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### Dore Gold: Tower of Babble Study Guide

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### DORE GOLD: TOWER OF BABBLE STUDY GUIDE, 2005-2008 Steven Alan Samson

### INTRODUCTION: THE ROOTS OF CHAOS

Α	ADDRESSING T	HE GLOBAL CRI	SIS AT THE GENERAI	ASSEMBLY (1-3)

- 1. George H. W. Bush's New World Order
- 2. Reemergence of Utopian Enthusiasm after WW!!
  - a. Earlier examples: League of Nations and the Concert of Europe
- 3. **Crippling Flaws** of the United Nations
- 4. Author's Thesis
  - a. The UN in not a benign but ineffective world body; it has actually accelerated and spread world chaos
- B. "THERE IS NO NEUTRAL GROUND" (3-6)
  - 1. Bush's Critique of the UN, 9-12-02
    - Reminder of the UN's original purpose: to combat aggressors and protect human rights
  - 2. UN Was Born at a Moment of Extraordinary Moral Clarity
  - 3. The Case against Saddam Hussein
    - a. Human rights abuses
    - b. Violation of **16 Security Council resolutions** that fell under Chapter VII
  - 4. Moral Judgments Are a Necessary Prerequisite for Taking Action
    - a. Purpose of the **Security Council**
  - 5. The Problem
    - a. The UN's refusal to make moral judgments
    - b. Order vs. chaos
- C. MORAL EQUIVALENCE (6-12)
  - 1. UN's Failures
    - a. Somalia
    - b. Rwanda
    - c. Srebrenica
    - d. Kosovo
    - e. Macedonia
  - 2. Kofi Annan's Failure
    - a. UN's policy of reflexive neutrality
    - b. David Rieff's critique
  - 3. Annan: The Quintessential UN Bureaucrat
    - a. The UN's institutional ideology of impartiality
    - b. Khmer Rouge protected by Javier Pérez de Cuellar
    - c. Pol Pot
  - 4. Diplomatic Neutralism Is Immoral
    - a. Worship of consensus
  - 5. UN's Flaw
    - a. Saddam Hussein
    - b. Richard Butler's critique
    - c. "moral equivalence"
  - 6. Iraq: Oil for Food Program
    - a. \$10.1 billion stolen
    - b. Investigations

- 7. Other Scandals
  - a. Spread of AIDS
  - b. UN sex trade
- 8. UN Agencies
  - a. Libya's Qaddafi chaired the Human Rights Commission
  - b. Syria's election to the Security Council
- 9. Moral Equivalence
  - Resolutions: Dripping in moral equivalence even when they may be nonbinding
- 10. Post-Cold War UN Role
  - a. UN seen as a source of international legitimacy
- D. THE SOURCE OF INTERNATIONAL LEGITIMACY (12-18)
  - Loss of Moral Clarity
  - 2. The Original UN Was an Alliance Built on Shared Interests
    - Soviets and Saudis merely abstained from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
  - 3. Tower of Babel: Original Member States Spoke the Same Political Language
    - a. Introduction of new political languages by new members
    - b. Loss of the clarity of 1945 as UN member states talked past each other
    - c. Churchill's hope: a true temple of peace, not merely a cockpit in a Tower of Babel
  - 4. A Minority of 75 Free Democracies out of 184 Member States in 1993
  - 5. Third World Authoritarianism
    - a. Soviet bloc resolution on human rights, 1985
    - b. Preemption of humanitarian intervention
  - 6. Annan on the UN's Unique Legitimacy
    - a. Practical implications: superiority of a consensus of dictators
  - 7. Military Action by the United States
    - a. Not dependent on UN approval when vital American interests are involved, e.g., the naval quarantine of Cuba and the Korean War
  - 8. The Security Council Has Approved the Use of Military Force Only Twice
  - 9. UN Charter's Restrictions on the Use of Force
    - a. The UN Charter was **not supposed to supersede the US Constitution** for Americans
    - b. Doctrine that states lack the moral authority to make decisions about their own security threatens to undermine the global war on terrorism
  - 10. UN's Failure to Identify Aggressors
    - a. U Thant
  - 11. **Serious Threats** Are Often Handled Outside the UN Framework
    - a. Khmer Rouge
    - b. **Idi Amin**
    - c. Bangladesh
    - d. Kosovo
  - 12. Legitimacy of Extra-Legal Interventions
    - a. Michael Walzer
  - 13. George H. W. Bush's "New World Order"
    - a. George F. Will's dissent
  - 14. Accusation of Unilateralism
- E. INEPT HANDLING AND UNNECESSARY TARGETS (18-21)
  - 1. Breakdown of the Non-Proliferation System
    - a, Opposition to ABMs
  - 2. African Secessionist Movements and Apartheid Regimes
  - 3. General Assembly Res. 3379: "Zionism Is Racism"
  - 4. Anti-Israel Activity Led to Turning a Blind Eye to Urgent Crises
    - a. Liberian civil war
    - b. Sierra Leone

