements Has Laid the Foundation for a **New Kind of Religious Establishment**
 - a. From outside to inside the policy process
 - b. What the final form may look like
 - c. Limits of what the public will accept
 - d. Temptations of Wilsonian overstretch
- D. JACKSONIAN AMERICA (96-103)
- 1. Decline in Support for Fordism
 - a. Profound changes

- (1) decline of social democratic values
- (2) increasing attraction of classical Anglo-American individualism among later immigrant groups
- (3) revival of anti-big government populism and defiant individualism
- 2. **Achilles Heel of Fordist Society**
 - a. Its collective, institutional nature
 - b. Lack of success in building parties on the basis of economic rather than social and cultural factors
- 3. Fundamental Incompatibility of Vision
 - a. Fordist Society: Classes, masses, and blocs mediated by bureaucrats
 - b. Jacksonian America hates that kind of society
- 4. Balance of Cultural and Economic Forces: Tilting Away from Fordism
- 5. Anti-Fordist Dynamic
 - a. New Deal Democratic coalition: ethnic ties are dissolving due to Fordist housing policy that has moved people from ethnic neighborhoods
 - b. Workers now commute great distances
 - c. Class identity withers away
 - d. What lingers: race, gender, and Southern regional identity
- 6. Forest Fire Analogy
 - a. Reversion to hardwoods after a transitional period of conifer hegemony
 - b. Popular rebellion against the “system” of the Fordist mandarin
- 7. The Enemy: An **Arrogant Clerisy** of Administrative and Cultural Elites [cf. liberal Fordist ecumenism and principled multiculturalism, Julien Benda’s *Treason of the Clerisy*, and Roger Scruton’s Culture of Repudiation]
 - a. Millennial capitalism has less need of this intermediary class [part of Marx’s *petite bourgeoisie*]
 - b. Trend toward **Disintermediation**: information technology and the Internet are reducing the need for middlemen
- 8. **Consequences** of These Trends
 - a. Breakup of Learned Guilds
 - (1) Demise of trade monopolies
 - (2) Pressure on the tenure system
 - (3) Experts are losing their immunity and their authority
 - b. Political Result: A “both ends against the middle” coalition
 - (1) This is a modern variation on the original Jacksonian coalition
 - c. Shrinking of Middle Management
 - (1) **Proletarianization of the Professions** [Milton Friedman notes that “the physician [today] is an employee of an insurance company or an employee of the government. . . The end result is third party payment and, worst of all, third party treatment.” *Imprimis*, July 2006]
 - d. Clear choices between political parties will be rare [both parties try to recruit the disaggregated, uncommitted middle ground of the electorate]
 - (1) The old economy shrinks as manufacturing employment declines
- E. GATHERING STRENGTH OF THE AMERICAN REVIVAL MODEL AND THE MILLENNIAL ECONOMIC MODEL (103-05)
 - 1. They Have Been the Dominant Forces in Domestic Politics Since 1980
 - 2. Turnabouts in **Foreign Policy**
 - a. Reagan’s anti-establishment, American Revival foreign policy was abandoned by Bush 41
 - b. Clinton moved away from Fordism in international economic policy but remained Fordist in politics and security policy
 - c. Bush 43 has been placing American foreign policy squarely on the basis of American Revival ideas

Study Questions

1. Identify the four old schools of the foreign policy debates. In which of these schools does the “American Revival” have its roots? What has been the ideological effect of structural changes in the economy? (83-85)
2. Who are the Revival Hamiltonians? How do they differ from the earlier, Fordist Hamiltonians or their 19C predecessors? Thought Question: What is it about their economic base that gives them powerful leverage? What gives them confidence? (85-88)
3. Who are the Revival Wilsonians? What were the components of the earlier Wilsonian coalition and what were their key ideas? What accounts for the passionate dissent by the Revival Wilsonians against the old Wilsonian orthodoxy? Thought Question: Why is their role such a pivotal one (even though the Hamiltonians hold more of the economic power)? What are some of the “strange fellows” that energize neoconservatism and Revival Wilsonianism? How is the hegemony of liberal Fordist ecumenism being challenged? Why is the old Wilsonian project, along with its “principled multiculturalism,” being deinstitutionalized (largely bypassing international organizations)? What new kind of religious establishment is emerging? (88-96)
4. What is it in the nature of Fordist society that Jacksonians find so objectionable? What factors contribute to the anti-Fordist dynamic? Who do Jacksonians regard as the enemy? What accounts for the increase of “disintermediation”? What are the consequences of the resulting disaggregation [e.g., the break-up of traditional voting blocs] and decentralization? (96-103)
5. Discuss the fortunes of American Revivalism and the millennial economy in domestic as well as foreign policy since 1980. (103-05)

Review

American Revivalists	old schools of American foreign policy
effects of structural changes	Revival Hamiltonians
traditional Wilsonian ideas	Revival Wilsonians
liberal Fordist ecumenism	neoconservatives
new religious establishment	deinstitutionalization
disintermediation	Jacksonian hatred of Fordism
turnabouts in foreign policy	proletarianization of the professions and other consequences
	Wilsonian <i>realpolitik</i>
	principled multiculturalism
	clerisy

PART THREE: REVIVAL IN ACTION

CHAPTER SEVEN: THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION

Outline

- A. INTRODUCTION (109-10)
 1. **Cornerstones** of the Bush Security Policy
 - a. Preventing hostile hegemonic powers establishing themselves
 - b. Protecting freedom of the seas and skies
 - c. Maintaining American sticky power
 - d. Bring pro-American democracy to the Middle East

