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Colin Dueck: Reluctant Crusaders Study Guide

Steven Alan Samson *Liberty University*, ssamson@liberty.edu

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COLIN DUECK: RELUCTANT CRUSADERS STUDY GUIDE, 2007 Steven Alan Samson

INTRODUCTION

Α.	THESIS	(1-3)
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- 1. Grand Strategy
- 2. Conventional Criticism of the Bush Grand Strategy
 - a. Alleged unilateralism
 - b. Traditional liberal internationalist assumptions
- 3. Liberal Goals, Liberal Assumptions
- Problem with the Liberal (or Wilsonian) Approach: Disjuncture Between Means and Ends
 - a. It encourages ambitious goals and commitments abroad
 - b. It assumes these goals can be met without commensurate cost or expenditure on the part of the United States
- 5. Reluctant Crusaders
 - Americans have often been crusaders in the promotion of a more liberal international order
 - They have frequently been reluctant to admit the full costs of promoting this vision
 - c. The administration's difficulties in Iraq are the result of an excessive reliance on classically liberal or Wilsonian foreign policy assumptions
- 6. Question of How and Why Grand Strategy Changes
 - a. Comparison of historical periods of strategic adjustment
- B. POWER AND CULTURE: EXPLAINING CHANGE AND CONTINUITY IN AMERICAN GRAND STRATEGY (3-4)
 - 1. Cultural Factors
 - a. Classical realists (e.g., Lippmann and Kennan) understood their effect
 - b. Contemporary **structural realists** [e.g., Waltz and Mearsheimer] do not
 - This has encouraged the growth of **constructivism** as an alternative
 - 2. International Relations Theory: Dichotomy Between Realist and Constructivist Approaches
 - Author's Purpose: To bridge the gap "by showing how [1] **international pressures** and [2] **American "strategic culture"** have acted together to push and pull U.S. grand strategy in opposite directions over time."
 - 3. Three Major Turning Points
- C. THESES ON AMERICA'S CULTURAL LEGACIES (4-5)
 - Strategic Concepts Must Resonate with America's Liberal Political Culture
 - a. Illiberal Approaches Rejected: *e.g.*, **Henry Cabot Lodge**'s proposed balance-of-power alliance with France and **Walter Lippmann**'s proposed sphere-of-influence arrangement with the Soviet Union
 - 2. Limited Liability: The Costs of Overseas Commitments Must Be Limited
 - 3. These Two Cultural Legacies Contradict One Another
 - a. The tradition of limited liability discourages making concrete sacrifices toward the liberal vision
 - b. Result: Expansive goals are pursued by quite limited means.
 - 4. "These Twin Cultural Legacies Also Incline American Grand Strategy in Opposite Directions from International Pressures."

- a. "The result is a persistent tug of war between [1] international pressures and [2] U.S. strategic culture: a cyclical tension that drives the story of American strategic adjustment over time."
- 5. Author's Methodology
 - Historical counterfactuals, extensive archival research, and competitive theory testing
 - a. Goal: To recover some of the strengths of classical realist thinking by appreciating the role of both power and culture in international affairs
- D. ORGANIZATION OF THE BOOK (5-8)
 - Outline of the Author's Neoclassical Realist Model: combining realist and cultural explanations
 - Four Distinct Realist Subcultures: nationalist, realist, progressive, and internationalist
 - 3. Post-WWI Return to an Isolationist Strategy
 - a. Three alternatives at the time
 - b. Woodrow Wilson vs. the Senate
 - c. Default option of disengagement
 - 4. Post-WWII Containment Strategy
 - a. Four major alternatives
 - 5. Post-Cold War Liberal Internationalist Strategy
 - a. Four major alternatives
 - 6. Post-9/11
 - American Exceptionalism: "Classical Liberal Ideas Have Shaped and Molded U.S. Strategic Assumption and Behavior in Ways That No Structural Realist or Materialist Could Have Predicted."

Review

classical realism structural realism constructivism liberal political culture limited liability realist subcultures

CHAPTER ONE: POWER, CULTURE, AND GRAND STRATEGY

- A. GRAND STRATEGY (9-13)
 - 1. Definitions
 - a. Basil **Liddell Hart** coined the term
 - 2. Need for Precise Limits to a Definition
 - a. Grand strategy: "a calculated relationship of ends and means in the face of one or more potential opponents."
 - (1) "The task of identifying and reconciling goals and resources is the essence of strategy."
 - b. "Grand strategy only exists when there is the possibility of the use of force internationally."
 - 3. What Is Included
 - Grand Strategy: A Conceptual Road Map and a Set of Policy Prescriptions
 a. Guidelines on the use of various policy instruments
 - 5. It Is Not Necessary to Assume That a Coherent Plan Exists
 - 6. Defining Change in Grand Strategy: Strategic Typologies
 - a. Edward Luttwak: "expansionist" vs. "status quo" strategies
 - b. Charles Kupchan: "compellent," deterrent," and "accommodationist"

strategies

- lain Johnston: "Accommodationist," "defensive," and "expansionist"
- 7. Measuring Strategic Adjustment
- 8. Major vs. Minor Change
 - a. First- vs. second-order change
- B. EXPLAINING STRATEGIC ADJUSTMENT (13-14)
 - A Good Place to Start: A Country's Position in the International System
 - Two Foci
 - a. **International Pressures**: Structural Realist Theory
 - b. **Culture**: Constructivist Theory
 - Power and Culture: The Debate: Three Potential Explanations of Strategic Choice
- C. CULTURAL EXPLANATIONS (14-16)
 - 1. Starting Premise: International Pressures Are Essentially Indeterminate
 - a. Definition of **Culture**: "Any set of interlocking values, beliefs, and assumptions that are held collectively by a group and passed on through socialization."
 - 2. How Culture Shapes Strategic Choice
 - a. Perception
 - b. Causal beliefs
 - c. Definition of national interests
 - 3. Culture Delimits a Set Range of Acceptable Options, Tactics, and Policies [It can prevent meaningful choices by rendering plausible alternatives unacceptable or unthinkable: cf. Herman Kahn's Thinking the Unthinkable]
 - a. Formal institutionalization: bureaucratic agencies
 - b. Informal institutionalization: regular discourse
 - Summary
- D. POWER-BASED EXPLANATIONS
 - International Pressures
 - a. Structural realists
 - 2. Causal Underspecification
 - a. Kenneth Waltz
 - Structural realism requires a theory of state behavior
 - 3. Offensive Realism
 - a. John Mearsheimer
 - b. Powerful states adopt more expansive grand strategies
 - c. Culture treated as an epiphenomenon
 - d. Its conceptual clarity and parsimony
 - e. Its dubious theoretical assumption
 - f. Domestic-level motives are important [as recognized by Raymond Aron]
 - g. Offensive realists demonstrate the limits of systemic limits on state behavior
 - h. [**Defensive realism** is examined in note 53 on page 176]
- E. A NEOCLASSICAL REALIST MODEL OF STRATEGIC ADJUSTMENT (18-20)
 - 1. Gideon Rose: United by Common Assumptions
 - a. Focus on particular behavior
 - b. The international system is the most important long-term cause
 - c. Domestic-level factors are layered in
 - 2. How It Explains Changes in Grand Strategy
 - a. It looks first to the international system
 - b. Some range of strategic options has an impact on strategic choice
 - 3. Twofold Process
 - a. Need for domestic support for any new departure in grand strategy
 - b. Cultural assumptions voiced by the foreign policy elite may be internalized and genuine
 - 4. Interaction of International and Cultural Variables

- a. Discontinuities between international changes and national responses
- b. International conditions drive the process
- c. State officials respond by reframing cultural arguments to minimize the appearance of discontinuity
- d. Strategic culture can help explain deviations from balancing behavior

Review

Basil Liddell Hart grand strategy strategic typologies structural realist theory (power) constructivist theory (culture) culture offensive realism