- 5. Belated Action
  - a. Congo, 1998: delay until 2003
- 6. UN: A Transparently Politicized Body
- 7. The UN Is Not a Neutral Party
  - a. Richard Butler
  - b. "Impartiality"
- 8. Erosion of the UN's Original Standards
- F. PERPETUATING TERRORISM (21-23)
  - 1. Refusal to Abandon Impartiality
  - 2. Failure to Stand Up to Terrorism
  - 3. Suicide Terrorism Legitimized
    - a. Definition as "resistance to occupation" even though the Palestinian Authority ruled
  - Human Rights Commission Supports Resistance
- G. "EVIL IS PREVAILING" (23-24)
  - Sergio Vieira de Mello

United Nations: author's view express purpose of the UN Rwanda and Bosnia massacres

Richard Butler Kofi Annan U Thant
Javier Pérez de Cuéllar Security Council approval for the use of force

how the massacres of Cambodians, Ugandans, East Pakistanis, and Kosovars were ended

George F. Will on the UN Res. 3379

### CHAPTER ONE: THE EROSION OF STANDARDS

### Outline

- A. CREATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS (25-27)
  - 1. United Nations: An American Idea
    - a. Daniel Moynihan: "At first the UN was seen as the instrument of American ideologues."
  - 2. Origin
    - a. The role of Franklin Delano Roosevelt
    - b. The Atlantic Charter
    - c. Declaration by United Nations, 1942
  - Purpose
  - 4. Dumbarton Oaks Conference
    - a. The four policemen
  - 5. San Francisco: Founding Conference
    - a. Security Council
    - b. General Assembly
  - 6. Built-in Tensions
    - a. Utopian proposals [Francis Lieber earlier noted this tendency]
  - 7. **Walter Lippmann**: Responsibility for World Order Must Not be Delegated
- B. MORAL CLARITY (28-32)
  - 1. Membership Prerequisite: Belligerence Against the Axis
  - 2. Collective Security
    - a. Two prerequisites for its success

Identify aggression Mobilize a response

- 3. Moment of Moral Clarity
  - a. **Nuremberg trials** against Nazi war criminals

- b. Fundamental human rights
- Benign View of the USSR
  - a. Excusing Soviet behavior, *e.g.*, James Byrnes compared what Churchill later called the "Iron Curtain" to the Rio Treaty
  - b. Loophole in the **Genocide Convention** of 1948
  - c. Alger Hiss, acting secretary-general at the founding conference
- 5. Minimal Influence of the USSR
- 6. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948
  - a. **Eleanor Roosevelt**, first chairman of the UN Commission on Human Rights, called it a "common standard"
  - b. Authors included Eleanor Roosevelt, **René Cassin**, **Charles Malik**, and P. C. Chang
  - c. Overwhelming political agreement
  - d. Hassan al-Turabi's view, 1994
- Addition of New States
  - a. Dissolution of European colonial empires
  - b. Authoritarian offspring of the former USSR and totalitarian Islamist regimes
  - c. Clash of ideologies rather than a clash of civilizations
- 8. Nonaligned Movement
- 9. Growing Influence of Authoritarian Regimes
- 10. **Dean Acheson**'s Critique
- C. OPENING THE DOOR FOR AGGRESSION (33-36)
  - 1. Post-Cold War World
    - a. George H. W. Bush's vision for a "new world order"
    - b. Madeleine Albright on the Security Council
  - 2. Loss of a Common Sense of Purpose
    - a. Opposition to human rights by the majority Afro-Asian bloc
    - b. 1993 **human rights declaration** omitted freedom of speech and freedom of assembly
  - 3. Debates of Decolonization
    - a. General Assembly Res. 1514 (XV)
    - b. Soviet bloc gains
  - 4. Seizure of Goa, 1961
    - a. Jawaharlal **Nehru**'s rationale
    - b. Adlai **Stevenson**'s appeal
  - 5. Struggle to Define Aggression
    - a. Subversion
    - Self-determination issue
    - Protection of peoples under "alien domination"
- D. CONDONING TERRORISM (36-40)
  - 1. Freedom Fighters