2. Revolutionary Ideology of the American Revival
- B. DESIGNATION OF THE WAR ON TERROR (110-13)
 1. Most Significant Decision: Invasion of Iraq
 2. Bitterly Controversial Choices
 3. Concern with “Grand Terror”
 4. Allies Preferred a More Nuanced View
 5. Power of the Jacksonians
 6. **Metaphorical Wars**
 - a. Cold War
 - b. **Merits** of the Latest Metaphor
 - (1) Al-Qaeda poses a direct threat to the American economic strategy
 - (2) Exacerbation of a damaging recession (2000-2003)
 - (3) A fundamentalist caliphate would threaten the American presence in the Middle East
 - (4) Large scale of the violence and total nature of terrorist demands resembles the actions of a hostile great power
 7. **War on Terror** Replaces the Cold War as the Central Organizing Idea
 - a. Ballooning defense spending, return to the Reagan fiscal straitjacket on Fordist social programs
 - b. Support of hard-core conservatives
 - c. Democrats’ dilemma
 8. Jacksonian Response
 - a. Vigorous foreign policy
 - b. Clinton years
 9. Restructuring of American Foreign Policy
 10. Interpretation of 9/11
- C. DIFFERENCES WITH PREVIOUS ADMINISTRATIONS HIGHLIGHTED (114-15)
 1. “Axis of Evil”
 2. Potential Targets for “Preemptive War”
 3. Dramatic Language
 4. International Tensions Systematically Intensified
- D. IRAQ WAR (115-20)
 1. Rationale
 - a. Presumption: Development of WMDs
 2. Other Considerations
 3. **Three Separate Lines of Argument in Favor of the War**
 4. **Jacksonian**: Clear and Present Danger Test
 - a. Need for a powerful statement to America’s enemies
 - (1) Warning shot
 5. Revival **Wilsonian** Neoconservatism: Making the World Safe for Democracy
 - a. Reconstruction of the Middle East region
 - (1) Sobering effect on neighboring regimes
 - (2) Humanitarian dimension
 6. **Hamiltonian** Realism: Ending an increasingly expensive strategy of containment
 - a. Containment strategy poisoned the region
 - b. **Saudi Arabia** was the chief problem
 - (1) Regime delegitimized by the presence of foreign troops and thus put on the defensive
 - (2) American pressure recognized as likely to be counterproductive
 - c. Other **Problems with Containment**
 - (1) Erosion of sanctions
 - (2) Civilian suffering
 - (3) Taking Iraqi oil off the world market aided OPEC price hawks
 - (4) Saddam left free to engage in mischief
 - d. Bottom Line: containment was a political and humanitarian disaster

- e. **Strategic Rationale:** "Taking Iraq's political weight out of the radical Sunni Arab camp would make a permanent and probably beneficial change in the political geometry of the Middle East"
- 7. Summary
 - a. The case for war was rich but the administration's public case for the war was surprisingly thin
- E. CIAO EUROPA (120-25)
 - 1. Willingness to Part Company with France and Germany
 - a. Europe fell to third place in American concerns
 - 2. Place of Europe in Traditional American Grand Strategy
 - a. Dominant position: 1917-1991
 - b. Limited European cooperation today
 - 3. Europe Is Unlikely to Provide Help
 - 4. Limits of the Franco-German Alliance
 - a. Germans want an end to power politics
 - b. The French elite wants to get back in the game
 - c. Common opposition to American foreign policy
 - d. The U.S. has extended the **Monroe Doctrine** to Europe
 - (1) The French and the Germans will not be permitted to silence Poland and other dissenting countries
 - 5. Middle East as the American Priority
 - 6. Trampling on European Sensibilities
 - 7. Different Perceptions of Europe's Place
 - a. Europe's Self-Image as an Economic Superpower
 - (1) End of the Soviet threat has emboldened Europe's self-confidence
 - b. Demand for a European Veto
 - c. Issue of International Rule of Law
 - 8. Al-Qaeda as a Common Threat
 - 9. Iraq and Iran
 - a. Nuclear proliferation issue
 - b. Ideal outcome of the war from the European standpoint
 - 10. Implications for U.S.-European Relations
 - a. They do not have a joint Middle East policy
 - b. U.S. policy likely will shift to ensuring the continuing independence of EU member states

Study Questions

1. What are the cornerstones of the Bush foreign policy? Do they differ significantly from the traditional cornerstones? Why is it difficult to grasp the idea of a War on Terror? What are some of the drawbacks as well as some of the merits of the War on Terror metaphor? How has it reshaped American foreign and domestic policy? How has the Bush Administration differed from its predecessors? (109-115)
2. What was the rationale given for the Iraq War? What three groups argued in its favor? What reasons did they give? What made Saudi Arabia the chief problem? What were some of the problems with the containment strategy that led Hamiltonians to reject it? What was the strategic rationale for war? (115-20)
3. Why is the United States largely saying goodbye to its former Cold War European allies? Why was Europe once America's chief strategic partner but also its greatest problem? What considerations weaken the Franco-German alliance? What differences have created greater disagreements and even bred animosity? Thought Question: How do the Europeans and Americans differ on the Middle East? (120-25)

Review

cornerstones of security policy metaphorical wars War on Terror
 Jacksonian, Revival Wilsonian, and Hamiltonian arguments in favor of the Iraq War
 Saudi Arabia problems with containment strategic rationale
 extension of the Monroe Doctrine