Neoclassical realism

CHAPTER TWO: STRATEGIC CULTURE AND STRATEGIC ADJUSTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES

- A. AMERICAN STRATEGIC CULTURE (21)
 - 1. Two Dominant and Persistent Features
 - a. Classical Liberal Assumptions
 - b. Preference for Limited Liability
 - 2. Four Distinct Strategic Subcultures
- B. LIBERALISM
 - 1. Classical Liberal Creed
 - a. **Attributes**: individual freedom, equality of right, majority rule, progress [free] enterprise, rule of law, strict limits on the state
 - b. **Material Conditions**: plentiful land, predominant middle class, assimilation of immigrants
 - c. **Competing Versions**: left, right, moralistic, nationalistic, egalitarian, capitalist, democratic, individualistic
 - d. Coexisting **Civic Republican** Tradition: emphasis on community and virtue [This is most evident in Daniel Elazar's moralistic subculture, which is associated with the New England culture hearth Puritanism]
 - e. Big Tent: its success in integrating and defusing potential opponents
 - 2. Transnational Classical Liberal Tradition: Thomas Paine, Immanuel Kant, Richard Cobden, Woodrow Wilson
 - a. Possibility of progress [see note 5 on democratic peace theory, p. 176]
 - b. Result: a virtuous cycle favoring peaceful international relations
 - c. United States was founded on the hope of building a new order
 - d. Special mission of the United States ["American exceptionalism"]
 - 3. A Central Goal: Promotion of a More Liberal International Goal [This is explored in Walter Russell Mead's Power, Terror, Peace, and War]
 - 4. Two Schools of Liberal Thought
 - a. **Crusaders**: interventionists [see Walter McDougall's <u>Promised Land</u>, Crusader State]
 - b. **Exemplarists**
 - 5. What They Have in Common
 - a. A desire to see to se democratic values and systems of government spread overseas
 - b. European-style realism or *Realpolitik* has little support
 - 6. Counterarguments
 - a. Skeptics consider talk about promoting democracy is mere rationalization

- "A cultural variable that does not vary cannot predict or explain policy change."
- 7. Rebuttal: Answering the Criticisms
 - a. Yes, the rhetoric is often self-serving
 - Belief in liberal ideas may have a constraining effect on grand strategy
- 8. References to Common Ideals
 - a. **Legitimation** function
- 9. Filtering Effect on the Decision-Making Process
 - a. Culture: a **filter** or permissive cause rather than an independent variable
- 10. Some Negative Consequences
 - a. It encourages an **all-or-nothing approach**: Underreaction/overreaction cycle
 - b. Euphoric expectations are disappointed and frustration ensues
- 11. Grand Strategy Enterprise Is Consequently Held Suspect
 - a. Resistance to national security policies
 - b. Recurrent debate: role as major power vs. preserving freedom at home
- 12. Summary
 - a. Range of options: United States as role model can justify both strategic disengagement and overseas intervention
 - b. **Resistance to** *Realpolitik* is the defining feature of America's liberal foreign policy worldview
 - c. Consequence: A liberal pattern of oscillation in matters of grand strategy
 - d. Implications: Tendency toward moralistic crusading, conception of war as unnatural, disconnection between use of force and diplomacy
 - e. Liberal gravitational pull may thwart contrary international pressures

C. LIMITED LIABILITY

- 1. Definition: "A Culturally Shaped Preference for Avoiding Costs and Commitments in Grand Strategy."
 - a. It is a state's failure "to promote its own influence, prosperity, or security in an optimal manner."
- 2. It Has Historically Influenced America an Grand Strategy in Two Ways
 - a. A frequent failure to promote America's leading role
 - b. Its pursuit of foreign policy aims by disproportionately limited means
- 3. **Nonentanglement**: America's Default Position
 - Preference for a strategy of military and political disengagement [Erik von Kuehnelt-Leddihn: America is an isle of the blessed surrounded by two ocean moats]
 - b. George Washington's Farewell Address
 - c. Historical focus on Latin America and the Pacific
 - d. This strategy was deeply tied up with symbols of American nationhood
 - e. Practical Implications
- 4. A Grand Strategy Based on Limited Liability Has Been Difficult to Maintain
 - a. Its persistence despite international pressures
 - American exporters and financiers had a contrary interest in keeping European markets open [cf. the 1930s "merchants of death" allegation]
- 5. New Era: 1941-Present
 - a. Japanese Attack on Pearl Harbor
 - b. Capital-intensive (rather than manpower-intensive) wartime strategy
 - c. Cold War: de-emphasis on conventional military power
 - d. 1990s
 - e. 9/11
 - f. Each case illustrates a failure to pursue stated interests with the requisite level of effort, robbing the US of considerable influence over outcomes
- 6. Why?

- a. Historical precedent: Americans grew accustomed to disengagement [The British navy provided considerable security]
- b. Insular strategic mentality
- 7. Reinforcement by Domestic Political Institutions
 - a. American political system was created to resist dramatic policy changes
 - b. Separation of Powers: Congress vs. Presidents
 - c. Built-in constraints
- 8. Limited Liability Is Implicit within the Classical Liberal Tradition
 - a. Liberals believe the tendency of history is toward peace and democracy
 - b. Baseline assumption: more peaceful order will evolve through economic exchange, etc., without the need for regular military interventions
- 9. Measuring the Impact of Limited Liability Assumptions
 - a. The relevant metrics
 - b. Conservative/liberal divide
 - c. Bifurcation of American internationalism
 - Conservatives in the 1950s: opposed to high levels of defense spending and multilateral commitments
 - e. Selective application of elements of limited liability
- D. STRATEGIC SUBCULTURES (31-33)
 - 1. The Variables: Strong vs. Weak Liberalism, Strong vs. Weak Commitment to Limited Liability
 - a. **Four subcultures** [the first two correspond closely to Walter Russell Mead's Wilsonians and Jacksonians]
 - 2. Internationalists
 - Nationalists
 - 4. Progressives
 - Realists
- E. WHY ONE SUBCULTURE OVER ANOTHER?
 - 1. Intersecting Pressures of Four Distinct Factors
 - 2. International Conditions Are the Most Important Long-Term Influence on Patterns of Strategic Adjustment
 - a. Gain vs. loss of relative power
 - 3. "The Dominant Strategic Culture Helps Determine the Relative Political Appeal of a Given School of Thought."
 - a. Realism has the worst fit
 - 1) Henry Kissinger
 - b. Weakening of limited liability assumptions in the 1940s
 - 4. Domestic Politics
 - a. Electoral turnover
 - 1) Inclination toward change
 - 2) Incentive toward change
 - b. Building winning coalitions
 - 5. Political Leadership
 - 6. Summary
- F. THE PROCESS OF STRATEGIC ADJUSTMENT: AGENDA SETTING AND COALITION BUILDING (37-42)
 - 1. How Strategic Adjustments Are Made
 - Domestic political processes of agenda setting and coalition building allow nationally distinct strategic cultures to influence strategic behavior
 - 2. Reliance on Broad Cultural Assumptions and Belief Systems
 - 3. Strategic Ideas
 - a. Two routes to **policy failure**: **electoral turnover** or **external shocks** [This understanding informs Robert Higgs's <u>Crisis and Leviathan</u>]
 - b. Punctuated equilibrium
 - 4. Determinants of Grand Strategy Direction: Shock and Turnover
 - a. Strategic culture continues to have an impact on strategic outcomes

through two mechanisms: agenda setting and coalition building

- 5. Flux and Crisis Open a Window of Opportunity for Change
- 6. Role of Agenda Setting
 - a. Initial stage
 - 1) Indispensible role played by a credible messenger or policy entrepreneur
 - b. Latter stage
 - 1) Leading officials shape the nature of the choices
 - c. Cultural legacies act as a filter
- 7. Process of Coalition Building
 - a. Role of the president
 - b. Constraints
 - c. Strategic ideas can play a key role in cementing coalitions
- 8. Neoclassical Realist Approach
 - a. Perception of the national interest
 - Autonomy of leading state officials
 - b. Institutionalization of new strategic ideas
- 9. Recapitulation
 - Outline of the typical "life cycle" of strategic adjustment
- 10. Summary
 - a. Timeliness
 - b. International feasibility
 - c. Policy entrepreneurs
 - d. Cultural resonance
 - e. Fortuity
- G. RESEARCH METHOD AND DESIGN (42-43)
 - 1. Testing the Model of Strategic Adjustment
 - 2. Comparative case Study Approach
 - a. Process-tracing
 - b. Controlled comparison of variables
 - c. Use of counterfactuals
 - 3. Criteria for selecting the cases