Res. 2708 (XXV)

- 2. Airplane Hijackings
- 3. Yasser Arafat's Speech, 1974
- 4. New Concept of Collective National Rights
  - a. Idi Amin
  - b. 1979 exception on hostage taking
  - c. Res. 37/43, 1982
- Ad Hoc Committee on Terrorist Bombings
- E. BEYOND A "TALK HOUSE" (40-43)
  - 1. **Richard Holbrooke**'s "Talk House"
    - a. General Assembly's new value structure
  - 2. Modifying the 1949 **Geneva Conventions** 
    - a. Elevated legal status of "national liberation" groups
  - 3. Human Rights Commission Resolution Against Israel

- b. United States voted off the Commission
- General Assembly's Decisions Provide Political Guidance to the Secretary-General
  - a. René Cassin's complaint in the 1950s
  - b. Secretary-General promotes UN General Assembly resolutions
- F. FAILURE (43)
  - 1. The Old UN Was Born in the Shadow of the Holocaust
  - The New UN Did Nothing in Response to Mass Murder in the 1970s and 1980s

**Dumbarton Oaks Conference** FDR's "four policemen" purpose of the Security Council Eleanor Roosevelt Commission on Human Rights Charles Malik Jawaharlal Nehru René Cassin Alger Hiss India's seizure of Goa Adlai Stevenson's warning Dean Acheson Madeleine Albright Walter Lippmann Richard Holbrooke new concept of human rights exception to the international convention against hostage taking 1949 Geneva Conventions Res. 1514

### CHAPTER TWO: FAILURE FORESHADOWED

- A. FIRST POSTWAR ARMED AGGRESSION: PALESTINE (45-52)
  - 1. **Trygve Lie**'s Response
    - a. Arab League invasion
  - 2. Security Council Warned
    - a. American response
    - b. Soviet response
    - c. UN's Lack of Responsiveness
  - 3. British Mandatory Palestine: A Group of Ottoman Imperial Districts Since 1517
    - a. Sharif Hussein
    - b. Balfour Declaration
    - c. Double-cross [more of a triple cross because France was involved, too]
    - d. Mandate system
  - 4. Article 80 of the UN Charter
  - UNSCOP
    - a. Partition
    - b. General Assembly **Res. 181**, November 29, 1947
    - c. Jerusalem
  - 6. Creation of Israel
  - 7. Arab Walkout from General Assembly
  - 8. Palestinian Arabs Resort to Military Force
    - a. Jerusalem water supply cut off
    - b. Security Council inaction
  - 9. Full-Scale Invasion, May 14, 1948
  - 10. Fall of the Old City of Jerusalem and Expulsion of Jewish Residents
    - a. Abba Eban: UN's "active relinquishing of responsibility in a critical hour."
  - 11. Expiration of the old League of Nations Mandate
  - 12. Israel Defense Force (IDF)
    - a. Harel Brigade under Yitzhak Rabin
  - Moral Significance: The UN Had Not Lifted a Finger to Defend the Jews of Jerusalem
- B. REWARDING AGGRESSION (52-56)