CHAPTER EIGHT: WHERE BUSH IS RIGHT

Outline

- A. U.S. FOREIGN POLICY (126-30)
 - 1. **Basic Strategic Direction**
 - a. Era of harmonic convergence with Europe is over
 - b. Ideas and values of the American Revival
 - c. Continuing deconstruction of the New Deal
 - 2. Foreign Policy Must Be More Jacksonian Now
 - a. Attitude of Liberal Internationalists
 - (1) They “see the Jacksonian tendencies of the American public as regrettable remnants of a barbarous past”
 - b. Public Feels Threatened
 - c. Rising Expense of American Foreign Policy
 - 3. Anticipated Response to More Serious Attacks
 - a. “It is difficult to overestimate the power and the passion that would go into the public response to successful attacks on American cities with weapons of mass destruction” [the ferocity of the Israeli response to the kidnapping of its soldiers in the summer of 2006 and the Carthaginians’ reaction to their doom in the 2C BC are indicative]
 - b. “Americans will respond to provocations like those of September 11 with massive and overwhelming force. Those who cannot stand us must learn at least to fear us.”
 - c. Bush Administration’s Response to 9/11
 - 4. America Still Demonstrates the Capacity for **Sophisticated Interventions**
 - a. Prerequisite: Jacksonians must be able to trust their “leaders with complex, nuanced responses to urgent policy challenges”
 - b. The response to 9/11 as an act of war was the only politically viable choice
 - 5. Regime Change in Iraq: A Significant Accomplishment
 - 6. Middle East Policy: Concrete Results Began Appearing by 2004
 - a. Capture of Saddam Hussein
 - b. Libya began dismantling its WMD program
 - c. Iranian arms inspections
 - d. Syria
 - e. Saudi Arabia
 - f. Hamas
 - 7. Strategic Opportunities
- B. SHIFT FROM EUROCENTRIC POLICY (130-32)
 - 1. Reason: **Rapid Development of the Non-Western World**
 - 2. Europe Cannot Be Granted a Veto
 - 3. Turning Away from Europe May Be the Best Way to Build a Better Relationship
 - 4. Need to Dispel **European Illusions**
 - a. Rejection of the Kyoto Protocol and the International Criminal Court
 - 5. Clinton’s Consultation and Deference Only Encouraged These Illusions
 - 6. Bush Administration Made the Strategic Decision to Discourage Illusions

- a. Europe's inflated sense of its importance
 - 7. Best Basis for Progress toward European Integration: a Good German Relationship with the United States
- C. SHIFT AWAY FROM INSTITUTIONS TOWARD COALITIONS OF THE WILLING (132-34)
 - 1. **Dysfunctionality of International Institutions**
 - a. General Assembly
 - b. Security Council
 - c. World Trade Organization (WTO)
 - 2. Sluggishness of International Institutions
 - 3. Inability to Provide the Needed Rapid Response
 - a. Much work will have to take place outside such institutions
 - 4. Kosovo as an Illustration
- D. OTHER BUSH ADMINISTRATION SUCCESSES (134-35)
 - 1. China and the Two Koreas
 - 2. **China and Japan**
 - a. Taiwan
 - b. Normalization of Relations with China
 - 3. India and Pakistan
- E. BIG DECISIONS (135-37)
 - 1. Problem: The Administration's Conduct Has Been Choppy and Uncertain
 - 2. Raw Quality of Post-9/11 Strategic Thinking
 - 3. New and Original Directions in Foreign Policy Often Start Badly
 - a. **Theodore Roosevelt**
 - (1) The Philippines
 - b. **Woodrow Wilson**
 - (1) The Fourteen Points and the League of Nations
 - c. Froth and spray of new waves

Study Questions

1. How would you characterize the new strategic direction of American foreign policy? Why must it be more Jacksonian now? What is the attitude of liberal internationalists? Politically, what is required for the U.S. government to be able to make sophisticated interventions, as in the case of negotiated with China or responding to humanitarian disasters? What are some of the positive developments in the Middle East that followed regime change in Iraq? (126-30)
2. Why was it necessary for the United States to shift from a Eurocentric policy? What European illusions needed to be dispelled? Thought Question: Why is a good relationship between Germany and the United States the best basis for progress toward European integration? (130-32)
3. Why is the United States shifting away from international institutions to coalitions of the willing? What makes them so dysfunctional? What are some of the Bush Administration successes? What problems have undercut these successes? What often happens to bold new foreign policy initiatives? What were some of the mistakes of the Theodore Roosevelt and Wilson administrations? (132-27)

Review

basic strategic direction	Jacksonianism and the attitude of liberal internationalists
sophisticated interventions	Bush Middle East policy : concrete results
development of the non-western world	European illusions
dysfunctionality of international institutions	China and Japan
Theodore Roosevelt	Woodrow Wilson