Review

features of American strategic culture classical liberal creed attributes material conditions civic republican traditions

attributes material conditions civic republican tradition crusaders exemplarists legitimation function

filter all-or-nothing approach Realpolitik

limited liability nonentanglement Washington's Farewell Address

post-Pearl Harbor era four subcultures four distinct factors
Henry Kissinger routes to policy failure agenda setting
coalition building

CHAPTER THREE: THE LOST ALLIANCE: IDEAS AND ALTERNATIVES IN AMERICAN GRAND STRATEGY, 1918-1921

- A. INTRODUCTION (44-45)
 - 1. WWI: Great Sacrifice of Men and Material
 - 2. The Outcome

- a. Armed forces reduced, no security commitments
- 3. Historic Impact on the Prospects for International Peace and Stability
- 4. Most Accounts Emphasize Idiosyncratic Causes
- 5. Three Plausible Alternatives for Postwar Grand Strategy
- 6. Effect of Domestic Politics, Presidential Leadership, and Chance
- Common Assumptions of Limited Liability and Classical Liberal Thought Acted as a Strong Constraint
 - a. Wilson ruled out a balance of power alliance
 - b. The Senate ruled out a strong League of Nations
- B. ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIC IDEAS, 1918-1920 (45-47)
 - 1. Pre-WWI Grand Strategy of Nonentanglement
 - a. Open Door policy
 - b. Expectation: Liberalizing effect of free trade
 - c. Export of popular culture [Americanization]
 - d. Powerful battleship fleet
 - e. Annexation of Hawaii and Samoa
 - f. Support of the independence and integrity of China
 - g. Caribbean regarded as an "American lake"
 - h. **Spanish-American War** [William Graham Sumner, one of the antiimperialist critics, called it "the conquest of the United States by Spain"]
 - 2. Causes of Its Breakdown
 - a. Unrestricted submarine warfare by Germany
 - b. Differences over war aims
 - 1) Republicans wanted a straightforward war alliance to achieve Germany's unconditional surrender
 - 2) Wilson saw the war as a necessary first step in promoting an international order
 - 3. The War Was a Shock to Old Strategic Assumptions, Revealing the United States as a Great Power
 - a. Mobilization of 4 million
 - b. Federal regulation of the economy
- 4. Three Broad Strategic Alternatives: League, Western Alliance, Disengagement
- C. WILSON'S LEAGUE OF NATIONS (47-48)
 - 1. Wilson's Vision: An Association of Nations
 - a. **Article 10**: collective security
 - b. **Deterrence** via arbitration, economic sanctions, etc.
 - c. Armed force
 - 2. New International Order
 - a. Naval disarmament
 - b. Britain and France pressured to open colonial markets
 - c. Open Door: Japan asked to abandon its claims to Manchuria
 - d. Germany placed on probation
 - e. Containment of the USSR
 - 3. Wilson's Grand Strategy
 - a. Assertion of American hegemony at minimal cost
 - b. Informal American sphere of influence
 - c. Prince of American leadership: Uphold the integrity and independence of fellow League members
- D. A WESTERN ALLIANCE (48-50)
 - 1. Republican Realists: **Henry Cabot Lodge**, Charles Evans Hughes, **Elihu Root**, Philander Knox, Will Hays, Theodore Roosevelt [**Reservationists**]
 - 2. A Modest League of Nations
 - a. Emphasis on mediation and consultation rather than collective security
 - b. Opposition to Article 10
 - c. Collective security appeared to undercut the **Monroe Doctrine**
 - 3. Wilson's Strategic Priorities Were Backward

- a. Peacetime alliance with Britain and France
- b. German power must be curbed
- c. Philander Knox favored a small entente
- E. DISENGAGEMENT FROM EUROPE (50-51)
 - Nationalists and Progressives: William Borah, Hiram Johnson, Robert LaFollette
 - a. The **Irreconcilables** favored open markets overseas
 - 2. Reasons for Opposition to an Alliance
 - a. America had limited economic interests in Europe
 - b. League support favored Wall Street financiers
 - c. American interests were no longer threatened by Germany
 - d. American was secure geographically and immune from invasion
 - e. Britain posed the only real threat
 - 3. It Was a Strategy of Limits
- F. REALISM AND INTERNATIONAL CONDITIONS, 1918-1921 (51-54)
 - American Disengagement Exposes a **Deficiency in Structural Realism**
 - a. Unprecedented power of the United States
 - 1) It had outmobilized and outspent any other belligerent during the latter part of the war
 - 2) It had become the leading creditor in the world economy
 - 3) It was set to challenge Great Britain as the leading commercial and naval power
 - b. Structural realists would have expected it to play a greater role overseas
 - c. Instead, its postwar demobilization and disengagement robbed it of much potential influence over the postwar international order
 - d. Its lag of a quarter century may have permitted a second world war
 - 2. Realist Response: Wilson's Collective Security Strategy Was Not Feasible
 - 3. How the League Might Have Worked
 - a. It had a chance to work as a U.S.-led coalition of status quo powers
 - Wilson denounced the balance-of-power system as inherently unstable
 - 2) He rejected it in favor of a preponderance of power on the part of democratic nations
 - 3) The League was practical only as an **oligarchy** dominated by Britain, France, and the United States
 - b. The **real question** was the willingness of the United States to meet strategic commitments outside the Western Hemisphere
 - 4. Vague and Sweeping Nature of Wilson's Commitments
 - Wilson believed the United States "would willingly relinquish some of its sovereignty."
 - b. U.S. policy makers were hostile to economic aid and the assumption of war debts
 - c. **Limited Liability Problem**: Wilson refused to admit that a commitment to collective security necessitated a large standing army and higher taxes to pay for it. [Cf. Winston Churchill's nearly contemporary creation of Iraq: "an Arab regime that would preserve British interests but would cost as little as possible." Christopher Catherwood, <u>Churchill's Folly</u>, p. 96]. [Such actions are reminiscent of a biblical injunction: Luke 14:28-30]
 - d. Wilson expected that American hegemony would simply be conceded
 - e. But America's immense economic power did not entirely translate into military or political leverage; Wilson was unable to force concessions
 - 5. Postwar International Conditions Suggested a Need for American Engagement
 - a. Flaws in Wilson's League: it was expansive, but lacked a specific commitment to France
 - b. Optimal Alternative: Lodge's concept of the League as a Western alliance

- c. Structural realists cannot ultimately explain why the United States rejected both the League and the alliance
- d. These decisions can only be understood by reference to American strategic culture and the actions of President Woodrow Wilson [Otto Scott lumped Woodrow Wilson together with James I, Robespierre, and John Brown in his never completed "sacred fools quartet"]
- G. DOMESTIC AGENDA SETTING, 1915-1919 (55-61)
 - The Shock of WWI Opened Up an **Opportunity** for Advocates of New Strategic Ideas to Make Their Case
 - a. League to Enforce Peace (LEP)
 - b. Wilson fashioned his own concept of a League
 - c. **Forced Choice Approach**: Wilson "presented his own country with two strategic possibilities for the postwar era: his League, or a return to disengagement."
 - 2. League of Nations Idea
 - a. Theodore Roosevelt: world league for the peace of righteousness
 - b. Col. Edward House: Philip Dru, Administrator
 - Progressive and internationalist interest groups: League of Free Nations Association, Socialist Party, Women's Peace Party
 - d. League to Enforce Peace (LEP): William Howard Taft
 - 3. Two Broad Versions of the League Idea
 - a. Establishment version
 - b. Progressive version
 - c. Wilson's critique of each
 - Wilson's Version
 - a. Willing to compromise with the Great Powers so he could co-opt them
 - b. League seen as a means of achieving effective American hegemony
 - c. Necessity of military power to enforce a collective security system
 - d. Implacable opposition to socialist revolution
 - 5. The Crusading Liberal Tradition Was the Greatest Influence on Wilson
 - Mainstream assumptions within elite U.S. foreign policy circles:
 "progress would bring peace, growing prosperity, and an integration of the world along democratic lines."
 - b. Wilson articulated a new, internationalist school of thought
 - c. "The strategy was new; the goals were not."
 - 6. The Specific Version of the League Was Essentially His Own
 - 7. Response to **Sir Edward Grey**, 1915
 - 8. Wilson's Call for a New International Order, 1917
 - a. No other alternative was seriously discussed by the president
 - 9. Setting the Agenda
 - a. He delayed offering any detailed proposals for a long as possible
 - A Series of Historic Speeches: Declaration of War, Fourteen Points, Liberty Loan
 a. The League was the keystone of the new order
 - 11. Popularity Among Liberal-Minded Supporters
 - a. Skeptics such as Lodge framed their criticisms in technical terms
 - b. Wilson effectively closed off all other options except disengagement
 - 12. Alternative Ideas Were Sidelined
 - 13. The New Strategic Commitment Toward Europe Was Framed in Terms That Resonated with America's Tradition Aversion to Entangling Alliances
 - a. [A group dynamic is evident here: America could still keep its distance]
 - 14. The League Represented a Liberal Alternative to Nonintervention
 - a. It was the only way to intervene and preserve America's sense of moral detachment
- H. INTERNATIONAL PRESSURES, 1919 (61-67)
 - 1. **Versailles Peace Conference**: Wilson's **Concessions** Were Designed to Co-opt the Other Great Powers into a Liberal International Order