- 1. Reversing Principle by Penalizing the Victim
  - a. Truce imposed on May 29
- 2. **Bernadotte Plan**: Proposed Arab Sovereignty over Jerusalem
- 3. Assassination of **Folke Bernadotte** by Lehi [which was led by Yitzhak Shamir, who later served as an Israeli PM]
- 4. Renewed Calls for Internationalizing Jerusalem
  - a. Jordan annexes the West Bank
  - b. Jordanian abuses
- 5. Palestinian Refugees
  - a. Displaced Persons (DPs)
  - b. 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees: Definition of a Refugee
- 6. Palestinian Exception
  - a. Franklin Delano Roosevelt on Arab immigration into Palestine
- 7. Two Separate Agencies with Differing Missions
  - a. UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
    - (1) Supposed to find permanent homes for refugees
  - b. UN Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA)
    - (1) Support Palestinian refugees within camps created by Arab states
  - c. Refugee status of Palestinians redefined, making the number 900,000
  - d. Arab states thwarted resettlement plans
    - (1) Arab vote against Res. 194
- 8. UN Acquiesces to Arab Position on Refugees
- 9. Arab States Were the Most Responsible for Displacing Palestinians
- 10. The Refugee Problem Was a Direct Result of the Arab States' Aggression
  - a. More than 570,000 Jewish refugees from Arab states
- C. FAILING ANOTHER TEST (56-65)
  - Partition of British India
    - Pakistan: Muslim State
    - b. India: Secular State
  - 2. 584 Princely States
    - a. Lord Mountbatten
    - b. Jammu and Kashmir
  - 3. Maharaja Appealed to the Indian Government fore Help
    - a. Instrument of Accession
    - b. Indian View
      - (1) Dilemma: Exclusion of Kashmir would raise doubts about India's commitment to secularism
    - c. Pakistani View
      - (1) India's annexation of Kashmir would leave Pakistan without a buffer zone
  - 4. Appeal to the UN
    - a. India's charge: Pathan invaders were transported from near the Afghan border
    - b. Pakistani denial that it had provided assistance to the tribesmen
      - (1) Sir Mohammed Zafrullah Khan challenged the validity of Kashmir's accession to India and charged India with conducting a genocidal policy [an demagogic example of "outbidding"]
  - 5. UN Commission on India and Pakistan (UNCIP)
    - a. Lack of decisive action
    - b. Aggression treated as a dispute
      - (1) By **referring** it to the UN, India had unwittingly **prolonged the Kashmir dispute**
  - 6. What Went Wrong
    - a. Britain's and America's strategic interests in Pakistan

- b. Res. 726
- c. False symmetry
- 7. Pakistani Falsehoods
  - a. Josef Korbel
  - b. Pakistani intervention
    - (1) Role of Akbar Khan
- 8. First Interim Report
  - a. UNCIP **substantiated India's charges** but the UN was unwilling to deal with aggression
  - b. Karachi Agreement, June 1949 and UNMOGIP
- 9. Second Kashmir War: 1966 ceasefire brokered by Alexei Kosygin
- 10. Establishment of Bangladesh
  - a. Simla Agreement, 1972
- D. THE LEGACY OF EARLY FAILURES (65-69)
  - 1. UN's Betrayal of Its Founding Vision
    - a. False equivalence
  - 2. Territorial Integrity Issue
    - a. Article 2
    - b. Loophole for irredentist claims
  - 3. China's Invasion of Tibet, 1950
  - 4. Spread of Aggression: Absence of a Firm Norm
    - a. North Korean invasion
    - b. Goa
  - 5. Use of Force to Consolidate New States Became the New Norm
    - Indonesia: North Borneo and East Timor
  - 6. Assaults on Colonial Legacies
    - a. Lebanon
    - b. Kuwait
  - 7. Absence of a Clear and Consistent Response
    - a. Portuguese colonies
    - b. Falkland Islands
    - c. Kuwait
  - 8. Security Council Mandate
    - a. Moral relativism was an inevitable by-product of the UN's work
  - 9. What Held the International Community Together Was the Alliance System Created by the Cold War

UN, American, and Soviet reaction to Arab invasion of Israel
Andrei Gromyko
Balfour Declaration
League of Nations Mandate for Palestine
Trygve Lie
Bernadotte Plan
Res. 181

1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees FDR on Arab immigration into Palestine c

Jewish refugees from Arab states

Alexei Kosygin UNCIP

Res. 181
Palestinian refugees
creation of Israel
1966 India-Pakistan ceasefire

Kashmir referred to the UN

....