CHAPTER NINE: WHERE ANGELS FEAR TO TREAD

Outline

- A. MISTAKES AND FAILURES (138-41)
 - 1. Tactical Mistakes
 - 2. Intelligence and Assessment Errors
 - a. Iraqi WMD programs
 - b. Turkish failures
 - c. Delay in Security Council resolution
 - 3. War Policy
 - a. Failure to take elementary precautions against possible setbacks
 - 4. Aftermath of the War: Gravest Challenge to the Bush Presidency
 - 5. **Avoidable Mistakes**
 - a. Churchill's method of securing public opinion
 - b. Failure to better plan for postwar Iraq [Iraqi executive officer to American liaison officer Joe W. Guthrie: "You broke our country. Now, you fix it."]
 - 6. Learning the Value of **Gravitas**
 - a. Avoiding triumphalism
- B. DAMAGED RELATIONS WITH KEY AMERICAN ALLIES AND PARTNERS (141-51)
 - 1. Misunderstanding Europe's Political Situation
 - a. The Administration allowed France to get between Washington and Moscow
 - 2. France Underrated
 - a. Intelligence and flair of the French at their best
 - b. The French feel free to engage in global diplomacy
 - (1) French calculations changed due to Gerhard Schröder's reelection campaign
 - (2) Opportunity for the French to oppose American goals
 - (3) Expectation of the United States
 - d. **Worst French Blunder**
 - (1) **Jacques Chirac** blocks the second Security Council resolution
 - (2) Revenge is a dish best served cold
 - e. Little Can Be Done to Repair the Damage
 - 3. Germany
 - a. Collateral damage to American-German relationship maximized
 - b. Shock to European neighbors over the Franco-German arrogance and unilateralism over the euro
 - 4. America's Divide and Rule Policy Was Still Not a Success
 - a. Reversal of sixty years of American policy to unite Europe
 - 5. **Europe's Decline: A Problem for American Foreign Policy**
 - a. The United States can count on less help; that increases the costs and risks of America's world role
 - b. More political headaches
 - (1) America as a scapegoat
 - (2) Bad European decisions
 - (3) **Europe's best choice**
 - 6. Latin America
 - a. **Vicente Fox**
 - b. **Hugo Chavez**
 - c. FTAA negotiations scaled back
 - 7. Setbacks and Defeats in Public Diplomacy
 - a. Unpopularity of the United States

- b. Nuances
 - 8. **Reasons for the Failure**
 - a. Spending on public diplomacy slashed
 - (1) USIA moved to the State Department
 - (2) These programs were products of a Cold War campaign to win support
 - b. Harsh rhetoric
 - c. Chief failures were at the level of elite communication
 - (1) Cold War experience with political elites of American allies
 - 9. **Secession of Elites**
 - a. Exceptions
 - (1) **Tony Blair** won public tolerance in support of the United States at great political cost [See TRB in *New Republic*, July 3, 2006]
 - b. Reasons for the secession vary from place to place
 - 10. Failure to Prepare for This Secession
- C. **ROOT CAUSES OF FOREIGN POLICY PROBLEMS (151-53)**
 - 1. Difficulties of Holding Together a Vibrant But Combustible Coalition
 - a. Factions' mutual suspicion and hostility
 - 2. Cost of the Failures
 - a. Loss of good will in the Arab world
 - 3. Irony of the Neoconservative Failure
 - a. Intervention justified on humanitarian grounds
 - b. Failures of the occupation
 - 4. The Failures Are Not Decisive
- D. **CLASSIC PROBLEM OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY (153-55)**
 - 1. Long, Complex Wars Cannot Be Fought Without Jacksonian Support
 - 2. Jacksonian **Resistance to Nation-Building**
 - a. Loss of enthusiasm after Saddam Hussein was overthrown
 - 3. Neoconservatives See the Work of Reconstruction and Occupation a Model for the Middle East
 - a. Jacksonians "reach for their guns" at the mention of nation-building
 - 4. The Perennial Dilemma
 - a. Wilsonians often write checks Jacksonians do not want to cash
 - 5. Neoconservatives Got a Chance to Think Tank Ideas in the Field
- E. **AMERICAN REVIVAL (151-60)**
 - 1. The Conventional Wisdom
 - 2. Current Problems Reflect the Failures and Successes of the Clinton Administration
 - a. Central Europe
 - b. China
 - 3. Bush's **Most Acute Problems** Due to Clinton Failures
 - a. North Korea
 - b. Asian financial crisis
 - c. Indonesia
 - d. Middle East
 - 4. Shared Assumptions
 - a. American seen as the irresistible nation
 - b. Avoidable public rebuffs
 - 5. Need to Develop New American Revival Approaches to Problems Inherent in the American Project
 - 6. Consequences of the Rise of Neoconservatism
 - a. Unsettling push for democratization
 - b. Scorn for the old Wilsonian institutions has led to isolation
 - 7. American Revival: More Strength and More Stress
 - a. Inner logic of capitalism
 - b. Increase of its revolutionary tension

8. Capitalist Development Cannot Be Slowed
 - a. Resistance, resentment, and volatility
 - b. **Legitimacy crisis** for the American system
9. Revolution in the American System
 - a. "Change always poses problems for hegemonic powers"
- F. **BASIC CONTRADICTION IN THE GLOBAL SYSTEM (160-61)**
 1. Is It a Level Playing Field or an American Empire?
 - a. It is an uneasy combination of the two
 2. The Bush Administration Lost Control of This Balance After 9/11
 3. It Also Lost Control over Management of the Israeli/Palestinian Conflict
- G. **DIFFICULTIES OF RUNNING AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY (161-62)**
 1. How Leaders Have Dealt with Unprecedented Challenges
 - a. Lincoln, 1864
 - b. First Phase of World War Two
 2. Bush's Domestic Opponents
 3. Difficult International Environment
 - a. Bush successes
 - b. Failures