- a. [This was another of Wilson's agenda setting maneuvers, but he was unwilling to extend the same courtesy to the Senate Republicans]
- Concessions to Britain on Naval and Colonial Matters
- 3. Lloyd George Conceded Article 10 to Wilson to Win Support on Other Matters
- 4. American Threat to Britain's Maritime Supremacy
 - a. Wilson abandoned **naval disarmament** and **freedom of the seas**
- 5. Question of Germany's Former Colonies
 - a. **Mandate System**: Gen. Jan Smuts's compromise
 - b. Wilson retained a pleasing legal fiction, but ceded the issue to Britain and its dominions
- 6. The British and Americans Forced Wilson's Version of the League on France
 - a. France demanded the disarmament of Germany, creation of an independent Rhineland, and continuation of the alliance
 - b. France also demanded an international military force
 - c. "The American interest, in Wilson's eyes, was to constrain Germany, not to crush it."
- 7. This Franco-American Difference with Regard to Germany Caused the Most Serious **Impasse**
 - a. Both Wilson and **Georges Clemenceau** threatened to leave
 - b. Compromise: A 15 year occupation of the Rhineland and a military guarantee
- 8. The U.S. Guarantee of French Security Was a Dramatic Concession
 - a. It violated the entire spirit of Wilson's universalistic vision and committed the United States to a postwar defense alliance with France
 - b. Col. House's reaction: "it would be looked upon as a direct blow at the League of Nations."
- 9. Criticisms from Across the Political Spectrum
 - "The logic for such an alliance was so strong that Wilson was forced to go along with it in the end."
- 10. Postwar Economic Reconstruction
 - a. Wilson's opposition to debt cancellation
 - b. Recommendation: Lower trade barriers and borrow from private lenders.
- 11. Reparations from Germany
 - Quid Pro Quo: "If the United States would not forgive French war debts, it seemed only fitting that Berlin pay to rebuild the French countryside."
- 12. Japan's Claims
 - Japan's proposal for a racial-equality clause was unacceptable to Wilson
 - b. Japan effectively got an exclusive sphere of influence in China in exchange for supporting the League
- 13. Wilson's Return to the United States, June 1919 [he may have suffered his first stroke at the Versailles conference]
 - a. Idealistic critics decried Wilson's "sellout"
 - b. Compromises
 - c. Wilson's success in gaining international acceptance of a collective security system
- I. DOMESTIC COALITION-BUILDING, 1919-1920 (67-75)
 - 1. Wilson's Failure to Win Domestic Support
 - a. Chiefly due to America's tradition of limited liability
 - b. Each side in the subsequent debate sought the other's defeat
 - 2. Senate: A Two-Thirds Majority Was Needed to Ratify the Treaty
 - a. Three-Way Split
 - 1) Democrats, 47
 - 2) Republican reservationists led by Lodge: 30+
 - 3) Irreconcilables led by Borah and Johnson: 5-20
 - 3. Fluid Lines of Division

4. Wilson's Inflexibility

- a. Psychological explanation: Alexander and Juliette George
- b. Medical explanation: Edwin Weinstein
- c. Wilson's Explanation: Republicans Wanted to Destroy His Vision of a League of Nations by Gutting the Crucial Article 10
- d. He "did not share the Republicans' belief in a strategy of limited liability."

5. Republican Inflexibility

- a. Partisan politics provides part of the answer
 - 1) Wilson's concentration of power in the executive branch
 - 2) A desire to deal Wilson a political defeat [Wilson's "October Surprise" of 1918 had broken a promise to the Republicans]
 - 3) A series of strong reservations was needed to keep party unity
- b. Opposition on principle: Root supported an alliance with France
- c. Borah and other nationalists emphasized the loss of national sovereignty
- d. Lodge expressed non-interventionist sentiments
- e. League was seen as a gross violation of America's limited liability
- 6. Wilson's Use of Public Pressure
 - a. Mild reservationists (up to 10) wavered
 - b. Wilson's speaking tour through the West
- 7. Wilson's Loss of Support on a Variety of Fronts
 - a. Walter Lippmann and Herbert Croly turned against Wilson's League
- 8. Sense of Liberal Disappointment Spread to the Senate
 - a. Borah and Johnson blasted a sellout of liberal principles
 - b. Conservative Republican leaders made concessions to Progressives
 - c. It is questionable whether Lodge could have won support for a peacetime alliance with France
- 9. Reasons for the **Disillusionment of Progressives**
- 10. Conservative Backlash After Six Years of Experimentation and Upheaval [other such cycles are evident in American political history]
- 11. The Task for Republican Leaders Was Negative: Unite the Opposition
- 12. Lodge Built a Broad Coalition of Republicans in Favor of a League Without Any Strict Obligation to Collective Security
 - a. He made repeated references to Washington's Farewell Address even though he was an internationalist of another stripe
- 13. Two Effects of the Clear Difference Between Wilson and Lodge
 - a. It gave a platform to those with latent criticisms of Wilson
 - Secretary of State Robert Lansing and future ambassador William Bullitt
 - 2) Ethnic interest groups
 - 3) Business and labor associations formed anti-League lobbies
 - . **Forced choice**: Wavering internationalists were forced to choose sides
- 14. Final Senate Vote
- 15. Pressure on Wilson to Compromise
 - a. Wilson's refusal to yield
 - p. Final vote on the amended version of the **Treaty of Versailles**
- 16. A Winning Coalition Simply Did Not Exist
- J. STRATEGIC OUTCOMES, 1920-1921: THE TRIUMPH OF DISENGAGEMENT (75-81)
 - Two Remaining Strategic Alternatives: Western Alliance or Disengagement
 - 2. Democrats Instructed to Vote Against the Reservations
 - 3. Crucial Developments of 1920
 - a. Waning support for any new international commitments
 - b. Ascendancy of the noninterventionist position in the Republican party
 - c. Election of a Republican president supportive of disengagement
 - 4. Tribute Paid to the Traditions of Nonentanglement
 - 5. General Decline Support for International Commitments of Any Kind
 - a. Lodge's view: the protracted debate wrought a great change in public

opinion

- 6. Nomination of Warren Harding
 - a. Harding straddled the League issue
- 7. Death of **Theodore Roosevelt**, January 1919
 - The opposite of Harding: progressive and reform-minded at home, expansive and assertive abroad
- 8. Harding Interpreted His Victory as a Mandate Against the League
 - The energy of internationalists like Hughes was directed into economic diplomacy
- 9. Return to Nonentanglement
 - a. Promotion of trade and investment
 - b. The "associational" or "cooperative:" state
 - c. Washington naval treaties
- 10. Result: The United States Was Left with a **Loss of Leverage** to Accomplish Harding's Liberal and Ambitious Goals
 - a. Few carrots or sticks
 - b. Reduction of the standing army
 - c. Reduction of the navy
 - d. "Weakened political and military structure to sustain the nascent liberal order of the 1920s."

