An Economic Analysis on Overbilling Incentives and Auditing Programs

Author(s)

Chris Kuo, Liberty UniversityFollow

Publication Date

5-2014

Document Type

Article

Disciplines

Accounting | Business | Finance and Financial Management

Comments

This article was published in the Journal of Business Ethics in May 2014. The final publication is available at link.springer.com.

http://www.springer.com/open+access/authors+rights?SGWID=0-176704-12-683201-0

Abstract

An institutional auditing program typically consists of the following steps: a sample audit, the decision to move to the full audit, a settlement offer, and the full audit. Statistical sampling techniques are often used to estimate the overbilling percentage and amount. This paper discusses the optimal settlement offer, the net recovery through auditing, the condition for the auditors to move to the full audit, and how an auditing program can be truly cost-effective. This paper provides an evaluation for the statistical sampling techniques to an auditing program. The economic incentives of a contractor to overbill are also identified. Finally, it presents the key metrics and the managerial implications for auditing managers to design or enhance their auditing programs.

Recommended Citation

Kuo, C. An Economic Analysis on Overbilling Incentives and Auditing Programs. Journal of Business Ethics, 121:3 (May 2014), 441-449.