Study Questions

1. How does the author distinguish between various types of mistakes? What have been some of the costs? What was the nature of the costliest one? Why does it still represent the gravest challenge to the Bush presidency? Which mistakes were the most avoidable? Why? **Gravitas** is a Latin term for something of substance, heavy or weighty [such as C.S. Lewis's "The Weight of Glory"] rather than vapid or vacuous. [138-41]
2. How did the administration misread the political situation in Europe, especially in France? What were some of the French and German blunders? What price is being paid for these mistakes and by whom? What is Europe's best remaining choice? What have been some of the mistakes and missed opportunities in Latin America? What factors help account for some of the setbacks and defeats in public diplomacy? Which have been the most important? What does the author mean by the "secession of elites"? [This seems to build on the "circulation of elites" concept of Vilfredo Pareto. "Secession" suggests that Timothy Leary's "tune in, turn on, and drop out" is becoming a new paradigm for elite self-destruction]. Who has stood in the gap to defend the United States? (141-51)
3. Thought Question: Evaluate the nature of the conflicts that have bred to our most expensive foreign policy failures. [One that the author alludes to under the rubric of "secession of the elites" is summarized by Philip Rieff, author of *Triumph of the Therapeutic and My Life among the Deathworks*: "all communications of ideals come under permanent and easy suspicion"]. What are some of the costs of these failures? What is ironic about the neoconservative failure? (151-53)
4. What is the classic problem of American foreign policy? Why? How is America's perennial dilemma illustrated by the conflict of visions between the Jacksonians and the neoconservative Revival Wilsonians? What is one of the weaknesses of the latter? (153-55)
5. Why are the policies pursued by the Bush administration so intimately connected with those of the Clinton Administration? Where may some of the most acute problems be found? What shared assumptions by the two administrations have created problems? How does the revolutionary tension associated with the new capitalism also contribute to "what is likely to be a serious legitimacy crisis for the [global] American system"? What is its basic contradiction? Where has control over the balance been lost? (155-62)

Review

avoidable mistakes	<i>gravitas</i>	Jacques Chirac's blunder
Europe's decline	Vicente Fox	Hugo Chavez
secession of elites	Tony Blair	Jacksonians and nation-building
Bush's most acute problems	legitimacy crisis	contradiction in the global system

PART FOUR: THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

CHAPTER TEN: FIGHTING TERROR

Outline

- A. URGENCY OF TODAY'S CHALLENGES (165-67)
 - 1. **Two Challenges in the Late 1940s**
 - a. Stop spread of Communism
 - b. Replace the British world system
 - c. The price of failure
 - 2. Another War on Two Fronts
 - a. Fanatical terrorists
 - b. Need to repair damage to the American system
 - c. **The price of failure**
 - 3. Link Between Poverty and Terrorism Is Not a Simple One
 - a. **Privileged backgrounds of revolutionary leaders**
 - 4. Societies in Crisis Breed **Radical Ideologies**
 - a. 19C Industrial Revolution
 - 5. Crisis of the Capitalist System Weakens the Forces of Order
 - a. Weimar Germany
 - b. Post-WWII Italy and France
 - c. Post-Communist Russia
 - 6. **Failed States**
 - a. Bottom Line: United States and its allies must find ways to promote orderly and peaceful development or our security will be endangered by the ideologies and organizations of terror
- B. FACING UP TO THE THREAT OF GRAND TERROR (167-68)
 - 1. It Is a War
 - 2. **Nature of the Threat These Groups Pose:** Time Will Tell
 - a. Their resilience and resourcefulness
 - b. Preventive measures needed
 - c. Security concerns of the public
 - d. Error of "misunderestimating"
- C. NEED TO ARTICULATE OUR GRAND STRATEGY (168-75)
 - 1. Cold War Containment Policy
 - a. George Kennan's analysis
 - 2. Other Preferences
 - a. **"Rollback"**
 - b. "Live and Let Live"
 - 3. Policy Debates
 - 4. Flexibility of Containment
 - 5. **Triple Containment**
 - a. Military: alliances, nuclear deterrent, credible presence in threatened

- areas
 - b. Political expansion opposed
 - c. Soviet influence opposed
 - (1) Labor organizations
 - (2) Anticommunist intellectual and cultural leaders
 - 6. Need to Update the Containment Concept
 - a. War must be fought on several fronts
 - b. Containment is already a familiar policy
 - (1) Need to stress continuities
 - 7. Differences of Strategic Approach in the New War
 - a. **Deterrence:** nuclear arsenal does not deter as it once did
 - (1) Relative irrelevance of the nuclear arsenal
 - (2) Greater freedom for direct attacks against terrorist organizations
 - 8. **Forward Containment**
 - a. Version of triple containment
 - (1) Political and military
 - (2) Ideological
 - (3) Expansion and consolidation of state power
 - b. The Hope: deprive terrorists of real victories, keeping them weak and divided
 - 9. Current Focus on the First Kind of Containment
 - d. Current proactive efforts
 - e. Preventing proliferation
 - f. Upgrading home defenses
 - 10. Cutting Links Between Terrorist Groups and Governments
 - a. **State-sponsored terrorism** during the Cold War
 - (1) East Germany and Syria
 - (2) Arab-Israeli Conflict
 - 11. Collapse of the Soviet Union Ended East European Sponsorship of Terrorism
 - a. State-sponsorship persists in the Middle East
 - b. Acts of war against civilization [cf. Ibn Khaldun's *Muqaddimah*]
 - 12. Disingenuous Subterfuge of Distinguishing Civilian from Military Funding
 - 13. Need to Create a Strong International Consensus
 - a. Example of Libya
 - 14. United States Will Be Entangled in the Contradictions of the International System
 - a. Bottom Line: **Unilateral action may be required**
 - b. Even though the Parties of Heaven and Hell may combine against us [cf. Dore Gold's *Tower of Babble*, Pierre Manent, and Roger Scruton]
- D. THE SECOND DIMENSION: IDEOLOGY (175-82)
 - 1. The Ideas of Communism Were on March During the Cold War [and are again on the march in Latin America today]
 - a. Today the ideas of the terrorists need to be contained
 - 2. Need for a Better Name Than "Islamicism" for the Ideology We Are Opposing
 - a. One candidate: **Arab Fascism**
 - 3. Two Forms of Arab Fascism
 - a. Secular: **Ba'athism** (Arab Renaissance national socialism)
 - b. Religious: **Osama bin Laden**
 - c. Totalitarian politics
 - d. White [or, better, Green] vs. Black Fascism
 - 4. We Must Push for Political Containment of White Fascists
 - a. Need to distinguish White fascism from conservative Islam
 - b. We must acknowledge legitimate opposition to Western cultural penetration
 - (1) We can make common cause with legitimate Muslims
 - 5. Efforts of NGOs and Private Citizens
 - a. Education of women