11. Popular Support for Nonentanglement

- a. Who Benefited (cui bono):
 - 1) Pacifists/progressives: repudiation of new military commitments
 - 2) Nationalists/conservatives: minimal costs of the new strategy
 - 3) Republican internationalists: role of Wall Street
- b. The window of opportunity closed for any real commitment to peace and stability
- c. Internationalists were thrice outmaneuvered
- Cultural Factors Prevailed
- K. CONCLUSION (81)
 - 1. Three Strategic Options Were Viable
 - a. Preferability of a western alliance
 - b. Considerable room left for cultural factors to influence the final outcome
 - 2. The Critical Factors
 - a. Domestic patterns of agenda setting and coalition building by Wilson
 - b. Cultural assumptions
 - 3. Result: A Return to the Default Position of Disengagement

Review

Americanization Spanish-American War competing war aims League of Nations Article 10 deterrence

Wilson's grand strategy collective security reservationists
Henry Cabot Lodge Monroe Doctrine deterrence
reservationists

William Borah Hiram Johnson reasons for opposing an alliance

deficiency in structural realism how the League might have worked

Woodrow Wilson: forced choice approach to setting the agenda limited liability problem

flaws in Wilson's League opportunity created by external shock

forced choice approach League to Enforce Peace Versailles peace conference

Wilson's concessions
freedom of the seas
Georges Clemenceau
three-way split

David Lloyd George
mandate system
impasse at Versailles
coalition building
Republican inflexibility

disillusionment of Progressives crucial developments of 1920 death of Theodore Roosevelt

loss of leverage popular support for nonentanglement

CHAPTER FOUR: CONCEIVING CONTAINMENT: IDEAS AND ALTERNATIVES IN AMERICAN GRAND STRATEGY, 1945-1951

- A. INTRODUCTION (82-83)
 - Peacetime Commitment to a Strategy of Containment
 - 2. Alternative Options
 - a. Nonentanglement
 - b. Rollback of Communism
 - c. Spheres of Influence
 - 3. Structural Realism Predicts the Expansion of U.S. Strategic Commitments But Its Explanation Is Incomplete
 - a. Containment is global and ideological in nature
 - b. U.S. officials sought American predominance (primacy)
 - c. They took for granted the existence of a transnational ideological conflict
 - 4. The Insight Revealed by Neoclassical Realism
 - a. U.S. strategic behavior after 1945 was determined not only by structural conditions
 - b. A sphere of influence option was viable but it failed to resonate culturally
 - c. Containment better suited American liberal assumptions
- B. AMERICAN STRATEGIC IDEAS, 1945-1951 (83-84)
 - Shock of the Wartime Experience
 - a. The **Pearl Harbor attack** discredited nonentanglement
 - Window of Opportunity for More Expansive Conceptions of America's Role in the World
 - 3. FDR's Goals
 - 4. Direct Conflict with Soviet Goals
 - Four Alternatives
- C. NEOISOLATIONISM (84-85)
 - 1. The Essence of Neoisolationoism
 - 2. Robert Taft and Herbert Hoover: Fortress America
 - 3. Fear That the Tradition of Limited Government Would Be Undermined
 - Left-Wing Democrats: Henry Wallace
 - 5. Classical Liberal Concerns
- D. ROLLBACK (85-86)
 - 1. Military Intervention
 - a. Robert Taft and the Korean War
 - 2. Two Versions of Rollback
 - a. James Burnham
 - b. Preventive Airstrike: Stuart Symington
 - Truman's Limited Rollback Attempt
- E. SPHERES OF INFLUENCE (86-88)
 - 1. Partition of Germany
 - a. U.S. military and diplomatic presence required
 - 2. Geographical Outcome Would Have Been Similar to What Resulted
 - a. The superpowers might have avoided the most costly and risky features of the early Cold War period
 - 3. With Qualifications, a Limited Informal Sphere of Influence Arrangement Existed
 - a. It was confined to Europe

- b. It took a length process to reach it
- c. Détente was not reached until the 1970s
 - Even then, Nixon and Kissinger continued to pursue Wilsonian Goals
- d. Moscow and Washington had incompatible strategic cultures
- 4. Initial Supporters of This Strategy
 - a. George Kennan, Charles Bohlen, Walter Lippmann
 - b. Before 1946, the acceptance of a Soviet sphere of influence in Eastern Europe was virtually unquestioned
 - c. James Byrne
- 5. Key Condition: Soviet Sphere Be Kept Open [The takeover of Czechoslovakia in 1948 was the last straw]
- F. CONTAINMENT (88-93)
 - Drawing Lines of Resistance
 - a. Dramatic expansion of defense expenditures
 - b. Economic and military aid
 - Alliances that involved explicit security guarantees from the United States
 - 2. Implementation of **Containment** Took Years to Complete
 - a. The defining assumptions of containment were established by late 1946
 - 3. Four Distinct Characteristics
 - 4. Influenced by Liberal Assumptions
 - a. Occupied countries Germany, Austria, and Japan were democratized
 - b. Long-term liberal goals
 - c. The end game: "either the breakup or the gradual mellowing of Soviet power" (Kennan)
 - 1) Clifford-Elsey Report, 1946
 - 5. Anti-Communist
 - a. Goal: combat the spread of Communism [a zero-sum game]
 - Kennan's Long Telegram: "inner central core of Communist parties" work together
 - b. Marxist-Leninist ideas taken seriously
 - c. Diplomatic concessions were regarded as pointless
 - 6. Unwillingness to Engage in Serious Diplomacy
 - 7. **Global Nature** of Containment
 - a. Belief that "the economic revival of Western Europe and Japan depended upon access to food, raw materials, and markets located in the developing world."
 - b. Worldwide promotion of a liberal order
 - c. Line of defense around the Soviet bloc
 - 1) French Indochina viewed as a test case
 - 2) China: KMT aided in fight against the CCP
 - 8. Long-Term Goal: Freeing Eastern Europe
 - a. Undermining the coherence of the Soviet bloc
 - 9. A Strategy of Breathtaking Scope
 - a. It was a strategy of preponderance, not balance
 - Yawning gap between aims and military capabilities until 195p.
- G. REALISM AND INTERNATIONAL PRESSURES, 1945-1946 (93-96)
 - 1. Role of International Pressures
 - The Mid-1940s Witnessed a Revolution in the International Distribution of Power
 - a. United States power in 1945: 50% of world's manufacturing; it was the leading air and naval power and had the only atomic weapons
 - b. USSR: "the only other major power with the ability and the desire to threaten America's vital interests."
 - c. U.S. economic aid provided a counterweight
 - d. A neoisolationist strategy was regarded as too risky

- 3. Impossibility of Rollback
 - a. Implausibility of a conventional assault
- 4. Sphere of Influence Approach: A Viable Alternative from a Realist Perspective
- 5. Complicating Factor: Nature of the Soviet Strategic Culture and Stalin's Leadership
 - a. Promotion of a Soviet system
 - b. Sovietization and autarchy
 - c. **Popular front** governments were a sham
 - d. Impossibility of an open sphere of influence
- 6. Alternative: Closed Spheres of Influence
 - a. This would hare resembled Churchill's infamous "percentages agreement" of 1944
- 7. Stalin's Pragmatism
 - a. Probing for weaknesses
 - b. Willingness to trade
- H. DOMESTIC AGENDA SETTING, 1945-1946 (96-100)
 - 1. Cultural Factors Acted as a Crucial Filter
 - a. Classical liberal vision
 - Franklin Delano Roosevelt (FDR) on Yalta
 - b. Four Freedoms: FDR as a true believer
 - 2. Liberal Assumptions
 - "U.S. officials hoped to discourage military and political rivalries between the major powers, bind other countries economically to the United States, and create a more peaceful and prosperous world order." [cf. Walter Russell Mead's Power, Terror, Peace, and War]
 - 3. Reason for the Shift Toward a Strategy of Containment
 - a. No domestic support for a pure sphere of influence approach
 - b. Opposition from U.S. foreign policymakers to abandoning the wartime goal of a liberal international regime
 - 4. Harry Truman
 - a. Demand for free and fair elections in Poland
 - 5. Summary of the Immediate Origins of Containment
 - a. Admiral Leahy and Navy Sec. James Forrestal
 - b. Kennan's **Long Telegram**, February 22, 1946
 - c. Key Assumptions [known as the **Truman Doctrine**]
 - 6. It Was the Only Viable Grand Strategy That Resonated with American Cultural Assumptions
- I. INTERNATIONAL PRESSURES, 1946-1951 (100-08)
 - 1. Challenge: Balancing Containment with Limited Liability
 - Allies Willingly Supported These New Commitments Aid
 - a. Need for a more direct U.S. presence overseas
 - b. Complex and staggered process of transatlantic bargaining
 - c. Series of escalated and unexpected commitments
 - 3. The First Stage, 1946-47
 - a. Worsening economic conditions
 - b. Appeal of communism and neutralism
 - c. Response: the Marshall Plan
 - d. Quid Pro Quo: European governments must liberalize their economies, cooperate, accept the rehabilitation of Germany, and align with the United States in the Cold War
 - 4. Mixed European Response
 - a. Expectations of Marshall aid played a role in the "Western choice" of European governments in 1947-1948
 - b. Disappointed U.S. hopes for a fully integrated and economically liberal **European union**