### **CHAPTER THREE: THE COLD WAR FREEZE**

### **Outline**

A. KOREAN WAR (71-75)

 Invasion Trygve Lie

- 2. Situation Before the Invasion
  - Postwar occupation

Earlier Japanese occupation

- 3. Res. 82 and 83
- 4. Military Aid and an American-Led Force

Pusan

- 5. Soviet Boycott of the Security Council
- 6. Soviet Perspective
- 7. UN Had Failed to Deter North Korea
- 8. "Defense Perimeter" Issue
  - a. Announcement by **Dean Acheson**
- 9. Soviet Presidency of the Security Council, 1950
  - Allegation of mass extermination of Koreans [another example of outbidding]
- 10. Inchon Landing
- B. AMERICA TAKES THE LEAD (75-79)
  - 1. Acheson's Uniting for Peace Resolution
    - a. Success of the maneuver
    - b. Long-term consequences
      - (1) It boomeranged back on American interests
      - (2) U.S. veto bypassed in 1967
  - 2. Pandora's Box
    - a. Erosion of Security Council's authority
    - b. Concern about an expanded war
      - (1) **Douglas MacArthur**'s advance into North Korea
      - (2) Chinese counterattack
    - c. The General Assembly cannot dispatch forces
      - (1) UN "recommendations"
      - (2) Gulf War authorization
  - 3. Korean and Iraqi War Justifications Were Comparable
  - 4. UN Provided Legitimacy for the Military Campaign
- C. "WHAT IS THE UNITED NATIONS DOING?"
  - 1. Dag Hammarskjöld
    - a. UN as a "third force"
    - b. Support of Patrice Lumumba
    - c. Katanga
    - d. Moise Tshombe
    - e. Diplomatic standing given to Katanga
    - f. Hammarskjöld's assassination
  - 2. Hammarskjöld's Poor Relations with Moscow
    - a. His desire to make the UN a sounding board
  - 3. Hungarian Revolt of 1956
    - a. Imre Nagy
    - b. Invocation of Acheson's United for Peace Resolution
    - c. Soviet encirclement
    - d. General Assembly discussions
    - e. Hungarian appeal
  - 4. Suez Crisis
    - a. UN's condemnations proved effective because Britain, France, and Israel were democracies
    - b. Public opinion is irrelevant for dictatorships
  - 5. Charting a Neutralist Course
  - 6. Laos
    - a. Kennedy administration convened a Geneva Conference in 1961
  - 7. UN's Propaganda Value
- D. THE CRISIS IN CUBA AND UN INACTION (82-88)

- 1. U2 Reconnaissance Photos, October 16, 1962
- 2. Kennedy's Public Address, October 22
  - a. Imposition of a strict quarantine
- 3. Ambassador Stevenson's Presentation
  - . OAS support for military action
  - b. Why Art. 51 was not invoked
- 4. American Allies Notified
- 5. Security Council debate
  - a. Valerian Zorin's role
  - b. Stevenson's question
  - c. Stevenson's retort
  - d. Display of photos
  - e. Adjournment
- 6. U Thant's appeal
  - a. Kennedy's complaint
  - b. Khrushchev's acceptance of the appeal
- 7. Khrushchev Capitulates, October 28
  - a. RFK's Ultimatum to Dobrynin
    - (1) Khrushchev's later admission
  - b. US withdraws missiles from Turkey
- 8. Verification Issue
- E. THE TURN AWAY FROM AMERICA (88-90)
  - 1. Problem with U Thant's Diplomacy
    - a. Khrushchev: "U Thant wouldn't allow the UN to do anything detrimental to the interests of the Soviet Union."
  - 2. Moral Force of the Secretary-General Eroded
  - 3. American Optimism
    - a. Dean Rusk's confidence
  - 4. New Problems
    - a. The UN became increasingly hostile to American interests

"Uniting for Peace" resolution Douglas MacArthur Dean Acheson
Adlai Stevenson Valerian Zorin Dag Hammarskjöld
Patrice Lumumba Moise Tshombe Imre Nagy

U Thant

# CHAPTER FOUR: IGNITING WAR, UNDERMINING PEACE

- A. BUILD-UP TOWARD WAR (91-97)
  - 1. New Leadership in Moscow, 1964
  - 2. 1949 Armistice
    - a. Mixed Armistice Commissions began breaking down, mid-1950s
    - b. Hostile incursions into Israel
    - c. Sea of Galilee: Artillery Strikes
    - d. Golan Heights: Water Diversion
  - 3. Shelling from the Golan Heights in Syria, 1967
  - 4. Soviet Mischief
    - a. USSR warns Egypt that Israel was preparing a major offensive