- b. Attention must be paid to Islamic ideas and values
- c. Need to study fascist materials
- 6. Exaggerated Sense of the Differences That Divide Us
 - a. **Jacobin Model of Mustapha Kemal Atatürk's Secular State**
 - (1) Outward manifestations of religious commitments are frowned on by aggressively secular states: France, Mexico, and Turkey [cf. French laicism and Graham Greene's *The Power and the Glory*]
 - b. Attempt to Confine the Influence of Religion to the Private Sphere
 - (1) Civil codes rooted in Roman law are adopted
- 7. **Populist Reaction Against Aggressive Secularism**
 - a. The American model is not part of the Muslim historical experience
 - b. Potential point of contact: the American idea of a free religion is a free state
 - c. Similarities between religious policies of the early caliphs and the American people
- 8. Attempts to Find Common Ground
 - a. American Christianity
 - (1) Absorbed elements of the Islamic critique of Byzantine Christianity
 - (2) Christians pioneered the critical scrutiny of texts
 - (3) Trinitarian piety of contemporary American Christians is a far cry from the pagan polytheism that tainted parts of the early Church
 - (4) Religious tolerance
- 9. Exaggerated Fears of Evangelical Militancy
 - a. Flexibility
 - (1) Conservative ecumenism
 - b. Historical direction of American religion in overcoming bigotry
- 10. Possible Result: A Richer, More Authentic Dialog of Civilizations
- 11. Historical Precedent: **Challenge of the Cold War**
 - a. Racism addressed
 - b. Capitalism responded to the Communist challenge
- 12. Today's Moral Challenges
 - a. Need to renew our personal faith commitments
- E. ADDRESSING THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT (182-89)
 - 1. So Much Debate Has Yielded So **Little Consensus** or Insight
 - 2. Support for Israel
 - a. Regarded by many as excessive and one-sided
 - b. failure to pressure Israel on its settlements policy
 - 3. Europe's Blind Eye
 - a. **Europe is a root cause**
 - (1) **Anti-Semitism**
 - (2) **Imperialism**
 - 4. Need for a More Creative Engagement
 - 5. Europe's Unearned Air of Moral Superiority
 - 6. No Acceptable Peace Settlement Is Imminent
 - 7. Attitudes of the Israeli Public
 - 8. The **Palestinian Equation** Is Even More Complex
 - a. Dispossessed refugees
 - 9. Argument of Israeli Hawks
 - 10. **The Dilemma**
 - a. There is little that an outside power can do to force a solution
 - (1) Risks to peacekeeping forces
 - (2) Similar position of the British in the 1940s
 - b. Breakdown of the Oslo peace process
 - 11. Need to Focus on the Future of the Palestinian People
 - a. Question of the future of aid to refugees

- b. Need to shift focus from territorial compromise to the future of the people
- 12. Proposals for **Just Compensation**
 - a. Compensation to Holocaust survivors was \$50-100 billion
 - b. The United States should take the lead in proposing an international commission
 - c. Emphasis should be on individual compensation claims
 - (1) Proof of wrongdoing would not be required
 - d. Substantial contribution from the United States
 - e. Help from Europe and Japan
 - f. Need to help individuals and families to leave the blighted camp system
- 13. There Is No Prospect of Ending the Dispute Soon
- 14. But the United States Needs to Make a Serious Effort
- F. THE THIRD ELEMENT: BLOCKING STATE TERRORISM (189-90)
 - 1. The Establishment of Fascist Governments Must Be Resisted
 - 2. The Case of Hitler
 - 3. Governments Cannot Be Permitted to Have Links to Terrorist Movements