- 5. Second Stage, 1948
 - a. "Most Western European governments sought military alliance with the United States
 - Precipitating Cause: Czech coup of February 1948 [which was followed in March by the defenestration of Jan Masaryk, the foreign minister and son of the founding president]
- 6. Initial U.S. Reluctance
 - a. "Only such an alliance would give European governments the confidence to resist Soviet pressures while focusing on domestic economic reconstruction."
 - b. Issue of reconciling France and Germany
 - c. North Atlantic Treaty [NATO]
- 7. New French Confidence
 - a. Creation of the Federal Republic of Germany, September 1949
 - b. **European Coal and Steel Community** (ECSC), May 1950
 - New fears of the North Korean attack
- 8. Third Stage: Augmented Conventional Military Force
 - Forward military presence adopted in 1951
- 9. The Situation in 1951
 - a. Continuing reluctance
- 10. Japan
 - a. American officials began to reverse course by 1947
 - b. The CCP takeover on the mainland led to new arrangements for Japan
 - c. Restoration of national sovereignty to Japan
 - Japan was induced to cooperate in isolating China and rearming against the USSR
- 11. Compromise under the terms of the San Francisco treaty, 1951-52
 - a. Japanese resented restrictions on trade with mainland China
 - b. The attempt to "remilitarize" Japan met with opposition in Japan
 - c. The period of occupation was formally ended, the U.S. retained basing rights, but Japan agreed only to maintain a token "police reserve force."
- 12. In Both Germany and Japan, a Defeated Enemy Was Rehabilitated in Order to Stave Off Local Communist Expansion
- 13. Middle East
 - a. Waning British influence led Britain and Middle East states to turn to the United States for aid and support
 - b. Turkey and Iran
 - c. Greece
 - d. **Empire by Invitation** (Geir Lundestad): "The stimulus for a new U.S. commitment came from abroad, not from the United States."
- 14. Upgrading Economic and Military Aid
 - a. Greece and Turkey [Truman Doctrine]
- 15. East Asia: The Most Frustrating Region
 - a. Local allies (China, South Korea, Indochina) were pressured to enact liberal political reforms
 - b. Mid-1949: collapse of the Nationalist army on mainland China
 - c. Indochina: French military setbacks [culminating in the defeat at Dien Bien Phu in 1954]
 - d. South Korea: **Kim II-sung**'s invasion, June 1950
- New Military Commitments
 - a. Indochina: semiautonomous French protectorate under Bao Dai
 - b. Formosa (Taiwan): security guarantee for **Chiang K'ai-shek**
 - c. South Korea: security commitment to Syngman Rhee
- 17. Korean Peninsula
 - a. Blatant military aggression
 - b. Truman saw a need to make a stand

- By the end of 1951, the United States Had Made an Unprecedented Set of Military Commitments in East Asia
 - Demonstration of the feasibility of containment: Viability of the non-communist regimes
 - b. Authoritarian regimes were accepted as a temporary concession
- J. DOMESTIC COALITION BUILDING, 1946-1951 (108-12)
 - 1. Inadequate Defense Spending
 - a. This undermined the credibility of America's diplomatic commitments
 - 2. **Strategic Dilemma**: Perceived superiority of Soviet conventional forces
 - a. Nuclear weapons seen as a means of overcoming this imbalance
 - b. Soviet atomic test, 1949
 - c. Solution: Defense of Europe by bolstering conventional forces
 - 3. Reality of the late 1940s: Large-scale military spending was out of the question
 - a. Truman's policy preferences
 - b. Republican victory, 194e6
 - c. Fiscal retrenchment
 - 4. Strategic Incoherence of Containment Was Part of Its Appeal
 - a. Low levels of military spending in the late 1940s
 - Military and financial implications were developed slowly in response to external shocks
 - c. Gradual increase in costs and commitments
 - 5. Widening Gap Between America's Strategic Commitments and Its Ability to Meet Them
 - a. The gamble
 - 6. Political Constraints on U.S. Defense Spending Lifted with the Korean War
 - a. "The North Korean attack revealed that conventional military forces had not been rendered obsolete by nuclear weapons; it also highlighted NATO's military weakness relative to the USSR."
 - b. Supplemental defense expenditures
 - Effort to close the gap
 - 7. Republican Attacks
 - a. Robert Taft sought to limit the domestic role of government
 - b. Search for a low cost alternative strategy
 - c. Attempt to fuse a strategy of disentanglement with a rollback strategy
 - d. But the policy of limited war in Korea continued

CONCLUSION (112-13)

1. Summary

Review

containment rollback spheres of influence

Pearl Harbor attack neoisolationism Robert Taft

Herbert Hoover James Burnham distinct characteristics
Kennan's Long Telegram popular fronts "percentages agreement"

Franklin Delano Roosevelt Harry Truman Truman Doctrine
Marshall Plan proposed European union Czech coup
North Atlantic Treaty European Coal and Steel Community

empire by invitation

European Coar and Steel Community

European Coar and Steel Community

Bao Dai

Chiang K'ai-shek Syngman Rhee strategic dilemma

CHAPTER FIVE: HEGEMONY ON THE CHEAP: IDEAS AND ALTERNATIVES IN AMERICAN GRAND STRATEGY, 1992-2000

- A. INTRODUCTION (114-15)
 - 1. Collapse of the Soviet Union
 - 2. Few Dramatic Changes in America's Strategic Commitments in the 1990s
 - a. Increased pace of U.S. military intervention
 - 1) Two central claims: U.S. preeminence and special responsibility to promote and uphold a liberal international order
 - 3. Why the Continuity?
 - 4. Clinton National Security Policy of Engagement and Enlargement
- B. ALTERNATIVE POST-COLD WAR STRATEGIC IDEAS (115-16)
 - 1. Four Broad Schools of Thought
- C. STRATEGIC DISENGAGEMENT (116-17)
 - Advocates Desired to Return to Strategic Independence or Hemispheric Defense
 - a. Ralph Nader and Patrick Buchanan
 - 2. Reasons Given by the Advocates
 - a. Absence of a major threat
 - b. Hazards of an overseas presence
 - Implications
 - a. Preference for a small standing military force
 - 1. This Position's Resonance with the General Public
- D. BALANCE OF POWER (117-19)
 - 1. Call to Abandon "Global Meliorism" (Walter McDougall)
 - a. **Henry Kissinger**, James Kurth, Samuel P. Huntington
 - 2. Promotion of a Liberal World Order: Not Seen as a Central U.S. Security Interest
 - 3. Need to Preserve a Functioning Equilibrium
 - 4. "Live and Let Live" Attitude
 - 5. Need to Avoid Strategic Overextension
 - a. But with a vigorous defense of vital U.S. interests
 - 6. Summary
- E. PRIMACY (119-21)
 - 1. "Benevolent Global Hegemony" (William Kristol)
 - a. Neoconservative influence [*The Weekly Standard* launched a "national greatness" movement]
 - 2. Multiple Threats
 - a. Terrorism, WMDs, rogue states, peer competitors
 - b. Lack of strong leadership by the United States
 - c. Problem: Lack of political will
 - d. "The unipolar moment" (Charles Krauthammer)
 - 3. Recommendations
 - a. Containment of China
 - b. Containment of Russia
 - c. Expansion of NATO
 - d. Aggressive counter-proliferation policies
 - e. Regime change
 - 4. Military Intervention in Cases of Aggression or Humanitarian Disaster
 - a. Desire for increased defense spending
 - b. Treaties resisted as restraints on American autonomy
 - 5. How Primacy Advocates Differ from Balance of Power Realists
 - a. More aggressive
 - b. More idealistic
- F. LIBERAL INTERNATIONALISM (121-24)
 - 1. Authors: Graham Allison and Joseph Nye
 - 2. Promotion of Strong Multilateral Institutions