- Massing of Egyptian troops and tanks on the border
- 5. Egypt Orders Partial Withdrawal of UNEF Peacekeepers, May 16
  - a. UNEF was the pride of the UN
  - Ras Nasrani b.
- The Matter Should Have Been Taken Before the General Assembly 6.
  - Earlier Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai and Gaza
  - U Thant ignored Hammarskjöld's promise b.
  - The gambit failed C.
  - Egypt asks that UNEF be terminated, May 18 d.
- **UNEF Withdrawn** 7.
  - U Thant ignored his earlier warning a.
  - Decision had the support of Ralph Bunche and staff b.
- Closure of the Straits of Tiran 8.
  - **Gamal Abdel Nasser** a.
  - U Thant tries to split the difference b.
  - Nasser declines the offer
- 9. Security Council Convened
  - Soviets blocked action
  - French wuwei [doing nothing, deliberately]
  - Arthur Goldberg
- 10. Failure of Pres. Johnson's Proposal for Maritime Powers to Intervene
- B. WAR (97-99)
  - UN's Failure 1.
    - King Hussein flies to Cairo a.
    - Iragi army
  - Nasser's Objective: Destroy Israel 2.
    - Combined forces: 250,000 troops, 2000 tanks, 700 frontline aircraft
    - Israel's lack of strategic depth
  - 3. Preemptive Attack against Egypt
    - 200 Israeli aircraft destroyed Egypt's air force on the ground
    - Diplomatic warning to King Hussein b.
      - Odd Bull's resentment (1)
  - 4. Jordanian Attack
    - Israel withheld fire until UN headquarters seized in Jerusalem
  - 5. Middle East Map Changed
    - Gaza and Sinai a.
    - West Bank b.
    - Old City of Jerusalem C.
    - Golan Heights
  - UN Takes a More Active Role in the Postwar Settlement
- C. RESOLVING THE CONFLICT (99-102)
  - **Soviet Position** 1.

3.

Security Council adopts a call for a ceasefire

Soviet resolution failed

2. Moscow Convenes an Emergency Special Session of the General Assembly Kosygin condemned Israel as an aggressor Dobrvnin's proposal

- Soviets Triple the Size of Their Mediterranean Fleet
  - Moscow's use of the Suez Canal
- President Johnson's Speech 4.
  - Israel should not withdraw a.
  - Need for peace agreements b.
  - Need to respect territorial integrity
- Soviet Resolution Failed in the General assembly 5.
  - Israel not condemned as the aggressor
- **SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 242** (102-07) D.

- 1. Agreed Basis for Later Peace Accords
- 2. Debate on the Withdrawal Clause
  - a. Article by Stephen Schwebel
  - b. Withdrawal must be to "secure and recognized boundaries"
- 3. The Old Armistice Lines Were Not Recognized International Boundaries
- 4. Illegality of the Previous Territorial Status Quo
  - a. West Bank
  - b. Gaza Strip
- 5. Status of Jerusalem
- 6. Lord Caradon's Draft Resolution
  - a. Soviet objection
  - b. Unanimous approval
  - c. French text
    - Principle of textual interpretation [too often observed in the breach]
- 7. The Soviets Relent
- 8. American View
  - William Rogers
  - b. Pres. Ford
  - c. Pres. Reagan
  - d. George Schultz
  - e. Pres. Bush 41
  - f. Warren Christopher
  - g. Pres. Bush 43
- 9. Jerusalem Was Not Mentioned in the Text
  - . Arthur Goldberg
- E. REGRESSION (107-10)
  - 1. Importance of the Achievement
    - a. Pres. Johnson Outmaneuvered the Soviets
  - UN Reverts to Form
    - a. Gunnar Jarring
      - (1) His reinterpretation
  - 3. New Resolutions
    - a. Res. 3414
    - b. No room left for territorial compromise
  - 4. Kofi Annan Attacks the "Illegal Occupation"
    - a. Res. 242 is undercut
    - b. Future peacemaking efforts are undermined
  - 5. Flaws in the United Nations
    - a. Flaws had become intrinsic
  - 6. End of the Cold War