Study Questions

1. Compare today's challenges with those of the late 1940s. In each case, what is (or was) the price of failure? Explore the link between poverty and terrorism. Thought Question: How does the background of revolutionary elites illustrate the "secession of elites"? [Roger Scruton's culture of repudiation" and Kenneth Minogue's "political moralism" both contribute to an understanding of this phenomenon]. What factors have bred radical ideologies? What must the United States and its allies do in response – or face failure? (165-67)
2. What is the nature of the grand terror we face? What assumptions must we make? The Cold War containment strategy was only one of several. Summarize the analysis of George F. Kennan. What were some other strategies? What options were discussed in the policy debates of the Cold War? What does Mead mean by triple containment? How does he propose updating the concept for the War on Terror? What are the advantages of a containment strategy? What are some of the new realities? (167-72)
3. What does Mead mean by "forward containment"? What are its components? Where is the current emphasis? What was the West's weakness in dealing with terrorist groups during the Cold war? In the wake of the Soviet Union's collapse, what is needed? What constraints will limit American options? (172-75)
4. How important is the ideological dimension of the struggle? What are the two forms of Arab Fascism? [Problem of terminology: the radical Shiism of Hezbollah developed in Persian Iran]. What understanding is needed in order to exercise discernment? What necessary role is played by NGOs and private citizens? What must they do? What is the western intellectual source of the modern secular state? The populist reaction against secularism in the Muslim world exaggerates the philosophical and political differences that divide Muslims and Americans, who have also resisted the extremes of secularism. Thought Question: Why is the American model of "a free church in a free state" so difficult for the Muslim world to grasp? Where may common ground be found? There is also a similarly exaggerated fear of evangelical militancy ("fundamentalism") by secular liberals. How may such scorn be rebutted historically? How may fanatical fascists be isolated in the Middle East? What were some of the positive American responses to the moral challenge of the Cold War? What is needed today? (175-82)
5. Why is Europe a root cause of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and why does it remain so? Why is the Palestinian equation even more complex than the Israeli? What is the dilemma? Why does Mead believe the focus must shift from a territorial compromise to

preparing “a significantly better future for the Palestinian people”? What precedent is there for Mead’s recommended approach? Who could help? (182-89)

6. What does history suggest needs to be done about state terrorism? (189-90)

Review

challenges of the late 1940s	price of failure then and now	radical ideologies
privileged backgrounds of revolutionary leaders		failed states
nature of the grand terror threat	rollback	triple containment
deterrence	forward containment	state-sponsored terrorism
unilateral action	Arab Fascism	Ba’athism (Syria, Iraq)
Osama bin Laden	Jacobin model of secular state	Atatürk
populist reaction	challenge of the Cold War	Europe as a root cause
anti-Semitism and imperialism	Israeli-Palestinian dilemma	just compensation

CHAPTER ELEVEN: RECONSTRUCTING THE AMERICAN PROJECT

- A. NEED FOR NEW ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL RELATIONSHIPS (191-93)
1. Search for an Ideal to Replace the “Harmonic Convergence” of the Fordist Era
 2. **Checklist of Interests** That Defined the 20C American Project
 - a. Europe
 - b. Asia
 - c. Grand Terror and Arabian Fascism
 3. Strength of American Hard Power
 - a. Weakness: **intelligence deficiencies**
- B. DIFFICULTIES WITH AMERICAN SOFT POWER (193-98)
1. **Paradox**
 - a. Earlier worries about challenges from Europe and Japan before the shift
 - (1) Our greater ease with the new system’s **individualism and inequality** made it easier to accept the pain of the transition and reap the rewards
 - b. But it increasingly appears that this socio-economic transformation has undermined or poses new challenges for America’s soft power
 - c. **Alienation** of elite and mass constituencies around the world
 2. **American Unpopularity**
 - a. Its genesis in the 1990s
 - (1) Asian financial crisis
 - (2) Latin American economic reforms
 - (3) NAFTA
 - b. Wellspring of anti-Americanism was tapped by Gerhard Schröder to win re-election in 2002
 3. Reversing Course Is Not the Answer
 4. Effect of an Awakened Jacksonian Public Opinion
 - a. **Multilateral engagement** with the world on something like Europe’s terms is not an option
 5. No Turning Back the Clock on Economic Policy
 - a. Fordist nostalgia
 - b. The new methods promise greatly enhanced living standards
 - c. The quest for greater efficiency and dynamism is essential
 6. New American Task: **Build a New Version of the Old American System**
 - a. Potential for millennial capitalism

7. Decentralization
 - a. **Reduction of elite influence**
 - b. Harder for authorities to govern
 - (1) Germany's quarrel with Washington
 - (2) Growing populist political atmosphere
 8. Angels Being Thrown Out of Their Whirlwinds: A Billion Mutinies
 9. Need to **Repackage Our Leadership** [and make it more unobtrusive]
 - a. World is looking for a new approach
- C. NEED FOR A NEW AND MORE CREATIVE APPROACH TO GLOBAL GOVERNANCE (198-203)
1. Sterile Debate over Institutions
 - a. The American political process refuses to embrace trade-offs
 2. There Is No Perfect Solution to the Tensions and Contradictions
 3. Key International Institutions Were Designed for a Different World
 - a. Imperial rule still prevailed at the time
 - b. There was a greater diversity of development
 4. The Problem Is One of Representation: The Paradox
 - a. Only truly global institutions represent everybody
 - b. If everybody is equally and fairly represented, nobody has any real power [a corollary to this phenomenon was noticed by Paul Valéry]

Paul Valéry, "Politics of the Mind," 1932:

But to clarify this glimpse into the *fiduciary life* of the world, founded on confidence in man and in the future, and to give you a real sense of the very real importance of the imaginary, I should like to show you how *power* [*potestas*] itself, which is ordinarily thought to result from force [*potentia*], is essentially a spiritual value.