- 3. New Set of Global Issues
 - a. Environmental degradation, population and migration, world poverty, etc.
- 4. Promotion of Cooperation and Coordination
- 5. Humanitarian Intervention
 - a. Ethnic cleansing
 - b. Peacekeeping missions
 - c. **Soft power** (Joseph Nye)
 - d. Call for deep cuts in U.S. defense spending
- 6. Arms Control
 - a. **Transparency** in the production, sale, and deployment of weapons
 - b. "Confidence and security-building measures" (CSBMs)
 - c. Cooperative security
- 7. Promotion of Democracy and Human Rights
 - . Tools: economic sanctions, diplomatic pressure, foreign aid
- 8. Divisions Within This School of Thought
 - a. Supporters of the use of force
 - b. Progressive tradition of **Hiram Johnson** and Henry Wallace
 - c. Hawks vs. doves
- G. REALISM AND INTERNATIONAL CONDITIONS (124-27)
 - 1. The End of the Cold War Was a Revolutionary Change
 - 2. Realists Offered Predictions Concerning Systemic Outcomes
 - a. **John Mearsheimer**: Multipolar evolution
 - 3. Kenneth Waltz
 - Germany and Japan will assert their strategic independence from the United States
 - 4. Neoclassical Realist Approach
 - a. Critique of Waltz and Mearsheimer
 - b. Balance of power theory is a hindrance to understanding the current order
 - c. America's lead in precision weaponry over any potential rival
 - d. The United States created the international institutions that shape political and economic affairs in the world today [cf. Walter Mead]
 - 5. **Predictions**
 - a. Absence of vigorous balancing against the United States
 - b. No disengagement from America's international role
 - 6. United States Is Powerful Enough to Define Its Interests and Security Broadly
 - a. Hegemonic powers prefer to weaken their rivals
 - 7. The Puzzle for Realists
 - a. Why was a liberal grand strategy adopted?
- H. LIBERALISM, LIMITED LIABILITY, AND AMERICAN GRAND STRATEGY UNDER CLINTON (127-28)
 - 1. Opportunity for Sweeping Changes
 - a. Americans experienced no adverse effects from the end of the Cold War
 - 1) Premises of liberal internationalism and primacy were reinforced
- I. LIBERAL INTERNATIONALISM UNDER CLINTON (128-37)
 - 1. Pressures to Reduce Global Strategic Commitments
 - a. [Expectations of a "peace dividend" promoted by Democrats, 1992]
 - 2. New Optimism
 - 3. Clinton's Lack of Foreign Policy Interests
 - a. Byzantine structure of the national security bureaucracy
 - 4. Clinton's Initial National Security Team
 - a. Their conflicted motives
 - 5. Five **Shared Assumptions**, Despite the Differences within the Administration
 - a. Post-Cold War world would be dominated by non-traditional threats
 - b. Action through multilateral institutions
 - 1) Burden-sharing

- 2) Multilateral economic arrangements
- c. Humanitarian interventions
 - 1) Assertive multilateralism
- d. **Geoeconomics** to reverse U.S. economic decline
- e. Liberal world order
 - 1) Undemocratic regimes seen as a standing threat
- 6. These **Assumptions** Are Consistent with a **Strategy of Primacy**
 - a. United States as the **indispensable nation**
 - 1) Hegemonic stability
 - b. Forward defense in Europe and Asia
 - c. Maintain military superiority
- 7. Two Other Assumptions
 - a. Threats are interdependent but peace is indivisible
 - 1) Updated version of the Cold War "domino theory"
 - b. Imperative of American leadership
- 8. Combination of Liberal Internationalism and Primacy
- 9. Clinton's Twin Motivation: Conviction and Anticipation of Political Reward
 - Clinton hit the Bush record on Bosnia
- 10. Legacy of Internationalism and Primacy Shaped His Thinking
 - a. Tactical disagreements between two internationalist candidates, 1992
 - 1) Pat Buchanan as an alternative [Ross Perot is ignored]
- 11. Strategy of "Engagement and Enlargement"
 - a. Public support for an active foreign policy
- 12. Implications Overseas
 - a. Pragmatism wrapped in idealistic rhetoric
 - b. Internationalist as well as assumptions
- 13. United States Maintained a Large Military Presence in Core, Democratic Regions
 - a. Goal of "strategic reassurance"
- 14. **Commonwealth of Independent States** (CIS): Pressure for Democratic, Market Reforms
 - a. Effort to turn Russia into a strategic partner
- 15. Two Initiatives in Eastern Europe
 - a. **NATO Expansion**
 - b. Intervention Against Yugoslavia
- 16. China
 - a. Conflicted view
 - a. Strategy of engagement
- 17. Recurrent Patterns of Humanitarian Intervention
 - a. Inaction in Rwanda
 - b. Haiti: Intervention to restore a democratically-elected president
 - Somalia: attempt to rebuild a failed state
- 18. Extraordinary New Strategic and Diplomatic Commitments
 - a. Goals for Bosnia in the wake of the Dayton Accord
- J. LIMITED LIABILITY UNDER CLINTON (137-45)
 - 1. "Intense Reluctance to Back Up This Internationalist Agenda by Force"
 - a. Series of half-hearted interventions
 - 2. Somalia
 - a. Intention of maintaining the flow of food supplies
 - b. UN resolution designating Somalia as a failed state
 - c. Unfavorable conditions for nation-building
 - d. Aideed manhunt and the Mogadishu firefight
 - 3. Haiti
 - 4. Bosnia
 - a. Dithering for two years
 - b. Strategy of "lift and strike"
 - c. Reliance on airpower and mercenaries

- 5. Kosovo
 - a. Quicker response
 - b. Reliance on airstrikes
 - c. Slobodan Milošević sues for peace
- 6. Al Qaeda: Cruise Missile Strikes in Afghanistan and Sudan
- 7. Iraq: Campaign of Precision Airstrikes
- 8. Reliance on Allies in Sierra Leone and East Timor
- 9. New American Way of War
 - a. Air power arms sales, and aid
 - b. Reliance on proxy forces on the ground
- 10. Why the High Sensitivity to the Costs and Risks of Serious Military Action?
 - a. Realist View: The geopolitical stakes were unusually low in these cases
 - b. Realists would have argued against intervention
 - c. Resultant undermining of U.S. credibility
- 11. Domestic Cultural Constraints Better Explain the Sensitivity
 - a. Public sensitivity to military casualties: often overstated
 - 1) Deference to the president and elite opinion
 - Variable factors: likelihood of success, coherence of goal, vital national interest
 - 3) Unfavorable attitudes to incoherent missions
 - b. Congressional risk-aversion
 - 1) Republican skepticism
 - 2) Unilateralist Republican freshman class of 1994
 - c. Reaction of career military: resistance to the use of force
 - 1) Powell Doctrine
 - 2) Twofold problem: loss of bargaining power and rise of a "zero-tolerance" culture
- 12. Clinton Set the Tone
 - a. His refusal to act consistently on strategic matters
 - b. His unwillingness to court the opposition
- 13. Consequence: Reinforced the View Overseas That the United States Could Be Successfully Coerced
 - a. "Strategy for How to Defeat the United States"
 - 1) Mohammed Aideed
 - 2) Osama bin Laden
 - 3) Saddam Hussein and Slobodan Milošević
- 14. Military and International Expenditures
 - a. "Bottom Up Review," 1993
 - b. Existing force structure retained; size reduced
 - c. Accelerated pace of smaller-scale operations overstrained the forces
 - d. Low levels of spending on international affairs
- 15. Events Repeatedly Forced the Administration's Hand
- K. CONCLUSION (145-46)
 - 1. Summary