Res. 242 Egypt's act of war, 1967 closing of Tiran Strait withdrawal of UNEF King Hussein Johnson speech status of Jerusalem

shelling from Golan Heights Gamal Abdel Nasser Lord Caradon

### **CHAPTER FIVE: THE RETURN OF THE UN?**

- a. REASONS FOR HOPE IN 1990 (111-12)
  - 1. Optimism of Brian Urquhart and Other UN Advocates

- a. UN acted quickly on Kuwait and Iraq
- b. It acted in unison
- c. It condemned Iraqi actions
- B. THE CRISIS EXPOSED SIGNIFICANT FAULTS (112-16)
  - Past Failures to Condemn Iraq
    - a. Issue of whether the UN could have prevented the attack
    - b. Invasion of Iran, 1980
    - c. Some did not want to jeopardize their lucrative arrangements with Iraq
  - 2. Kurt Waldheim Only Offered His "Good Offices"
    - a. Security Council Res. 479
  - 3. Moral Equivalence
  - 4. Failure to Deal with the Spread of WMDs
    - Irag's failure to honor commitments despite service on the IAEA
    - b. Osiraq nuclear reactor
    - c. Israeli strike
    - d. Duping of IAEA and Hans Blix
    - e. IAEA weakness again exposed in 2003 in the cases of Libya and Iran
    - f. Hans Blix's cultural sensitivity courses
  - 5. Genocide
    - a. Saddam Hussein's chemical attack on Halabja
    - b. Appointment of Gen. Ali Hasan al-Majid, "Chemical Ali"
      - (1) Anfal campaign of 1988 killed over 100,000 Kurds
  - 6. Kurds Need International Protection
    - a. Allies supported Kurdish independence under the Treaty of Sèvres
  - 7. Pérez de Cuéllar Adopts a Neutral Stance
- C. IGNORING GENOCIDE—AGAIN (116-19)
  - 1. Popular Rebellion in Kurdistan and the Shiite South after the Liberation of Kuwait
    - a. Ethnic cleansing of "Marsh Arabs"
    - b. 1.5 million Kurds seek refuge in Turkey and Iran
    - c. International refugee crisis
  - 2. Toothless Security Council Res. 688: Call for "Open Dialogue"
  - 3. Operation Provide Comfort
  - 4. No-Fly Zone
  - 5. Human Rights Watch Declared That Genocide Had Occurred
    - a. Failed effort to bring genocide charges
- D. CORRUPTION AND APPEASEMENT (119-27)
  - 1. UNSCOM
  - 2. Security Council Res. 687
  - 3. New Inspections: More Robust and Intrusive
  - 4. Iraq Destroyed Huge Quantities of Prohibited Weapons
    - a. UNSCOM Created a "Concealment Unit"
    - b. Burden of proof was placed on the Iraqi government
  - 5. What Brought About the Demise of UNSCOM Was Kofi Annan Himself
    - a. Richard Butler named head of UNSCOM
    - b. UN encroachments on his turf
    - c. Ways Annan obstructed him
  - 6. Oil for Food Program
    - a. Annan recommended doubling it in 1998 as Saddam Hussein was defying UNSCOM (February 1, 1998)
    - b. Saddam pulled in \$10.1 billion in illegal revenues
    - c. Corruption
    - d. Benon V. Sevan
    - e. Iraq imported banned military weapons and dual-use technology through oil-for-food contracts
  - 7. Annan Led a UN Delegation to Baghdad, February 1998
    - a. Richard Butler was excluded from the trip

- 8. Memorandum of Understanding, February 23, 1998
- 9. Annan's Campaign Against UNSCOM
  - a. Lakhdar Brahimi circumvented it
  - b. Prakash Shah
  - c. Failure of the Memorandum
- 10. Saddam Hussein Suspended UNSCOM's Disarmament Work, August 5, 1998
- E. THE EVIDENCE MOUNTS, AND THE UN DOES NOTHING (127-32)
  - Iraq Failed to Account for the Yeast Extract Growth Medium Used to Produce Anthrax

Treaty of Sèvres Javier Pérez de Cuéllar Operation Provide Comfort Res. 688

### CHAPTER NINE: THE UN BACKS TERRORISM

Review

Hizballah Hamas Muslim Brotherhood

## CONCLUSION: FROM MORAL EQUIVALENCE TO WORLD ORDER

**Review** 

democracy

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