Power has only the force we are willing to attribute to it; even the most brutal power is founded on belief. *We credit it with the ability to act at all times and everywhere, whereas, in reality, it can only act at one point and at a certain moment.* In short, all power is exactly in the position of a bank whose existence depends on the sole probability (incidentally, very great) that all its clients will not come at once to draw out their deposits. *If, either constantly or at a particular moment, a certain power were summoned to bring to bear its real force at every point in its empire, its strength at each point would be about equal to zero. . . .*

Notice too (and this is an even more interesting consideration), that *if all men were equally enlightened, equally critical, and above all equally courageous, no society would be possible! . . .*

Trust, credulity, inequality of intellect, and fear in a thousand forms are here equally indispensable. And to these essentials must be added greed and vanity -- and other virtues -- the condiments, the psychological accessories to those psychological bases of society and politics.

5. The Problem for Mass Democracies
 - a. **Federal devolution**
 - b. Interest and affinity groups
6. Global Institutions: **Lost Sense of Participation and Empowerment**
 - a. Democracy weakened
 - b. Less accountability of institutions
7. Role of the Universal Institutions of the 1940s

- a. Need for proactive reform
- 8. **Two Major Strategies**
 - a. Restructuring the United Nations
 - b. Creation of dynamic single-purpose and regional institutions
- 9. Reform of the Security Council
 - a. Expansion of permanent membership
- 10. Regional Institutions
- D. AFRICA (203-05)
 - 1. Capetown Slums
 - 2. Khalelitsa
 - a. Need for mortgage loans
 - b. Lack of neighborhood stores
 - 3. Financial Engineering
 - a. **Mass mortgage and financial service markets**
- E. LATIN AMERICA (205-09)
 - 1. Finding Ways to Help Growth
 - 2. We Should Make Our Immediate Neighborhood an Example
 - 3. U.S.-Mexico Relations as a Centerpiece
 - a. Regional economic integration
 - 4. First Step: NAFTA and Other Trade Agreements
 - a. Trade is not enough
 - b. Falling wages
 - (1) North-south gap
 - c. Result: Domestic problems for the United States
 - 5. Need to Revisit the Conditions of Illegal Workers
 - a. Need to develop ways to ease the path of guest workers
 - b. Attention needs to be given to the needs of low-income Americans
 - c. Absorption limits
 - 6. Third Option: **Retirement Initiative**
 - a. Aging retirees
 - (1) Escalating cost of retirement housing
 - b. Why not encourage the emigration of retirees?
 - 7. Legal Protections Must Be Negotiated
 - a. Favorable tax, customs, insurance, property rights, and inheritance laws
 - b. Reimbursement to health care facilities
 - 8. **Advantages** to This Kind of Development Policy
 - a. Reduce Medicare costs
 - b. Pump money into local economies
 - c. major investments
 - 9. Millennial Capitalism at Work: It Is Not Foreign Aid
 - 10. Its Chief Merit: Giving the Poor Better Access to Capitalism
 - a. Development of mortgage markets, etc.
- F. DIRECT INVOLVEMENT OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE (209-10)
 - 1. Engagement of Civil Society
 - a. Need to address the world's most urgent problems
 - 2. Private Philanthropy and Faith-Based Charity
- G. THE FUTURE OF MILLENNIAL CAPITALISM (210-12)
 - 1. Author's Optimism
 - a. 9/11 struck while the United States as at a vulnerable point
 - b. Critical Stage: the benign features of millennial capitalism were still relatively underdeveloped
 - 2. Entrepreneurs Are Promoting the Transition in Their Own Societies
 - a. The United States is only the first to shift
 - b. France
 - c. Diversity of expressions
 - 3. **Cultural and Social Lag**

- a. Mass urbanization
 - b. Trade cycle
 - c. **Historical derailments**
- 4. The Pace of Change Again Outstrips the Means of Amelioration
 - a. Reactionary protest and utopian longing
- 5. **Hernando de Soto**
 - a. Microcredit movement
 - b. Role of women
 - c. The poor need access to capitalism
- H. THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY (212-13)
 - 1. Empowerment of People
 - 2. Building a New Version of the World System
 - 3. Standing for Values and Freedom
 - 4. Franklin Delano Roosevelt
 - 5. **Endicott Peabody**
 - a. *Cui Servire Est Regnare* [Who serves, rules]
 - 6. Jesus

Study Questions

1. Identify the major interests that defined the 20C American project. Why has it been easier for the United States to adjust to the socio-economic transformation of millennial capitalism? Why is America so unpopular, particularly with foreign political elites? Thought Question: How does this relate to the secession of elites both at home and abroad? What are some of America's non-options? What is the new American task? What are some of the consequences of the new decentralization of authority? Can people be equally and fairly represented? What problem does this pose for mass democracies? What can America do? How does the author propose to restructure the universal institutions of the late 1940s? (191-203)
2. What reforms does the author recommend to help lift Africa and Latin America out of poverty? How can the American people become involved? What reasons does Mead give for optimism about the future of millennial capitalism? What are some of the dangers? What does the Peruvian economist Hernando de Soto recommend? What kind of moral guidance was offered by guiding lights of the older establishment, such as Endicott Peabody? (203-13)

Review

checklist of interests	intelligence deficiencies	paradox of American soft power
individualism and inequality	alienation of elites and masses	American unpopularity
multilateral engagement	new American task	effects of decentralization
need to repackage American leadership		federal devolution
lost sense of participation and empowerment		major American strategies
mass mortgage and financial service markets		retirement initiative
cultural and social lag	Hernando de Soto	Endicott Peabody