Review

four schools of thought
Walter McDougall
Charles Krauthammer
ethnic cleansing
Hiram Johnson
Kenneth Waltz
humanitarian interventions
Ralph Nader
Henry Kissinger
Graham Allison
soft power
hawks vs. doves
neoclassical predictions

assumptions of a primacy strategy
Commonwealth of Independent States

Patrick Buchanan William Kristol Joseph Nye transparency John Mearsheimer shared assumptions hegemonic stability strategic reassurance

NATO expansion

Somalia failed state Bosnia Kosovo Slobodan Milošević Al Qaeda

Powell Doctrine loss of bargaining power "zero tolerance" culture

Mohammed Aideed Osama bin Laden Bill Clinton

CONCLUSION: THE AMERICAN STRATEGIC DILEMMA

- A. AMERICAN GRAND STRATEGY UNDER THE GEORGE W. BUSH ADMINISTRATION (147-48)
 - 1. Initial Shift toward Strategic Realism
 - 2. Shift to a Strategy of Primacy after 9/11
 - a. New agenda
 - b. Initial unwillingness to pay the prince necessary to secure a stable postwar Iraq
 - 3. Decision for War Against Saddam Hussein
 - a. Familiar pattern of strategic adjustment
 - b. Aggressive democracy-promotion consistent with the Wilsonian tradition
- B. REALISM, LIMITED LIABILITY, AND STRATEGIC ADJUSTMENT, 2001 (148-52)
 - 1. New Republican Foreign Policy
 - 2. Continuities with Clinton
 - Differences
 - a. Increase in military spending
 - b. Criticism of open-ended deployments
 - c. Skepticism about nation-building
 - 4. Hard-line Approach to Potential Adversaries
 - 5. Foreign Policy Appointments
 - 6. William Kristol's "Project for a New American Century" [Neoconservative]
 - 7. Initial Opposition to Coalition-Building and Humanitarian Intervention
 - a. Emphasis on great power politics
 - b. Opposition to "rogue-state rollback"
 - c. Richard Haass: "return to professionalism"
 - 8. Primacists Were Restrained
 - a. Skepticism of Colin Powell, Condoleezza Rice, and Richard Haass
 - p. Richard Cheney and Donald Rumsfeld took hard-line stands
- C. TERRORISM, PRIMACY, AND STRATEGIC ADJUSTMENT, 2001-2003 (152-62)
 - 1. Administration Gravitated Toward a **Strategy of Primacy** After 9/11
 - a. Continuity: hard line toward adversaries, relevance of military power, skepticism regarding multilateral institutions
 - b. Discontinuity
 - 1) New emphasis on U.S. preponderance
 - 2) Promotion of democracy
 - 3) Muscular Wilsonianism
 - The Particular Strategic Adjustments Could Not Have Been Predicted on the Basis of Structural or International Pressures
 - a. Options: Tough but restrained response, multilateral approach, military withdrawal from the Middle East
 - 3. Neoclassical Realist Model of Strategic Adjustment
 - a. Search for a new strategy
 - b. Expected response: Retaliation against Afghanistan
 - Key foreign policy advocates used the window of opportunity to reset the agenda
 - 4. First Phase of the War on Terror

- a. More aggressive counterterrorist approach
- b. Broad public and congressional backing
- c. Reliance on proxy forces
- d. Consequences of the failure to send in U.S. ground forces earlier
- e. Consequences of the continued resistance to nation-building
- f. "Nevertheless, the war in Afghanistan was widely viewed as a major success
- 5. Options for Reshaping National Security Policy
- 6. Declaration of an All-Encompassing War on Terror
 - a. It helped build public support
 - b. It reflected a genuine shift in mentality
 - 1) The president had been shocked by the 9/11 attacks
 - c. Donald Rumsfeld: Opportunity "to refashion the world"
- 7. Strategy of Containing Saddam Hussein
 - a. Lack of interest in regime change before 9/11
- 8. Subsequent **Arguments for Regime Change** Following the Afghan War
 - a. WMDs
 - b. Provision of WMDs to terrorists
 - c. The neoconservative idea that democratization of Iraq could trigger regional changes
 - e. Undesirability of maintaining an extensive military presence in Saudi Arabia
- 9. Preparation for the War in Iraq
 - a. Powell pursued a disarmament approach
 - b. U.N. approved Res. 1441, September 202
 - c. Senate authorized the use of force, October 2002
 - d. Threat of a French veto
 - e. Final ultimatum, March 17, 2003
- 10. Justification of the War
 - a. It was seen as part of a broader, global struggle
 - b. "Axis of evil"
 - 1) **Preemption** policy
 - c. Crusade against rogue states
- 11. National Security Strategy
 - a. "Promote a balance of power that favors freedom"
 - b. Great power competition played down
- 12. The Strategy Painted a Stark Picture of Grave Threats
 - a. Terrorism
 - b. Nuclear proliferation
 - c. Willingness to act preemptively
- 13. Preventive Military Action Was Made the Centerpiece of U.S. Grand Strategy
 - a. Impossibility of containment
 - b. New willingness to incur serious risks
 - c. Dramatic rise in defense spending
- d. Expanded U.S. presence in the Muslim world

 14. New Strategy Aggressively Affirmed **U.S. Predominance**
- 15. Intense Public Controversy
 - a. Widespread agreement for the War in Afghanistan
 - b. Widespread and passionate debate over Iraq
- 16. Criticisms
 - a. Risk of "imperial overstretch"
 - b. Danger of failing to make good on promises
- 17. The Precedent in Afghanistan Was Not Encouraging
 - a. Installation of a weak new government
 - b. Obligation to prepare for major reconstruction efforts
- 18. Deadly Consequences of the Failure to Plan for Postwar Reconstruction

- a. Creation of a power vacuum [cf. recent increase in opium production]
- b. Steep learning curve
- c. Signs of premature disengagement
- 19. Nation-Building on the Cheap Is Ineffective
 - . Whether the delay in Iraq reconstruction has been a fatal mistake
- 20. Summary
- D. CONCLUSION
 - Initial Realism
 - 2. Subsequent Strategy of Primacy
 - 3. **Neoconservatives**' Influence
 - a. Independent influence of ideas
 - b. Doctrine of democratic enlargement
- E. CASE SUMMARIES AND THEORETICAL FINDINGS
 - 1. Similar Features of the Cases of Strategic Adjustment

[Other plausible candidates for study would have included the Johnson, the Nixon, and especially the Reagan adjustments]

- a. 1918-1921
- b. Post-1945
- c. 1990s
- d. Post-9/11
- 2. Main Theoretical Findings
 - a. Inadequacy of structural realism as an explanatory model
 - b. Powerful impact of cultural and ideational legacies
 - c. Structural realism still provides a compelling long-term explanation
- 3. **Neoclassical Realist** model is more complete and convincing
 - a. International material pressures
 - b. Strategic culture as a **permissive cause** or filter
 - c. Concession to constructivism
 - d. Classical realists understood culture
- 4. Effect of Domestic Political Competition
- 5. Critical Importance of Presidential Leadership
- 6. Pervasiveness of Four Factors
 - a. International pressures, strategic culture, domestic politics, and presidential leadership
- 7. Other Questions
 - a. Question of the model's applicability to other countries
 - b. Possibility that shifting economic interests may favor one strategic culture over others
 - c. Positive effects of certain cultural legacies upon U.S. grand strategy
- F. THE FUTURE OF U.S. GRAND STRATEGY (169-71)
 - 1. Predictions
 - a. Unlikelihood a more modest, pure balance-of-power strategy
 - b. More probable out come: disengagement
 - 1) The result would be disastrous
 - c. This scenario is unlikely in the foreseeable future
 - 2. Continued Oscillation Between Various Forms of Globalism
 - 3. Preference for Limited Liability
 - a. It is often a worthwhile restraint
 - b. An excessive emphasis on limited liability is unsuited to the world's leading champion of freedom
 - c. Realism has the most to offer as a prescription

Review

Richard Haass Condoleezza Rice strategy of primacy "axis of evil" U.S. predominance affirmed neoconservatives main theoretical findings four factors return to professionalism Richard Cheney War on Terror National Security Strategy criticisms

doctrine of democratic enlargement neoclassical realist model class

predictions

Colin Powell
Donald Rumsfeld
arguments for regime change
preventive military action
"imperial overstretch"

classical realism